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Abstract: 
I propose pragmatist philosophy as a companion for ecological economics, a research 
tradition with a focus on addressing sustainability issues and integrating ecological principles, 
economics, and the broader social sciences. Ecological economics laudable goals include 
balancing competing values, tradeoffs, and insights for more equitable decision-making. 
However, the field is built upon somewhat tenuous philosophical and theoretical foundations, 
which has resulted in a muddled body of literature, concerns about relativistic science, and 
questions about the future viability of the field. To address such concerns, I propose and 
articulate pragmatist ecological economics. Generally, joining pragmatism and ecological 
economics provides established beliefs about: the nature of reality with a contextual ontology; 
the way we learn via Dewey’s experience model; the way to assess knowledge based upon 
deliberative democracy and ‘wary assessment’ and; a clear purpose to communicate, understand, 
and facilitate social learning about the human-nature relationship. Specific recommendations 
include a core subject matter (a comprehensive understanding of human-nature relationships), 
integration of normative sustainability, and a focus on better processes and methods that 
synthesize across big ideas (e.g., relationship to place research, ecosystem services). I stress that 
all approaches to understanding the human-nature relationship provide different, partial 
understandings. Consequently, I demonstrate a ‘research menu’ framework by weighing into a 
methodological debate between Q- and R-methodology. Finally, I propose that a social-
ecological systems perspective and a pragmatist ecological economics are compatible, as the 
former can help the latter better achieve its applied goals by orienting the understanding of the 
human-nature relationships within the larger system.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The conservation sciences or, in the case of this dissertation, the slightly more specific 
conservation social sciences, are unique. First, the broad field includes researchers from a variety 
of areas of academic study and, as a result, there is no single unified disciplinary foundation. For 
instance, research taking place within the W. A. Franke College of Forestry and Conservation 
(FCFC) at the University of Montana ranges widely, from studies of predator-prey dynamics, to 
“optimal” forest rotation strategies, to the meaning of wilderness solitude and unconfined 
recreation, and the nuances of the Public Trust Doctrine. While each of these study areas may 
take place within a slightly more specific department, such as the Department of Society and 
Conservation at the FCFC, a prerequisite disciplinary foundation is still lacking. For example, 
unlike research taking place in an economics department, where research methods and basic 
underlying theory and scientific beliefs are established, generally accepted, and conveyed to 
students in a like manner, such topics in the conservation sciences are often taught with broad 
brush strokes (e.g., qualitative research methods, quantitative research methods, general research 
paradigms).  
Second, while the approach to research in the conservation sciences is diverse and 
without unification, the general purpose for research is agreed upon, in a very general sense. That 
is, conservation science is meant to create robust knowledge for, perhaps, conservation 
outcomes, sustainability, or better natural resource management, planning, and stewardship (the 
meaning or avenue to such outcomes is an open question and depends on one’s perspective).  It 
is arguable as to whether ‘basic’ science, or science for the sake of knowledge creation, can be 
clearly distinguished from ‘applied’ science, or science for some purpose, within the context of 
the conservation sciences.  
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A consequence of these two, somewhat unique, facets of the conservation sciences is that 
few scientific beliefs and practices are implied, other than a commitment to science, knowledge, 
and perhaps understanding. Thus, a situation is created where each individual researcher needs to 
articulate such beliefs and practices from foundational philosophy to on-the-ground practice and 
application. In pursuit of a Doctor of Philosophy, this dissertation aims for such an articulation. 
In order to set up this articulation, this introduction includes a discussion of a motivation and 
general context, the specific research problem, general approach and conclusions, an overview of 
relevant research that I have engaged in (which will serve as an example for discussions herein), 
and an outline of the dissertation layout. 
 
1.1. Motivation: Complex environmental problems and holistic approaches 
A significant amount of effort in the conservation sciences is focused on addressing 
‘complex social-ecological problems’. This particular term appears to be the most prevalent in 
the literature, and it captures ideas such as ‘wicked problems’ (Rittel & Webber, 1973). Wicked 
problems are characterized by scientific uncertainty and the inability to fully understand all the 
relevant information, multiple formulations of both problems and solutions predicated upon deep 
differences in values (thus resisting clear and agreed upon solutions), and interrelated social and 
ecological systems whereby implemented solutions have irreversible effects that span multiple 
spatial and temporal scales (Allen & Gould, 1986; Balint et al., 2011; Davies et al., 2015; 
Norton, 2012; Rittel & Webber, 1973; Xiang, 2013). Examples of complex social-ecological 
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problems include major challenges facing humankind such as global climate and land-use 
change, and widespread environmental degradation accelerated in the age of Anthropocene1.  
The complex environmental problem motivating this dissertation is planning and 
management of natural resources at a regional level, with a specific focus on decision-making 
related to administration of multiple-use public land. This task is considered to be complex, in 
part, because it is an ongoing iterative process without a ‘stopping rule’ that signals completion. 
An understanding of success of management and planning approaches is based not on clear 
objective criteria but on the elusive consensus of diverse stakeholders (Allen & Gould, 1986; 
Balint et al., 2011; Lachapelle et al., 2003). The Forest Planning Rule of 2012 is the guiding 
document for developing plans for USFS administered land, and the inherent complexity of the 
task is reflected in the explicit requirement that natural resource stewardship on public forests 
“contributes to ecological, social, and economic sustainability…and the sustainable use of public 
lands to support vibrant communities” (U.S. Department of Agriculture Forest Service, 
2012:21173). Considering both diverse aspects of sustainability and of nearby communities 
highlights a temporal scale reaching some distance into the future and a spatial scale extending 
beyond the administrative boundaries of public land to a larger social-ecological system (SES). 
Administering multiple-use public land for current and future generations, within the context of 
the forest and its onsite users as well as surrounding communities, reinforces the complexity of 
the task. That is, multiple formulations related to the ‘right way’ to plan and manage natural 
                                                 
1 The ‘Anthropocene’ is a term increasingly used within the scientific community, which refers to the time period 
roughly marked by the start of the industrial revolution. Within this relatively short period (when compared to 
geological timelines), the activities of humankind have essentially influenced every natural system on earth. That is, 
there is nothing that is free from human influence and, as a result, ecological “degradation” has increased 
dramatically. Perhaps the most obvious form of ecological degradation is the loss of biological diversity associated 
with a rapid species extinction relative to other epochs.  
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resources are likely to exist and, given the nature of the resource (i.e., publicly owned), there 
should be no single privileged perspective.  
To address complex social-ecological problems, where solutions can be thought of as 
indeterminate (not singly defined) (Xiang, 2013), ‘holistic’ approaches are commonly suggested. 
Examples of contexts where holistic approaches are recommended include landscape and urban 
planning (Xiang, 2013), social-ecological vulnerability assessment (Adger, 2006; Armatas et al., 
2017a; Schröter et al., 2005), ecosystem service valuation and assessment (Armatas et al., 2018; 
Deal et al., 2017), adaptive governance (Chaffin et al., 2014), and water governance (Pahl-Wostl, 
2015). While the meaning of ‘holistic’ is fairly specific and thoroughly discussed and debated in 
the philosophy of science literature2, its meaning within the conservation sciences appears to be 
more general and, in many cases, synonymous with ‘integrated’. For example, according to 
Caracelli and Greene (1997), within the context of mixed-methods research, a holistic approach 
involves the integration of methods throughout a study with the goal of presenting a single 
integrated explanation of results. Hardy and Patterson (2012) use ‘holistic’ and ‘integrated’ 
interchangeably in describing the approach to research and knowledge production within 
complex systems science and indigenous approaches to understanding. In the conservation 
sciences literature, ‘holistic’ is sometimes used to describe the research process (methodological 
approach), while other times it qualifies a type of understanding or decision-making style. For 
instance, Xiang (2013:2, emphasis original) suggested that complex problems require “a holistic 
                                                 
2 According to Zahle and Collin (2014:1-2), the “individualism-holism” debate is centered around two issues: (1) the 
nature of social phenomena and, “as part of this, their relationship to individuals” and; (2) the extent to which 
“social scientific explanations [should] focus on individuals and social phenomena respectively.” According to 
Greene and Caracelli (2003) this long-running debate, or ‘historical dualism’, is considered by many to be 
incommensurable and, as a result, unlikely to be reconciled. Fundamentally, questions such as when integration or 
holism has occurred, or what is needed to be integrated and, hence, holistic are likely unanswerable, as these 
questions require consensus on who decides, as well as how they decide.    
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and process oriented approach that is by nature adaptive, participatory, and transdisciplinary.” 
As a systems scientist,  Pahl-Wostl (2015:viii, emphasis added) noted that she tries to “integrate 
different perspectives to achieve a holistic understanding of governance systems and their 
dynamics. In adopting such a broad understanding, seemingly incompatible theories may start to 
look complementary rather than contradictory.” Chaffin et al. (2014:9) explained that adaptive 
governance is “born from the social will to manage SESs holistically for either increased 
resistance to undesirable change or the ability to transform a system to a more desirable state.”  
There are several research traditions that focus on addressing complex social-ecological 
problems with holistic approaches, including (but not limited to) ecological economics, human 
ecology, sustainability science, conservation psychology, and conservation biology. This 
dissertation is focused on ecological economics (EE) and its potential role in addressing complex 
social-ecological problems with holistic approaches; however, the other fields are mentioned 
because they share a common goal and common challenges. These commonalities (listed below), 
and the fact that each field exists, imply that addressing complex social-ecological problems is a 
team effort where each field can offer something different in the quest for a holistic approach and 
a holistic understanding of the problem. The broad, interrelated commonalities are: 
1. Addressing the challenge of transdisciplinary research (Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1993; 
Howarth, 2008; Lélé & Norgaard, 2005; Thompson Klein, 2004), defined broadly 
herein as scientific inquiry that includes not only experts and the formally trained, but 
also policy-makers, practitioners and the general public.  
2. Grappling with the difficulty of interdisciplinary research, where calls for 
methodological pluralism (e.g., Armatas et al., 2018; Florin & Mathieu, 2015; Miller 
et al., 2008; Minteer, 2012) introduce well-documented challenges, including 
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overcoming disciplinary hierarchies and power dynamics, disparate (or poorly 
defined) ontological and epistemological assumptions across disciplines, and the 
difficulty of co-producing knowledge in the shadow of the dominant paradigm of 
descriptive-analytical knowledge production (Gardner, 2013; Talwar et al., 2011; 
Wiek et al., 2012). 
3. The broad belief that complex social-ecological problems require consideration of 
natural and social systems as interrelated units (i.e. SESs). Frameworks for 
understanding SESs acknowledge the complexity of most environmental problems 
and the inadequacy of a single discipline for providing solutions, the interrelation 
between natural and social systems, and the evolution of such interrelated systems 
across time and space (Adger, 2006; Ostrom, 2009; van Riper, 2014). Such systems 
may be considered to be ‘open’, which suggests some level of influence between the 
specific system of interest and outside systems. According to Norton (2012), complex 
social-ecological problems are situated within open systems and, as a result, there is a 
need for contextual analysis and acceptance that all models are supplemental. 
4. A ‘problem-oriented’ motivation for scientific inquiry which, according to Pahl-
Wostl (2015:viii), “supports integration and openness” in the form of interdisciplinary 
thinking. At the same time, it has been suggested that the “emphasis on problem 
solving in the context of application to socially identified priorities tends to erode the 
independence of academic researchers and, consequently, weakens their defense 
against external influences. As a result, scientific agenda tends to grow from political 
developments rather than from scientific findings.” (Shi, 2004:25)  
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These broad commonalities, particularly as they relate to complex environmental problems and 
holistic approaches, serve as the context and motivation for this dissertation, but they do not 
constitute the specific focus of this dissertation. The specific focus is on the philosophy and 
theory underlying holistic approaches to address complex environmental problems. As discussed 
next, this area of the conservation sciences is in need of attention. While the discussion herein 
centers around ecological economics, the discussions below likely apply to other research 
traditions (e.g., conservation biology) facing similar challenges.   
 
1.2. Research problem: A lack of scientific identity  
Ecological economics (EE), a transdisciplinary and interdisciplinary field broadly 
focused on issues of sustainability, has ambitious goals with a commitment to engage in 
problem-oriented science that directly addresses on-the-ground issues. According to Howarth 
(2008:469), EE should strive to understand the “interplay between economic and ecological 
systems with the goal of informing decisions that balance competing values and the insights 
offered by a variety of intellectual traditions.” Erickson (2015:ix) suggested that EE should 
“ground the study and application of economics within the biophysical realities of a finite world 
and the moral obligations of a just society.” The meaning of justice or equity within the context 
of EE appears to mainly refer to both distributional justice (i.e., equity and fairness in the 
distribution of, and access to, natural resources) and procedural equity (i.e., equity and fairness 
related to participation in the decision-making process) (Marques et al., 2015; Siciliano & Urban, 
2017).  
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Despite the promise and appeal of EE, the field has developed in a way that has led to 
ambiguity, both in terms of its subject matter and its methodology. With regard to the former, 
Røpke (2005:274) noted that “it is a difficult, if not impossible task to identify the main topics 
and research programmes of ecological economics…the field could be said to cover almost 
anything with a faint relation to the environment.” Spash (2015:32) asserted that the body of 
literature in EE is “amorphous.” Regarding methodology, it has been argued that there is 
relatively little focus on the philosophical and theoretical foundations of EE, which impedes 
progress in the field and calls into question the scientific integrity of research conducted within 
its purview (Baumgärtner et al., 2008; Puller & Smith, 2017; Spash, 2013). Anderson and 
M'Gonigle (2012) questioned the future of EE given, in part, its incoherence. That is, a lack of 
clarity about the field’s foundations have led to “a situation of ambivalences and contradictions” 
(Puller & Smith, 2017:19) and a “precarious and epistemologically confused position” (Spash, 
2012:37).  
The general sentiment of these critiques is that progress and coherence of EE, and 
ultimately its relevance, depends on more scholarship related to its scientific foundations. Such 
discussions can both lead to a stronger disciplinary identity, and criteria for sorting good science 
from bad science. In other words, a graduate student interested in applying an ecological 
economic approach to a problem such as national forest planning in the United States should, for 
example, have foundational philosophical and theoretical frameworks to choose from which are 
clear and useful for guiding research. While foundational philosophical commitments (often 
labeled axiomatic research paradigms) are not necessarily discipline specific (and thus a student 
could choose any foundation), a characteristic of a well-formed and cohesive discipline is one 
which has examples of non-discipline specific paradigms paired with discipline-specific stances 
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in a way that yields a cohesive general methodology. For example, consider the hermeneutic 
approach to understanding the experiences of tourists and outdoor recreationists (Patterson & 
Williams, 2002), the phenomenological approach to understanding how health practitioners 
assess patients with emotional problems or mental disorders (Davidsen, 2013), or the application 
of positivism to study economics and law (Hovenkamp, 1990; Katz, 1996). At this stage within 
EE, options for adopting such frameworks are very limited (see, for example, those advocating 
critical realism for perhaps the most comprehensive example (Puller & Smith, 2017; Spash, 
2015)).  
Related to this issue, the relatively limited amount of literature on the scientific 
foundations of EE is itself in need of organization and greater clarity. In other words, the 
literature related to the philosophy and theory underpinning EE does not, in general, build upon 
itself in a productive manner. For instance, several paradigms have been suggested, including 
critical realism (Puller & Smith, 2017; Spash, 2015), some form of social constructivism 
(Baumgärtner et al., 2008; Goeminne, 2011; Tacconi, 1998), and the phenomenological (or 
interpretivist) approach (Ramos-Martin, 2003). But, how these different approaches relate to one 
another is generally unclear; despite these paradigms often being placed beside one another in 
research-paradigm typologies. Other philosophical perspectives, which fit oddly within the 
context of more traditional scientific paradigms, such as American pragmatism in the form 
articulated by Bromley (2008) and post-normal science (Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1993; Munda, 
1997) have also been recommended for EE, and their position on the landscape is perhaps less 
clear.  
It is worth emphasizing that I am not suggesting that philosophy of science discussions in 
EE should amount to a “theirs is wrong and ours is right” type discussion; instead, consistent 
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with peer-reviewed scholarship in general, there is a need for more charitable critical assessment 
and productive dialogue. This is not to say that critical assessment is non-existent. For instance, 
Spash (2015) is critical of particular attempts to establish a paradigm for EE. Referencing 
Baumgärtner et al. (2008), who argue generally for a social constructivist position, Spash 
(2015:33) stated: “their discussion still claims an epistemological plurality to support plurality in 
the use of methods. Besides being unnecessary, there is a problem in proposing multiple 
epistemologies without any synthesis. This is the simple impossibility of simultaneously holding 
two (or more?) contradictory ways of understanding the meaning of knowledge.” As another 
example, Puller and Smith (2017:19) are critical of the pluralist approach of Söderbaum (2008), 
when they stated: “his presentation of neoclassical economics as one narrative amongst many is a 
constructivist interpretation that does not respect the essence of positivism.” 
However, these criticisms, the root of which are directed at the idea of methodological 
pluralism, are difficult to interpret. While unstructured pluralism (a relativistic ‘anything goes’ 
approach) is clearly disavowed, there is a lack of clarity about what form of methodological 
pluralism is appropriate. For instance, Spash (2012:40-41, 45, emphasis added) is a critic of 
unstructured methodological pluralism (i.e., relativism) and makes an explicit case against it, but 
in the same paper he is clear that “all pluralism” should not be discarded; he suggested a 
‘methodological position’ of EE as “structured methodological pluralism [which] requires 
working across fields of knowledge with those who share a common ontology and 
epistemology.” How is this call for structured methodological pluralism with common ontologies 
and epistemologies to be interpreted exactly? In this context, ‘structured’ methodological 
pluralism refers mainly to the work of Dow (2004), who essentially suggests a middle ground 
between a singular approach and relativism; but there is still a lack of clarity regarding what this 
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middle ground is, and how different paradigmatic assumptions should (or should not) be 
reconciled. While Dow (2004) does introduce and discuss Thomas Kuhn’s idea of a paradigm 
shift (along with his view on paradigm commensurability), this view is only one ‘worldview’ 
among many (a point discussed further below).   
In sum, there are two issues regarding discussions of the scientific foundations of EE. 
The first issue is the limited scholarship on the philosophical underpinnings of EE which can 
yield insight for applying EE in practice. This is the primary issue addressed by this dissertation. 
The second issue is that discussions regarding the philosophical underpinnings in EE are lacking 
a common framework for building a productive dialogue. That is, these discussions in EE do not 
have a way to clearly position one’s stance within the context of philosophy of science 
discussions. In other words, embracing a particular paradigm and some form of methodological 
pluralism may become more understandable, and thus promote productive dialogue, with a 
framework that moves beyond the research paradigm to lower-level research in practice, and 
higher-level scientific worldview. This second issue is addressed in Section 2 below, and it 
provides a framework for the discussion that follows throughout the dissertation.   
 
1.3. Major conclusions: Pragmatist philosophy, and a focus on human-nature 
relationships and social-ecological systems 
To address the gap in the literature with regard to scientific foundations for EE, a 
pragmatist philosophy is adopted and discussed. There are several connections between 
pragmatism and EE, which suggest the general appropriateness of the former underpinning the 
latter. Directly, several have noted the potential compatibility of pragmatism and EE (e.g., 
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Bromley, 2008; Nahser, 2014; Norton, 2005, 2011b). Several indirect connections can also be 
found. For example, institutional economics generally claims pragmatism as its philosophical 
basis (Stikkers, 2015; Webb, 2007). Institutional economics focuses on how social institutions 
(e.g., cultural norms) and social relations are linked to economic behavior (Hodgson, 2001), and 
practitioners adopting this economic perspective were early contributors to ecological 
economics. Furthermore, institutional economists had long been grappling with ideas about 
methodological pluralism, systems thinking, and equity and distribution (Røpke, 2005). Hodgson 
(1997) does not explicitly reference EE, but a discussion relating (mostly institutional) 
economics with addressing complex environmental problems sounds much like a pragmatist 
inspired EE (as defined in this dissertation).  
Another indirect connection between EE and pragmatism is through Aldo Leopold. There 
is the connection between Leopold and pragmatism, as evidenced by the debate between two 
well-known environmental philosophers about whether Leopold was a pragmatist (Callicott et 
al., 2009, 2011; Norton, 1996a, 2011a). Leopold then, if one reads him through a pragmatist lens, 
can link pragmatism and EE. First, Leopold lobbied for the hiring of a professor in ‘ecological 
economics’ at the University of Wisconsin in 1947. Also, Leopold was among the most 
prominent to articulate ideas fundamental to contemporary ecological economics, such as better 
aligning economic activity with ecological principles and embracing a cautionary and ethical 
management approach (Lin, 2013, 2014). The connection between Leopold, Pragmatism, and EE 
can be gleaned throughout much of Bryan Norton’s work (even if it is not explicitly stated), and 
Nahser (2014) explicitly connects the three in a short, very general article. Given these 
connections, one could argue for pragmatism as an underpinning of EE based upon this historical 
path through institutional economics and Aldo Leopold.  
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A third connection between EE and pragmatism is within the context of mixed-methods 
research, which has focused significantly on interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary methodology. 
Pragmatism has been advocated as a leading candidate for the philosophical underpinning for 
such research (Biddle & Schafft, 2014; Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Leech, 2005; Morgan, 
2007). However, a general critique leveled at EE inquiry is a lack of strong theoretical 
foundations, and the potential for the employment of multiple methodologies that have 
conflicting, incommensurable philosophical assumptions; and a pragmatist philosophy is 
considered a viable foundation for methodological synthesis (Frankel Pratt, 2016; Hands, 2001).  
Clearly, given these connections between pragmatism and EE, the basic premise of this 
dissertation is not its unique contribution. The unique contribution is making the connection 
between pragmatism and EE official via thorough synthesis of the two scholarly arenas. The 
more thorough treatment is given to pragmatism, because the primary intention of this work is to 
bring pragmatist ideas to ecological economists, and perhaps other conservation social science 
disciplines that are hybrid in nature (i.e., those sharing the commonalities outlined above). 
Through this synthesis of these two scholarly arenas, a pragmatist EE is articulated and 
discussed. Two primary conclusions are then reached from this synthesis, which is that a 
pragmatist EE should: (1) focus on human-nature relationships and; (2) embrace a social-
ecological systems perspective. These conclusions are briefly discussed to prime the reader.  
 
1.3.1. Human-nature relationships 
It is suggested that a pragmatist EE should focus on understanding human-nature 
relationships, but it needs to be stressed that the meaning of human-nature relationships in this 
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dissertation is more broadly conceptualized than other definitions of human-nature relationships. 
For instance, van Riper et al. (2019:71) defined human-nature relationships as “psychologically 
stable worldviews about the complex relationships that form between people and places.” These 
authors reference the ‘New Ecological Paradigm’ (NEP) as the longest-running and most well-
known measurement of such worldviews (Dunlap et al., 2000). Among many critiques of NEP, 
Flint et al. (2013) viewed NEP as an overly simplistic view of the complex relationships. New 
typologies have been suggested.  
The review of the human-nature relationship ‘concept’ by Flint et al. (2013) highlights 
the broad range of discussions (and terminology) surrounding the topic. Indeed, they found 
several literature domains related to human-nature relationship concepts, including values, 
attitudes, and worldviews literature, as well as religious traditions and those of environmental 
philosophy and environmental ethics. In their review, Flint et al. (2013) suggested three main 
dimensions of human-nature relationships that generally capture the existing typologies derived 
through empirical research: (1) positionality, which captures the perceived appropriate role of 
humans in nature; (2) character of bond, which captures not only why people think nature is 
important, but also whether people perceive there to be an existing bond with nature (i.e., 
‘connectedness/apathy’) and; (3) understanding of nature, which includes notions about the 
fragility and/or resilience of nature. 
Often, human-nature relationships are conceptualized in terms of positionality, or the 
appropriate role of humans, which include ideas such as humans relating to nature as ‘master’, 
‘steward’, ‘partner’, or ‘participant’ (van den Born, 2008; van den Born et al., 2001). However, 
thinking of the human-nature relationship in terms of worldviews, or perhaps as “attitudes 
toward nature” (Bauer et al., 2009:2911), regarding the appropriate role of humans within the 
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context of the natural world does not capture the entire human-nature relationship discussion, as 
reflected by Flint et al. (2013). Even within the relatively narrow context of protected area 
management, it has been suggested that the term relationship is “quite nebulous” (Dvorak et al., 
2013:1519). It is a broad conceptualization of the human-nature relationship, as conveyed by 
Flint et al. (2013), that is embraced herein.  
As an example of this broad conceptualization, consider Flint et al. (2013:215), whose 
aim was partly to discuss whether the ecosystem services concept could be identified as a 
“specific type” of human-nature relationship. Ecosystem services are often defined as the goods 
and services provided to people by nature (de Groot et al., 2002), and it is a concept that has been 
adopted widely in the conservation sciences as a framing for conserving ‘nature for people’ 
(Mace, 2014). Ultimately, Flint et al. (2013) were reluctant to include the ecosystem services 
concept as a type of human-nature relationship. They concluded that the ecosystem services 
concept “dominating contemporary environmental management policy and practice may only 
cover a narrow segment of the broad human-nature relationship spectrum” (Flint et al., 
2013:215), namely the instrumental and humans separate from nature segment.  
A pragmatist EE agrees with this assessment, though two additional points could be 
made. First, ecosystem services does not constitute a ‘type’ of relationship, but instead it is a part 
or element of the human-nature relationship. Similarly, attachment to place is a part of the 
human-nature relationship. The belief that humans should protect nature for its intrinsic value, or 
the belief that humans should dominate over nature, are also parts of the human-nature 
relationship. It is not likely that a single typology will neatly capture all these complex parts, but 
understanding and communicating the human-nature relationship as holistically as possible is the 
goal of a pragmatist EE. The second point, with a focus on the importance of language, is that a 
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pragmatist EE would conceptualize the human-nature relationship less as a clearly defined entity 
lying on a spectrum, and more of a conglomerate of parts, which will vary across (and within) 
people depending on the context. The importance of context is stressed through this dissertation, 
and in the case of the human-nature relationship it is consistent with the thinking of Flint et al. 
(2013).  
This brief discussion of the human-nature relationship, as conceptualized in a pragmatist 
EE, likely raises more questions than answers, and the discussion does not fully return to the 
human-nature relationship until Section 5.2. However, this overview of a major theme in this 
dissertation can serve as a reminder as one reads about ideas such as Dewey’s model of 
experience, important pragmatist goals (e.g., understanding, communication, and social 
learning), Bryan Norton’s normative sustainability, the lack of consensus and the diversity of 
thought on theories of welfare, and the challenging task of understanding and potentially 
integrating different approaches to science. Regarding this last point, in addition to the stated 
goal of EE and other research traditions focused on research application, the second primary 
conclusions of this dissertation is the need for a social-ecological systems perspective (which by 
its very nature focuses on linkages between different bodies of knowledge).  
 
1.3.2. Social-ecological systems perspective     
Chapter seven discusses social-ecological systems in detail, but the idea is integral 
throughout the entire dissertation. The primary conclusion is social-ecological systems (SES) 
research can help to position the understanding of human-nature relationships yielded from a 
pragmatist EE within the SES at large. Generally, this conclusion is motivated by the common 
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roots, basic assumptions, and goals of ecological economics and SES research. It is argued, first 
and foremost, that SES research, and the accompanying frameworks, represent heuristics or 
conceptual maps, not definitive models. This follows from the articulation of a pragmatist EE in 
chapter five. It is also argued that SES research can help a pragmatist EE acknowledge the 
missing knowledge gaps necessary for addressing complex environmental problems. Similar to 
the discussion above on human-nature relationships, this brief discussion is meant to impress the 
importance of SES research in the reader’s mind because, even though the full discussion does 
not come until chapter seven, complex social-ecological systems are commonly mentioned 
throughout the dissertation.  
More generally, the idea that both human-nature relationships and the overarching SESs 
are so complex that even robust collaboration between various disciplines will only yield 
‘tentative truths’ is inherent in this dissertation. The meaning of ‘tentative truths’ will become 
clear through the discussion of pragmatist philosophy and a pragmatist EE, but underlying this 
idea are the need for public debate and deliberation about both scientific knowledge and the 
potential tactics for addressing complex environmental problems. EE, when focusing on 
understanding and communicating human-nature relationships and complex SESs requires 
humility; indeed, it requires a pragmatist approach. 
 
1.4. An overview of research to be used for discussion   
At a basic and individual level, this dissertation is motivated by the desire to clearly 
articulate and understand the research that I have been engaged in for the past eight years. To this 
end, the theoretical and philosophical insights developed throughout this dissertation are often 
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related back to completed research, whether to reinforce a point made, or to highlight limitations 
and/or potential missteps. While details of this past research are conveyed at strategic places 
(e.g., the Gila National Forest study in chapter 6), it is worth providing an overview of relevant 
research here for context and background.      
Starting in 2011, a collaboration between the University of Montana and the Aldo 
Leopold Wilderness Research Institute formed to develop a process to understand the social-
ecological vulnerability of a broad range of stakeholders. This research collaboration took place 
(or is currently taking place) in three separate locations, though these applications have the same 
general goal of informing United States Forest Service planning and management through a 
comprehensive understanding of the linkages between the environment and human well-being 
and the drivers of change threatening such well-being. 
The collaboration started on the Shoshone National Forest in Wyoming with a goal to 
complement an ecological assessment of biophysical resources by Rice et al. (2012), which 
found that water-related ecological components were particularly vulnerable to climate change 
on the Forest. Specifically, to complement this understanding, a social assessment was 
completed to identify a broad range of water benefits (i.e., ecosystem services) likely to be 
influenced by changing natural conditions, which included an exploration of stakeholder 
perspectives regarding the importance of identified ecosystem services and the perceived threats 
to these important benefits (Armatas, 2013). The study applied Q-methodology (discussed at 
length in this dissertation); a rank ordering method where respondent’s opinions are analyzed 
using factor analysis, resulting in the distillation of individual viewpoints (96 in Armatas (2013)) 
into typified viewpoints (four in Armatas (2013)).  
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With the original intention to integrate this social assessment with an economic 
assessment focused on providing non-market values for a limited number of highly relevant 
ecosystem services, additional theoretical work was completed. This work resulted in two peer-
reviewed publications: (1) how Q-methodology, a structured and formal social science method, 
could benefit the design phase of stated preference surveys, an economic approach to non-market 
valuation that primarily employs some combination of focus groups and expert interviews 
(Armatas et al., 2014) and; (2) the benefit, and role, of Q-methodology for completing a holistic 
social-ecological vulnerability assessment (Armatas et al., 2017a).   
In June 2015, the economic assessment commenced with a choice modelling study, 
which is a non-market valuation method that asks respondents to weigh alternative scenarios 
about the state of the environment and allows for statistical derivation of monetary values related 
to several attributes. For that study, the attributes were water-based ecosystem services derived 
from the Shoshone National Forest, and a full analysis of the data, and integration of the 
ecological, social, and economic assessment were combined and articulated in Armatas et al. 
(2018). 
In addition to this work on the Shoshone National Forest, the social assessment approach 
using Q-methodology was replicated, with slight alterations, on the Gila National Forest. This 
effort had two purposes: (1) support the forest plan revision process and; (2) articulate how the 
process implemented on the Shoshone National Forest and the Gila National Forest constitutes a 
‘social vulnerability protocol’ that can potentially be implemented within other forest planning 
efforts. A ‘social vulnerability protocol’ was developed for federal land managers and planners, 
and published as a general technical report (Armatas et al., In Press).  
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Finally, there is an ongoing study taking place on the Flathead Wild and Scenic River 
system, which will implement the social vulnerability protocol within the specific decision 
context of comprehensive river management planning (Armatas et al., 2019). Data collection for 
this study will take place in late summer 2019. This brief review of my research history is 
presented for two reasons. First, the discussions throughout this dissertation are commonly 
related back to research on the Shoshone National Forest, Gila National Forest, and/or the 
Flathead Wild and Scenic River system, so there is a need to generally introduce this research to 
the reader.  
Secondly, and perhaps most importantly, all of this research (in addition to other relevant 
scholarship such as the synthesis focused on articulating the benefits of understanding traditional 
phenological knowledge for supporting adaptive management (Armatas et al., 2016)), constitutes 
conservation social science intended to support “public land management and planning decision-
making”. In the case of the three research studies highlighted above (Shoshone, Gila, and 
Flathead), it has been often stated that an “ecological economics” approach was being applied. 
The use of scare quotes with regard to both the application of informing management and 
planning and the ecological economic approach indicates a level of dissatisfaction; indeed, such 
phrases feel like platitudes more often than not. There is a personal desire, and I argue 
conservation science need, to add depth to these statements. The goal is to better understand how 
the research reviewed above supports management, or how it constitutes an EE approach.  
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1.5. Dissertation outline 
In order to facilitate the discussion of the scientific foundations of EE, as well as SES 
research, a framework for assessing science is presented in chapter two. Chapter three reviews 
ecological economics, with a specific focus on the challenges facing the field of research. A 
thorough review of pragmatist philosophy and environmental pragmatism constitutes chapter 
four. In chapter five, a pragmatist EE is proposed within the context of the established scientific 
assessment framework. As an example of how a pragmatist EE operates in practice, a 
methodological debate (i.e., R-methodology versus Q-methodology) is presented and discussed 
in chapter six. Chapter seven includes a synthesis of ideas from EE and SES research with the 
intention of improving the application of research, as well as highlighting how interdisciplinary 
research can potentially be improved through a better understanding of what different fields of 
research can provide. Finally, chapter eight reviews the primary conclusions and possible future 
areas of research.    
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2. A SCIENTIFIC MACROSTRUCTURE: WORLDVIEWS, PARADIGMS, AND 
RESEARCH PROGRAMS 
Science has been broadly defined as a “systematic set of empirical activities for 
constructing, representing, and analyzing knowledge about phenomena being studied”, which are 
guided by normative philosophical commitments (Patterson & Williams, 1998:284). Assessing 
scientific practice, from the foundational philosophy to on-the-ground practice, is often done by 
considering the scientific ‘macrostructure’, which is the standard unit of analysis applied by 
philosophers of science since its conceptualization by Thomas Kuhn (Anderson, 1986b). While 
there is no standard approach to characterizing the macrostructure of scientific practice 
(Patterson & Williams, 2005), the framework developed by Patterson and Williams (1998) is 
adopted herein as a starting point (amendments to the ‘worldview’ level are suggested).  
This framework, which is illustrated in Figure 2.1, is multi-layered with three different 
levels. Worldviews are the broadest level, which inform paradigms which, in turn, are “linked” 
to research programs (Patterson & Williams, 2005:363). The framework may be particularly 
helpful for addressing the limitations of EE previously discussed, because it explicitly 
distinguishes a ‘worldview’ from a ‘paradigm’. These two terms, and ‘paradigm’ in particular, 
have been used in various ways within discussions of scientific foundations3. In order to prevent 
confusion on this issue, Patterson and Williams (1998) consider ‘worldviews’ as the broadest 
beliefs of a researcher within a research tradition, and ‘paradigms’ as those ideas related 
                                                 
3 In his seminal work, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Thomas Kuhn (1970:175) defined a scientific 
paradigm, in its broadest sense, as “the entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and so on shared by the 
members of a given community.” A paradigm in this sense, according to Masterman (1970), is synonymous with a 
‘metaphysical world view.’ The first edition of Kuhn’s book (i.e., Kuhn, 1962) used the term ‘paradigm’ in at least 
21 different ways (Masterman, 1970); a point that was criticized as ambiguous and inconsistent, resulting in greater 
specificity of the meaning of ‘paradigm’ in Kuhn’s second edition. 
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specifically to ontology, epistemology, and axiology. This conceptualization of a paradigm is 
consistent with what Morgan (2007) called ‘paradigms as epistemological stances’; this usage 
has been suggested as the most dominant within the social sciences. The importance of 
distinguishing worldviews from paradigms is emphasized below in the review of scientific 
foundations of EE, but it is necessary to first describe the framework in Figure 2.1.  
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Figure 2.1. Framework for mapping scientific foundations (adapted from Patterson and Williams (1998, 2005)) 
 
   
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Philosophy of Science 
Application of Science 
Paradigm (Laudan’s 1984 Model): practice of science – debates concerning normative commitments underlying a specific approach to science 
Worldview: definition of science – debates concerning the nature of science and validity 
Position 
Relativism/Antifoundationalism
s 
Rationalism/foundationalism 
Dialog 
Extreme rationalism 
only one approach 
to science exists 
Pluralism 
Multiple paradigms co-
exist in science but will 
converge 
 
Kuhnian model  
Periods of single paradigm 
science followed by 
revolutionary paradigm 
change which requires 
leap of faith 
Extreme relativism 
only rule is anything 
goes 
Critical pluralism 
Multiple paradigms co-exist 
– choices among them 
guided by logic, though 
some indeterminacy exists 
Oppositional  Integrative       Reflective       Incommensurability              Unnecessary 
Paradigms are characterized by 
three interdependent, mutually 
defining/constraining normative 
commitments 
Epistemology 
(Nature, methods, limits of knowledge) 
Ontology 
(Nature of reality, nature of human experience) 
Axiology 
(Ultimate goals, instrumental goals) 
Research programs comprise 
the disciplinary foundation 
Conceptual domain 
-Normative commitments 
-Theoretical foundation 
 
Substantive domain 
-Real world context 
 
Methodological domain 
-Research logic/design 
-Sampling units of observation 
-Data collection, measurement, 
representation 
-Data interpretation and analysis 
Research Programs: application of science - debates concerning theory and the methods of collecting, analyzing, and interpreting data 
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2.1. Worldviews 
The first level in the framework developed by Patterson and Williams (1998) is the 
worldview. This is the broadest and most general level, which pertains to the basic ‘rules’ of 
science. The worldview level is rarely engaged by the typical researcher, as most prefer to “apply 
the rules of science defined by someone else” and, in addition, this level is only a basic starting 
point (on its own it is inadequate for describing a researcher tradition); “worldviews tend to be 
somewhat nebulous and hard to pin down” (Patterson & Williams, 1998:287). Nonetheless, 
understanding researcher worldviews is important, because it is where basic beliefs, which often 
go unstated, are established. For science today, discussions of worldviews are increasingly 
important at a time when science is trending towards integration (as is the case in EE). Because 
without understanding different researcher worldviews, it is challenging to effectively 
communicate and perform research that is integrated, or at the very least mutually informing and 
supporting.  
Below, slight amendments to worldviews as defined in Figure 2.1 are suggested to better 
capture the issues related to EE; the original conceptualization of worldviews (Patterson & 
Williams, 1998, 2005) is provided, with slight amendments to follow.  
 
2.1.1. Worldviews: focusing on science versus other knowledge, how science changes, and the 
interaction between different scientific approaches  
Worldviews are conceptualized on a continuum from rationalism/foundationalism to 
relativism/antifoundationalism. This continuum is characterized in two ways. First, there are the 
worldviews related to what constitutes science and, relatedly, how science changes over time. 
The perspectives on the rationalism end of the spectrum are commonly labeled ‘positivism’, and 
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the general sentiment on this extreme end is that there is a single, universal set of rules for 
distinguishing science from non-science (Chalmers, 2013; Patterson & Williams, 1998). Those 
occupying this end of the spectrum are not suggesting that there are multiple approaches to 
science where those practicing different types “stay in their lane”. Instead, they are suggesting 
that a single type of science exists to address all types of questions. Of course, those types of 
questions would vary across disciplines but, again, a single type of science would be used. 
Patterson and Williams (1998:287) cited Calder and Tybout (1987) as an example of the extreme 
rationalist worldview, who suggested that knowledge yielded by the interpretivist research 
paradigm can be “provocative and entertaining reading…but must stand apart from science.” A 
belief in a single approach to science is the impetus for defining and refining rules and methods 
of scientific practice within rationalist research traditions (Patterson & Williams, 1998). On the 
rationalist end, scientific practice has strict rules for determining that which is valid and that 
which is not.  
This contrasts with the relativist/antifoundationalism perspective, where there is no 
universal set of rules for judging science. Instead, this end of the spectrum holds that “criteria for 
judging science are dependent on the values or goals of the scientific community evaluating 
them” (Patterson & Williams, 1998:285). The relativist perspective tends to focus on addressing 
the problem without adhering to a rigid methodology. Indeed, the extreme end of the relativist 
spectrum is most famously the territory of Paul Feyerabend who, in his seminal work Against 
Method, called for an ‘anything goes’ approach to science (i.e., ‘epistemological anarchism’) 
(Feyerabend, 1975). The goal of the less-extreme antifoundationalists is to develop ‘exemplars’, 
or general methodological guides (Patterson & Williams, 1998).  
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In the middle of the spectrum, there are worldviews that acknowledge a plurality of 
approaches to science, but with caveats regarding how science will change over time. For 
instance, the ‘pluralism’ worldview acknowledges multiple approaches to science with the 
associated idea that eventually these multiple approaches will converge. Alternatively, the 
‘Kuhnian model’ worldview considers a situation where multiple approaches to science exist, but 
only one approach is in operation at a single time.  
According to Patterson and Williams (2005:371), a second way of characterizing 
worldviews is according to the ‘dialog’, or the “form and nature of response different world view 
positions adopt in regard to questions of legitimacy, validity and diversity arising from across-
paradigm differences.” In other words, the dialog position can help to define beliefs about the 
interaction between different approaches to science. This interaction is particularly important 
within the context of EE considering its focus on interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary research. 
The ‘dialog’ aspect of Figure 2.1 may be the least intuitive, at least when framed as a spectrum, 
because on the extreme rationalist end there is the ‘oppositional’ belief, which considers different 
approaches to science as competing. That is, science is monolithic, and choosing to do it a 
particular way represents, by virtue of that choice, a disavowing of other approaches. Intuitively, 
one might assume that the polar opposite of this dialog is ‘integrative’; that is, the opposite 
worldview of a monolithic and competing science is one where a plurality of approaches to 
science interact until the point of convergence.  
Instead, the integrative perspective is adjacent to the oppositional perspective, because a 
plurality of approaches interacting to the point of convergence still yields, in essence, a single 
approach and truth. Following this logic, the right end of the spectrum is defined by the 
‘unnecessary’ perspective, or the belief that different approaches to science need not interact 
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because scientific knowledge cannot be distinguished from other types of knowledge. In other 
words, as opposed to the rationalist ‘dialog’ where a single approach to science exists, the 
extreme relativist ‘dialog’ is one where there are an unlimited number of approaches to science 
or, alternatively, no approaches to science if one makes no distinction between scientific 
knowledge and other forms of knowledge. A consequence of this worldview is that there is no 
need for dialog between approaches (a dialog is ‘unnecessary’). 
 
2.1.2. Worldviews: focusing on paradigm dialogs and integration 
Given the general focus of the conservation sciences on increasing collaborative efforts 
and gaining insight from multiple perspectives, slight amendments to the worldviews idea are 
proposed to focus more on paradigm dialogs, and general views related to how different 
approaches to science can be integrated. As a result, a scientific macrostructure that operates on 
the assumption that there are multiple legitimate ways to practice science is assumed. Operating 
on this assumption, worldviews are conceptualized on a spectrum from separate/distinct to 
blended/unified. This change is motivated by the desire to understand and articulate the nature of 
science being pursued in EE (an interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary field). In addition, 
amending worldviews in this way does not eliminate the ideas implicit in Figure 2.1. The 
implicit ideas (e.g., rules of scientific inquiry, a priori/foundational knowledge) are still captured 
by the normative paradigmatic assumptions in the second ‘paradigm’ level.  
To populate the new proposed spectrum, incorporating contributions from mixed 
methods research may be appropriate, which is an area of study that has put forth significant 
effort in understanding different perspectives related to the relationship between different 
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approaches to science. For instance, Table 2.1 was developed by Greene (2008) for the purposes 
of debating whether mixed-methods research is a distinct methodology.  
 
Table 2.1. Mixing Methods and Mixing Paradigms  
What is the character of traditional 
paradigms? 
What most importantly guides 
practical inquiry decisions? 
Mixed methods ‘paradigm stance’ 
The assumptions of different traditional 
paradigms are fundamentally 
incommensurable. Each paradigm 
represents a coherent whole, which must 
be respected and preserved 
Paradigmatic assumptions PURIST STANCE – Because the 
assumptions of different paradigms 
are incompatible, it is not possible to 
mix paradigms in the same study 
The assumptions of traditional paradigms are 
not fundamentally incompatible, rather 
different in important ways. These 
differences are valuable and should be 
preserved to maintain methodological 
integrity while expanding the scope of the 
study. 
Paradigmatic assumptions, as well 
as context and theory 
COMPLEMENTARY STRENGTHS 
STANCE – Because the 
assumptions of different paradigms 
are importantly different, methods 
implemented within different 
paradigms should be kept separate 
from one another. 
The assumptions of different traditional 
paradigms are different in important ways 
and remain valuable, but paradigms 
themselves are historical and social 
constructions and so are not inviolate or 
sacrosanct. 
Paradigmatic assumptions, as well 
as context and theory 
DIALECTIC STANCE – Engaging 
dialogically with paradigm 
differences can generatively yield 
new insights and understandings. 
Historical philosophical 
incommensurabilities among paradigms 
are reconcilable through new, emergent 
paradigms, such as pragmatism, scientific 
realism, or transformation-emancipation. 
The assumptions and stances of 
new paradigms that actively 
promote the mixing of methods, 
along with context and theory. 
ALTERNATIVE PARADIGM 
STANCE 
The assumptions of various traditional 
paradigms are logically independent and 
therefore can be mixed and matched in 
varied combinations. 
The practical characteristics and 
demands of the inquiry context 
and problem at hand. Paradigms 
help us think better but do not 
themselves guide practice.  
A-PARADIGMATIC STANCE 
The assumptions of various traditional or 
emergent paradigms may well be 
embedded in or intertwined with 
substantive theories. 
The substantive issues and 
conceptual theories relevant to 
the study being conducted. 
Paradigms help us think better 
but do not themselves guide 
practice. 
SUBSTANTIVE THEORY STANCE 
Source: Adapted from Greene (2008) 
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While the term ‘worldview’ is not applied within this particular debate, it is implied. That is, it 
highlights different ideas related to how different approaches to science can (or cannot) interact. 
Incorporating Table 2.1 adds both detail to the ‘dialog’ idea and highlights differing opinions 
regarding the connection between the second level (i.e., paradigms) and the third level (i.e., 
research programs) of the macrostructure.  
Incorporating the insight from Table 2.1 yields a slightly modified version of worldviews 
(Figure 2.2). These changes result in a different interpretation of the worldview level. On the 
extreme left end of the spectrum is the purist/oppositional dialog, which holds that the various 
different approaches to science are developed as single coherent wholes, which cannot be 
blended. On the far right end of the spectrum is the ‘alternative paradigm’ dialog, which suggests 
that different approaches to science will eventually yield new convergent approaches. The 
alternative paradigm stance can be related to the pluralism worldview in Figure 2.1.   
 
Figure 2.2. Worldviews focused on paradigm interaction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Worldview: the relationships between different approaches to science – debates concerning the 
interaction between different paradigms and the connection between paradigms and practice 
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While Figure 2.2 does not depart drastically from Figure 2.1, the slight shift in focus is 
important. By removing the Kuhnian model worldview, the focus is shifted from how science 
changes and evolves to how it is practiced. The former is descriptive, while the latter is 
normative. Furthermore, removing the Kuhnian worldview avoids the debate as to whether Kuhn 
considered paradigm shifts to occur as the result of some relativistic ‘leap of faith’. While this is 
a popular interpretation of Kuhn’s work, it has been challenged variously within philosophy of 
science discussions (Godfrey-Smith, 2003).  
As previously stated, the small changes in Figure 2.2 also shifts discussion away from the 
dichotomy between one approach to science and an infinite number of approaches. While the 
extreme positivism versus extreme relativism debate is historically entrenched, it could be 
argued that it is an unproductive dichotomy (and perhaps even currently irrelevant). While some 
may hold that there is only one way to do science, such adherents are unlikely to be interested in 
EE specifically, or the conservation social sciences more generally. However, the ‘oppositional’ 
descriptor in Figure 2.2 is retained, as the belief that different approaches to science are 
incompatible is certainly possible, perhaps even common. Removing the extreme relativist 
position is likely warranted within science discussions, as it reflects a debate regarding the nature 
of knowledge more broadly. Indeed, an extreme relativist position is one which seems to deny 
the existence of ‘science’, or a “systematic set of empirical activities for constructing, 
representing, and analyzing knowledge about phenomena being studied” (Patterson & Williams, 
1998:284, emphasis added).  
Even though the extreme relativist position as advocated by Feyerabend does not 
expressly reject science (only particular, dogmatic styles of science), it does not have a 
mechanism for rejecting or eliminating ideas. Furthermore, it posits that scientists need not 
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follow a method of any kind, but instead should follow their subjective wishes (Chalmers, 2013; 
Godfrey-Smith, 2003). While the extreme relativist position is both articulated within the context 
of scientific discussions, and includes some worthwhile ideas for the purposes of science (e.g., 
pluralism and creativity of method), disavowing systematic approaches appears antithetical to 
science and, therefore, may not be a scientific worldview per se. Also, the worthwhile ideas 
suggested by Feyerabend and others can be incorporated into a pluralistic worldview without 
adhering to a position of epistemological anarchy (a point discussed further below).  
Finally, the inclusion of extreme relativism as a worldview, at least within the context of 
EE discussions, has resulted in unproductive, straw-dog arguments where those advocating for 
methodological pluralism are often branded Feyerabend-type anarchists by default (in 
contemporary discussions of methodology in EE, I cannot find an example of someone taking an 
extreme relativist worldview). Broadly, this is a long-standing problem, according to Patterson 
and Williams (2005:362-363), characterizing the nature of research traditions “has always been a 
difficult task, subject to pitfalls such as creating straw men caricatures (in cases where authors 
characterize traditions they do not subscribe to) or of reifying a set of rules that do not truly 
describe how a specific epistemological tradition really works.”  
In short, the different worldviews outlined above illustrate the different ideas related to 
foundational science issues. These general issues are the subject of much debate within the 
context of what are often labeled the ‘paradigm wars’. A history of this broad debate is beyond 
the scope of this work (see Denzin (2010) for a concise overview). But, particular issues within 
this debate are inherent (yet rarely discussed) within the context of EE discussions about what 
underpins practice within the research tradition. For instance, the ‘incompatibility thesis’ states 
that “compatibility between quantitative and qualitative methods is impossible due to the 
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incompatibility of the paradigms that underlie the methods” (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2003:18-
19). The different stances listed in Table 2.1 imply different opinions about this thesis.  
Those adopting an ‘a-paradigmatic stance’ are not likely to give the incompatibility thesis 
much thought, as they find questions regarding the link between epistemology and methods 
“distracting and unnecessary”; whereas those with the ‘alternative paradigm’ worldview reject 
the forced choices set-up by the incompatibility thesis between, for instance, a 
subjective/objective epistemology (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2003:18). While few researchers 
today strictly adhere to the incompatibility thesis, it is still influential to those adopting popular 
paradigm stances such as the ‘complementary strengths’ stance (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2003).  
 
2.2. Paradigms 
The second level of the scientific macrostructure framework is the ‘paradigm’, which is 
the dimension of a research tradition where the normative philosophical commitments or 
assumptions underpinning actual research are established (Patterson & Williams, 2005). All 
science is underpinned by basic philosophical assumptions (whether one is cognizant of them or 
not). As noted by Patterson and Williams (1998:284), “when you practice science in a particular 
way, you are ‘buying into’ something; specifically, a set of normative philosophical 
commitments.” Theoretically, there is a substantive link between paradigms and research 
programs (Patterson & Williams, 2005); however, explicit discussions of these assumptions are 
fairly uncommon in most research. As noted by Phillips (1996), philosophical assumptions are 
typically not discussed unless one is in the position of defending methodological choices.  
The relatively small amount of scholarship focused on paradigmatic assumptions has 
been acknowledged both within EE specifically (Baumgärtner et al., 2008; Puller & Smith, 2017; 
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Spash, 2012, 2013, 2015), and natural resource management more broadly (Patterson & 
Williams, 1998). One could argue that such scholarship within these contexts is not a pressing 
issue, as empirical research, while limited, has shown that paradigmatic assumptions have a 
small influence on the practice of research (Greene, 2008). A pragmatist EE rejects this potential 
argument, but it is worth mentioning nonetheless. 
As depicted in Figure 2.1, the framework adopts Laudan’s model (Laudan, 1984) where 
the different types of normative commitments are interrelated, mutually defining and 
constraining. These assumptions are categorized as ontological, epistemological, and axiological, 
and the basics of these different types of assumptions are briefly discussed. However, it should 
be noted that the different assumptions represent individual, extensive fields of study in 
philosophy of knowledge and science and, in the case of axiological assumptions, ethics. In other 
words, the overview of these ideas is cursory.    
Ontological assumptions refer to ideas and opinions about what exists in the world, 
including the nature of reality, human experience, and social beings. This concept is sometimes 
mapped from realism to relativism, or objectivist to constructivist. An extreme realist would 
suggest that one reality exists, where the social and natural world are both concrete, and 
phenomena can be observed and explained in terms of accuracy. Whereas, an extreme relativist 
would suggest that multiple realities exist (perhaps one reality for each person), where 
phenomena become reality through the mind and its processes (Evely et al., 2008; Moon & 
Blackman, 2014; Morgan & Smircich, 1980).  
With regard to human nature, or the nature of social beings, Patterson and Williams 
(1998) distinguished between information-based models and meaning-based models, where the 
former includes a conceptualization of humans as being rational, analytic, and goal-driven where 
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humans process information that is available to them. The standard ‘rational actor’ model in 
economics is an information-based model. Meaning-based models view social beings as actively 
engaged in constructing meaning through experience. Using slightly different language, Hudson 
and Ozanne (1988) conceptualized social beings as deterministic and reactive under the positivist 
perspective, and voluntaristic and proactive under the interpretive perspective. Morgan and 
Smircich (1980) conceptualized social-being ontology as humans as ‘transcendental beings’, 
‘social actors’, ‘information processors’, ‘adaptive agents’, and ‘responding mechanisms’.  
Babbie (2010) defined epistemology as the “science of knowing,” which is concerned 
with aspects of validity and what constitutes a claim to ‘truth’. Hudson and Ozanne (1988) 
characterized epistemology as views related to how knowledge is acquired and generated, what 
is knowable, who can know, the issue of causality, and the relationship between the researcher 
and the subject. Epistemology is often illustrated along an objective-subjective continuum, where 
a strong ‘objectivist’ (positivist) approach considers knowledge to be singular in that one truth 
exists that can be verified with observation and empirical evidence that is both generalizable and 
independent of social thought; whereas a strong ‘subjectivist’ (sometimes used synonymously 
with ‘constructivist’ or ‘interpretivist’) approach considers a world that is inherently influenced 
by one’s experience and, as a result, multiple legitimate truth claims exist (Durning, 1999; Moon 
& Blackman, 2014).  
The positivists “seek context-free generalizations”, or “abstract laws that ideally can be 
applied to an infinitely large number of phenomena, people, settings, and times”; whereas the 
interpretivists “seek to determine motives, meanings, reasons, and other subjective experiences 
that are time- and context-bound” (Hudson & Ozanne, 1988:511). The subjectivist approach does 
not focus on finding general laws, particularly in the social sciences, as they are either thought to 
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be non-existent or beyond humans’ ability to comprehend. Naturally, the differences in belief 
regarding what type of knowledge can be generated has implications for the types of questions 
asked, and the general path toward knowledge. For instance, some have distinguished the linear 
process of the positivists from the hermeneutic circle of the interpretivists, where the former 
yield a final answer (often in the form of a law) and the latter may express the understanding at 
the moment, which is subject to iterative revision (Hudson & Ozanne, 1988; Patterson & 
Williams, 1998).   
Regarding issues of causality, which is interrelated with the knowledge generated, 
positivists focus on identifying causal linkages based upon the belief, for example, that human 
behavior can be explained, at least in part, by a preceding causal event. Interpretivists “view the 
world as being so complex and changing that it is impossible to distinguish a cause from an 
effect” (Hudson & Ozanne, 1988:512). Views on causality partly underpin the “individualism-
holism” debate which, according to Zahle and Collin (2014:1-2), is centered around two issues: 
(1) the nature of social phenomena and, “as part of this, their relationship to individuals” and; (2) 
the extent to which “social scientific explanations [should] focus on individuals and social 
phenomena respectively.” The positivist perspective operates on the assumption that causal 
linkages between an independent and dependent variable on an individual level can be 
aggregated to explain or predict social phenomena more broadly, whereas an interpretivist would 
likely adhere to a ‘holism’ argument, which holds that aggregating individual cases does not 
yield an explanation of the whole. According to Greene and Caracelli (2003) this long-running 
debate, or ‘historical dualism’, is considered by many to be incommensurable and, as a result, 
unlikely to be reconciled. This issue of aggregation, as well as issues of causality are discussed 
toward the end of chapter five and throughout chapter six.   
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Epistemological assumptions also encompass views related to the role of the researcher 
relative to the phenomenon observed, and the positivist viewpoint is one where the researcher is 
detached and separate from the subject in a way that prevents the researcher from influencing the 
results; that is, the researcher is an objective observer of phenomena (Hudson & Ozanne, 1988; 
Patterson & Williams, 1998). The alternative, interpretivist perspective is what Patterson and 
Williams (1998:288) called the “fusion of horizons”, where the observer is entwined with the 
observed phenomena and, therefore, active in coproducing knowledge as opposed to simply 
describing it. Adherents to this viewpoint do not consider the researcher to have a privileged 
vantage point (Hudson & Ozanne, 1988). The call for greater ‘reflexivity’ and ‘positionality’ in 
research, which appears to be relatively common in the conservation social science literature, is a 
call for greater attention to be paid to this particular assumption.        
The third set of assumptions that comprise a research paradigm are axiological, which 
refer to commitments related to the goals and objectives of research, as well as the ethical 
considerations and value commitments of the researcher. Patterson and Williams (1998) 
categorized axiological commitments in terms of ‘terminal goals’ and ‘instrumental goals’, 
where the former refer to the primary aims of science (e.g., prediction, explanation, description, 
understanding, communication) and the latter refer to the criteria by which research is evaluated 
(e.g., generalizability, persuasiveness, insightfulness). Positivists are usually associated with an 
axiology focused on prediction, and interpretivists are associated with a goal to understand 
(Hudson & Ozanne, 1988). Additionally, references to value-free or value-laden knowledge 
implicitly refer to an axiological perspective, where the former suggests that scientific research is 
free from influence of human values (and thus neutral) and the latter is under the direct influence 
of human values (Gonzalez, 2013). Axiology is sometimes not explicitly included within 
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discussions of inquiry, because it traditionally departs from questions of truth to questions of 
value. 
Some may still argue today that science need not be concerned with axiology, based upon 
a worldview that it is chiefly concerned with questions of how the world is (as opposed to ethical 
questions regarding how the world ought to be). However, and particularly within the 
conservation social sciences, there is an increased focus on addressing questions of value in 
conjunction with questions of truth. For instance, EE is a problem-oriented science with the dual 
aim of creating knowledge for action or, as articulated by Baumgärtner et al. (2008:385), a 
cognitive interest (“understand and explain then world as it is”) and an action interest (“manage 
the world based on an idea of how it ought to be”). 
Within the scientific macrostructure framework presented above, combining ontological, 
epistemological, and axiological assumptions comprises a research paradigm. There are many 
paradigm typologies, which reflects that lack of consensus regarding the exact composition of 
various paradigms. Moon and Blackman (2014) identified and discussed nine paradigms: 
positivism, post-positivism, structuralism, social constructivism, interpretivism (which subsumes 
hermeneutics, phenomenology, and symbolic interactionism), critical theory (which subsumes 
emancipatory, advocacy or participatory, and feminism), post-structuralism, post-modernism, 
and pragmatism. Lincoln et al. (2011) identified and discussed five paradigms: positivism, 
postpositivism, critical theory et al., constructivism, and participatory. Evely et al. (2008) 
discussed seven paradigms: extreme positivism, structural realism, critical realism, 
transcendental realism, hermeneutics, nominalism, and extreme subjectivism. Crotty (1998) 
identified five paradigms. As discussed by Patton (2002), there are many more paradigm 
typologies, and some are more parsimonious than others; there are typologies with as few as two 
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paradigms and as many as 27. Regardless of how a particular paradigm is conceptualized, or 
which one is chosen by a researcher, the various commitments defining each paradigm are meant 
to guide the practice of research on the ground. In other words, research programs should be 
underpinned by research paradigms.  
 
2.3. Research programs 
Generally, the research program level is where researchers are most active and 
comfortable, and Patterson and Williams (1998) identified three domains that comprise a 
‘research program’ within a scientific discipline: (1) the conceptual domain, which includes 
normative commitments (e.g., ontological and epistemological assumptions) and theoretical 
foundations (e.g., specific core concepts such as utility maximization in economics); (2) the 
methodological domain, where issues, for example, related to research design, sampling 
preferences, and data analysis and interpretation are considered and; (3) the substantive domain, 
which includes real-world issues and the application of research.  
Worldviews and paradigms are generally not specific to disciplines, as a researcher could 
hold a ‘complementary strengths’ worldview and apply a post-positivism paradigm to their work 
within the context of any discipline. Research programs, on the other hand, are discipline 
specific4, because this level is where normative commitments are paired with specific theories, 
conceptual models, constructs, and specific methodologies for generating empirical data; it is 
                                                 
4 It is worth mentioning that this is only true to the extent that disciplines are communities of scientists. As journals, 
conferences, and departments increasingly cross disciplinary boundaries, this may become less evident.  
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also the level where science is applied to real-world or managerial problems (Patterson & 
Williams, 1998).  
Unlike paradigms, which can be classified and discussed in terms of the same 
characteristics (e.g., epistemology), research programs are not “composed of independent, 
mutually exclusive categories with distinct boundaries”, as the “diversity of phenomena dealt 
with is so broad and varied” (Patterson & Williams, 1998:290). While the phenomena studied at 
the research program level vary significantly, it may be possible to find common ground within 
the theoretical foundation of the conceptual domain component. Elements of this theoretical 
foundation are what Greene (2008:8) referred to as ‘stances’, or the “conceptual perspectives 
related to the core constructs and theoretical dispositions” of a discipline. Similarly, these beliefs 
are considered as roughly equivalent to the term ‘concepts’ defined by Baumgärtner et al. 
(2008:388): “an intellectual figure – a norm, a notion or a mechanism – that is part of the basic 
construction of the world by a scientific community”. For example, a core stance of economics 
in general would be that given budgetary considerations, a consumer will purchase the ‘best’ 
bundle of goods, as it relates to the concepts of preferences and utility (Varian, 2014). 
Even though Patterson and Williams (1998) stressed that research programs can be 
challenging to clearly distinguish because of the broad range of phenomena studied, when 
considering a broad range of research programs within a discipline, one should begin to 
understand what types of phenomena are being studied. Patton (2002:80) related this to 
foundational or ‘burning’ questions of a discipline (e.g., sociology focuses on “what holds 
society or social groups together” or “what keeps them from falling apart”). Within the context 
of natural resource management social science, Patterson and Williams (1998) provided 
examples of research programs that focused on why people engage in recreation experiences and 
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what landscapes people prefer. These burning questions of natural resource management social 
science highlight, in part, an axiological goal to improve natural resource management. Often 
burning questions of different disciplines are considered to be obvious, which is perhaps why 
they are not explicitly addressed within Figure 2.1. However, as discussed below, the burning 
questions of EE are not always clear and, therefore, burning questions are considered as another 
element of research programs.  
A final point about research programs was made by Greene (2006:94): they gain 
“credibility and persuasiveness when all of these domains [(i.e., worldviews, paradigms, and 
researcher programs)] act in concert with one another, when their interlocking connections are 
smooth and well oiled, when the overall presentation is strong, coherent, well articulated and 
thus persuasive.” This is an imperative for EE, and part of proposing a pragmatist EE, and thus a 
significant point of this dissertation, is to achieve some level of coherence. The macrostructure 
framework may facilitate this coherence, which is now applied to briefly review scientific 
progress and debate within EE.  
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3. ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS: A RESEARCH TRADITION WITHOUT COHESION 
Ecological economics (EE) is a research tradition focused on understanding, broadly, the 
interaction between humans and nature for the purpose of making more sustainable decisions, 
with an explicit focus on the diverse range of competing values, and the biophysical limits of the 
planet. EE officially formed in the late 1980s (Røpke, 2005), but there is little agreement, and 
relatively little scholarship regarding the research tradition as a well-oiled, single entity. In other 
words, well-articulated EE research programs, which trace on-the-ground practice up through the 
scientific macrostructure are limited. To be clear, there is a significant amount of scholarship 
focused on the theoretical foundations or conceptual ideas of EE. This scholarship is the result of 
thirty years of collective thinking, and roots of core ideas extending further back into a variety of 
disciplines (i.e., systems ecology, multiple strands of economics, energy studies stemming from 
physics and engineering, and general systems theory) (Røpke, 2004, 2005). Franco (2018) traced 
some EE ideas back to the 1880s.  
This diverse range of disciplinary expertise was coupled with an enthusiasm for applying 
a more integrated type of science to address complex/wicked environmental problems. These 
problems were increasingly alarming to policy and science communities, and singular 
disciplinary approaches were considered inadequate5. The coupling of interdisciplinary research 
and an interest in complex environmental problems resulted in progress toward better defining 
the substantive domain in Figure 2.1. For instance, there is general agreement that the application 
of research within EE should address sustainability issues. While full clarity and agreement on 
                                                 
5 Ropke (2005) outlined the various synergies relevant to the formation of and development of EE, which primarily 
took place in the late 1980 and early 1990s and focused on sustainability and transdisciplinary research in the wake 
of the Brundtland Report, including the emergence of the Beijer Institute, which is also known for work in resilience 
and social-ecological systems.   
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what sustainability means is a challenge given the variety of definitions and perspectives on the 
notoriously elusive concept, EE has been referred to as the ‘science and management of 
sustainability’ (Costanza, 1991b), and one primary ‘approach to the concept of sustainability’ 
(Quental et al., 2011). 
Despite progress in particular areas of research programs within EE, the research 
tradition lacks cohesion. While there are several examples where a comprehensive treatment is 
provided (e.g., Costanza, 1991b; Daly & Farley, 2004; Faber et al., 1996; Martínez-Alier & 
Muradian, 2015; Spash, 2017a; Tacconi, 2000), there are very few examples where all three 
domains of the research program (including epistemology, ontology, and axiology) are clearly 
defined and the various interrelationships between the research programs, paradigms, and 
worldviews are discussed. That is, it is rare to find accounts that explicitly describe a worldview, 
paradigm, and research program to be applied within EE. This is partly because, as outlined in 
the introduction, there is a lack of literature within EE related to the normative commitments that 
are established at the worldview and paradigm level. Prior to outlining pragmatist philosophy as 
one option to improve the cohesion of EE, the progress of EE as a field is briefly reviewed.  
 
3.1. Worldviews: A debate about methodological pluralism and the need for more nuance 
One could argue that discussions related to worldviews within EE are both foundational 
and prevalent. Indeed, as the then newly minted Editor-in-Chief of the journal Ecological 
Economics, Howarth (2008:469) suggested that EE is defined “by a set of concrete problems 
rather than a particular epistemology or methodology.” This statement implies a worldview 
where multiple approaches to science not only exist, but are necessary and required for research 
within EE. Richard Howarth was not breaking new ground with this statement, but reinforcing 
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the widespread call for methodological pluralism within EE that accompanied the field from the 
start (e.g., Costanza, 1991a; Gowdy & Erickson, 2005; Norgaard, 1989; Tacconi, 1998).  
As Norgaard (1989) noted when EE was in its nascent stage, the research tradition will be 
most useful if it maintains the “breadth of the methodological base of economics and ecology 
and reaches out to the methodologies of other disciplines as well.” Most seem to agree that 
methodological pluralism is beneficial in principle, as it represents the belief that “certain 
knowledge about reality is not in general possible” (Dow, 2004:283). Therefore, there is the need 
for multiple ways of knowing to understand complex social-ecological systems (SESs), 
particularly when the subject matter involves situations where law-like behavior and definitive 
theories are not likely to be found (Dow, 2004). EE, and particularly its social science focused 
efforts, addresses such subject matter.  
While these discussions clearly suggest that an extreme rationalist worldview (Figure 2.1) 
does not align with EE, there are rarely additional details offered regarding what worldview 
should be embraced. To be clear, many criticize the calls for methodological pluralism as 
dangerous by suggesting that without additional details as to what methodological pluralism 
means, the research tradition is embracing a default position of Feyerabend-style relativism. For 
instance, Spash (2015:33) stated: “the conundrum for methodological pluralists is that they must 
either indiscriminately accept everything, and so lose any meaning for the concept of knowledge, 
or accept some grounds for rejecting ideas and approaches which they find strongly 
objectionable.” In other words, it has been argued that embracing methodological pluralism is 
impeding the realization of the fields promising goals (Anderson & M'Gonigle, 2012), and 
leading to a situation where sorting good knowledge from bad knowledge is not possible 
(Baumgärtner et al., 2008; Spash, 2012, 2015). There is a concern that unstructured pluralism 
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could result in an ‘anything goes’ approach where a science is practiced on a tenuous theoretical 
foundation (Dow, 2007; Spash, 2015).  
Narrowing the potentially appropriate worldviews to somewhere in the middle of the 
spectrum between extreme rationalism and extreme relativism represents the majority of work 
within EE. For instance, as briefly outlined above, Clive Spash, who is perhaps the most active 
scholar within the context of discussions on normative commitments of EE, eschews 
unstructured methodological pluralism but embraces structured methodological pluralism for 
interdisciplinary research in cases when epistemological and ontological commitments are shared 
(Spash, 2012).  
Given the caveat that methodological pluralism is acceptable when ontology and 
epistemology align, then it seems that Spash is positioned near a ‘complementary strengths 
stance’ in Table 2.1, or somewhere on the left side of the spectrum illustrated in Figure 2.2. 
Without explicit acknowledgement of his stance, or explicit rejection of stances other than 
extreme relativism, it is difficult to know exactly where Spash (2012) is positioned or what types 
of middle-ground methodological pluralism are being rejected. It seems the ‘unstructured’ 
pluralism, as explained by Dow (2004) or embraced by Spash, is not specific enough. 
Furthermore, without a more nuanced discussion of worldviews, it is challenging to understand if 
those criticizing methodological pluralism have greater concern with blending (or not blending) 
paradigms (i.e., an issue with particular dialogs), or with the relationship between paradigms and 
research in practice. In other words, by rejecting particular forms of methodological pluralism, is 
one rejecting an ‘alternative paradigm’ worldview or an ‘a-paradigmatic’ worldview?  
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3.2. Paradigms: Several mentioned, but few linked to research programs 
Those advocating for a critical realism paradigm (Puller & Smith, 2017; Spash, 2015) 
perhaps provide the most thorough discussion regarding both the various associated normative 
commitments, and the implications for adopting such a paradigm for research within EE. For 
instance, Puller and Smith (2017) highlighted past research that is both guided by critical realism 
and relevant to EE (which include discussions of approaches to interdisciplinary research, cost-
benefit analysis as an unrealistic planning tool, and the limits to growth).  
Other contributions to the paradigm discussion within EE were listed in the introduction, 
so they are not restated here. Instead it is worth noting that there is relatively little discussion that 
explicitly links the advocated or selected paradigm with an EE research program. For instance, 
Baumgärtner et al. (2008:390) articulated their normative commitments related to epistemology, 
noting that knowledge is the result of “the interplay between human intellect and empirical 
experience.” However, the implications of this commitment within the context of an EE specific 
study is only articulated at a very general level. For example, the authors stated that these 
epistemological assumptions, in part, support their use of ‘generic modeling’, which abstractly 
represents the system under study in a way that “can potentially be generalized to a large class of 
systems [while], at the same time, [retaining] enough structure to be actually applicable to 
realistic systems” (Baumgärtner et al., 2008:389). While this suggestion implies that exemplars 
are the goal (i.e., a model that may be generalizable to a limited extent), it is difficult to clearly 
understand how this is achieved without specific examples.   
To be sure, clearly demonstrating the link between normative commitments and research 
practice is a challenge (and the ‘a-paradigmatic’ stance sees it as unnecessary); nonetheless, such 
attempts could benefit the field of EE. It is worth noting that this challenge is not unique to EE, 
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as mixed methods research more generally is grappling with a similar issue. For instance, 
pragmatist philosophy (herein advocated as a foundation for a worldview and paradigm in EE) is 
increasingly popular as a potential way forward within mixed methods, as it aims to move 
beyond6 historical philosophical incommensurabilities. But, Greene (2008) suggested that there 
is a need to move past describing the philosophical position to providing specifics of how 
pragmatism may actually influence research in practice. A similar argument is made for EE; that 
is, simply suggesting a paradigm as an underpinning to a research program in EE without 
specific examples of the implications of such normative commitments is inadequate. 
 
3.3. Research programs: well-developed generalities, relatively few specifics  
As a research tradition, EE lacks a strong and clear identity (Faber, 2008; Røpke, 2005). 
Part of this lack of identity is due to the lack of organization and specificity related to its subject 
matter (Faber, 2008; Røpke, 2005; Spash, 2012). The lack of specific research topics, or ‘burning 
questions’, likely stems from a very broad definition of what is studied in EE. For instance, 
Spash (2015) stated that the objects of study are the interaction between society, economy and 
nature. Others narrowed the subject matter to the interaction between economy and nature (e.g., 
Baumgärtner et al., 2008; Costanza, 1989; Proops, 1989), though caveats are often attached. For 
instance, Costanza (1989:1, emphasis added), described the subject matter as the “relationship 
between ecosystems and economic systems in the broadest sense.” The journal, Ecological 
Economics, “emphasizes critical work that draws on and integrates elements of ecological 
                                                 
6 As will be discussed at length in chapter 4, particular normative assumptions of pragmatism facilitate this moving 
beyond, such as experience as the foundation of its epistemology and an axiology focused on communication and 
understanding. 
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science, economics, and the analysis of values, behaviors, cultural practices, institutional 
structures, and societal dynamics” (Elsevier, 2019:paragraph 1).    
This broad and general study area and diversity of disciplinary interest in EE yields, 
unsurprisingly, a research tradition that lacks a singular (or even several) burning question(s). As 
Røpke (2005:285) suggested, EE could be said to cover any topic with even a slight relation to 
the environment; in other words, “the field is programmatically open, pluralistic and 
transdisciplinary, so virtually unrelated contributions can appear as parts of the field. The core 
beliefs provide a framework for research, but they give little specific guidance.” 
Core beliefs in this context (also referred to as ‘stances’ and ‘concepts’ above) refers to 
the theoretical foundation of the ‘conceptual domain’. There may be some disagreement 
surrounding the various core beliefs, but surveying the literature within EE yields an abundance 
of scholarship on core beliefs (e.g., Castro e Silva & Teixeira, 2011; Costanza, 1991a; Gowdy & 
Erickson, 2005; Munda, 1997; Nadeau, 2015; Özkaynak et al., 2012; Proops, 1989). After two 
decades of debate and discussion in the field, core beliefs on conceptual issues started to emerge. 
Gowdy and Erickson (2005), in the Cambridge Journal of Economics, published a paper entitled 
“The approach to ecological economics”. Table 3.1 illustrates the stance on several main 
conceptual issues in ecological economics in comparison to neoclassical welfare economics. The 
intent is not to review each and every belief discussed by Gowdy and Erickson (2005), but 
instead to emphasize that even though particular elements of many research programs in EE are 
well developed (i.e., general theoretical beliefs), practitioners generally lack specifics about how 
these beliefs influence both the methodological domain and the substantive domain.  
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Table 3.1. Key core beliefs of ecological economics 
Source: Gowdy and Erickson (2005:213) 
 
That is, the core beliefs in the neoclassical welfare economics column have been developed and 
refined in a way over time that is tightly knit and gives practitioners guidance. For example, the 
decision rules associated with potential Pareto improvements are fairly definitive. The same 
cannot be said of the ecological economic alternative. How one can make a decision based on 
equity, stability, and resilience of environmental and social systems (with economic systems 
Conceptual issue Neoclassical welfare economics Ecological economic alternative 
Value Monism Reduce value to commensurable 
monetary units; utility function. 
Separate value into incommensurable 
categories; multi-criteria assessment 
The Rational Actor Individual consumers and firms at 
the center of analysis  
Analyze humans as social actors, 
consumers versus citizens 
Marginal Analysis Comparative statics of marginal 
change.  
Recognizes discontinuous change and 
total effects 
Evolutionary 
Change 
Evolution as constrained 
optimization, survival of the fittest 
view of market outcomes, 
individual based selection  
Importance of contingency, historical 
accidents, path dependency, consider 
altruism and group selection as well as 
selfishness. 
Uncertainty  Reduce uncertainty to risk. Market 
outcome focus to decision-making 
Precautionary principle to deal with pure 
uncertainty. Process-oriented, co-
evolutionary focus to decision-making. 
Decision Criteria Efficiency as the sole criterion, 
usually based on potential Pareto 
improvements.  
Equity, stability, resilience of 
environmental and social systems. 
Production Process Theory of allocation of fixed 
resources; production function.  
Production as a biophysical process, 
thermodynamics; extended IO approach, 
joint production of goods and polluting 
wastes. 
Discounting Straight-line discounting of future 
costs and benefits.  
Recognizes the difference between 
individual and social valuation of the 
future; hyperbolic discounting.  
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nested within the latter) is an open question which has multiple answers. This is a direct 
acknowledgement of complex environmental problems. 
Additionally the lack of an established area of concern beyond the interaction of humans 
and nature is impeding progress in EE. Without a set of concise burning questions, or a set of 
goals related to what aspect(s) of sustainability can be addressed by EE, it is challenging to 
understand its potential contributions. This potentially impedes interdisciplinary research, as the 
role of the ecological economist is difficult to articulate. To be clear, some have attempted to 
outline the primary topics or burning questions in EE. For instance, Røpke (2005) listed three 
main research programs: (1) identity formation (a great deal of which included distinguishing EE 
from environmental and resource economics, as done in Table 3.1); (2) issues of scale and the 
resilience approach and; (3) valuation and decision-making. Castro e Silva and Teixeira (2011), 
through a ‘bibliometric’ analysis of literature within EE, listed ten topic areas: (1) theory 
building; (2) methodological issues; (3) values; (4) policies, governance, and institutions; (5) 
technical change and the environment; (6) trade and the environment; (7) global environmental 
issues; (8) production, consumption and sustainability; (9) biodiversity conservation and; (10) 
valuation. These topic areas are consistent with social-ecological systems research, a topic 
returned to in detail in chapter seven.  
 While these topic areas are more specific than the interaction between nature, the 
economy, and society, they are still quite broad. Furthermore, research in EE has pursued these 
broad topics in a way that may or may not distinguish itself from environmental and resource 
economics. Regarding issues of scale, global environmental issues, and sustainability, one could 
argue that EE has progress in a way that distinguishes itself from the more traditional economic 
approach through an articulation of how a macro-economic system can better realize the 
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biophysical realities of our planet. The conventional economic worldview is one that fosters a 
strong commitment to boundless economic growth without much consideration of social and 
environmental context – this worldview has led, in part, to pressure on natural resources and 
environmental degradation (Lin, 2013). While some would argue this is an outdated 
‘conventional economic worldview’ adopted by few economists at this point, it has galvanized 
many around further discussion of a macro-level ecological economy, which is usually discussed 
as a theoretical endpoint where human economic activities are reorganized in a way that is more 
in line with ecological principles (e.g., Janda & Lehun, 2015; Lin, 2014).  
This underpins the ‘pre-analytic vision’ in EE that asserts there is a need to better link 
economic systems and a biophysical reality; a need that requires explicit attention to issues of 
scale. That is, “the embeddedness of the economy in nature and the related idea that the human 
economy can be said to take up more or less ‘space’ in relation to the closed system of the earth. 
The larger the scale of the economy becomes, the greater the risk of destroying the conditions for 
human life on earth in the long run” (Røpke, 2005:275). To this end, several topics have been 
developed or further explored within EE, including de-growth, low-growth and the steady state 
economy (Daly, 1974, 1996; Martínez-Alier et al., 2010; Paech, 2017; Victor & Jackson, 2015), 
alternative measures to well-being beyond the conventional gross domestic product (GDP) 
(Boyd & Banzhaf, 2007; Daly & Farley, 2004), and framing economic growth within the 
‘coevolutionary paradigm’ (Kallis & Norgaard, 2010; Norgaard, 1994). The practical avenues to 
such a theoretical endpoint are not well established, but EE has at least progressed in developing 
a vision of this endpoint.  
The broad topics of valuation, values, and decision-making are perhaps less 
distinguishable from the more traditional approaches of environmental and resource economics. 
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According to Plumecocq (2014), who completed a discourse analysis of several journals relevant 
to EE, the field of EE has increased its focus on ‘ecosystem services methods and debates’ over 
time and, partly as a result, the fields of EE and environmental and resource economics have 
become less distinct (despite an express interest of EE to be something different than 
environmental economics). For instance, the significant amount of research focused on 
improving and applying valuation methods such as stated preference approaches are mostly 
situated within a standard economic framework (e.g., Armatas et al., 2014; Blamey et al., 2000; 
Fischer & Hanley, 2007; Kontogianni et al., 2012). This is not to say that EE contributions 
related to valuation, which expressly depart from economic frameworks, have not been made. 
For example, Spash et al. (2009:962) used the theory of planned behavior to gain a better 
understanding of what motivated willingness to pay (WTP). Kumar and Kumar (2008) applied a 
‘psycho-cultural’ perspective to improve interdisciplinary collaboration and cooperation in the 
valuation of ecosystem services and, similarly, van Riper et al. (2017) focused on incorporating 
socio-cultural phenomena into ecosystem service valuation. Spash (2007) applied deliberative 
monetary valuation as a way to combine economic and political processes in valuation. Armatas 
et al. (2018) combined Q-methodology and choice modeling to provide a social and economic 
perspective on the importance of ecosystem services, which ensured that a broad range of 
perspectives could express their opinions.  
The primary point to be gleaned from this section on research programs is two-fold. First, 
ecological economists can better articulate how the core beliefs of the research tradition, such as 
in Table 3.1, are to be realized in practice. Second, ecological economists need to better 
articulate what their ‘burning questions’ are. This requires further grappling with the 
fundamental question of how EE is different from the more traditional approaches of 
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environmental and natural resource economics, the latter of which have, for example, ways to 
accommodate ‘difficult to value’ aspects of the environment such as existence and bequest 
values. In other words, simply accounting for non-use values, for instance, does not seem to 
constitute an EE approach. Can more traditional environmental and natural resource economic 
approaches be considered EE if they are accompanied by an understanding of drivers of changes 
affecting the provision of environmental benefits, costs accrued to society resulting from human 
and natural change, or the social, political and cultural barriers to receiving particular benefits? If 
one answers yes to this question, then it seems to flow naturally into another: when is one not 
practicing EE anymore, and doing something different such as political ecology?    
Pragmatist philosophy can help to add cohesion to research in EE by better linking the 
scientific macrostructure. While pragmatist philosophy may partly address the need for greater 
specificity in terms of burning questions and subject matter, a social-ecological systems 
framework is also a potentially important contributor to the need for greater specificity (as 
discussed in chapter 7).   
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4. PRAGMATISM AND A DIVERSE COLLECTION OF IDEAS 
Pragmatism is a philosophical tradition, which is often labeled ‘American Pragmatism’ 
due to its origin in the United States. It is distinct from a more colloquial use of the term 
‘pragmatist’ or ‘pragmatism’, which may also be associated with America, as Westbrook 
(2005:ix) explained:   
In ordinary speech, a ‘pragmatist’ is someone (often a politician) who is willing to 
settle for a glass half empty when standing on principle threatens to achieve less. 
Pragmatists are concerned above all about practical results; they have a “can do” 
attitude and are impatient with those of the “should do” disposition who never 
seem to get anything done. Americans are often said to be a particularly pragmatic 
people, and many Americans pride themselves on a sensibility others are inclined 
to label shallowly opportunistic. 
This distinction between the philosophical tradition and the colloquial use of the term is 
generally made because it can, and has, created confusion (Ralston, 2011; Webb, 2007, 2012). 
That is, colloquial uses of ‘pragmatism’ are confused as stances of pragmatism philosophy. For 
instance, in a textbook describing qualitative research and methods within a section entitled 
“pragmatism”, Patton (2002:135-137) suggested that, in practice, one does not need to consider 
theory and the normative commitments of various research paradigms. In this context, the 
meaning of ‘pragmatism’ is colloquial (as no reference to the philosophical tradition is made). 
Similarly, within the context of EE, Spash (2013) negatively described one main camp within the 
field ‘new environmental pragmatists’. This camp was characterized as environmental scientists 
chiefly concerned with influencing policy and management, who market the importance of 
nature through commodification and valuation; while at the same time sacrificing theoretical 
rigor, especially in the social sciences, in the pursuit of solving practical problems within the 
current world hegemony. Spash (2012, 2013) is clear to stress that he is referring to the 
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colloquial use and not the philosophical tradition; nonetheless, the conflation between the two 
uses of the term ‘pragmatism’ does occur.  
Despite the attempts to distinguish the different uses of the term, some have suggested 
language used within the philosophical tradition can be misleading. For instance, Crotty 
(1998:62) characterized criticism of pragmatism both as misguided based on “a simplistic and 
distorted reading”, and warranted given a “rhetoric” that is easily misinterpreted due to its 
simplicity and ambiguity. This assessment seems fair because, on one hand, a thorough reading 
of pragmatist philosophy highlights several commitments that belie an expedient approach (see, 
for example, the discussion by Minteer (2012:26-28) with regard to pragmatist commitment to 
the method of inquiry and democracy). On the other hand, cursory survey papers (there are 
many) can correctly describe pragmatism and, at the same time, give an impression that 
pragmatist philosophy advocates for an ‘anything goes’, rigor-less approach to science. For 
example, in their ‘guide to understanding social science research for natural scientists’, Moon 
and Blackman (2014:1175) suggested that pragmatism applies all necessary approaches to 
understand the research problem without committing to a particular philosophical position, is a 
perspective that seeks a “compromise” between empiricism and rationalism, judges the value of 
knowledge “with respect to how well it serves human purpose”, and can be applied for “any or 
all” research purposes. Although this description is potentially valid, without additional detail of 
the more nuanced aspects of pragmatist philosophy, and how it may be different from other 
perspectives driving research, one could certainly draw a conclusion that pragmatist philosophy 
and pragmatism in the common-language sense are synonymous.  
Pragmatist philosophy (henceforth the only meaning of the term ‘pragmatism’ or 
‘pragmatist’) is commonly traced to the thinking and writing of three people: Charles Sanders 
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Peirce, William James, and John Dewey (George Herbert Mead is sometimes mentioned as a 
fourth – and Ralston (2011) added Jane Addams as a fifth). It is frequently noted that these 
pragmatist originators were quite different in their thinking, which is partly why the exact nature 
of what pragmatism ‘is’ has been thoroughly discussed to no certain conclusion. This point was 
belabored in the early days of pragmatism when, in 1908, Arthur Lovejoy argued for thirteen 
pragmatisms, which “are separate not merely in the sense of being discriminable, but in the sense 
of being logically independent, so that you may without inconsistency accept any one and reject 
all the others, or refute one and leave the philosophical standing of the others unimpugned” 
(Lovejoy, 1963:2). As noted by Hands (2001), William James originally articulated six different 
pragmatist approaches. The ‘what is pragmatism’ question is perhaps even more noticeable 
today, which is reflected by: (1) various distinctions within the pragmatist community, such as 
between ‘classical pragmatists’ and ‘neo-pragmatists’ (Putnam & Putnam, 2017) and, further, 
‘neo-pragmatists’ and ‘paleo-pragmatists’ (Minteer, 2012; Ralston, 2011; Westbrook, 1993) and; 
(2) a common caveat accompanying summaries of the pragmatist landscape stressing the 
“spectrum of meanings…multiple permutations…novel versions” (Ralston, 2011:77), and/or the 
past and present “philosophical heterogeneity” (Minteer, 2012:8).  
In some cases, the various meanings of pragmatism is explicitly identified as a challenge. 
For example, Proctor (1998) outlined potential insights that pragmatism could provide within the 
context of the relativist debate regarding the social construction of nature, but these contributions 
were, according to the author, somewhat obscured by the myriad meanings of pragmatism. In 
other cases, the lack of a settled understanding appears to create freedom to suggest new 
directions and applications. Koopman (2009:1) justified his book, Pragmatism as Transition, not 
as “yet another in a long line of books in which the author attempts to state what pragmatism is”, 
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but as a novel conception of pragmatism based on previously stated, though little explored, 
pragmatist ideas. 
This characteristic of pragmatist philosophy is acknowledged for several reasons. First, it 
underscores the broad nature of pragmatist philosophy and highlights why a concise and 
authoritative overview is a potentially intractable task. Second, it signals to the reader that the 
pragmatism presented herein is not only partial, but also potentially different from pragmatisms 
presented elsewhere. Third, it stresses the need to be specific about the conceptualization applied 
herein with regard to how it relates to the various threads within the pragmatist literature.  
For this dissertation, pragmatism is, first and foremost, a philosophical perspective that 
can serve as a philosophy of science. Pragmatism applied as a philosophy of science is common, 
though its framing as such is inconsistent (a point clarified below). However, as previously 
suggested, pragmatism is quite broad and, as a result, it has been discussed as something more 
than a philosophy of science. This lack of limits is reflected in a variety of pragmatist 
discussions, such as pragmatism as social theory (that is, a general idea related to how societies 
function) (Frankel Pratt, 2016; Joas, 1993). Or, more broadly, pragmatism as a ‘Way of Life’ 
(Putnam & Putnam, 2017) or a “complete philosophical ‘Weltanschauung’, a plenary and 
exhaustive view of the world” (Long, 2002:39). The wide scope of interest within pragmatist 
philosophy is likely due to the varied interests of the founders. As Webb (2007:1070) noted, 
“Peirce focuses upon scientific, logical and mathematical inquiry while Dewey uses scientific 
inquiry as a resource for inquiry into practical problems of society and individuals.” 
Within the context of EE and the macro-science framework provided above, interpreting 
pragmatism as a philosophy of science and something more is relevant because it highlights the 
potential that pragmatism may not only inform the worldview and paradigm levels, but also 
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facets of research programs such as burning questions and methodology. In other words, 
pragmatist philosophers have focused on the more universal7 paradigmatic assumptions (e.g., 
epistemology) and, in addition, they have articulated specific stances and methodological 
characteristics that align with, or potentially address weaknesses related to, EE. For example, if 
considering environmental pragmatism as a methodology (Light & Katz, 1996), an 
environmental ethic (Rosenthal & Buchholz, 1996), a method of conflict management (Varner et 
al., 1996), and/or an approach to sustainable adaptive management (Norton, 2003, 2005, 2015), 
then the discussion necessarily departs from general philosophy of science issues such as reality 
and inquiry to specific subject areas. Some of these subject areas, such as environmental values, 
complex social-ecological systems, and intergenerational equity are highly relevant to EE.    
 The pragmatism that can help guide research within EE is, broadly, summarized by 
Ralston (2011) as a “sophisticated way of thinking about knowledge, existence and social-
political affairs.” This type of pragmatism is characterized by Ralston (2011) as ‘paleo-
pragmatism’, and it is roughly represents the pragmatism embraced herein. This is the type of 
pragmatism discussed and accepted by Minteer (2012), who is perhaps fairly categorized as an 
environmental pragmatist. While environmental pragmatism, and those contributing to it (e.g., 
Bryan Norton, Ben Minteer, Andrew Light), form a significant portion of the pragmatist ideas 
discussed below, the focus is on pragmatism more broadly. As Bryan Norton recently stated, the 
core of his diverse body of work (which includes ideas related to sustainability, adaptive 
management, environmental values, and social-ecological systems) is, more broadly, 
“pragmatism” as a “forward looking philosophy” (Meine, 2018:289). 
                                                 
7  ‘Universal’ in that one can apply pragmatist philosophy of science to a variety of subjects, from international 
relations (Frankel Pratt, 2016; Ralston, 2011) to community health research (Andrew & Halcomb, 2007). 
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4.1. Pragmatism as a philosophy of science: A worldview and a paradigm 
A review of the pragmatist literature highlights several different conceptualizations of 
pragmatism as a philosophy of science. It has been placed beside other research paradigms (as 
defined above) such as positivism, constructivism, and interpretivism (e.g., Moon & Blackman, 
2014). It has been discussed primarily in the context of its influence on such paradigms (e.g., 
Crotty (1998) discussed its influence on ‘symbolic interactionism’; Lovejoy (1963) identified 
one of thirteen pragmatisms as ‘pragmatism as interactionism’), and framed as being 
fundamentally different than such ‘metaphysical’ paradigms (Denzin, 2010; Morgan, 2007, 
2014). Somewhat differently still, Norton (2005:519-578) provided a historical overview of 
pragmatism and concluded that it is most appropriate to think of pragmatism as encompassing a 
revised version of positivism.  
These various different framings of pragmatism as a philosophy of science, as well as its 
status as an emergent paradigm with an ‘alternative paradigm’ stance (Table 2.1), suggest it does 
not neatly fit with the more traditional research paradigms. This ill fit is implied, or in some 
cases explicitly stated (e.g., Haack, 2009), in the numerous accounts of pragmatism which start 
by describing the philosophy as one that rejects traditional philosophical dualisms (e.g., 
realism/relativism, free will/determinism, facts/values, individualism/holism). From the 
beginning, Dewey promoted pragmatism as a different kind of philosophy (Morgan, 2014), and 
more recent scholarship has focused on conveying the difference of pragmatism from other more 
traditional research paradigms as it relates to perceived relationship between ontology, 
epistemology, methodology, and methods (Denzin, 2010; Morgan, 2007, 2014). As suggested by 
Morgan (2007), pragmatism may seem out of place within the context of other paradigms 
because it does not necessarily adhere to the same structure (specifically, pragmatism does not 
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prioritize ontology in its quest for knowledge). This relationship between the different 
paradigmatic normative commitments reflects part of the pragmatist worldview.  
That is, pragmatism does not adhere to the common framework for knowledge 
production provided in many research methods discussions (e.g., Crotty, 1998; Lincoln et al., 
2011), where a pyramid-like structure is presented with ontology forming the base which 
supports the epistemology tier, which supports the methodology tier which, in turn, supports the 
methods tier. As Morgan (2007:58) noted, this framework is often presented with ontology, 
epistemology, and methodology being weighted equally (at least in a nominal sense where one is 
not more important than another), while at the same time the sequential orientation “led to an 
emphasis on metaphysical questions about the nature of reality and the possibility of truth 
because these ‘higher order’ assumptions imposed limits on every aspect of their system.” This 
orientation, and the fact that comparisons between different paradigms were often rooted in 
ontological issues, is what led Morgan (2007) to dub these more traditional paradigms 
‘metaphysical’. The macrostructure framework developed by Patterson and Williams (1998) is 
adopted partly because it adhered to Laudan’s paradigm model, which explicitly posits that the 
different types of normative commitments (i.e., ontology, epistemology, and axiology) are 
mutually defining and constraining, as opposed to hierarchical.  
In addition to the view that ontology is not necessarily foundational to the construction of 
a research paradigm (discussed further below), the pragmatist worldview adopts the perspective 
that traditional philosophical dualisms (e.g., realism versus relativism) are reconcilable, usually 
through some middle ground. For instance, Haack (2009) proposed an ‘intermediate theory’ of 
epistemology by rejecting the traditional dualism between foundationalism and coherentism. 
This dualism is not elaborated upon, though Steup (2018) provides a quality introduction. 
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However, the primary point is that the pragmatist worldview is a middle ground where multiple 
approaches to science exist in a beneficial way and paradigmatic differences can be reconciled. 
On the spectrum illustrated in Figure 2.2, the pragmatist worldview to science could be 
positioned near the ‘blended/unified’ end of the spectrum, but it is important to note that this 
position is likely considered a theoretical endpoint. That is, over an infinite amount of time, a 
plurality of approaches may converge toward a singular scientific approach and, consequently, a 
unitary truth. The starting point, on the other hand, is somewhere between pluralism and critical 
pluralism (Figure 2.1). As Minteer (2006:6) noted, pragmatism is known “for its acceptance, if 
not hearty embrace, of the condition of pluralism; i.e., that individuals are differently situated 
and are shaped to a significant degree by dissimilar traditions and experiences. Any claim to a 
universal or singular ‘good’ is thus illusory.” While this ‘pluralism’ refers mainly to the belief 
that there is no single ethical norm, plurality in scientific approaches is also embraced by 
pragmatists.   
Discussing the implications of the incorporation of different approaches to science, and 
perhaps even convergence toward a single methodology, for the purpose of practical research is 
critical. Prior to that discussion in chapter five, pragmatism is presented as a paradigm by 
discussing the normative commitments related to ontology, epistemology, and axiology.  
 
4.1.1. Pragmatist ontology: Disagreements and questions of relevance  
Unsurprisingly, pragmatist literature on ontology is diverse. There is disagreement related 
to the realism versus relativism debate. The founding pragmatists were split on the issue, and this 
split continues today. Charles Peirce was a realist, though of a unique kind (Haack, 1977). Peirce 
believed in the existence of universal laws and the associated causality, which existed outside the 
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human mind; however, human conceptions of this reality is “purely mental in its composition” 
(Skagestad, 1983:269). According to Peirce, over time a community of inquirers could arrive at a 
single, unitary truth (Norton, 2005). William James did not subscribe to this belief, and took a 
more pluralistic approach (Norton, 2005). Some have suggested that James took an essentially 
agnostic view toward metaphysics as a whole (Morgan, 2007). The continuance of this 
disagreement today is perhaps most evident in the ‘neopragmatist’ camp, which is often said to 
include Richard Rorty and has been distinguished from others by its proximity to relativism and 
subjectivism (Minteer, 2012; Norton, 2005). The ontological position of the ‘paleo-pragmatists’, 
on the other hand, tends toward realism, though this is still a middle of the spectrum realism.  
This middle-of-the-spectrum position is appropriate given that pragmatism is generally 
focused on transcending typical philosophical dualisms, which are unlikely to yield consensus 
conclusions and may impede effective inquiry (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Ralston, 2011). 
According to Norton (2005:63), pragmatism is “not relativistic—it expects to arrive at a 
justifiable decision in a particular situation—so it is better thought of as contextual.” On the 
other end of the spectrum, pragmatism is definitely not strictly realist in that is strongly rejects 
‘foundationalism’, or the idea that knowledge is grounded in basic beliefs about a certain reality 
(Minteer, 2012). Pragmatists generally deny that the human mind is a mirror image of nature 
(Bromley, 2015). Anderson (2011) suggested that pragmatists do not believe in an absolute truth 
at a given time but, instead, a temporary belief that would inevitably change.  
Norton (2005) suggested ‘limited realism’ as a pragmatist epistemology, but it is 
discussed here as it captures what could be perceived as ontological assumptions and it 
highlights what is meant by ‘contextual’. Furthermore, it touches on antifoundationalism and the 
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importance of language, which are two key pragmatist commitments (Minteer, 2012). Norton 
(2005:109) stated:  
Limited realism accepts the fact that no substantive knowledge of the external 
world is knowable a priori; we must construct our system of beliefs without 
benefit of prior principles to guide us [(i.e., antifoundationalism)]. It also accepts 
the apparently unavoidable conclusion that our varied linguistic forms, designed 
to function in many different situations, yield no common underlying structure for 
all experience [(i.e., importance of language)]. The categories we find in this 
world are of our own making; they are not given in reality independent of us. For 
these reasons realism must be limited. But it remains realism in the most 
important sense. It retains a method of selection based in reality, not in our 
wishes, dreams, or imaginations.  
Thinking of reality within pragmatism as ‘contextual’ is perhaps more clear in light of this 
stance, as our experiences, social commitments, opinions about what is important, and general 
viewpoints are diverse and, inevitably, shaped at least in part by different circumstances. As 
discussed in the next section on epistemology, pragmatist views on the meaning of ‘experience’ 
represent a view of social beings that aligns with the interpretive approach and meanings-based 
models (i.e., social beings are proactive learners that engage with, and derive meaning from, 
their natural and cultural environment); however, this does not imply an ontology where humans 
are “arbitrary creators who simply make up a ‘world’” (i.e., a ‘wholesale constructivist’ 
approach) (Anderson, 2011:11). Instead, human beings are natural interpreters of our natural and 
cultural environment, which belies certain knowledge about reality without denying the 
existence of such reality (Anderson, 2011). As Bromley (2015:10) explained, “there are, to be 
sure, objects and events ‘out there’ in the world, but there are no universal and objectively ‘true’ 
descriptions of the objects and events in that world.” Hildebrand (2018) asserted that John 
Dewey took an ontological position that was realist, naturalist, non-reductive, emergentist, and 
process-oriented. This position is one where our place in some objective reality cannot be 
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divorced from our observations of that reality and, therefore, for all intents and purposes, reality 
is ‘limited’.  
This middle-ground ontological position may be unsatisfactory to some. However, 
pragmatists commonly consider a final and settled position as generally unimportant. As Lohse 
(2016) suggested, there are two prominent views regarding the relevance of ontological 
investigations within the context of social science: (1) the ‘ontology first’ viewpoint, which holds 
that questions of reality are mostly neglected and are in need of sorting out prior to methodology 
and theory and; (2) the ‘leave ontology behind’ viewpoint, which holds that these abstract 
discussions have received plenty of attention and are not all that important for fruitful social 
science anyway. While some pragmatists have focused on the benefit of ontology as being 
somewhere in the middle (e.g., Frankel Pratt, 2016; Lohse, 2016), the general sentiment that 
ontology is not of paramount importance is evident in a variety of pragmatist thinking. As 
pointed out by Frankel Pratt (2016:512), the pragmatist school has made an effort to collapse 
ontology and epistemology, which is likely due to the common perception among pragmatists 
that “fundamental ontological questions of social theory, such as the nature of action, experience, 
agency, structure, or mind, are too abstract and do not need to be answered anyway to permit 
fruitful inquiry.” 
 The agnostic view of William James toward metaphysics is one example, as mentioned 
above, but many others appear to agree. For instance, Morgan (2007) focused on methodology, 
epistemology, and methods when discussing research underpinned by pragmatism (essentially 
removing ontology as an essential element). As pointed out by Norton (2005:572), the 
democratic pragmatic epistemology for social inquiry, which is centered on bottom-up 
approaches where diverse interests and communities are engaged, is an open-ended process 
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whereby “progress is measured by the plausibility of the stories we tell about our common 
interests,” and this process is important regardless of whether “it is viewed as having a single, 
ideal endpoint.” The book which is being quoted here (i.e., Norton, 2005) has been described as 
being grounded in ‘pragmatist epistemology’ and not in metaphysics (which subsumes ontology) 
(Hickman, 2007; Norton, 2007). 
 One’s opinion on whether ontology (and some coherent position with regard to it) is a 
fundamental element of social scientific inquiry clearly has implications for how a pragmatist 
approach is received, because it is likely fair to suggest that pragmatism has made greater 
progress in issues related to epistemology and methodology. For instance, within EE, one 
criticism of the philosophical foundation provided by Baumgärtner et al. (2008) was that it 
appeared to commit an ‘epistemic fallacy’ (Spash, 2012, 2015); that is, effectively merging 
ontology and epistemology, or claiming means to describe reality (i.e., epistemology) without 
defining reality (i.e., ontology) (Spash, 2015). Whether a pragmatist approach is vulnerable to 
such critiques is perhaps an open question, and one’s opinion is likely contingent upon their 
worldview. It will become clear in the next chapter that this potential weakness of pragmatism is 
not considered a fatal flaw for a pragmatist EE, and it should also be noted that there are 
particular ontological positions in pragmatism that are quite clear, such as the social nature of 
human beings (as elaborated upon below).  
 
4.1.2. Pragmatist epistemology: Experience creates knowledge, democratic process confirms it 
(at least for the moment) 
Pragmatist knowledge claims are developed and verified through repetitive observation 
and experimentation related to diverse human experience, at both the individual and community 
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level (Minteer, 2012; Norton, 2005). The notion that experience is central to creating knowledge 
is perhaps the most basic epistemological commitment, and it is why ‘empiricism’ is generally 
listed as foundational to pragmatist philosophy. The empiricism embraced by pragmatists is, 
however, different from classical empiricism (particularly the British version) (Hildebrand, 2011; 
Webb, 2007). Earlier British empiricists, such as John Locke and David Hume, reduced 
experience to a mechanistic occurrence whereby ‘sense data’ is recorded through perceptual 
senses, and then processed through thoughts or ideas; the result is “intelligence by way of an 
elaborate process of associative learning” (Hildebrand, 2018:11). The pragmatist view of 
‘experience’ is different. Even though the version presented below is gleaned from, and mostly 
credited to, the writings of John Dewey, it is important to note that Dewey built upon earlier 
thinkers such as Charlies Peirce and William James as he articulated a reformed version of 
classical empiricism (Anderson, 2011; Hildebrand, 2018; Hildebrand, 2011). Particularly, Dewey 
built upon the ideas of William James’ ‘radical empiricism’ (Hildebrand, 2011).   
 Dewey’s version of ‘experience’ was borne out of his interest in psychology and, 
specifically, his fundamental disagreement with common psychological theories related to how 
humans experience the world. According to Dewey (1930, cited by Hildebrand (2018:10)), 
psychology could provide insight into deep philosophical questions, and perhaps facilitate the 
overcoming of “longstanding divisions (between subject and object, matter and spirit, etc.) [by 
showing] how human experiences —physical, psychical, practical, and imaginative —were all 
integrated in one, dynamic person.” This holistic view of human psychology eschewed the more 
standard atomistic and reductionist approaches. Dewey was particularly critical of the reflex arc 
concept (Dewey, 1896), which characterized humans as:  
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A passive organism encountering external stimuli causing a sensory and motor 
response; for example, a child sees a candle (stimulus), grasps it (response), burns 
her hand (stimulus), and pulls her hand back (response). This, it argued, makes 
explicit the event’s basic stimuli and responses, replete with connections 
satisfactorily describable in mechanistic and physiological terms – and all without 
recourse to mysterious and unobservable entities” (Hildebrand, 2018:13, 
emphasis added).   
Dewey thought that this atomized and mechanistic view of psychology could never account for 
the diversity of lived meanings in the sociocultural environment; a belief which resulted in a 
reconstruction of psychological stances on various components of human conduct (e.g., 
instincts/impulses, perception/sensation, acts/habits), and informed his “lifelong contention that 
mind, contrary to long tradition, is not fundamentally subjective and isolated, but social and 
interactive, made through natural and cultural environments” (Hildebrand, 2018:11). 
 What resulted from a more holistic view of human learning and behavior, in part, is a 
pragmatist conceptualization of experience that is part ‘realist’ epistemology in that the things 
and events (i.e., the physical world) that one’s senses interact with are integral to human 
perception. However, human learning and behavior is also partly anti-realist (or constructivist) 
through “a partnership of perception with background belief, in the sense that our beliefs about 
what we see, hear etc., are affected not only by what we see and hear, but also by already-
embedded beliefs about how things are” (Haack, 2009:157, emphasis original). Returning to the 
example of the child with the candle, learning (or lack of learning) are not only shaped by the 
physical environment where the event takes place, but also by the child’s past experiences, and 
her level of involvement in the experience (Hickman, 2009). Elaborating on these ideas, Dewey 
(1933, 1938) sketched the inquiry and learning process in five steps. Dewey’s five steps are 
summarized from Hickman (2009) and Hildebrand (2018):  
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1. An emotional response or feeling that something is different or new within the context of 
a typical experience (e.g., a child wandering through an otherwise familiar room to find a 
burning candle); 
2. A formulation of the problem (which is a divergence from the typical assumption that 
problem identification precedes experience), where a new situation calls for exploration 
and application of an intellectual response (e.g., the child tries to make the situation 
‘more stable’ by applying lessons learned from past experiences); 
3. Hypothesis construction, where past theoretical understanding and current perceptions 
weigh the possible consequences of various actions (e.g., child uses past familiar 
exploration methods by reaching for the candle); 
4. Testing and experimentation, where one ‘reasons through’ the implications of actions 
and, potentially, finds contradictions thus necessitating a return to the problem 
identification or hypothesis construction phase (e.g., the child grasps the candle based on 
previous exploration attempts in other situations which, this time, results in a burned 
finger);  
5. Application and evaluation, where inquiry is ended with a decision as to whether an 
‘indeterminate situation’ has been converted into a ‘determinate one’ (e.g., if the burn is 
sufficient to prevent further exploration, then the effect of the flame on the child’s finger 
is learned; if the burn is insufficient to prevent further exploration, then the experiment 
starts over again until a lesson is learned).    
While Dewey was clear to stress that this sketch of how people think and learn is both a 
simplified schematic (in reality, the phases are likely not as discrete or linear) and an exemplar 
(i.e., not ‘everybody’ thinks this way), it outlines a view of experience that is “processual, 
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transactional, socially mediated, and not categorically prefigured as ‘rational’ or ‘emotional’” 
(Hildebrand, 2018:28).  
This view of learning can perhaps clarify what is meant when it is suggested that 
pragmatism emphasizes epistemology over ontology, because the nature of social beings is such 
that experience yields beliefs which, in turn, yield action. Morgan (2014) illustrated this with a 
simple diagram (Figure 4.1). 
Figure 4.1. Dewey’s model of experience 
 
Source: Morgan (2014) 
Interpreting this figure can be facilitated with the following from Fesmire (2003:28): “classical 
pragmatism situates reason within the broad context of the whole person in action. It replaces 
beliefs-as-intellectual-abstractions with beliefs-as-tendencies-to-act, pure reason with practical 
inquiry, and objectivist rationality with imaginative situational intelligence.” 
With this view of experience, Dewey was attempting to resolve the tension between two 
perspectives of the world (i.e., one that is biological, functional, and material, or one that is 
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inherently creative and spiritual). This dichotomy was overcome, like many others, with a 
conclusion that the world is both, and that humans are actively engaged in diverse circumstances 
for diverse purposes: “in a phrase, there is no psychology without social psychology, no possible 
inquiry into pure, biological instincts (or any other “natural” powers) which does not also 
consider both the social and environmental context of the phenomena studied and the inquiry’s 
own context” (Hildebrand, 2018:15). The interactive nature of humans within diverse 
environments is why pragmatist experience is seen as transactional, where “each learner is a 
living organism with her own history, needs, desires, and, perhaps most importantly, her own 
interests” (Hickman, 2009:9). 
 The nature of experience in pragmatism highlights three other ‘positive’ characterizations 
of Dewey’s account of experience: (1) experience as ‘experimental’; (2) experience as ‘primary’ 
versus ‘secondary’ and; (3) experience as ‘methodological’ (Hildebrand, 2018). Experience is 
‘experimental’ because through interaction with one’s environment, there is the potential 
opportunity to learn and understand how various actions may or may not be significant for 
controlling future events (Hildebrand, 2018). ‘Potential opportunity’ is emphasized because it 
has been noted that, unlike other versions of empiricism, Dewey’s version does not assume that 
all experiences must somehow influence what can be known (Hildebrand, 2011). For Dewey, 
knowledge is a subset of experience (Webb, 2007). This distinguishing characteristic of 
experience within pragmatism reflects Dewey’s position that there are two types of experience.  
The first type, ‘primary’ (also referred to as ‘had’, ‘felt’, or ‘direct’) experiences, are the 
most common. Indeed, primary experiences start and end all inquiry. They include those 
experiences that are barely reflected upon, regulated, or prepared for; these relatively 
unquestioned types of experiences are habitual (Hildebrand, 2018; Hildebrand, 2011; Morgan, 
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2014). The second type, ‘known’ experiences (also referred to as ‘reflective’, ‘secondary’, or 
‘indirect’ experiences), are abstractions away from primary experiences in purposeful and 
selective ways, whereby something in the primary experience triggers the need for more 
thoughtful reflection (Hildebrand, 2018; Miettinen, 2000). In other words, the majority of human 
existence is comprised of habits, or ‘primary’ experiences, but in the face of problem situations, 
‘secondary’ experiences arise. This is why problem definition is the second phase of learning 
within Dewey’s model, and why theory is considered to be an intermediate phase of inquiry. As 
Hildebrand (2018:30) explained, “as we live our lives, we confront problems which invoke the 
need for inquiry and, often, there is a need to devise a tool of explanation and amelioration. 
Theory is that tool, generated by these encounters; it does not come first.” Reflective thought is a 
process of adaptation striving towards stability, where “discordances in experience” arise from 
the failure of applying past actions in the context of an ever changing environment (Fesmire, 
2003:30).  
Prior to continuing with the pragmatist view of experience, it is worth interjecting a brief 
discussion on abductive reasoning or logic. This reasoning represents the initial stage of deriving 
a belief, and it connects to the natural inclination to explain our experiences for the purpose of 
ameliorating problems. Typically, only two types of reasoning are distinguished: inductive and 
deductive. Inductive reasoning is ‘bottom-up’ (i.e., deriving theories and descriptions from 
observations), and deductive reasoning is ‘top-down’ (i.e., testing hypotheses with observations). 
Abductive reasoning was a third form of logic distinguished by Peirce as the process of 
formulating an explanatory hypothesis in the event of an interrupted habitual experience (Misak, 
2004b). While similar to induction in that it starts with observations, abduction was distinguished 
more as a preliminary step of developing a number of potential hypotheses; Peirce considered it 
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to be a ‘bolder’ and more ‘perilous’ step than induction (Anderson, 1986a). Induction is the final 
“evidencing process” (Anderson, 1986a:151), it is when some generalized theory or description 
is added to our system of beliefs (Misak, 2004b). While it could be assumed that those 
employing inductive reasoning are considering multiple possible explanations for some 
occurrence, articulating abduction as its own process is consistent with the pragmatist focus on 
transparency regarding the knowledge production process (this relates to ‘wary assessment’ 
discussed below), as well as the need to explain and describe events.   
Returning to Dewey, primary and secondary experiences are distinguished to: (1) make a 
‘phenomenological’ observation that we engage and cope with a world that is not always 
meaningful or understood (sometimes experiences are simply experienced; not used to derive 
knowledge for the prediction and control of circumstances – however, the lack of understanding 
does not make the experiences “less real”) and; (2) stress that experience is a ‘method’, whereby 
knowledge creation should always start from a point that is devoid of theoretical presuppositions 
(Hildebrand, 2018:30, emphasis original).  
With regard to the first point, it is important to stress that human interaction with the 
world may be both misunderstood due to the limited ability of our senses and difficult to 
articulate or grasp. This latter point is due to the pragmatist view that the perceptual state is loose 
in a way; it includes states “phenomenologically indistinguishable from those caused, in a 
normal way, by sensory interactions with the world” (Haack, 2009:158). Déjà vu is perhaps a 
good example of a phenomenologically indistinguishable experience. When discussing Charles 
Peirce’s stance on experience, Misak (2004a:155) explained that experience goes far beyond 
what our ears, eyes, nose, and skin report: “Peirce takes anything that is compelling, surprising, 
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brute, or impinging to be an experience, regardless of what causes us to feel compelled and 
regardless of whether we can identify the source of the compulsion.”  
Another important point regarding experience is the pragmatist commitment to ‘anti-
foundationalism’, or the belief that there is no certain knowledge serving as the foundation of 
inquiry. Webb (2007) suggested that pragmatism is better thought of as a-foundational and 
Haack (2009) coined ‘foundherentism’, as opposed to anti-foundational. Because, again, 
pragmatists are focused on moving beyond entrenched philosophical dualisms. Some might 
consider anti-foundationalism as synonymous with ‘coherentism’, which is typically presented as 
opposite foundationalism (see Steup (2018) for an introduction to these ideas). Regardless of 
chosen terminology, the primary point remains that pragmatism, unlike other modern 
philosophies, does not begin with theoretical starting points or presuppositions8.  
Closely related to the rejection of epistemological foundationalism is the embrace of 
‘fallibilism’, or the idea that humans will inevitably ‘get it wrong’ and that there are no 
immutable beliefs. As Webb (2007:1069, emphasis original) explained, “beliefs well warranted 
by previous inquiry provide the means of furthering other inquiries. This does not mean that 
well-warranted beliefs are themselves permanently exempt from future critical scrutiny.” The 
                                                 
8 At this juncture, it may be worth noting that, as Miettinen (2000:54) pointed out, Dewey’s (and others) model 
of experiential learning does inherently assume that an individual has “an innate capacity to grow and learn”, which 
constitutes an ontological assumption about the nature of social beings within pragmatism. As an aside, the 
assumption nicely highlights how, under the research paradigm conceptualization applied herein, the normative 
commitments are mutually defining and restricting. But, more importantly, it seems to add some level of ambiguity 
to the exact meaning of a-foundational. While the starting point in pragmatism is “experience as actually 
encountered” (Webb, 2007:1069), it does seem that there is a foundational assumption related to the nature of 
social beings as social, learning entities. Does this represent a contradiction within pragmatism? While this question 
may have been addressed in the literature, it is not resolved at this time. A similar potential flaw in pragmatist logic 
is with regard to the basic premise that democratic debate and deliberation are assumed as unquestionably positive 
axiological goals. In this instance, there is at least one targeted response (see Minteer (2012:22-25)).   
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empiricism of pragmatism results in a critical, radical, and dynamic model of theorizing, where 
previous interpretations and judgments are constantly scrutinized by new experiences (Dewey, 
1925; Hildebrand, 2018). This does not mean that there is no knowledge outside the human 
mind, but instead (applying the popular analogy of Charles Peirce) that knowledge is like a cable 
made up of individual strands (i.e., beliefs) where the breakage of one strand does not necessarily 
weaken the cable as a whole (Peirce, 1868 [1955]; Webb, 2007). This signals the idea of a 
tentative truth, which does not commit with certainty or a capital “T” truth. 
Peirce held that fallibilism was not about doubting all beliefs about which error is 
conceivable, but as doubt arises through experience there will be a need to revisit individual 
beliefs in a piece-meal fashion (Misak, 2004a). As nicely articulated by Friedrichs and 
Kratochwil (2009:714), pragmatist epistemology generally means that “instead of relying on 
false promises, we will learn to act on reasonable bets.” Knowledge it inherently tentative, and 
pragmatist epistemology implies open-mindedness and humility; confidence is good, as in any 
pursuit, but one should always acknowledge the possibility of needing to revise knowledge, as 
well as personal beliefs. 
Given the pragmatist stance that all knowledge is derived through experience, specifically 
those secondary experiences when some problem triggers an inquiry, two big issues remain for 
the purposes of this dissertation. First, is whether there is a difference between scientific 
knowledge and other knowledge, and second is the process by which knowledge is accepted (or 
not accepted) as ‘true’, or tentatively true in the case of pragmatism. Regarding the difference 
between scientific knowledge and non-scientific knowledge, following Dewey (1910 [2008]), 
Morgan (2014:1047) pointed out that similar to thinking about inquiry as a specific type of 
experience in pragmatism, research as a scientific approach is “simply a form of inquiry that is 
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performed more carefully and more self-consciously than most other responses to problematic 
situations”. However, there is no sharp distinction between everyday life and research. Perhaps 
the former can be thought of as self-consciously logical and the latter as carefully systematic. 
Webb (2007) noted that neither scientific knowledge nor common sense knowledge is privileged 
(either or both may be important within the context of a particular inquiry). It follows then that 
the process of assessing common sense knowledge and scientific knowledge is generally the 
same, though one would expect the assessment of scientific knowledge to be more rigorous 
somehow (peer-review within scientific communities, with their respective assessment criteria, 
represents that more rigorous process). 
The process for assessing knowledge claims is fundamentally democratic. Pragmatism 
holds that “community experience” (Norton, 2007:305) or “public critical discussion” 
(Bernstein, 1989:9) are the arbiters of good and bad knowledge. The process of assessing 
knowledge claims is repetitive and, according to Hildebrand (2011:47, emphasis original), both 
epistemic and existential:  
Verifying truths happens because of how one lives – their habits of regular 
interaction with others, their encouragement and rewards to those who criticize 
them. If I wish to know if my theory is true, I must coax others to try out what I 
have undergone so I can learn what they find. The most important route, in other 
words, to justifying belief runs through the experiences of others.  
When assessing knowledge claims, there is a need to return to the primary experiences that gave 
rise to inquiries and, subsequently, one needs to be wary and critical of the process and steps 
employed to develop knowledge and conclude that an indeterminate situation is now a 
determinate one. This is because, as Dewey (1925 [1981]:386) stated, “all intellectual terms are 
the products of discrimination and classification”.  
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Therefore, one must “go back to the primitive situations of life that antecede and generate 
these reflective interpretations, so that we re-live former processes of interpretation in a wary 
manner.” This wary assessment, as explained by Hildebrand (2011), requires understanding both 
the immediate elements of the experience (i.e., the interaction with the real world) as well as the 
background information influencing one’s experience. In other words, all experiences are 
undergone with some pre-conceptions, and when a secondary/reflective experience is engaged, 
there is some level of selective emphasis. Explaining Dewey’s stance, Hildebrand (2011:47-48, 
emphasis added) stated:  
Selective emphasis is an ingredient in any encounter. The difference between 
healthy and unhealthy empiricist methods lies in the degree to which selections 
and choices are overt and avowed by the experimenter…a good scientist enacts 
habits of transparency and disclosure as she urges others to conduct experiments 
which, she hopes, will ratify her choices and confirm her findings.  
Truth, as noted by Hildebrand (2018:43), “does not stand outside experience, but is an 
experienced relation, particularly one which is socially shared.” These guidelines for assessing 
the quality of knowledge are very general, indeed, the process essentially describes peer-review 
within scientific communities. However, it is this general nature of assessing knowledge 
combined with the belief in the diversity of human experience that accommodates another 
fundamental commitment of pragmatism—pluralism.  
 While the pragmatist community is somewhat divided in their interpretation of John 
Dewey’s writing regarding the connection between scientific inquiry and democracy, Minteer 
(2012) argued that Dewey’s pragmatism considered the two to be intimately connected. Minteer 
pointed, in part, to the clear articulation made by Gouinlock (1990:267, emphasis added), who 
suggested that democracy and science are ‘fused’ through similar foundations:  
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the norms of science are incorporated into those of democracy...the nature of their 
combination can perhaps best be suggested by thinking of them as a union of 
certain moral and intellectual virtues…the virtues include a willingness to 
question, investigate, and learn; a determination to search for clarity in discourse 
and evidence in argument. There is also a readiness to hear and respect the views 
of others, to consider alternatives thoroughly and impartially, and to 
communicate in a like manner in return…these virtues embrace novelty, 
innovation, growth, regard for concern for others, and scientific discipline…these 
might be viewed as the virtues of the experimental inquirer, but they are also 
virtues in the process of collective moral deliberation. What makes democratic 
behavior more than free speech and counting votes is that the participants use 
scientific intelligence in determining the nature of their situation and in 
formulating plans of action, and they are not stuck on foregone conclusion. 
The embrace of pluralism in pragmatism, whether it be a plurality of ethical stances and values 
or a plurality of approaches to scientific inquiry, stems partly from the normative commitment 
that science and democracy should be closely related. Inherent in this commitment is the belief 
that most complex social problems are the result of varied and conflicting viewpoints. 
Conflicting viewpoints are not necessarily a negative, at least in the view of William James, who 
thought that competing perspectives could be complementary: “each may compensate for 
something concealed by the other” (Fesmire, 2003:48). While this commitment to pluralism may 
appear to be relativistic, its adherence to community deliberation to sort good knowledge from 
bad knowledge should yield some level of consensus. In other words, pragmatists do not suggest 
that all ideas are equally valid, even though full consensus may not be found, one would expect 
that a manageable number of warranted beliefs would emerge through public debate and 
deliberation.  
 Reinforcing the basic point that the pragmatist founders were, themselves, split on a 
variety of issues, it is worth noting that Peirce, a more strict adherent to an objectivist/realist 
worldview, was less enthusiastic about pluralism than Dewey and James (Misak, 2005). Peirce 
believed that the goal of all inquiry (e.g., mathematics, ethics, chemistry) was focused on finding 
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a single ‘right’ answer to questions, but he acknowledged that such answers may not exist within 
the context of particular questions (most notably those concerning ethics) (Misak, 2005). Peirce 
considered truth to be a particular kind of opinion, which would persist if inquiry was carried on 
to an ultimate conclusion. However, such conclusions are never actually reached as they are at 
some infinite point in the future, but the iterative building of knowledge through generations did 
constitute a particular type of reality or “objective idealism” (Skagestad, 1983:269). Other 
pragmatists such as Dewey hold that “when we look to the practice of inquiry to get a fix on the 
concept of truth, we find only solidarity or the practice of arriving at beliefs which are warranted 
for our community” (Misak, 2005:130).  
While there is clearly a tension between these two positions, a few points are worth 
stressing. First, a core pragmatist idea that does seem to be in consensus is that: (1) disagreement 
and pluralism is productive in that it leads to learning and an improvement of beliefs (Misak, 
2005) and; (2) even if one adopts Peirce’s position, a single correct answer is often only a 
theoretical endpoint to be reached after an infinite amount of inquiry and democratic debate. The 
second point, which follows from the first, is that warranted beliefs or assertions are tentative, as 
ongoing experiences and learning will iteratively update beliefs. The third point, which is 
particularly salient for the discussion herein related to EE, is that pragmatists were aiming for a 
very general philosophy for addressing any type of inquiry and, therefore, the type of question 
being addressed will inevitably influence whether there are a plurality of truths. For instance, it 
seems reasonable to suggest that there is a single right answer regarding the earth’s 
circumference, but multiple right answers to the question of how humans are supported by 
national forests.  
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The final element of pragmatist epistemology to be discussed is, as Minteer (2012:10) 
phrased it, a commitment to a “linguistic emphasis on community.” This commitment refers to 
the importance of language for understanding diverse experiences and, consequently, knowledge. 
Following the writings of Rudolph Carnap, Norton (2005:563) stressed the pragmatist stance that 
languages are tools for describing and classifying our experiences, and because “linguistic 
choices” shape the world and our understanding of it, language should be “understood 
functionally, in terms of human purposes and goals.” Norton (2005) added that a ‘truly’ 
pragmatic approach is one that “pays attention to the uses of language in real, communicative 
situations”, and places “much more emphasis on the use of language for purposes other than to 
describe the world; more attention would be given to language that evokes attitudes, persuades 
others, enters into commitments, and builds trust.” This focus on language, pluralism, and 
democratic debate starts to blur the line between how we come to know what we know (i.e., 
epistemology) and the goals or reasons for pursuing scientific knowledge (i.e., axiology). The 
latter set of normative commitments is where I turn now.  
 
4.1.3. Pragmatist axiology: Communication, social-learning, and addressing the myriad 
practical problems of life  
Pragmatism focused on reorienting philosophy away from abstract concerns towards 
human experience (Morgan, 2014), but for what purpose? The terminal goals, ultimate purpose, 
or end in itself of pragmatism is not easily categorized. This is evident in Moon and Blackman 
(2014), who stated that the application of pragmatism is ‘any or all’; as opposed to positivism, 
for instance, which had a listed terminal goal of ‘prediction’. While this categorization of 
pragmatism is not particularly enlightening, it is reasonable. As Westbrook (1993) pointed out, 
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William James said that pragmatism “stands for no particular results. It has no dogmas, and no 
doctrines save its method…innumerable chambers open out of it.” This ‘method’ refers to the 
pluralistic approach of creating knowledge through experience which, so formulated, does not 
necessarily represent a path toward a single purpose such as prediction, understanding, 
emancipation, or deconstruction. The pragmatic approach is one focused on solving the myriad 
problems that are encountered through diverse experiences, and solving may require explanation, 
prediction, understanding, and/or deconstruction. This focus on problem solving has led to 
pragmatism being described as a research paradigm focused on simply doing ‘what works’, 
which is a crude summary that, according to Morgan (2014), has been a perennial problem for 
pragmatists. This crude summary suggests a pragmatist credo of ‘the ends justify the means’, but 
Morgan (2007) and many others assert this is a mischaracterization. 
This mischaracterization essentially equates pragmatism with crude instrumentalism, 
where the latter is usually defined as a view that scientific theories “are neither true nor false, but 
function as tools or calculating devices for organizing and systematizing observations in an 
economical fashion” (Skagestad, 1983:263). While pragmatists are generally interested in using 
knowledge to address practical problems and real-world issues, most would likely reject the 
expedience implied in this definition of instrumentalism. The mischaracterization of pragmatism 
is partly the result of cursory summaries such as that provided by Moon and Blackman (2014); 
however, I suggest such summaries are implicitly referring to Peirce’s ‘pragmatic maxim’, or 
some interpretation of it. The ‘pragmatic maxim’, while not labeled as such originally, is as 
follows: “consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive 
the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of those effects is the whole of our 
conception of the object” (Peirce, 1878:293). This wordy and confusing statement underlies the 
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fundamental pragmatist principle related to the connection between theory and practice, and 
many have interpreted and discussed this statement or some iteration of it.  
The pragmatic maxim was presented and interpreted differently by the classical 
pragmatists. For instance, Charles Peirce considered it to be a logical principal that could be 
proven mathematically, and William James viewed it less concretely as a ‘philosophical attitude’ 
(Hookway, 2012). However, there was general agreement that the pragmatic maxim was meant 
to facilitate making one's ideas clear by focusing on the differences, or practical implications, of 
accepting concepts and propositions as true (Legg & Hookway, 2019). Peirce, as a chemist and 
physicist, typically provided examples from the physical sciences, and this maxim was 
explained, in one instance, using force. Skagestad (1983:276, emphasis original) conveyed 
Peirce’s stance: “If we know all the effects of force, we know fully what force is; but we never 
do know all the effects of force, or of anything else. A scientist understands a term like ‘force’ as 
referring to the totality of its experimental consequences, and he knows the meaning of the term 
to the extent that he knows its experimental consequences.” This description of Peirce’s stance 
highlights two points. First, there is an epistemological assumption embedded in this description 
whereby the search for a unitary and complete truth is never complete. As highlighted above, 
Peirce believed that infinite inquiry (though impossible) would, in the end, reach such a truth. 
The second point is that while there was general agreement that the pragmatic maxim 
could provide guidance about clarifying ideas and knowledge, the classical pragmatists were 
generally focused on different ends (Hookway, 2012). Peirce used the pragmatic maxim to help 
explain abstract scientific concepts. According to Skagestad (1983), this was to encourage the 
continued investigation and discovery of beliefs about such concepts through novel experimental 
techniques. Using Peirce’s analogy, the multi-stranded cable that represents our understanding of 
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the physical concept of force is never complete, and it can be made stronger through future work. 
Peirce was searching for generalizations and universal laws through empirical means. He did not 
necessarily adhere to the belief, often assigned to pragmatists, that the “justification of science 
lies in its tendency to increase social happiness, or to strengthen social stability” (Skagestad, 
1983:265). In other words, with his realist leanings, Peirce likely had a view where facts and 
values were mostly separate. On the other hand, James and Dewey, with backgrounds more 
focused on social issues, seemed to extend the pragmatist maxim to include not only scientific 
inquiry, but also human conduct more generally.  
Hookway (2012:3, emphasis added) explained the pragmatist maxim in broader terms: 
“we clarify a proposition by showing how its truth would make a difference to what it is rational 
for us to do. Of course, what it would be rational to do, given the truth of this proposition, will 
depend upon aspects of the context.” Others have done similarly; Biddle and Schafft (2014:327) 
implicitly reference the pragmatic maxim when they suggested that pragmatism has a “highly 
contextualized axiology that recursively asks what practical difference one action makes versus 
another.” Bromley (2015:13, emphasis original) summarized the principle as: “the meaning of an 
object to us is nothing but the sum of its perceived effects on (for) us.” In essence, the maxim 
suggests that “planning and monitoring our activities requires information about what would 
occur if were to act in various ways…it is characteristic of philosophy and science to embody 
reflective, systematic thought” (Hookway, 2012:190). While these explanations of the pragmatic 
maxim appear to extend beyond Peirce’s original context, it is important to note that crude 
instrumentalism is not being advocated.  
The meaning of this maxim, based on the above explanations, may still lack clarity. First, 
what is meant by ‘context’ and, second, how does adhering to this pragmatic maxim guide our 
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actions as individuals and researchers (i.e., what are the implications for axiology)? The 
following excerpt from Hookway (2012:10, emphasis original) is among the most clear and 
accessible I have read:    
    
Let us allow that the ‘desires and circumstances’ constitute the contexts in which 
we can act…We might then consider possible contexts in which our desires are 
different or our circumstances are different. In that case, we may decide to try to 
change features of our context rather than simply doing what it is best to do given 
the desires we have and the circumstances in which we find ourselves. Indeed we 
might hold that what it is rational for us to do should not be determined by the 
desires we happen to have; instead we should be guided by our understanding of 
what desires we ought to have or by our conception of the good…Our use of the 
pragmatist maxim in guiding our inquiries and other actions is inseparable from 
our reflections about what it [sic] is reasonable. A full understanding of the 
pragmatist maxim probably requires an understanding of our cognitive contexts, 
of the sorts of information we should take account of in reflecting about the 
consequences of our actions in different possible circumstances. 
 
There are a number of important elements within this quote. First, specificity is added to the 
meaning of ‘context’ or ‘contextual’; that is, our actions take place within the context of varying 
desires and circumstances. Second, rationality is two-sided in that desires are pursued both based 
upon axiological (evaluative) concerns of what is appropriate, as well as instrumental (cognitive) 
concerns about the most effective path to achieving such desires (Rescher, 2000). If beliefs drive 
actions (and vice versa), then the pragmatist maxim guides us toward systematic reflective 
thought of both means and ends.  As Rescher (2000:170) noted, “at many junctures, life 
confronts us with alternative directions in which to proceed. And only though the evaluation of 
such alternatives can we effect a sensible (rationally appropriate and acceptable) choice among 
them.” However, ‘rationally appropriate’ extends well beyond that which is ‘preferred’ in the 
neoclassical economic sense; there is a need to consider the reasons for ones preferences and 
desires (Rescher, 2000).  
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 The third point is that pragmatism should not be interpreted as a philosophical system 
that values practice over thought. While Dewey (1929) identified, at the time, a major problem 
resulting from the prioritization of ‘pure’ science over practice or applied science, Putnam 
(2010:36) suggested that given the current prioritization of applied science over pure science (at 
least based upon the metric of government investment), Dewey would likely have “adjusted his 
rhetoric to emphasize the importance of pure science.” One important point to be gleaned from 
Dewey, and pragmatism more generally, is that practice and results are not prioritized over 
thought (i.e., pragmatism is not meant to justify expediency) but, instead, that theory and practice 
are so interrelated that considering facts and values in isolation does not make sense (Putnam, 
2010).  
 Biddle and Schafft (2014) do not explicitly suggest that pragmatist axiology is 
insufficient, but they do assert that most researchers claiming pragmatism as a paradigm do not 
adequately articulate axiological assumptions and, furthermore, imply that those claiming 
pragmatism adhere to a belief that theoretical assumptions and values are not relevant to the 
practical outcomes of research. It seems that a nuanced understanding of pragmatism, and 
honoring its commitment to a wary assessment of knowledge suggests the opposite.  Bernstein 
(2010:157) pointed out that Hilary Putnam, a prolific (and more contemporary) pragmatist, 
discussed at length the interrelationship between facts and values; accordingly, there is no way to 
make sense of scientific knowledge and its associated concepts “unless we understand that they 
are values and involve normative judgments; they cannot be analyzed or reduced to what is 
‘merely’ factual…values and norms are indispensable for an analysis and assessment of 
knowledge claims.” 
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The final point regarding the above block quote is that ‘our conception of good’, or our 
reflection about ‘the consequences of our actions in different possible circumstances’ is not 
merely an individual activity. Instead, our individual experiences are inherently social, as they 
take place in varied socio-cultural contexts. Making ideas clear, whether in the scientific realm 
or the political realm (or any other realm), implies conversation between people for the purpose 
of learning and improving our beliefs. Therefore, if one was forced to select a single, ultimate 
axiological goal of pragmatism, it would probably be communication and social learning. In the 
face of challenging problems, particularly those plaguing the public, Dewey (1927:155, emphasis 
added) suggested that the solution is “perfecting of the means and ways of communication of 
meanings so that genuinely shared interest in the consequences of interdependent activities may 
inform desire and effort and thereby direct action.” According to Norton (2007), pragmatism has 
the purpose of getting to cooperative action and accelerated learning.  
To this end, Bromley (2006, 2015) distinguished between ‘warranted assertions/beliefs’ 
and ‘valuable assertions/beliefs’. The former constitutes knowledge claims developed, tested, 
debated and, ultimately, accepted within a scientific community. The latter are those accepted 
scientific beliefs that are likely to resonate and motivate action within the context of some 
problem. As Bromley (2015:15) stated, “even if a class of warranted assertions exists and serves 
to define the best scientific evidence of particular events or phenomena, individuals in society 
are under no obligation to stop what they are doing and fall in line behind the prevailing 
scientific consensus.” In other words, the acceptance of scientific knowledge within a 
disciplinary community is a partial accomplishment within the context of addressing a practical 
problem; the other critical element is communicating such knowledge to a broader audience in a 
way that is both understandable and persuasive (in that it induces action). If one is reading this 
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through a conservation social science lens, then climate change is likely on the mind as a 
relevant example. A more generally applicable example is implicit in the current measles 
outbreak in the United States; that is, science has yielded a warranted belief related to 
vaccinations, though this belief is clearly not valuable to all members of the general populous.    
While the axiological commitment of pragmatism could be summarized as 
communication for the purpose of facilitating social learning and addressing problematic 
situations, it does not commit to what decision or action is best for solving some problem 
(indeed, a ‘best’ solution does not exist, as per wicked problems). Nor does it commit to what is 
the most pressing problem to be addressed. Indeed, Norton (2015:149) stated the following when 
it comes to weighing knowledge created by economists and environmental ethicists within the 
context of sustainability issues: 
Methods of economists and environmental ethicists function, within an open-
ended discourse, provide reasons to favor some actions or policies over others in 
specific situations. Their role should not be to provide universal, top-down value 
that determines the shape of evaluative discourse; instead, it is to contribute to 
reasons and arguments within the discourse that may prove convincing to 
participants who are considering and reconsidering competing values…so these 
theories will not be given the role of directly deciding what is rational policy 
substantively; their role will rather be to encourage deeper thinking about values 
among citizens and to support a reflective mood of deliberation within a 
community. 
The main message here is likely the impetus for a criticism of pragmatism which, ironically, is 
the opposite of the ‘ends justify the means’ criticism. As Rescher (2000:175) highlighted: “a 
common complaint against pragmatism is that it is an instrumentalistic philosophy that cares 
only for means and not ends.”  
Even though most pragmatists would reject this criticism, it is nonetheless worth a reply 
because it reinforces two important points. First, while pragmatism stands for no particular 
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results, it does not advocate arbitrary ends (Rescher, 2000; Westbrook, 1993). Quite the contrary, 
pragmatism is focused on a democratic process whereby all positions, at least to the greatest 
extent practicable, can be articulated in a systematic way, and the wary assessment of how 
knowledge claims are arrived at is paramount to a nuanced pragmatic approach that embraces 
open-mindedness and humility. Second, it is correct that pragmatist axiology does not explicitly 
privilege specific groups in all situations (e.g., women, impoverished people), but its focus on 
communicating a plurality of viewpoints and meanings for the purpose of solving public 
problems does imply an axiology meant to support the underserved and underrepresented. While 
this may sound anarchistic in that all viewpoints are, from the start, equally considerable, 
deliberative democracy is theoretically meant to minimize those unsubstantiated and 
unconvincing arguments.  
The pragmatist belief that underrepresented viewpoints can be supported (and that the 
most popular viewpoint does not necessarily reign supreme) is reflected in Dewey’s conception 
of ‘democracy’. Dewey did not view democracy simply as a form of government whereby the 
“sovereign is the multitude of individuals”, this “numerical aggregation” conception of 
democracy where the majority rules implied that individuals were non-social units. This did not 
align with Dewey’s view of democracy as an “ethical way of life” (Bernstein, 2010:74-75). For 
Dewey, the democratic ideal was one that fostered empathy through an understanding of 
viewpoints different from one’s own, and this meant that in the face of conflict there would be 
the willingness to question and revise one’s own opinions as opposed to entrenched partisanship 
(Bernstein, 2010; Fesmire, 2003). The pragmatist’s view of democracy opposes the type of 
ragged individualism that would result in one opposing taxes for schools because they have no 
children; such a perspective fails to comprehend the situation whereby our actions and 
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experiences are interrelated (Fesmire, 2003). This view of democracy and, consequently, 
decision-making, whereby the majority does not necessarily rule is an important underpinning to 
a pragmatist EE, which suggests that all levels of the human-nature relationship need to be 
understood (requiring a multitude of ‘research menu’ approaches). Chapter five discusses these 
ideas and points in detail.   
Even though pragmatist axiology is focused on the social (or collective) good, Biddle and 
Schafft (2014) are justified in their criticism of the lack of specifics with regard to what and how 
such social good is pursued. Indeed, inclusivity, in general, was one element Dewey suggested 
for a plan focused on improving the social good, but the specifics of what inclusivity meant were 
lacking (Bernstein, 2010). Pragmatist philosophy, as outlined above, is general in that it could be 
applied within a variety of contexts. Pragmatist philosophy broadly, for instance, does not 
specifically focus on public problems related to the environment, healthcare, or the economy. 
This is not to say that those adhering to the general principles of pragmatism have not applied 
such principles in specific situations. One needs to focus on these specific situations to better 
understand, for instance, what is meant by inclusivity.  
 
4.2. Pragmatist research programs: A focus on general methodological principles and the 
varied relationships between humans and the environment 
Discussing pragmatist research programs is potentially awkward, because research 
programs are defined by three domains (i.e., conceptual, methodological, and substantive), and 
the literature reviewed below does not necessarily fit this framework perfectly (as clarified in a 
moment). The ultimate goal of this dissertation is to articulate the implications of adopting 
pragmatism for research in EE; that is, how the worldview and normative commitments of 
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pragmatism can inform: (1) basic theoretical foundations (e.g., the adopted meaning of 
‘sustainability’, details regarding people as citizens as opposed to consumers, and making 
decisions based on equity, stability, and resilience—in other words, many of the elements of 
Table 3.1); (2) methodology (e.g., what specific methods might be most appropriate, how can 
one interpret non-market values of ecosystem services, how should ‘representativeness’ be 
considered, and what is the purpose (or lack thereof) of cost-benefit analysis) and; (3) managerial 
decisions and real-world problems through EE research (e.g., how can the results of an EE study 
be applied, how should they be communicated to decision-makers and the public).  
It seems the natural first question would be to ask how pragmatism has been applied in 
other contexts. That is, where and how are the pragmatist ideas, as outlined above, being 
discussed and used? It turns out that pragmatism has been discussed in a variety of contexts, and 
there are several that generally represent research programs; however, these discussions may 
only be partially relevant to the goals of this paper. On the other hand, there are discussions that 
are pertinent, but do not perfectly constitute research programs as defined herein.  
Regarding research programs that may only be partially relevant, I mean the application 
of pragmatism for supporting research in other disciplines. For instance, pragmatism has been 
advocated as a philosophical underpinning for research in numerous fields, including 
international relations (Frankel Pratt, 2016; Friedrichs & Kratochwil, 2009; Ralston, 2011), 
community health research (Andrew & Halcomb, 2007), human resources (Korte & Mercurio, 
2017) and, more generally and perhaps most prominently, mixed methods research (Biddle & 
Schafft, 2014; Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Leech, 2005; Morgan, 2007). There may be 
methodological insights from such scholarship that can apply to EE, but the subject-matter 
specifics of human resources research, for example, is not all that relevant to our discussion here. 
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Based on this rationale, the first goal of this section is to briefly review potential methodological 
insights from such scholarship without wading into the specific theories or real-world domains of 
these disciplines.  
Regarding discussions that are awkwardly framed as research programs (as defined 
herein), pragmatist philosophy has motivated an extensive discussion within environmental 
philosophy and ethics, and such discussions can potentially yield insights for EE both by 
informing general theoretical principles and approaches to applying EE research to practical 
problems. Pragmatist discussions within environmental philosophy and ethics, broadly known as 
environmental pragmatism, does not yield significant insight into methodological issues beyond 
what is implied by adopting the normative commitments outlined in Section 4.1. This is not to 
say that the works of philosophers and ethicists is purely speculative; indeed, environmental 
pragmatists have applied and discussed empirical research, and a principle goal of environmental 
pragmatism was to move away from the standard argumentative and theoretical philosophical 
approach to a “more applied empirical and integrative approach to normative debates” to 
influence policy and political processes such as planning (Minteer, 2012:11). Notwithstanding 
this non-traditional philosophical approach, it is likely fair to suggest that most of this work 
focuses less on specific methodological issues (e.g., sampling approaches, specific statistical 
approaches) and more on, for example, highlighting the benefit of adopting value pluralism (e.g., 
Minteer & Manning, 1999) and the application of different viewpoints for on-the-ground 
decision making (e.g., Meine, 2018; Norton, 2015). Therefore, the second goal of this section is 
to review environmental pragmatism with specific focus on insights that are relevant to EE in 
terms of theoretical foundations and problem-solving.  
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4.2.1. Applications of pragmatism for informing research methodology 
 A full review of how pragmatism has informed research methodology, across all 
disciplines, is well beyond the scope of this dissertation. Greene (2008) asserted that there is a 
need to move beyond describing the philosophical position of pragmatism to providing specifics 
of how it may actually influence research in practice. Generally, it seems as though this call has 
not been fully answered. While there are several examples of different disciplines advocating 
pragmatism as a methodological guide, there are very few examples of how pragmatism actually 
influenced research practice. One of the most explicit examples of how pragmatism specifically 
influenced research practice is provided by Friedrichs (2008) and Friedrichs and Kratochwil 
(2009); both sources discuss the same study (the earlier work is a book and the latter work is a 
condensed journal article). While much of their work articulates general methodological 
principles, they did provide specific instances where a pragmatic approach led to dropping 
statistical findings, and they stressed that findings were not interpreted in the light of existing 
theories until the final stages of research (thus honoring the exploratory nature of abductive 
reasoning). Beyond these few specifics, most research provides general methodological 
implications of adopting pragmatism as an underpinning.  
 Prior to commencing, it is worth noting that the lack of specific examples of how 
pragmatism influences research practice is likely partly the result of the general pragmatist 
hesitation to provide definitive directives. Indeed, pragmatism generally resists pre-ordained 
action whereby given some situation, A, one should proceed with action, B. This belief is implicit 
in a-foundationalism, abductive reasoning, the importance of context, and the pragmatic maxim; 
the general goal is to consider a variety of potential situations and actions, and then apply 
deliberation to understand the best way forward, for the time being. Nonetheless, if one is 
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advocating pragmatism for underpinning research, and research decisions are made with 
pragmatist normative commitments in mind, then there is likely a benefit in articulating the 
process of making such decisions.  
The benefit is both for other researchers who may be grappling with similar decisions, 
and over time it may be possible to establish contexts that are similar enough to warrant claims 
of quasi-generalizability (the idea of transferability discussed below). Additionally, articulating 
specific research practice decisions based on pragmatism allows the research community to 
provide feedback and deliberate about the validity of such decisions. Finally, it seems that if one 
is to claim pragmatism as an underpinning to research, then full transparency about research 
decision-making is required to allow for Dewey’s ‘wary assessment’ of such knowledge. 
  A look at the literature relating pragmatism to methodology, whether within the context 
of international relations or community health research, highlights several implications for 
research practice that could be applied broadly. For instance, a near universal suggestion is that 
pragmatism can provide methodological flexibility; as Ralston (2011:92) noted that pragmatism 
must remain “open-textured” to build a multi-faceted “tool-kit for the sake of resolving specific 
problems before the inquirer.” While ‘flexibility’ is appealing, it is both generally uninformative 
and again easily labeled as ‘anything goes’. Despite this limitation, I proceed with a brief review 
of generalities, because joining such basic principles with specific examples within EE could 
yield substantive guidance for EE methodologists.  
Within the context of international relations research, Friedrichs and Kratochwil (2009) 
outlined a ‘pragmatic research strategy’ based on abductive reasoning, which included several 
basic principles. One principle was to state publicly the purpose of the research, including the 
researchers personal motivation. This highlights an axiology where reflexivity, or acknowledging 
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the positionality and the influence of the researcher in relation to the knowledge produced, is 
given a high priority. This suggests an acknowledgement of the tenuous nature of the fact/value 
divide (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Morgan, 2007), and it also implicitly refers to a 
transparent methodology, which may foster collaborative efforts with other researchers even 
when philosophical orientation is different (Leech, 2005). Another basic principle for pragmatic 
methodology is the focus more on ‘orientation’ as opposed to causal theorizing; this entails 
abductive reasoning with the goal of articulating many explanations for some phenomena, and 
then iteratively working between inductive methods and deductive methods to, perhaps, find 
some causal link (Friedrichs & Kratochwil, 2009; Morgan, 2007). Definitive causal links or 
generalized conclusions are perhaps secondary axiological goals, as the abductive process is 
likely to lead to new insights that are valuable scientific contributions.    
Morgan (2007) suggested that the results of research underpinned by pragmatism should 
strive for ‘transferability’ as opposed to complete generality or context-dependence. Essentially, 
this is a middle ground where results might not apply in all cases, nor are they completely 
unique; patterns are the goal perhaps, not laws. To this end, “we need to investigate the factors 
that affect whether the knowledge we gain can be transferred to other settings” (Morgan, 2007). 
In chapter five, this idea of transferability is revisited when discussing ‘exemplars’.  
Another general implication for methodology is that formal tools, such as statistical 
methods, can be used to simplify the complexity of phenomena that may be too cognitively 
burdensome to understand, which implies that intuitive tools such as cross-tabulations may be 
preferable to inferential techniques such as regression (Friedrichs & Kratochwil, 2009). 
Inferential techniques are generally considered to be heuristics. For instance, the associations 
between dependent and independent variables, particularly if causality is implied, would be 
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viewed with caution. This extends to the concepts of multi-criteria analysis and cost-benefit 
analysis: “the use of formal methods for decision analysis is justified so long as they are viewed 
and used as decision support resources and not as decision-making tools” (Sarkar, 2018:225).  
Minteer and Manning (1999) stressed that a pragmatist approach is pluralistic in its 
embrace of many worldviews, and it is committed to developing theoretical and applied 
frameworks that can incorporate a diversity of ethical and moral positions into decision-making. 
This could be interpreted as a general methodological guideline, but it basically extends the 
normative commitments of pluralism and democratic deliberation to decision-making 
frameworks.  
 
4.2.2. Environmental pragmatism: the implications of value and ethical pluralism   
The major goal of environmental pragmatism is to expand the horizons of environmental 
ethics and philosophy beyond the traditional project of articulating a non-anthropocentric basis 
for all environmental value (i.e., nature is intrinsically valuable and thus worth protecting 
irrespective of its value for human purposes). According to Minteer (2012:18), ardent advocates 
of the non-anthropocentric view such as Holmes Ralston and Baird Callicott create "a kind of 
binary, all-or-nothing contest, one between a correct or 'appropriate' nature-centered worldview 
and an incorrect, consumptive anthropocentrism." Even though Ralston and Callicott are ardent 
non-anthropocentric philosophers, it is suggested that the idea that “an anthropocentric value 
framework is ethically and ontologically defective and thus must be replaced by a 
nonanthropocentric one is a widely held view in the field” (Minteer, 2012:19).  
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The stated reason for expanding beyond a single non-anthropocentric stance, or any 
morally singular stance for that matter, was to create room for debate and, ultimately, bring 
environmental ethics and philosophy discussions into the realm of public policy. Environmental 
pragmatists are generally motivated by an environmental philosophy that has been ineffective, or 
non-existent, within the context of environmental policy discussions and decision-making (Light 
& Katz, 1996; Minteer, 2012). While the non-anthropocentric argument is important for helping 
the general public deliberate about how environmental decisions are made, it cannot be the only 
stance given the variety of contexts within which environmental decisions are made. As Bryan 
Norton, who is fairly categorized as an environmental pragmatist, recently stated in an interview:  
After I joined the Environmental Economics Advisory Committee of the EPA, for 
example, I would have been laughed out of the room if I had started in saying, 
‘Oh, you don’t need to worry about these supply and demand curves. Nature has 
intrinsic value.’ Well, it wouldn’t have worked. So I had to figure out ways of 
contributing in contexts where philosophers and environmental ethicists had 
seldom tread. (Meine, 2018:280) 
Norton was somewhat unique in the environmental philosophy and ethics world because: (1) he 
had a philosophy of science background and a public policy perspective and; (2) he thought since 
humans are making the environmental decisions, then it was more important to see the world 
from a human perspective (Meine, 2018). This was not necessarily a popular perspective in the 
environmental ethics and philosophy field (Meine, 2018; Minteer, 2012). But, the pragmatist 
beliefs driving Norton and others, including both that humans should be allowed to have and 
express a plurality of values and that the pragmatic method can help us understand and revise 
those beliefs, underscores a desire to solve practical environmental problems with the support of 
systematic and empirical scientific approaches. To this end, environmental pragmatists have 
discussed, adopted, and/or developed several concepts or ideas that could be potentially 
beneficial to research within EE, including a well-developed stance on ‘sustainability’, a nuanced 
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stance on anthropocentricism, and a general method for decision-making (i.e., heuristic 
proceduralism). These concepts are reviewed in turn.  
 
4.2.3. Normative sustainability: expanding the dimensions of welfare 
The concept of sustainability is notoriously challenging, as there is no consensus on what 
it means nor how it can be achieved; beyond it being “about the future and our concern toward 
it” (Norton, 2010:534). Figure 4.2 illustrates different definitions of sustainability across 
different disciplines. To complicate matters, the definition of strong sustainability within an 
economic framework is not agreed upon. There are several permutations of strong sustainability, 
as thoroughly discussed by Neumayer (2013). Therefore, while there may be some level of 
agreement within EE for a strong-economic sustainability, there is not universal agreement as to 
what this entails.  
The intention is not to review all these different definitions of sustainability in detail, but 
to highlight the basic differences between the four columns and to review ‘normative 
sustainability’ as the working definition for environmental pragmatists. The primary difference 
between the four sustainability definitions is represented by the thick middle line between weak, 
welfare-counting sustainability and strong, stuff-counting sustainability. According to Norton 
(2015), a welfare-counting conceptualization of sustainability, whether within mainstream 
economics or EE, commits to representing any good or bad in terms of countable impacts on 
human welfare. Of course, this characterization (which posits EE as a welfare counting 
approach) presents EE as a clearly defined research tradition (this work contends otherwise). 
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Figure 4.2. A conceptual geography of sustainability definitions  
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Nonetheless, this characterization is consistent with an EE that would “encompass 
neoclassical economic theory with its emphasis on an efficient allocation of resources, but 
superimpose on this the criterion for just inter-generational distribution and an optimal scale of 
the macroeconomy” (Neumayer, 2013:28-29, emphasis original). On the right-hand half of 
Figure 4.2, stuff-counting sustainability is that which protects “goods, features, and other aspects 
of physically described systems that must be protected for the future” (Norton, 2015:80). The 
‘physical’ aspects of the system are distinguished because, as discussed further below, normative 
98 
 
sustainability focuses on the various opportunities that may be associated with such physical 
aspects of the system.  
 The basic review of ‘normative sustainability’ provided herein presents the following: (1) 
a general definition of normative sustainability; (2) the primary difference between counting 
welfare and counting stuff, and the meaning of ‘goods, features, and other aspects of physically 
describable systems’ and; (3) the definition of a ‘community’ and considerations of varying 
spatial and temporal scales. Before commencing, it should be noted that this review of normative 
sustainability is not exhaustive, as its main architect (i.e., Bryan Norton) has put forth 
monumental effort articulating normative sustainability and how it both differs from other types 
of sustainability and can inform decision making (Norton, 2003, 2005, 2015; Norton & Toman, 
1997). 
 
4.2.3.1. General definition of normative sustainability 
Norton (2005:363) defined normative sustainability as “a relationship between 
generations such that the earlier generations fulfill their individual wants and needs so as not to 
destroy, or close off, important and valued options for future generations.” Normative 
sustainability was conceptualized over two decades, and it represents an ambitious attempt to 
create an integrated concept of sustainable systems that incorporates key ideas of economists and 
ecologists into “an overarching system capable of both describing and evaluating policies 
proposed to support sustainability” (Norton, 2015:81). Following pragmatism, normative 
sustainability is focused on informing action and addressing practical problems; Norton was 
specifically focused on adaptive management. As such, sustainability is defined from the 
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viewpoint of the environmental manager who is “reacting to problems as they arise, must rely on 
everyday observation, consultation, and common sense, although he or she may consult the more 
precise models of disciplinary scientists from time to time” (Norton, 2005:357).  
The general nature of this definition, and the need to fill in the specifics (i.e., decide what 
is valued and important), partly emphasizes the normative (not just descriptive) aspect of this 
particular sustainability conceptualization. As Norton (2015:102, emphasis added) explained, “a 
normative definition differs from a descriptive one, such as Solow’s definition, in giving 
evolving community values a central role in specifying sustainability for that 
community…different communities will emphasize different features of special value.” Solow’s 
definition (and others) is ‘descriptive’ because it dictates, a priori, what should be measured (i.e., 
all relevant forms of capital (Neumayer, 2013)). Whereas normative sustainability holds that 
“choosing what to sustain is prior to choosing how to measure its sustenance” (Norton, 
2005:364). As expressed in Figure 4.2, normative sustainability does not specify ‘welfare’ as that 
which should be sustained necessarily. To make Norton’s distinction between welfare-counting 
and stuff-counting clear, there is a need to clarify (or attempt to) what is meant by welfare.  
 
4.2.3.2. Expanding the meaning of welfare and the meaning of ‘stuff’ 
Generally, a theory of welfare has be considered in terms of three levels: the conceptual 
level, the sources level, and the indicators level (Binder, 2010; Sumner, 2006). The conceptual 
level specifies the nature of welfare, “giving a formal account of what constitutes individual 
well-being and social welfare. At this level, it is specified what makes a life go well and under 
what conditions this takes place” (Binder, 2010:22, emphasis added). Notice that human well-
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being indicates the welfare of an individual, and social welfare indicates some aggregate or 
collective measure. The second level specifies the sources of well-being, and while an exhaustive 
list may not be possible the sources of well-being should follow from the conceptual level. The 
final, indicator level, is the “most practice-oriented layer, where concrete measures for the 
sources of well-being are proposed” (Binder, 2010).  
Norton disavows a welfare-counting approach to sustainability, which is referring to the 
theory of welfare within economics. Over time, the meaning of welfare in economics has 
changed as the field has evolved (Scarantino, 2009), but generally individual welfare has been 
thought of either in terms of hedonism or as preference satisfaction (Binder, 2010). The 
hedonism view of welfare would equate the presence of pleasure and the absence of pain as a 
state that maximizes welfare; however, this view in somewhat outdated in economics, as the 
view that welfare equates to the satisfaction of preferences is generally accepted (Binder, 2010; 
Hausman & McPherson, 1994; Sumner, 2006). This view parallels the idea that the economic 
concept of ‘utility’ is, contemporaneously, viewed only as a way to describe or represent 
preferences, as opposed to it being equated with pleasure or happiness (Varian, 2014). Both 
views of welfare are considered ‘subjective’ theories, as the individual is the judge of their own 
desires and there is not specification of what these desires may be because they are assumed to 
be wide ranging. Additionally, the preference satisfaction view is thought of as ‘state-of-the 
world’ theories, because they detail which states of the world fulfil certain desires (Binder, 
2010).   
 So what exactly are the deficiencies of counting welfare in Norton’s view? Generally, the 
issue with welfare counting is that economic valuation treats all environmental goods as 
measurable using the same indicator, thus providing a “comprehensive treatment of 
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environmental values” (Norton, 2005:166, emphasis original). Even though valuation of 
environmental goods and services has developed beyond simply asking open ended willingness-
to-pay questions (e.g., choice modeling makes WTP less explicit in some cases), it is fair to 
characterize economic welfare as singular (as Binder (2010) does) in that it does generally 
represent preference satisfaction through indicators such as WTP or income. Consider the 
following definition of sustainability (or sustainable development), which is generally accepted 
within an economic framework (regardless of whether it is considered strong or weak economic 
sustainability): some action is sustainable if “it does not decrease the capacity to provide non-
declining per capita utility for infinity” (Neumayer, 2013:8, emphasis added). 
 The issues with a comprehensive treatment of environmental values refers to the idea 
that, in principle, one can gain a total economic valuation of the environment by accounting for 
both use and non-use values. This principle stems in part from the unspecified nature of welfare 
beyond preference satisfaction. Welfare, as represented by the satisfaction of preferences, is 
“materially empty since it does not say anything about what might be the cause of this welfare 
gain” (Binder, 2010:33). For instance, one could prefer that a plot of national forest be logged 
instead of protected for recreation use for any number of reasons and, while this preference 
would imply a higher utility for logging, it says nothing about motives. As Carson et al. 
(2001:177) noted, economic theory is clear in that motives, or reasons for taking action in some 
situation, are “essentially irrelevant” and “it is utility whatever its sources that matters for total 
value.” That is, the welfare gained through the satisfaction of the logging preference does not 
necessarily imply some individual gain per se, as the ideas of bequest values and existence 
values are meant to convey. As Arrow (1951:17, emphasis added) emphasized long ago, 
economic theory assumes that individuals have preferences for the ordering of social states, 
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which are partly defined by the bundle of goods within each state; however, it is not assumed 
that “an individual’s attitude toward different social states is determined exclusively by the 
commodity bundles which accrue to his lot under each.”  
Even though Norton understands that this comprehensive treatment of environmental 
values may be possible in principle, there is enough evidence to suggest that it does not hold in 
practice. He cites a first-hand account of a debate regarding the validity of a contingent valuation 
study, but one does not need to look far to find accounts questioning and testing the capacity of 
economic approaches to comprehensively account for environmental values (particularly non-use 
values) (e.g., Chee, 2004; Kumar & Kumar, 2008; Langlois, 1998; Venn & Quiggin, 2007). 
Norton (2005, 2015) is clear that the application of economics within environmental decision-
making is important and potentially needed (depending on the decision context), but at the same 
time he stresses that it can only provide a partial understanding of complex environmental issues. 
The same critique is essentially leveled at all singular approaches, including at ardent supporters 
of non-anthropocentrism.  
This is where normative sustainability, with its focus on ‘stuff’, broadens its scope. 
Fundamentally, stuff-counting sustainability needs to make a broad range of values explicit. 
Before clarifying this statement, it is worth noting that the concept of ‘values’ is notoriously 
opaque, as can be gleaned from even a superficial reading of natural resource social science 
literature. It is not a new problem either, as works often belabor the point that values is an 
ambiguous idea (e.g., Brown, 1984; Dewey, 1939). Hechter (1992) even entitled an article: 
Should Values Be Written out of the Social Scientist's Lexicon? Nonetheless, discussing 
pragmatism, and Norton’s stuff-counting sustainability makes it nearly impossible to avoid the 
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term. Therefore, I proceed with caution for this section, but later discuss how pragmatism and EE 
could help to clarify the convoluted values concept.  
Environmental pragmatists generally call for value pluralism, and the term ‘values’ is 
prevalent in both books focused on articulating a clear vision of normative sustainability (i.e., 
Norton, 2005, 2015). In trying to distinguish stuff-counting sustainability from welfare-counting 
sustainability, it seems that Norton makes two substantive distinctions. First, there are a plurality 
of values that should be debated and discussed when a community is grappling with a complex 
environmental problem and deciding on a sustainable approach going forward. If the theory of 
welfare framework is applied to Figure 4.2, then Norton (consistent with pragmatism) is 
suggesting that individual well-being and social welfare will require more specificity than just 
preference satisfaction and the aggregation of such preferences. While he acknowledges that one 
cannot exhaustively catalog all possible values that may broadly define well-being, he suggested 
four broad categories that might be important to discussions about how to live sustainably: (1) 
community-procedural values; (2) weak-sustainability (economic) values; (3) risk-avoidance 
values and; (4) community-identity values (Norton, 2005).  
Procedural values, acknowledged as a potentially odd fit within the context of 
environmental problem solving, represent the contribution of discourse ethics by emphasizing 
that agreeing on a process for cooperative solutions is, in and of itself, a contribution to 
sustainable living. In other words, while process values do not imply the substance about what is 
valued, a fair and open process of establishing such values gives rise to sustainability 
commitments (Norton, 2005). Economic values refer to discussions of sustaining wealth. Each 
community, in essence, has to decide if maintaining the accumulated wealth of a society is an 
essential sustainability commitment. Measuring this wealth is an important topic, and it includes 
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discussions of enumerating both market and non-market goods and services, as well as when it is 
appropriate (or inappropriate) to apply non-market valuation techniques such as contingent 
valuation. Risk-avoidance values refer to the magnitude of influence that risk analyses should 
have in making decisions concerning environmental problems; the environmental protection 
agency (EPA) emphasizes this framework. Lastly, community-identity values are those that 
emerge on a community scale, which “are developed and passed from generation to generation, 
creating cohesiveness within human communities but also binding individuals and communities 
to their natural habitat” (Norton, 2005:371). These values stem from virtue ethics and “express a 
sense of the good life”, as Norton (2005:371-372) briefly elaborated:  
I have chosen to adopt the terminology of layered obligations, wherein a “thin” 
theory of justice includes obligations to treat other individuals with respect and 
“thick” obligations are obligations accepted as part of defining and living a good 
life in a community with shared values. Thin obligations originate in universal 
aspects of the moral situation, whereas thick obligations are culture-bound and 
relative to particular situations. 
It should be noted that within the context of environmental decision-making, the concepts of 
community and attachment to place are well-established and discussed in the conservation social 
sciences literature.  
The main point is that these four value categories are among those that may change, or be 
more or less influential within a variety of community settings (i.e., “different communities will 
emphasize different features of special value” (Norton, 2015:102, emphasis added). Stuff-
counting sustainability is meant to make explicit, through debate and discussion, the basic ground 
rules and content of what it means to live sustainably. Continuing with the welfare-theory 
framework above, what are the sources of well-being in normative sustainability? It appears to 
be the ‘goods, features, and other aspects of physically described systems that must be protected 
for the future’, as well as the ‘opportunities’ afforded by such features. Norton (2015:104, 
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emphasis added) slightly amended the definition of normative sustainability in his most recent 
book: “for a given generation to live sustainably means that that generation fulfills its needs and 
desires so as not to destroy important and valued opportunities for future generations.”  
An opportunity is defined as “a possible action or policy that could be chosen, given the 
environment at hand” (Norton, 2015:103). The second element of this definition related to the 
‘environment at hand’ stresses, somewhat obviously, the need to connect possible opportunities 
(choices or actions) to physical characteristics of the environment. The contrary concept to 
opportunities is ‘constraints’, which acknowledges that humans are generally adapting and 
operating within the reality of their physical system (e.g., a flat desert ecosystem constrains one’s 
ability to downhill ski). Norton (2015:104) follows his schematic definition of normative 
sustainability with:  
The definition leaves a role for communities to democratically decide what 
activities are valued deeply enough to sacrifice to protect them for future 
generations—what should be saved. One should not forget that this approach, 
which leaves action, choice, and policies unspecified, as variables, is insufficient 
as a definition of sustainability for any community. To actually instantiate this 
definition, it is necessary for a community to engage in a process by which 
opportunities are associated with the community’s deepest and most inspirational 
values. The task will be to describe a process by which a community, through 
democratic means and through participation in deliberation and negotiation, might 
define for itself what sustainability means to their community. 
 
One way to facilitate this process is by adopting Amartya Sen’s ‘capability approach’, 
which views welfare in terms of ‘functionings’ and ‘capabilities’. Functionings are roughly 
divided into ‘beings’ (being happy, being nourished, being educated) and ‘doings’ (travelling, 
voting, eating meat, providing for one’s family), and capabilities are the freedoms or 
opportunities to realize the desired functionings (Binder, 2010; Robeyns, 2016). As Robeyns 
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(2016:8, emphasis added) explains: “while travelling is a functioning, the real opportunity to 
travel is the corresponding capability. The distinction between functionings and capabilities is 
between the realized and the effectively possible, in other words, between achievements, on the 
one hand, and freedoms or valuable opportunities from which one can choose, on the other.” 
Sen’s approach considers a person’s (or community’s) well-being to be constituted by a 
combination of a variety of valuable opportunities (Robeyns, 2016). 
A full articulation of Sen’s approach is beyond the scope of this paper, but it is important 
to stress that it arose in direct contrast to the unidimensional approaches of preference-
satisfaction and hedonism welfare (see, for example, Binder (2010), Sumner (2006), and 
Robeyns (2016)). Sen’s approach, aside from motivating Norton’s use of the term ‘opportunity’, 
is a formal framework intended to incorporate a variety of underlying values beyond utility (i.e., 
it is multidimensional), and it incorporates different discourse ‘spaces’ to facilitate the 
overcoming of obstacles related to different technical languages and disciplinary assumptions 
(Binder, 2010; Norton, 2015).   
 
4.2.3.3. Defining a community 
 The final element to be discussed with regard to normative sustainability is the broad 
definition of community, and how varying spatial-temporal contexts can be integrated. 
Community is context dependent, but it can be generally understood as a “group with a shared 
identity” which, in some cases, are connected in important ways with a “physical area and the 
natural characteristics of that area” (Norton, 2015:103). Drawing boundaries around a 
community, whether social or ecological, can be a challenge, and clearly those who are (or are 
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not) part of the debate regarding a sustainable path will influence the chosen definition of 
sustainability. Norton’s pragmatist approach draws insights from complex systems theory and 
ecology to better manage such a challenge. Specifically, to operationalize normative 
sustainability over space and time, which is critical for any sustainability definition, Norton 
integrates ideas from hierarchy theory (HT).  
Briefly, HT posits that smaller subsystems in a set of nested systems change more rapidly 
than the systems they compose. Norton (2005:230) suggested it is “useful to perceive human 
choosers as embedded in a hierarchical system and to see that the human values delivered by that 
system emerge on different scales of space and time. Once values are so sorted, it may be 
possible to associate these variables with natural dynamics essential to their continuation.” Table 
4.1 illustrates roughly how different human concerns may relate to different times scales.  
 
Table 4.1. Correlation of human concerns and natural systems dynamics on different temporal 
scales 
Temporal horizon of concern Time scales Temporal dynamics in nature 
Individual and economic 0-5 years Human economies 
Community intergenerational 
bequests 
Up to 200 years Ecological dynamics and 
interaction of species in 
communities  
Species survival and our genetic 
successors 
Indefinite time Global physical systems 
Source: Norton (2005:231) 
 
The relationship between HT and Aldo Leopold’s ‘thinking like a mountain’ simile is 
prevalent in Norton’s writing (Norton, 1996b, 2005, 2015). The simile referenced by Norton is in 
Leopold’s A Sand County Almanac published in 1949, and it tells the story of culling predator 
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populations for the short-term benefit of hunting game, and the unforeseen consequences in the 
long-term (namely starving game, erosion and other environmental damage from unnaturally 
large game populations). Leopold (1966:140-141) ended the essay with:  
The cowman who cleans his range of wolves does not realize that he is taking 
over the wolf’s job of trimming the herd to fit the range. He has not learned to 
think like a mountain. Hence we have dustbowls, and rivers washing the future 
into the sea…perhaps this is behind Thoreau’s dictum: In wildness is the salvation 
of the world. Perhaps this is the hidden meaning in the howl of the world, long 
known among mountains, but seldom perceived among men. 
The central point is that the long-term perspective of the mountain results in different thinking 
than does the short-term perspective of humans. A focus on human concerns over different time 
scales is attractive, according to Norton (2005:220), because “this separation of values onto 
different scales reduces direct competition between them, since different dynamics will be 
associated with their production.”  
At this time, a full articulation of how HT fits into normative sustainability is not 
required, but its reliance on systems theory, the integration of diverse human values, and the 
modeling of natural resource management at a broad range of time scales supports the underlying 
case being made in this dissertation (i.e., that pragmatism is a suitable philosophy for driving 
research in EE). The quick review is also helpful as considering human values over different 
time scales is central to the environmental pragmatist view on anthropocentrism. 
 
4.2.4. Administrative anthropocentrism and anthropocentric holism   
Intrinsic value is the idea that the environment, or its constituents such as individual 
animals or large ecosystems have value irrespective of instrumental human interests. Without 
fully wading into the depths of the intrinsic value debate, environmental pragmatists view 
109 
 
intrinsic value as among a spectrum of values that include both instrumental (e.g., timber, 
recreation) and non-instrumental (e.g., spirituality, beauty, intrinsic) values (Minteer, 2012; 
Norton, 2005, 2015; Weston, 1996). Environmental pragmatism can be considered ‘subjectivist’ 
in that humans are doing the valuing, but that is not to say that it is crudely anthropocentric in a 
subject-centered, only human-beings-have-value kind of way (Weston, 1996). Humans have to 
prioritize and take action based upon a plurality of human values, among which intrinsic value is 
included. That is, humans can value intrinsic value (above and beyond any human benefits gain 
from that valuing). Human’s recognize and act upon intrinsic value, regardless of human benefit.  
Norton (2015:267) dubbed this idea ‘administrative anthropocentrism’, which “is the 
recognition that, when there is conflict among values held by persons or groups, the resolution of 
such conflicts, if achieved, will be a resolution by human beings.” The implication of this is that 
no value, such as the preservation of endangered species based upon intrinsic value arguments, is 
automatically deemed of highest importance. Any value, based upon community discussions, can 
be deemed the most important. In the case of endangered species, the intrinsic value of species is 
reflected as very important in the United States through the passage the Endangered Species Act 
(albeit to the chagrin of some). In a nuanced discussion of intrinsic values and pragmatism, 
including the ideas of John Dewey, Minteer (2012:63-64) reflected: “Norton seems to be making 
a careful distinction between ontological accounts of intrinsic value (which he rejects) and an 
anthropocentric accommodation of pragmatic noninstrumental value (which he accepts).” While 
Norton is accommodating such values, though there is some skepticism of the long-term impact 
of intrinsic value arguments within environmental discourse (Minteer, 2012), which is reflected 
above in the anecdote about the EPA advisory committee. 
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The idea of anthropocentric holism connects humans as the deliberators of a plurality of 
values across different time scales. How anthropocentric holism relates to other types of 
anthropocentrism is reflected in Figure 4.3. The difference between non-anthropocentric 
individualists and non-anthropocentric holists is commonly referred to as a biocentric view and 
ecocentric view, respectively (Minteer, 2012). By connecting different human concerns and 
values across time, partly through the incorporation of HT, Norton (2005) suggested that both 
humans and ecosystems can be valued; thus, the ‘anthropocentric holists’ moniker. 
 
Figure 4.3. Two intersecting distinctions in environmental ethics 
 
A 
Anthropocentrism 
B 
Nonanthropocentrism 
I 
Individualism 
Anthropocentric 
individualists 
 
Traditional ethics 
and mainstream 
economics 
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individualists 
 
Animal liberationists 
e.g., Singer, Sagoff 
II 
Holism 
Anthropocentric 
holists 
 
e.g., Leopold and 
Norton 
Nonanthropocentric 
holists 
 
e.g., Callicott 
Source: Adapted from Norton (2005:216) 
 
His claiming of Leopold in this camp is one part of his argument that Aldo Leopold was a 
pragmatist at heart, which is a debate that he has primarily had with Baird Callicott over the 
years (Callicott et al., 2009, 2011; Norton, 1996a, 2011a). Claiming Leopold as anything but a 
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non-anthropocentric adherent is a dissent from the majority opinion in environmental ethics and 
philosophy (Minteer, 2003). This brief review of anthropocentrism in environmental pragmatism 
was merely meant to introduce the topic for the purpose of this paper (i.e., not provide an 
exhaustive review). I now turn to the idea of decision-making as it pertains to environmental 
pragmatism.  
 
4.2.5. Decision-making: A process approach toward social learning   
 It should not surprise the reader that, given the discussion above, the path toward 
decision-making is the focus of environmental pragmatism; that is, there is no specific decision 
criteria in the way that economics, for instance, applies cost-benefit analysis or net present value. 
It may also not surprise the reader that many of the ideas in this section have been articulated by 
Bryan Norton. While good scholarship should draw from a diversity of sources, I echo Brister 
(2018), who noted: “Norton’s account of environmental decision-making is a rich one, drawing 
on Dewey’s theory of inquiry, Jürgen Habermas’s theory of deliberative democracy, and the 
adaptive management of C. S. Holling and natural resource managers.”  
 When confronted with complex environmental problems, environmental pragmatists 
eschew ‘substantive rationality’ as it “attempts to identify one correct answer by computation or 
by some algorithm, and it attempts to determine what is substantively rational by considering and 
measuring all outcomes against stated objectives” (Norton, 2015:57). Instead, procedural 
rationality, which focuses on the process employed given the problem at hand, is the approach of 
choice for making decisions. This aligns with the paradigmatic assumptions of pragmatism 
outlined above and, furthermore, it aligns with the natural resource planning literature that has 
generally called for a ‘transactive’ approach whereby expert opinion is complemented with 
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public engagement and transparent deliberation (Borrie et al., 1998; McCool et al., 2007; Nilsen 
& Tayler, 1997).  
Procedural rationality can be thought of in terms of ‘pure proceduralism’ or ‘constrained 
proceduralism’. The former does not attempt to assess the appropriateness of the outcome but 
simply accepts the decision made as the best one based upon the process in place; whereas the 
latter has a constrained decision space, where a limited number of options are established 
(perhaps due to an existing legislative policy) and then the process is implemented to choose the 
best outcome (Norton, 2015). Basic procedural rationality as a foundation, whether pure or 
constrained, is potentially open to the ‘means justify the ends’ critique of pragmatism outlined in 
the axiology section above (Section 4.1.3). This is perhaps why Norton (2015) introduced 
‘heuristic proceduralism’, which focuses first and foremost on identifying different processes 
that may be appropriate for establishing outcomes. While this may be implied in procedural 
rationalism more broadly, the focus of environmental pragmatists, consistent with Dewey’s focus 
on integrating scientific methods into democratic procedures, is to identify appropriate processes 
that tend to “encourage agreement and cooperative behavior within a deliberative process” 
(Norton, 2015:116-117). 
 Norton (2015:119-171) described a general method for heuristic proceduralism at length 
and, consistent with this section more generally, I will not go into great depth. The essence of 
Norton’s general method is to identify specific ways (e.g., scenario building) to envision 
different future possibilities or development paths whereby different social values, and indicators 
for such values, are discussed. There is a need to resist ‘chunking’, which refers to the breaking 
apart of nature into chunks of objects that have value. Economists do this when they consider 
forest stocks, for example, or the availability of cubic board feet, and environmental, non-
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anthropocentric ethicists do this when they assign value to individual organisms, species, and 
ecosystems. It is suggested that these evaluative methods are beneficial for making short-term 
decisions, but if intergenerational sustainability is the goal then there is a need to approach SESs 
with an open-ended, systems based understanding.  
Combining the ideas of hierarchy theory and the need to understand social values with a 
plurality of approaches provides context for different decision tools (e.g., cost-benefit analysis, 
multi-criteria analysis), which are associated with different spatial and temporal time scales. 
Norton (2015) ended the description of his general method with:  
Adaptive managers, ideally, would not, when faced with a problem of placing 
values on changes in natural systems, go to the economics department or the 
philosophy department to find a consultant to do a study at long distance. Rather, 
they should invite those practitioners—or local practitioners with similar skills—
into the public process. If studies of attitudes and values become necessary in the 
ideal adaptive process, evaluation of possible development paths should be 
initiated by members of the management team. Alternatively, evaluators with 
special abilities may be brought onto the management team. The point here is that 
both adaptive science and evaluation of change is best done within the conflict-
ridden context in which problems are faced, because each problem faced is 
unique.  
Norton’s general method, while informative, should be considered an ideal, because in practice 
executing what is suggested here is potentially full of obstacles. Brister (2018) noted that there is 
potentially valid skepticism that the type of process described is attainable within the context of 
complex environmental problems.  
Within the context of natural resource planning, the need for transactive planning is well-
established, as are its basic elements, including social interaction among stakeholders, 
opportunities for mutual learning among citizens and planners, debate and discussion regarding 
tradeoffs between values, and the forming of partnerships for implementing agreed upon 
management actions (Friedmann, 1973; Hudson et al., 1979; Krumpe & Stokes, 1993).  
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These ideas parallel those of Norton. However, how such an approach can be 
implemented in practice is less established, and it is recognized as a significant challenge to a 
variety of planning processes. For instance, the cost of public engagement may be considered an 
‘extra’ cost of planning, public facilitation expertise may be limited, and it can sometimes be 
difficult to clearly articulate to the public what their exact role is to be (McCool et al., 2007). 
One suggestion is that ecological economists should focus on developing methods that can be 
implemented within the public deliberation process, which are both scientifically robust and 
potentially capable of facilitating social learning through an understanding of diverse public 
perspectives about relationships between humans and the environment.  
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5. A PRAGMATIST ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS: BASIC SCIENTIFIC BELIEFS, 
GENERAL METHODOLOGY, AND SPECIFIC PRACTICES 
This section focuses on articulating how pragmatism can guide EE. In the context of this 
work, pragmatism constitutes a paradigm for EE within the macrostructure framework. 
Therefore, this section focuses on the implications of adopting pragmatism for both the higher 
level worldview as well as lower level research programs. What follows are recommendations 
for what a pragmatist EE would look like, including guidelines, imperatives, and a variety of 
other considerations.  
 
5.1. A pragmatist EE worldview: Paradigm relevance, dialog between scientific 
approaches, and a new dimension  
A scientific worldview encompasses general beliefs related to the nature of science. The 
macrostructure framework above focused on beliefs regarding the importance of paradigmatic 
assumptions for driving research practice, as well as beliefs about how different approaches to 
science interact (i.e., the dialog). In this section, a pragmatist EE worldview in relation to these 
beliefs is described. In addition, a third ‘worldview’ dimension is discussed, which was not a 
focus of Patterson and Williams (1998), but is increasingly relevant within the context of the 
conservation social sciences. This is the integration of a diverse range of stakeholders into 
science. The general idea of transdisciplinary research is that science should not be purely expert 
driven, but instead it should extend the peer-community to include non-experts as well (Lang et 
al., 2012; Wiek, 2007). The dialog element of the macrostructure framework essentially 
encompasses views on interdisciplinary research but, given the context of this work, it is also 
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important to think about beliefs related to transdisciplinary research (as challenging as this may 
be to define).  
 
5.1.1. Paradigms strongly support research in practice  
 Following Dewey’s belief in the ‘wary assessment’ of knowledge, all scientists should 
have an explicit philosophical stance driving their research whereby the process used to arrive at 
such knowledge is (or at least could be) described from the bottom to the top. That is, from the 
foundational beliefs to general methodology, specific methods, results, interpretation, and on-
the-ground implications. This follows a methodological pluralism described by Hodgson (2001), 
where potentially conflicting paradigmatic assumptions can coexist in a beneficial way within 
disciplines and the academy at large, but within a researcher’s mind assumptions should be 
consistent. This suggests a pragmatist EE is not ‘a-paradigmatic’ (Figure 2.2). Foundational 
assumptions of research within EE are more than ‘background information’, they not only 
influence research in practice but their understanding and connection to research practice is 
required to justify and defend science within the context of public deliberation. Furthermore, if 
the important axiological goals of communication and social learning are to be realized, then a 
researcher should be able to articulate even the most mundane elements of scientific inquiry, if 
they are considered to be of interest to other scientists and/or the general public.   
  
5.1.2. Interdisciplinary research can lead to convergence on a unified methodology  
A pragmatist EE necessarily embraces multiple approaches to science. More specifically, 
pragmatist EE occupies the space somewhere between pluralism and critical pluralism (Figure 
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2.1). Pluralism suggests that, over time, the multiple paradigms supporting science will converge 
toward a single set of normative assumptions and a single general methodology. Whereas critical 
pluralism suggests that multiple paradigms can co-exist and inform one another in valuable 
ways, though some indeterminacy will persist. As asserted above, EE is among the conservation 
social sciences and, therefore, it is unlikely that practitioners of EE believe that there is only one 
way to do science; at least in the sense, for instance, that a positivist approach is science and an 
interpretivist approach, while interesting, cannot be considered science. A pragmatist EE rejects 
both this stance, and the idea that anything goes and science is relativistic.  
Making such an assertion, while also avoiding the more specific discussion of the middle 
ground is not all that enlightening. Greater specificity requires, at least, taking a position between 
the outdated stance that there is only one way to appraise science and the devil’s-advocate stance 
that there is no way to appraise science. Additionally, greater specificity requires articulating 
what is meant by possible methodological convergence of different approaches or, alternatively, 
persistent indeterminacy (e.g., that ontological assumptions in positivism and constructivism 
renders science using these different assumptions as incompatible). The methodological-
pluralism spectrum illustrated in Figure 2.2 can facilitate this greater specificity. Generally, a 
pragmatist EE holds that there are several systematic approaches to understanding and describing 
the world which yield warranted assertions (scientific beliefs), but such descriptions are only 
partial. If complex environmental problems are assumed to unfold within dynamic SESs, then a 
pragmatist EE focuses in large part on considering partial descriptions of the world to yield a 
more detailed picture of the complex system.  
When trying to yield a more detailed picture, a pragmatist EE does not adopt a 
‘pure/oppositional’ dialog, where scientific explanations of the same phenomena are competing. 
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Again, it believes that scientific explanations are partial. For instance, if trying to describe the 
importance of a national forest, an environmental economic approach focused on total economic 
valuation (an exhaustive enumeration of use and non-use values) can, even in principle, only 
capture part of the importance of a national forest. Similarly, a hermeneutic approach only 
captures part of that importance. These partial understandings may be more applicable or 
appropriate in particular contexts; however, complex environmental problems will often require 
a combination of approaches. For example, national forest planning requires a consideration of 
ecological, social, and economic sustainability (U.S. Department of Agriculture Forest Service, 
2012), and no single method is going to provide the information needed to comprehensively 
inform and address this challenging task. 
When several methodologies are applied to addressing the same problem, a pragmatist 
EE worldview would posit that over time the combination of different approaches can lead to 
methodological convergence and, consequently, a more comprehensive tentative truth. While 
this suggests that a pragmatist EE may eventually yield a single methodology, it is important to 
stress that methodological convergence will not happen immediately, and it may never happen 
fully. That is, it may never happen to the extent that disciplinary roots start to disappear (i.e., 
some pure interdisciplinary approach were distinguishing different disciplinary contributions is 
not possible). In practice, different approaches to describing the importance of a national forest 
likely start as multi-disciplinary research, and perhaps the endpoint (at least in a single study) is 
the removal of conflicting methodological beliefs (i.e., strands of the cable of truth that are no 
longer tenable). 
For example, the aim to understand the importance of water-based ecosystem services on 
the Shoshone National Forest (Armatas, 2013; Armatas et al., 2014; Armatas et al., 2018) started 
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with a Q-methodology study. This methodology aligns more with a constructivist paradigm, and 
it provides a nuanced, qualitative understanding (in the sense that results are not generalizable) 
of the importance of ecosystem services. The results from this study were interpreted as 
beneficial for potentially helping forest planners and managers understand the tradeoffs among 
different ecosystem services. Additionally, the results were interpreted as beneficial for 
informing an economic, non-market valuation study of ecosystem services. This interpretation is 
detailed in Armatas et al. (2014), which is now best categorized as an attempt to improve non-
market valuation techniques within an environmental economics framework. Issues related to 
protest responses and lexicographic preferences are discussed, and more valid and reliable 
monetary estimates are suggested as benefits. Addressing these problems using a novel method is 
certainly a contribution to environmental economics, but it is not interdisciplinary per se. In other 
words, it is multidisciplinary in that a social science approach is proposed for adding rigor to a 
subsequent economic approach, but the basic assumptions underpinning the different 
methodologies remained unchanged as presented in Armatas et al. (2014).    
This changed when implementing the economic valuation study in practice. A second 
phase of this study on the Shoshone National Forest applied choice modeling, which is a non-
market valuation survey that typically yields monetary estimates of environmental goods and 
services. Supported by the Q-methodology study, a mailback survey was performed asking 
respondents to tradeoff different ecosystem services, and a cost attribute was included to allow 
for monetary estimates. Again, this survey was designed based upon standard economic 
paradigmatic assumptions (e.g., rational-actor model). However, analysis, interpretation, and 
discussion of this study was presented in conjunction with the initial Q-methodology study as an 
integrated assessment of ecosystem services (Armatas et al., 2018). This discussion includes 
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several methodological decisions that reflect interdisciplinary research and a pragmatist 
philosophy, including the decisions to not aggregate willingness-to-pay estimates or to publish 
the choice modelling results on their own (i.e., reserving a partial story of national forest value 
until a more detailed picture was understood). These decisions are discussed in greater detail 
below, but the important point for this section is that different approaches to science (even with 
potentially conflicting underlying assumptions) led to some convergence toward a more unified 
methodology. In other words, the constructivist ontology of Q-methodology and sometimes 
espoused in EE, which questions the practice of aggregating individual characteristics (in this 
case WTP), influenced the interpretation and presentation of results from an economic 
methodology, which is based upon a more objectivist ontology without such aggregation qualms. 
Of course, the extent that a plurality of approaches to science will result in a convergence 
to a single methodological approach is an open question. Pragmatism, as characterized by 
Greene (2008), results in convergence (Table 2.1); however, following Peirce, convergence to a 
unitary tentative truth (methodology in this case) may best be thought of as the result of infinite 
inquiry that is never actually reached. 
   
5.1.3. A pragmatist EE worldview on transdisciplinary research 
Transdisciplinary science is an ambitious and ambiguous approach whereby science 
integrates societal perspectives in a way that makes science more democratic while also 
maintaining rigor. Although there appears to be growing support for such research, not only in 
EE but in other emerging fields such as sustainability science (Quental et al., 2011), 
implementing such research in practice remains elusive. Perhaps the most fundamental question 
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regarding transdisciplinary research is whether it is possible. As Söderbaum (1999) mused in his 
discussion of values, ideology and politics in ecological economics, “some of us believe in 
transdisciplinary research, others do not.” 
A pragmatist EE views transdisciplinary research as that which can engage the public 
with methodological processes that not only yield an understanding of the world, but also lead to 
communication and social learning. In other words, research should help to partially describe the 
world in a way that constitutes a valuable assertion, which is distinguished from warranted 
assertions in that it is not only supported scientifically, but relevant and interesting to the public. 
As Hands (2001:263, emphasis added) suggested:  
Pragmatic philosophy can, and for Dewey should, serve an emancipatory role 
within the process of social reconstruction, but in order to do so it must affect the 
values that individuals hold. But these values are products of the social 
environment, and thus in order to succeed pragmatic philosophy must hook-up 
effectively with social life; the most significant hooks for pragmatic philosophy 
and social life are the social and moral sciences. 
This should not be interpreted as some form of manipulation, rather a call to better inject science 
into democratic processes. As Norton (2005:565) suggested, a pragmatic approach cannot “be 
dominated by the descriptive, snap-shot like aspects of science. The context, and the problems 
that constitute it, will ensure that values will be injected into the process. And the meaning given 
to scientific information is largely determined by its bearing upon disagreements that affect 
management decisions.” 
 While challenging, a pragmatist EE should focus on processes that engage the public and 
describe that which is of interest. For example, Armatas et al. (In Press) developed an application 
of Q-methodology within the context of national forest planning and management, which listed 
supporting decision-making and public relations as its two main contributions. The social 
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vulnerability protocol, as it is called, is intended as a process that managers and planners can 
implement themselves within the context of public engagement. The results from the process 
include an understanding of diverse viewpoints regarding the importance of ecosystem services 
and the drivers of change relevant to influencing such services. One benefit of the approach, 
according to Armatas et al. (In Press) is as follows:  
The clear representation of diverse viewpoints may also help decision-makers 
facilitate civil discourse between members of the general public. The protocol 
process can facilitate such discourse because it is an individual activity, which 
both allows all individuals to submit their input and prevents dominant 
personalities from monopolizing the discussion. The fact that every individual 
interacts with every ecosystem service in the ranking list can also help members 
of the public understand benefits that may not have been previously considered. 
We have observed participants discussing their Q-sorts (after the exercise), 
genuinely intrigued by their own and others tradeoffs. The “diverse archetypes 
can potentially give legitimacy to viewpoints that differ from one’s own. If one is 
no longer skeptical about the existence of a different viewpoint, then perhaps 
acceptance of that different viewpoint and subsequent civil discourse can 
commence” (Armatas et al., 2017b:34). The protocol may foster empathy among 
members of the public for different perspectives.    
 
This social vulnerability protocol highlights the benefits of understanding different stakeholder 
perspectives, such as helping decision-makers “understand ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of decisions” 
(Armatas et al., In Press). However, first and foremost, the benefits for communication and 
social learning are stressed, as reflected in the above block quote. Blending descriptive 
information for the primary benefit of planners and managers with a process that could 
potentially lead to better communication and social learning is consistent with a pragmatist EE 
worldview. It is also consistent with Norton (2015), who suggested that researchers should aim 
to engage science in the public process.   
 A final point about a pragmatist EE worldview is that it is incremental. As represented by 
Peirce’s analogy, the quest for an ultimate truth is through the replacement of individual strands 
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(i.e., beliefs) of a cable. This worldview is incremental both in terms of methodological 
improvement and the affecting of values. This might be the biggest difference between a 
pragmatist EE and other EEs. For instance, the critical-realist EE being advocated by Clive 
Spash and others essentially calls for the abandonment of mathematical formalism (i.e., methods 
employing the rational-actor model and the aggregation of such preferences) and the wholesale 
replacement of our current economic system. Spash (2017c:13) considered “activism as an 
essential part of being a committed ecological economist”, and additionally suggested that the 
goal of ecological economics is “destroying a dominant rhetorical claim made when mainstream 
economists, neoliberals and apologists for orthodox growth and consumerism lose an argument. 
That is, that there are no alternatives to the existing structures and system” (Spash, 2017b:xvii). 
This ‘dominant rhetorical claim’ highlights the primary criticism offered by mainstream 
economists in challenging ecological economists. Gowdy and Erickson (2005) labeled it the ‘we 
know this already’ defense of mainstream economics, and it refers to the following basic counter 
argument: the shortcomings of mainstream economics and its concepts such as the rational-actor 
model are well known; in many cases they have been (or are actively being) addressed and are 
therefore no longer valid. Furthermore, a superior alternative has yet to be offered. 
 A pragmatist EE worldview rejects the all or nothing stance, whether that be related to an 
environmental ethic, methodology, or alternative (more sustainable) economic system. A 
pragmatist EE strives for a better incorporation of ethics and intrinsic value for the purposes of 
more sustainable and equitable distribution of nature’s resources, but getting there is an 
incremental process. In other words, I agree with Turner and Clifton (2009:187), who in the 
context of discussing the contrasting general viewpoints of Indigenous cultures and predominant 
western societies with regard to climate change adaptation stated: “changing the dominant 
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industrial paradigm to far-thinking, eco-centric, community-centric perspectives could make an 
enormous difference to our collective impact on the planet, including the burden of human-
driven climate change.” However, changing the dominant thinking is not done through the 
assertion that utility-based anthropocentrism is wrong, but through incremental revision of the 
many beliefs that underpin the dominant industrial paradigm. This incremental approach may be 
unsatisfying to some, or labeled as obsequiousness. But, nonetheless, I argue it represents a 
pragmatist EE worldview, which may be beneficial for making progress towards resolving 
complex environmental problems. Furthermore, the worldview supports a more nuanced view of 
particular controversial topics within the literature, such as ecosystem services. This nuanced 
view, as well as other implications of research programs within a pragmatist EE are discussed 
below.  
 
5.2. Pragmatist EE research programs: Theoretical stances, methodological 
considerations, and real-world decisions  
Research programs involve the various debates surrounding underpinning theories and 
normative commitments (conceptual domain), issues of data collection, analysis, and 
interpretation (methodological domain) and, finally, the real-world context related to how 
science can accomplish its primary goals (substantive domain). The primary goal of the work 
herein is to better articulate how adopting pragmatism as a paradigm can influence research 
within EE. Specifically, what are the implications of adopting pragmatism for the conceptual, 
methodological, and substantive domains, whether that is within the context of informing 
management and decision-making, and/or facilitating social learning? 
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This section addresses this question for each domain in turn, but it is worth stressing that 
the implications detailed below are by no means exhaustive. Instead, major implications are 
detailed with the understanding that future research could expand and refine an understanding of 
how a pragmatist EE would operate at the research application level.  
 
5.2.1. Conceptual domain: normative sustainability, a holistic individual experience, and 
complex social-ecological systems    
 The conceptual domain concerns issues related to theoretical foundations and normative 
commitments. This section focuses on how adopting the normative commitments of pragmatist 
can influence the theoretical foundations of EE. Generally, several of the distinctions between 
environmental economics and EE listed in Table 3.1 align with a pragmatist foundation.  
 Adding to the distinctions made by Gowdy and Erickson (2005), another implication of 
adopting pragmatism for research in EE would be the reliance on normative sustainability as the 
working definition. Instead of aiming to sustain welfare for future generations, as defined by the 
value of some combination of human and natural capital, adopting normative sustainability 
would encourage ecological economists to focus on understanding the various opportunities and 
constraints that are relevant to communities as they confront complex environmental problems. 
If normative sustainability is the theoretical foundation of a pragmatist EE, then the 
methodological domain will have to facilitate an understanding of the various ‘opportunities’ that 
are relevant to a community given the environment at hand. Opportunities, as a reminder, are 
policies or actions that could took place within a given natural resource context. For example, 
opportunities could, depending on the physical resource, include: harvesting a section of forest, 
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expanding protected bear habitat, building a road, going skiing, going birdwatching, quietly 
reflecting about the grandeur of a landscape, restoring a riparian area, floating a river, preventing 
a species from going extinct, being part of an agricultural community and maintaining its 
historical connection to homesteaders, grazing cattle, or removing a dam.  
 Following Sen’s capabilities approach, opportunities require both a consideration of the 
broad range of ‘beings’ and ‘doings’ (i.e., functionings) as well as the capabilities to realize such 
functionings, which may or may not be constrained by the environment at hand. A pragmatist EE 
approach would expand these constraints to include not only the environment, but the SES more 
broadly. That is, there are, for instance, institutions that facilitate or constrain the realization of 
functionings. Sen’s approach was designed to better accommodate values beyond a nebulous 
utility. Again, ‘values’ is a challenging term, but normative sustainability requires a discussion of 
both underlying values and opportunities.  
 It seems that these values mostly refer to ‘held values’ as articulated by Brown (1984), 
who articulated the concept of value in natural resource ‘allocation’. He referenced three types of 
values: held values, relational values, and assigned values. Held values were discussed in the 
‘conceptual realm’, which referred to the underlying values that influence “the basis for 
preference about things and states of nature which are directly at issue in resource allocation” 
(Brown, 1984:232). Held values were categorized into instrumental (means values) such as 
frugality, generosity, courage, and fairness; and terminal (end) values such as happiness, 
freedom, beauty, and pleasure (these are akin to Sen’s ‘beings’). This definition highlights the 
unspecified nature of preference-satisfaction welfare; economics has typically ignored the basis 
for preferences by collapsing everything into utility. Assigned value was discussed in the ‘object 
realm’ as the “expressed relative importance or worth of an object to an individual or group in a 
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given context” (Brown, 1984:233). Assigned value can be unspecified, or specified: “thus, a 
forest may have assigned value in general (unspecified value) and have value for specific 
purposes, such as educational value, recreational value, commercial value, and food value” 
(Brown, 1984:234). Assigned value for an object is expressed through two different modes (i.e., 
actions or words) on multiple scales (e.g., ordinal). Lastly, relational value referred to the bridge 
between held values and assigned values because, as suggested by Brown (1984:233), value 
“arises from a preference relationship between a subject and an object”; it is this unobservable 
value at the “feeling level” that often gives rise to an expression of assigned value. Adopting 
normative sustainability as a theoretical foundation in a pragmatist EE requires that multiple held 
values are accommodated. How these values are accommodated is a question to be addressed 
within the methodological domain.  
 Another theoretical implication of adhering to the normative commitments of pragmatism 
is the shift from the rational-actor model to the more fluid, and potentially ephemeral, experience 
model described by Dewey and other pragmatists. The former assumes preferences that are 
stable and pre-existing, which are expressed in a linear fashion described by Brown (1984). The 
latter assumes that humans draw on previous experience, which includes potentially existing 
preferences, in addition to being shaped by current experiences. The implication of an 
experience-based model is that surveys, or other data collection methods, can themselves have an 
effect on peoples’ beliefs9. This is a critical point, as a pragmatist EE would view data collection 
                                                 
9 The reader may be thinking that this shift also invalidates much of what economic methods strive to accomplish, 
such as WTP estimates from non-market valuation surveys. I disagree, but it does highlight the partial understanding 
that WTP estimates provide, and it represents a stance that the rational-actor model is over-simplified. A pragmatist 
EE does not reject models, as simplified representations of reality are beneficial and needed tools for addressing 
complex problems. Instead, a pragmatist EE strives to document the inherent limitations of all models in a clear and 
transparent way through wary assessment. Better defining contexts (i.e., varied social and environmental conditions) 
where particular models are appropriate is part and parcel with this.   
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efforts as a way to get people to break habitual experiences (i.e., primary experiences) and, 
consequently, enter a ‘secondary’ experience where deep reflective thinking is engaged (as 
discussed in Section 4.1.2). Secondary experiences are where beliefs are affected and social 
learning takes place.  
 The final theoretical implication of a pragmatist EE is at the macro-level. Considering the 
systems within which individuals are embedded, a pragmatist EE adopts a complex systems view 
of the world. The choices people make are shaped by their varied social and environmental 
contexts, and the interrelationship between smaller systems nested within larger systems posits 
that considering isolated elements is inadequate. For example, clear cutting a portion of a 
forested ecosystem has implications for species biodiversity, nearby stream turbidity, increased 
economic opportunities, and lost (or gained) recreational opportunities. Additionally, though, it 
has implications for carbon sequestration, late-season river flows (which could affect autumn 
spiritual ceremonies of indigenous peoples and the realization of junior water rights), timber 
opportunities for future generations, and perhaps the desired ‘functioning’ of some population of 
people to be a good steward of the land. While those fully immersed in the conservation social 
sciences today may consider these additional implications obvious, it is a cognizance that is 
likely due in part to an increased focus on complex SESs and interdisciplinary research. 
 These broad theoretical implications of adopting pragmatism for research in EE have 
implications for methodology, several of which are discussed below.   
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5.2.2. Methodological domain—an overview 
The methodological domain, as defined in Figure 2.1, encompasses: (1) research 
logic/design; (2) sampling units of observation; (3) data collection, measurement, representation 
and; (4) data interpretation and analysis. This section discusses a general methodology for a 
pragmatist EE by addressing a broad range of methodological considerations. Specifically, a 
pragmatist EE general methodology is discussed in six parts: 
1. Discussion of the overarching need for holistic approaches that fully acknowledge the 
complexity of that being studied (research logic);  
2. Identification of a core burning question – the study of the human-nature relationship 
embodied by individual people (research logic/unit of analysis); 
3. Review of potentially fertile areas of existing knowledge for developing a holistic 
understanding of the human-nature relationship (research logic and design); 
4. Discussion of fundamental considerations regarding human-nature relationship 
investigation (data collection and measurement); 
5. Reflection on an example of an approach to understand the human-nature relationship 
(research logic, data collection) and; 
6. Proposed guidance for interpreting human-nature relationship research 
(representativeness, and analysis and interpretation). 
 At times, discussions of these six methodological considerations are quite broad, as they 
represent the fundamentals of a pragmatist EE. However, in the subsequent two chapters 
additional detail is provided in order to add depth to the generalities discussed below.  
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5.2.2.1. Part one: Holistic approaches and the confrontation of complexity 
As stressed in the introduction, the use of the term ‘holistic’ in the conservation sciences 
is prevalent. Interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary research are meant to address the complex 
environmental problems with holistic methodological approaches. A SES approach is meant to 
embrace the complexity and uncertainty associated with interrelated systems by striving for a 
holistic understanding. Above, Dewey’s view of experience is described as holistic. The need for 
acknowledging and confronting the complexity of SESs and the myriad problems that arise with 
holistic methodological and management approaches is often stressed. Indeed, a holistic view of 
science and how humans experience the world is consistent with a pragmatist EE. But, what does 
holistic mean within these contexts? I consider ‘holistic’ as synonymous with ‘comprehensive’, 
‘integrated’, and ‘complexity-aware’, but the brief discussion below is worthwhile both because 
of the importance of language in pragmatism and because ‘holistic’ is commonly used in the 
conservation social sciences.   
It may be worth starting with what ‘holistic’ is meant to oppose: overly reductionist 
approaches. For instance, a mainstream economic view of decision-making is quite reductionist, 
as people, in sequential order, consider a budget, their preferences, an invisible utility phase, and 
then a choice. The demand hierarchy (Figure 5.1), which underpins several recreation 
management frameworks, is reductionist. It conveys people’s demand for recreation with four 
distinct levels: (1) activities (e.g., fishing); (2) particular settings for such activities (e.g., pretty 
vistas with opportunities to catch fish); (3) experiences (e.g., adventure for stress relief and 
companionship) and; (4) benefits derived from recreation (e.g., a happy citizenry, weight loss, 
job opportunities).  
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Figure 5.1. Recreation demand hierarchy 
 
Source: (Driver & Brown, 1978; McCool et al., 2007) 
  
The reasons for reduction are likely obvious; they help humans, with their limited 
cognitive ability, make sense of the world. Models, as simplified representations of reality, help 
us to “better conceptualize, communicate about, understand and act on a forthcoming decision” 
(McCool et al., 2015:304). However, those calling for holistic approaches are not suggesting that 
modeling, or simplifying, complex phenomena should cease. Instead, there is a call for increased 
awareness of the dangers of simplification. For instance, the demand hierarchy, which is both 
historically dominant and prevalent today as the approach to recreation management, is one that 
shares a foundation with market-based approaches, whereby recreation experiences are assumed 
to be judged solely upon the associated settings, as represented by “collections of features or 
attributes” (Williams et al., 1992:30).  
While this approach is beneficial in that it frames the management task as one of 
primarily ‘producing’ the right settings to meet the other demands in the hierarchy, relying upon 
this mechanistic, ‘commodity metaphor’ also has its limitations, including its perpetuation of the 
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“notion that recreation settings are theoretically interchangeable, even reproducible, given that 
the replacement provides a similar combination of attributes” (Williams et al., 1992:30). The 
notion of reproducibility and interchangeability (or substitution) has been challenged variously 
within the recreation arena (Williams et al., 1992), as well as the sustainability arena (Norton, 
2011b).  
It should be stressed that overly simplifying complex phenomena related to the 
importance of the environment is not only potentially a problem for EE. Indeed, the work 
focused on getting ‘beyond the commodity’ metaphor (Williams, 2014a; Williams et al., 1992) is 
mostly presented from an environmental psychology perspective, which has a long history of 
applying consumer satisfaction research approaches to the environmental realm. Place research, 
which is itself a somewhat nebulous field of inquiry (Patterson & Williams, 2005), focuses on 
the complex relationship between people and places, and there is an ongoing debate regarding 
how such relationships should be assessed and discussed. Williams (2014a:93) referenced the 
risks of over-simplification in the context of place attachment research:  
Taken too far, measuring attachment to separable components of place works 
against the holism embodied in the idea of place. For one, it reverts back to multi-
attribute thinking, classic consumer satisfaction research, and environmental 
perception research in which the focus is on determining how much people 
perceive and value various aspects of a target object. 
 
Primarily, Williams is cautioning against overly reductionist approaches that reduce relationships 
to place into component parts. With regard to normative sustainability, Norton (2015) cautioned 
similarly in this discussion of ‘chunking’ the human-nature relationship.   
Models, or our simplifications of various phenomena, should be “based on an 
understanding of the complex systems with which we engage” (McCool et al., 2015:304). Within 
the conservation sciences, these systems are inherently complex. Individuals’ belief systems 
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about the environment and human management of that environment are complex, as are the 
workings of macro-scale SESs. Since a pragmatist EE is focused on these complex systems, at 
least in part, there is a need for methodological approaches that confront this complexity in an 
integrated, comprehensive, or holistic way.  
 
5.2.2.2. Part two: A core burning question 
Several times throughout this dissertation is the suggestion that claiming pragmatism as a 
theoretical foundation is rarely accompanied with specific implications for research practice. For 
example, the general points made in Section 4.2.1, such as the focus on ‘transferability’ and the 
benefit of flexibility, are often made only very generally. Similarly, I have stressed that EE 
provides more generalities than specifics. For example, what are the burning questions of EE? It 
seems the claim to study the interaction between the environment, the economy, and society is 
far too broad. As another example, how are equity, stability, and resilience operationalized? 
This section attempts to contribute to the need for greater specificity. Because even 
though more integrated research is a general goal of a pragmatist EE, it seems worthwhile to 
attempt to narrow the focus within the context of complex SESs. Therefore, one burning question 
is suggested as the core element of subject matter within EE: “what comprises the varied 
relationships that people have with the environment?” This burning question is most certainly 
not the only question to be addressed within EE, but I suggest that all other questions stem from, 
or lead back to, relationships between people and the environment.  
From a pragmatist perspective, this burning question is appropriate for two reasons. First, 
it acknowledges a reciprocity that is important to EE; humans are not only supported by the 
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environment, but they influence it as well. This influence can be both positive and negative, and 
recognizing a two-way relationship implies a mutual responsibility of stewardship for earth’s 
finite resources. Second, with a focus on language, using ‘relationships’ instead of a term such as 
‘interaction’ emphasizes the human responsibility and the dual goals of EE to describe the world 
while also encouraging action in a positive way. This two-way relationship is the primary 
difference between ‘opportunities’ and ecosystem services; the former implies the potential to 
draw stuff from the environment, but there is also a giving back element (e.g., restoration is an 
opportunity), while the latter is more about benefit flowing from nature to people (Bryan Norton, 
personal communication). Finally, the use of the term relationship implies an ongoing and 
dynamic connection between people and nature. Within the context of wilderness relationships, 
Dvorak et al. (2013:1520) noted that using relationships as a framing implies that peoples’ 
connection to nature is not a static “singular mood or state of mind”, but dynamic, cumulative, 
and enduring in the sense that they “develop over time and evolve as individuals renegotiate 
meaning across landscapes.”   
I suggest that studying the interactions between ecosystems, economies, and societies is 
too broad a focus for EE, but perhaps suggesting a focus on the composition of the varied 
relationships between people and the environment will be perceived as equally as broad. 
However, I assert that this burning question prioritizes the research programs within EE focused 
on valuation and values when coupled with the underpinning theory of normative sustainability. 
Other suggested topic areas, such as policies, governance, and institutions, global environmental 
issues, and technical change and the environment (Castro e Silva & Teixeira, 2011) are still 
relevant in that they: (1) relate to a macro-level SES and; (2) are motivated by making decisions 
in a way that can accommodate, sustain, or potentially alter relationships. The important 
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synergies between a pragmatist ecological economist and, say, a governance scholar and 
hydrologist is explored in chapter seven on SES research.  
A pragmatist EE focused on relationships would prioritize development of 
methodological processes that could describe relationships in a way that is informative to 
decision-makers and capable of facilitating social learning. Following Dewey’s version of 
experience, a relationship between a person (or community) and the environment should not be 
overly reduced to component parts, as stressed previously. However, there is still a need to 
define, to the greatest extent practicable, the complex relationships that people have with the 
environment. What makes up a relationship, and how do we understand and communicate it? 
  
5.2.2.3. Part three: Relationship elements 
From a pragmatist EE perspective, attempting to list or account for all the elements of the 
human-nature relationship is a futile effort. First, there are a variety of social and environmental 
contexts of interest to conservation social scientists, and the relationships are bound to vary 
across these different contexts. Second, human-nature relationships are complex and 
multifaceted, and different disciplines have historically thought of human-nature relationships in 
different ways. Despite the difficulties of clearly articulating that which is in a human-nature 
relationship, a pragmatist EE would adhere to the idea that a human-nature relationship is 
composed of those elements that influence, both positively and negatively, individual well-being, 
social welfare, and the environment. Both of these emphasized phrases are broadly 
conceptualized.  
A pragmatist EE would start by assessing the relevant science to better understand what 
comprises a human-nature relationship. Such science includes, but is certainly not limited to, 
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research related to ecosystem services, place10, and values. Again, values research could mean 
nearly anything, and future research synthesizing how disciplines that are particularly relevant to 
EE deal with the concept would be worthwhile. Immediately relevant disciplines include 
environmental psychology, ecology, conservation biology, economics, and environmental ethics 
and philosophy. While a full discussion of research related to ecosystem services, place, and 
values is beyond the scope of this work, a brief discussion may help to clarify the variety of 
elements that potentially constitute a human-nature relationship.  
 But first, Figure 5.2 is a useful framework for thinking about different general elements 
of the human-nature relationship. Williams (2014b) developed Figure 5.2 to help describe and 
organize the plurality of ways that research programs have addressed the concept of place. 
Meanings associated with relationships to places were thought of as inherent, instrumental, 
socio-cultural, and identity-expressive. Inherent meanings are those that are perhaps most 
generalizable, and they are often associated with material features of place that generalize from 
place to place and perhaps person to person. For instance, a scenic mountain vista, or high 
quality water are generally desired by all people and inherent in human-nature relationships. 
Instrumental meanings are associated with the physical properties of a place that contribute to 
desired behavioral or economic goals (e.g., fishing, timber resource). The third, socio-cultural 
layer refers to the elements of a human-nature relationship which are “socially or symbolically 
constructed within the cultural, historical, and geographical contexts of day-to-day life.” Such 
elements could include the connection to agricultural lifestyles in the western United States, 
where homesteading history, and irrigation of a mostly desert landscape have, in part, resulted in 
                                                 
10 Williams (2014) noted that because place research recognizes that relationships between people and locations are 
often a mix of natural and human-built environments, the use of ‘place’ instead of ‘environment’ or ‘nature’ is used. 
The relationships of interest to a pragmatist EE certainly include both built and natural environments, but in order to 
prevent conflation with place research I have refrained from using this term.  
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a highly studied human-nature relationship. Finally, there is the highly individualized identity-
expressive layer. These elements of the human-nature relationship may be deeply personal, such 
as that associated with a place where a loved ones ashes were spread. 
 
Figure 5.2. Relationship layers 
 
Source: Adapted from Williams (2014b:77) 
  
138 
 
 While Figure 5.2 was developed within the context of place research for the purpose of 
sorting through the plurality of ways that research programs have dealt with the concept, it may 
also provide a starting point for pragmatist EE to conceptualize the different main components of 
human-nature relationships. Williams (2014b) made the point that within place research, 
particular methodologies are more suited for investigation of particular meaning layers. This 
point holds true within values research and ecosystem services research, but the framework could 
also be considered in another way.  
 Particular concepts (e.g., place, ecosystem services) are perhaps more appropriate for 
articulating different elements of a human-nature relationship. Thinking of Figure 5.2 this way 
shifts thinking away from investigations of different research programs within the context of a 
particular big idea (e.g., place), to thinking across different big ideas for the purpose of a more 
comprehensive understanding of the human-nature relationship. To this end, a pragmatist EE 
might benefit from starting with the conceptual content of different big ideas. In an attempt to 
clarify what I mean, I briefly discuss ecosystem services, ‘human ecological meanings and 
services’ (an idea influenced by place research), and Sen’s capabilities approach and the 
incorporation of values. 
 
Ecosystem services 
The ecosystem services concept has made progress in identifying the connections 
between human well-being and the environment. The connections are most commonly thought of 
in terms of the benefits or human uses of nature. In relation to Figure 5.2 above, this common 
conceptualization of ecosystem services would suggest that the top two layers of the human-
nature relationship are the focus. In full recognition of it being overly reductionist, Figure 5.3 
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illustrates those terms that may be commonly associated with ecosystem services. The word 
cloud was derived solely from a table in de Groot et al. (2002:396-397) after a removal of 
irrelevant words (determined somewhat arbitrarily). The typology developed by de Groot et al. 
(2002) represents an early and seminal ecosystem services typology, which connects ecosystem 
functions (e.g., “water regulation”, “recreation”, “spiritual and historic information”) to 
processes (e.g., “variety of natural features with spiritual and historic value”) to services “Use of 
nature for religious or historic purposes”.  
 The word cloud is a combination of functions, processes, and services. This may seem 
problematic because the subject of this section is ecosystem services, but the distinction between 
functions, processes, and services in practice is not all that clear. The most obvious example is 
the listing of ‘recreation’ as a function as opposed to a service. This lack of clarity reflects the 
challenge of reducing the complex human-nature relationship using a single framework such as 
ecosystem services. Nonetheless, the focus on human uses is perhaps the most common 
association with ecosystem services. That is, the concept does not generally ask the question as 
to why recreation is important (e.g., spiritual renewal, family bonding), but more as to what is 
important (e.g., boating, open terrain for snowmobiling). This reflects a greater focus on 
assigning value to the latter, as opposed to an investigation of the held values underlying why 
boating, for instance, is valuable.  It follows then that ecosystem services, while without a settled 
definition (Wallace, 2007), is often criticized for its narrow economic framing. The focus on 
what recreation activities are important without much attention to the reasons (e.g., motivations, 
expected benefits) for recreating is reflected in the search for ecological endpoints (Boyd & 
Krupnick, 2009), service providing units (Kontogianni et al., 2012), and the definitive way to 
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distinguish intermediate ecosystem services from final ecosystem services. This is consistent 
with economic theory essentially ignoring motives, as discussed above (Section 4.2.3.2). 
 
Figure 5.3. Ecosystem services word cloud 
   
Source: Adapted from de Groot et al. (2002) 
 
 Overall, this is a somewhat uncharitable assessment of ecosystem services, as many are 
focused on taking a more comprehensive approach, as reflected by the various integrated 
ecosystem service assessments (e.g., Armatas et al., 2018; Crouzat et al., 2016; Martín-López et 
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al., 2014) and the focus on better accommodating cultural services11 (e.g., Bostrom et al., 2012; 
Chan et al., 2012). Like many concepts that are meant to be all-encompassing, as the ecosystem 
services concept gains popularity there appears to be less consensus regarding its definition or 
the appropriate typology for best understanding it. Some view this as an issue that needs to be 
resolved with a consistent definition and typology (e.g., Wallace, 2007), while others view it as a 
strength of the ecosystem services concept in that it is a flexible idea that can be adapted for 
multiple applications (e.g., Costanza, 2008).  
On this debate of consistent definition versus flexibility, a pragmatist EE would make 
two points. First, flexibility is indeed a benefit, because different problem contexts will require 
different deliberative discussions, and thinking of ecosystem services in multiple ways may help 
those with conflicting interests communicate. If the term ‘ecosystem services’ can orient people 
at the table toward the human-nature relationship, then that is positive. But, it is important to 
stress that the ecosystem services concept is most commonly associated with economics, 
monetary valuation, nature commodification, and the reduction of everything nature provides to 
a single metric (primarily the instrumental layer on Figure 5.2). Many are working toward 
revising this preconceived idea but, despite that, the notion is prevalent.  
This leads to the second point: language matters. Using the term ‘ecosystem services’ 
may not resonate with particular people, and it could be co-opted in a way that influences 
decision-making away from normative sustainability. Pragmatist EE should not ignore this 
possibility of using the ecosystem services concept, and the language embedded in it. Indeed, 
Bekessy et al. (2018) presented a critique of ecosystem services as a communication strategy, 
                                                 
11 Cultural ecosystem services are broadly defined, by Hein et al. (2006), as those benefits derived from nature 
related to recreation, cognitive development, relaxation, and spirituality. In economic parlance, these include non-
use values and option values, as well as direct use values, and those values related to spirituality and non-use, for 
instance, are quite challenging to monetize and enumerate.  
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and suggested that the concept may undermine public engagement. On the other hand, it is also 
important to understand that the ecosystem services concept is indoctrinated in some ways (i.e., 
explicitly called upon in policy documents), such as within the 2012 Forest Planning Rule—the 
guiding document for United States National Forest Planning (U.S. Department of Agriculture 
Forest Service, 2012). In other words, the ecosystem services concept, for better or worse, must 
be engaged within the context of National Forest planning.  
Regardless of how ecosystem services are conceptualized, such research can highlight the 
various elements that partially constitute a human-nature relationship, including: environmental 
conditions (e.g., biodiversity, non-fragmented habitat, water quality, water quantity), 
environmental functions (e.g., carbon sequestration, nutrient cycling), recreation activities (e.g., 
private boating, commercial recreation), livelihoods or historical connections to the land (e.g., 
ranching, farming, homesteading culture), and/or raw materials (e.g., timber, oil and natural gas, 
food, medicine). To be clear, these different ecosystem services are not types of relationships, 
but constitute parts (or elements) of a relationship. Returning to the point made in Section 1.3.1, I 
am in agreement with Flint et al. (2013) that ecosystem services are not a type of relationship, 
but instead a concept that can capture a portion of the human-nature relationship (which may be 
large or small depending on context and individual/community).   
After more than three decades of ecosystem services research, there are plenty of sources 
within the literature that could help to identify different elements of the human-nature 
relationship. Even though the ecosystem services concept may be subject to caricature 
descriptions, the goods-and-services language has almost certainly led to a focus on the benefit 
of the more tangible aspects of nature at the expense of understanding meanings and underlying 
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held values (i.e., the top two tiers of Figure 5.2). This means that the ecosystem service concept 
is not capturing all that comprises a human-nature relationship.    
 
Human ecological meanings and services 
Another way to conceptualize parts of the human-nature relationship is through “human 
and ecological meanings and services” (HEMS), which was coined by Williams and Watson 
(2007). This idea was intended to encompass the various benefits that humans associate with 
nature without relying on a narrow economic focus; it was meant to get ‘beyond the commodity 
metaphor’ (Williams, 2014a; Williams et al., 1992). The research underpinning HEMS is 
primarily relationship to place research. The distinction is between ‘functional’ orientations to 
place, as defined by the capacity of places to meet specific needs and goals (i.e., human 
ecological meanings and services), and ‘symbolic’ orientations to place encompassing the 
representation of identity and cultural values (i.e., human ecological meanings and services) 
(Williams, 2014a). A functional orientation to place might consider benefits such as survival and 
security, self-regulation, goal attainment (e.g., a kite surfer visiting a place because of wind 
conditions), and achieving a stable sense of self (Scannell & Gifford, 2010). A meanings 
orientation might find a place to symbolize ‘escape, back-to-nature and simplicity’, ‘centrality 
and identification’, ‘obligations’, and ‘community and social interactions’ (Van Patten & 
Williams, 2008).   
 One could argue that ecosystem services can accommodate meanings, but explicit use of 
the term meanings both reflects the pragmatist focus on language and an explicit 
acknowledgement that human-nature relationships are comprised of elements that are perhaps 
obscured by the ecosystem services framework. Unsurprisingly, given the roots of place research 
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in environmental psychology, these elements are more inward looking through an assessment of 
what feelings are associated within the person-place relationship. These elements are reflected in 
the place word cloud (Figure 5.4), which was derived from Huang et al. (2016), a Q-
methodology study on place meanings associated with travel destinations. This article has only a 
few citations, but it was chosen because it included 48 items related to place research, which is a 
higher number than is generally included in place research focused on creating constructs 
through typical psychometric approaches. Furthermore, choice of a Q-study primes the 
discussion below where I argue that Q-methodology can provide a nice middle ground between 
overly reductionist approaches and purely holistic (usually qualitative approaches).  
 A general point made by Williams (2014b) is that place research has, overall, focused on 
all the different layers of meanings (Figure 5.2). However, there are two points to be made about 
place research that may distinguish it from ecosystem services research, which may be mutually 
beneficial for synthesis purposes and, consequently, a more comprehensive understanding of the 
human-nature relationship. First, the incorporation of more qualitative approaches such as 
phenomenology, and the incorporation of particular disciplines such as environmental 
psychology and human geography (Williams, 2014b), have resulted in a robust amount of 
literature focused on the bottom two tiers of Figure 5.2 (i.e., socio-cultural and identity-
expressive). Second, even the more generalizable research, which may be better suited to 
instrumental and inherent meanings, often focus less on what a place provides in terms of goods, 
services, and human uses. In other words, the various ideas developed within place research, 
including place identity, place attachment, place dependence, rootedness, genius loci, topophilia, 
and place-making (Williams, 2014b), often move beyond the instrumental meanings. 
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 For instance, Jorgensen and Stedman (2001:241) break the relationship to shoreline lake 
properties in Wisconsin into three parts: (1) place identity (e.g., “I feel that I can really be myself 
at my lake property”); (2) place attachment (e.g., “My lake property is my favorite place to be”) 
and; (3) place dependence (e.g., “For doing the things that I enjoy most, no other place can 
compare to my lake property”). 
 
Figure 5.4. Place word cloud 
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As another example, which explicitly uses relationship terminology, Dvorak et al. (2013:1525) 
conceptualized the relationship to the Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness to include five 
parts: (1) place identity (e.g., “the boundary water is very special to me”); (2) trust in the 
management agency (e.g., “I share the Forest Service’s goals for the boundary waters”; (3) 
commitment to the management agency (e.g., “the connection I have with the Forest Service is 
something I really care about”); (4) Place meanings (e.g., “the boundary waters wilderness is a 
place to escape from civilization") and; (5) Place dependence (e.g., “No other place can compare 
to the boundar waters”).  
  
Sen’s capabilities and other values 
By design, Sen’s capabilities approach is an empty framework in that its functionings 
(beings and doings) could include anything. Nonetheless, it may help in thinking about how 
environmental values research, in a more nebulous way, can further define that which comprises 
human-nature relationships. Following this approach, being a good steward or being free from 
social pressures may be an important part of the human-nature relationship for some, and the 
opportunity to realize this functioning depends on capabilities (e.g., availability of volunteer 
options and areas without cellphone service). Like the HEMS concept, Sen’s capabilities 
approach is intended to explicitly accommodate a wider range of held values and meanings. 
Figure 5.5 is the final, methodologically-weak word cloud, which is derived from Tanner et al. 
(2008) and Nelson and Vucetich (2013). The former is a meta-study of values across four 
protected areas in the United States, all of which used the same 24 scale items (e.g., an economic 
resource; a family or individual tradition); the word cloud was based upon those scale items. The 
latter reference is entitled Wilderness, Value of, and it includes 30 arguments for Wilderness 
147 
 
(e.g., the life support argument, the future generations argument). I removed the frequent 
reference to the term ‘wilderness’ so it would not dwarf all other words in the figure. These two 
reference were chosen deliberately because of their focus on values associated with natural 
systems (protected areas and wilderness). In relation to Figure 5.2, the ‘values’ discussed in these 
references, and simplified in the corresponding word cloud, could occupy any or all of the four 
tiers. For instance, a nonanthropocentric argument is not inherent in all human-nature 
relationships, despite Callicott’s and other ethical monists best efforts, but it could occupy the 
socio-cultural and identity-expressive tiers.  
 
Figure 5.5. Values word cloud  
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Word clouds are chaotic, and this section is somewhat chaotic. This is partly by design, 
because the reality is that human-nature relationships are chaotic when considered across all 
people. A pragmatist EE consider relationships to include elements that are both tangible and 
intangible, and long-lasting and ephemeral. To clarify what is meant by long-lasting and 
ephemeral, consider the following distinction made by Williams (2014a:93): “what differentiate 
aesthetic experiences from attachment is that the former is an immediate (sensory) response 
whereas attachment implies something that builds up and evolves over time.”  
Having briefly outlined the complexity and variety of relationship elements, where does a 
pragmatist EE turn? I assert that a pragmatist EE should focus less on reducing the relationships 
between people and the environment into elements that are easily categorized and universally 
applicable. For decades, scholars have developed partial frameworks and concepts such as place 
and ecosystem services, and they have developed specific instruments to assess such ideas for 
the benefit of more sustainable and equitable decision-making. While these ideas continue to 
advance, a pragmatist EE sees the need to synthesize, or perhaps just add together, partial 
understandings. In other words, how do ideas such as ecosystem services, place, and human-
nature values inform or strengthen one another? 
To this end, it is suggested that what is needed are processes and procedures, whereby 
people can express their relationships with nature within the context of particular decision-
making situations. These processes may be generally applicable, but the specific results will 
likely not yield generalizable laws. This is another way of saying that there is not a lack of a 
general understanding of what comprises a human-nature relationship (as broadly defined 
herein), but instead there is a lack of processes that can be practically implemented within real 
decision-making contexts that yield an understanding of disparate human-nature relationships. 
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We do not lack well-formed, top-to-bottom theory of partial understandings at this point (e.g., 
ecosystem services), as scholars working mostly within disciplines have for many decades 
considered human-nature relationships from a variety of angles, as shown by Flint et al. (2013). 
What we lack is methodologists who can create and pass along manageable ways to understand 
human-nature relationships in a way that directly supports the decision-making needs of those 
facing the public every day.  
Of course, working to improve, say, rational-actor theory, the theory of planned behavior, 
or the theory of reasoned action is worthwhile research. We should continue to hone all partial 
understandings, but a pragmatist EE would hold that, individually, they will never be more than 
partial within the context of complex environmental problems. Wicked problems need more 
holistic approaches (Norton, 2012; Xiang, 2013) and, to reiterate, whether true convergence ever 
happens is an open question. Peirce would say that it will happen with infinite inquiry.  
 
5.2.2.4. Part four: Basic considerations for understanding relationships  
A pragmatist EE, when aiming for normative sustainability, needs to address three big, 
interrelated problems when trying to understand human-nature relationships: (1) the holistic 
individual relationship; (2) potential aggregation and/or considerations of representativeness and 
generalizability and; (3) communication and social learning. The first problem is the focus of this 
section, which is followed by a shorter discussions related to the second problem. Regarding this 
ordering, it should be stressed that the three problems are not necessarily addressed sequentially. 
Also, communication and social learning is not a step in the process per se; ideally, it should 
inspire and influence all steps of a research process. With regard to social learning, there are 
many potential avenues of future research.  
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Considering the focus on understanding and conveying human-nature relationships, a 
pragmatist EE aspires to take a contextual and transactional approach. The term ‘transactional’ is 
applied in at least three different contexts that are relevant to this dissertation. The first is with 
regard to the human-nature relationship itself. That is, by framing the connection between 
humans and nature as a relationship, it is implied that there is a give and take, whereby 
individuals are active participants in the creation of relationships with nature (Cole & Williams, 
2012; Dvorak et al., 2013; Watson, 2004; Watson et al., 2011). The second way the term is used 
is with regard to methodology, where the researcher does not impose too much structure on the 
participant, but allows meaning to emerge through free-flowing methodological processes (this 
meaning of transactional is elaborated upon in this section). The third way a pragmatist EE is 
transactional is through communication and social learning. Debate and deliberation are 
transactional in that people can, in theory, learn and change through their interactions with one 
another.    
Citing Altman and Rogoff (1987), Williams (2014a:90) noted: “a transactional approach 
does not unilaterally impose measures on an event, but it derives them from the event. What 
generalizes from study to study is not the measure, procedure, or technique but the construct and 
theory that underlies the research.” This quote is unpacked with three main discussion points. 
First, a transactional approach stresses that a human-nature relationship should not be 
assessed solely through pre-selected researcher categories; there needs to be room for people to 
express diverse relationship elements. Williams (2014a:96) explained:  
One can certainly ask respondents to rate a place in terms of their perceptions of 
its material and symbolic properties. But this is not the same as investigating what 
the place represents symbolically to an individual, community, or culture. From 
an interpretive or qualitative perspective, meaning is not so much a property of 
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the person or object, but a transaction between the two mediated through culture, 
social interaction, and individual past experience. 
Asking both about properties and meanings can provide useful knowledge about a relationship, 
and a pragmatist EE recognizes the differentiation. As such, a pragmatist EE works to develop 
general research processes that can yield a more comprehensive understanding. As Norton 
(2005:563) suggested, improving a language to discuss environmental problems “emphasizes the 
open-ended and creative task involved in learning how best to describe and classify our 
experiences. Describing the world is more like painting a picture than taking a photograph.”  
 This analogy stresses the relative lack of precision in describing human-nature 
relationships, though it does not preclude the existence of technique and methodical process. 
Reductionist approaches resting mostly on positivistic paradigms aim for precision but, in the 
case of the conservation social sciences, the phenomena being studied are often inherently 
convoluted. Not that aspiring to precision, as most quantitative approaches do, is wasteful, but 
instead it implies that a partial understanding of a particular type is being derived. Williams 
(2014a) distinguished between research focused on quantifying the strength of bonds to a place 
(i.e., degree of attachment to place) and primarily-qualitative research focused on characterizing 
experiences and meanings as kinds of partial relationships.  
The second point is that the generalizability of the underlying construct and theory refers 
to the paradigm being applied in research, and the normative commitments attached to such 
paradigms. For instance, a positivistic paradigm sees peoples’ actions as atomistic (as in the 
rational-actor model), whereas a pragmatist paradigm conceptualizes peoples actions as being 
driven by diverse, multifaceted beliefs (as per Dewey’s experience). Again, the normative 
commitments in a researcher’s mind should be consistent, but that does not mean research 
stemming from the different paradigms cannot yield mutually-informing knowledge.  
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This is the point stressed by Williams and Patterson (2007) in their critical assessment of 
an attempt to mix quantitative and qualitative methods. The authors contend that the issue, in the 
case of the particular application of interest, is not an attempt to mix methods but the unintended 
mixing of paradigms in a single analysis. To summarize, the issue the authors raise is that an 
ethnographic study is employed with qualitative interviews for the benefit of attaining a rich 
understanding of place meanings; however, a quantitative analysis of this rich data counteracts 
this potential benefit. The main message conveyed by Williams and Patterson (2007) is two-fold: 
(1) the unintended mixing of paradigms leads to an inability to assess the quality of knowledge 
and; (2) perhaps most importantly, the mixing of paradigms results in a situation where the 
strength of the different approaches (i.e., positivistic and interpretivist) is lost without a 
corresponding gain elsewhere.   
The third, and final, point related to the initial quote above (i.e., Altman & Rogoff, 1987) 
is that the lack of generalizability to the ‘measure, procedure, or technique’ refers to the methods, 
or specific practices. A researcher can employ a variety of different methods within a positivistic, 
constructivist, or pragmatist paradigm, but the interpretation and implementation of such 
methods will differ depending on the researcher perspective.  
In full recognition of these three points, a pragmatist EE proceeds cautiously with the 
development of general methodological processes that can potentially draw from the strengths of 
both ‘kind’ and ‘degree’ approaches. A pragmatist EE general methodology requires that 
homage is paid to all layers in Figure 5.2 or, at the very least, if particular layers of the 
relationship are not explored, then this should be explicitly stated.  
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5.2.2.5. A general process for investigating human-nature relationships 
An example of a process that may be practically applied in a variety of decision-contexts 
is detailed by Armatas et al. (In Press). The application is based upon Q-methodology, but the 
process involves two main steps: (1) focusing in on the elements of the human-nature 
relationship and; (2) considering the drivers of change potentially influential to such 
relationships. Q-methodology is a method that has both qualitative and quantitative elements; 
and, appropriately, it was recently highlighted as a suitable method for EE (Davies, 2017). A 
brief review of Q-methodology can highlight why it is a potentially appropriate method for 
understanding human-nature relationships. Then, examples from the evolving and long-term 
research project detailed in the introduction are provided to support the assertion that this 
methodology can be implemented in a variety of decision-making contexts. 
 Q-methodology is a social science method with roots in psychology (Brown, 1980; 
Stephenson, 1954b), which focuses on individual and subjective viewpoints about a topic of 
interest. The basic procedure in Q-methodology is to have a purposeful sample of individuals 
sort 30-50 items related to the topic of interest along a quasi-normal distribution. These items 
could be almost anything, but most often they are opinions or statements that capture, to the 
greatest extent practicable, the full range of ideas about some topic. The most appropriate topics 
are those which are controversial, involve tradeoffs and/or have the tendency to elicit conflicting 
ideas, such as decision-making within the context of complex environmental problems. The 30-
50 items are developed through focus groups, meetings with experts, informal discussions, 
study-area-specific literature and anything else that can provide valuable insight into the place-
based relationship. Ideally, the items draw on locally understandable language (i.e., respondents 
own words). The items are sorted relative to one another along a scale (defined numerically 
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and/or categorically); therefore, respondents are require to make tradeoffs and select items that 
are positively salient, negatively salient, and more neutral (Figure 5.6).  The scale is relative, as 
the numbers have no ‘real’ values. Indeed, those that put the items in the same category may not 
assign the same importance to the item. Typically, this sorting exercise (‘Q-sort’) is accompanied 
with a follow-up interview to understand reasons for a respondent’s sorting, as well as some 
basic demographic questions. The Q-sorts are factor analyzed to yield a limited number of 
general archetypical perspectives which are developed based upon respondents who sorted the 
items in a similar fashion.  
 There are a couple advantages of Q-methodology for the purpose of understanding a 
human-nature relationship. First, the method includes a fun, interesting, and challenging and 
thought-provoking exercise, where people grapple with a broad range of elements related to their 
relationship. In our experience, it is not uncommon to hear such superlatives from respondents, 
and people often take pictures of their completed Q-sort. Second, the method is conducive, and 
explicitly designed, to combining the Q-sorting activity with an interview whereby people 
express their reasoning for the Q-sort. This can yield a rich understanding of meanings related to 
the diverse relationships being expressed. For instance, in the study focused on understanding 
relationships between people and water derived from the Shoshone National Forest in Wyoming 
and Montana, a respondent who aligned with the ‘Native American’ perspective explained why 
cultural and spiritual values were so important: “Our way of governing, our way of teaching, our 
love for each other came from that River corridor…that is our stories, we come out of the water” 
(Armatas, 2013:260).
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Figure 5.6. Example of completed Q-sort on Gila National Forest. Sorted ecosystem services and drivers of change selected 
156 
 
As another example, a respondent who aligned with the ‘Agricultural’ perspective discussed the 
importance of agricultural community, commercial irrigation, and history; a combination which 
nicely highlights human ecological meanings and services (HEMS):  
I think it is important to understand that we are dependent on this commercial 
irrigation, though, I do not think of myself as a commercial irrigator. It is a huge 
enterprise, it is what we are dependent on. We would live in a desert valley if it 
were not for that, and all of the service industries that serve us like the fuel guy, 
the fertilizer, all the dealers that supply seed; they would have to be gone because 
we would not be here. Then you got the parts man, and the guy that fixes the 
tractor, and the guy that owns the tractor shop, the guy that services my pickup, 
there are just so many spin-offs of that. In ways too, it is just part of the history. 
We are in the museum cultural center [referring to the site of the interview] here 
in Hot Springs County, you look around and almost all of the; you look at the old 
photos and there is a doctor, but he also had a ranch. Or there is a dentist and he 
had, or there is a cobbler and they had a place up Owl Creek. They are all 
dependent on [commercial irrigation], so it is woven into a web. (Armatas, 
2013:256)    
  
The third benefit of Q-methodology, from the perspective of a pragmatist EE, is that it is 
considered holistic. This case can be made, in part, because Q-sorts are analyzed as single 
entities. Each Q-sort represents a person’s sorting, which means that those people are not being 
broken into constituent parts (Brown, 1980; Watts & Stenner, 2012). For instance, people are 
being grouped based upon their sorting of all the items. Interrelatedly, the holistic case can be 
made because all the items are sorted relative to one another. While components of the human-
nature relationship are separated into constituent parts (as reflected in Figure 5.6), the fact that 
the respondent considers and sorts all of them does create a more comprehensive picture than, 
say, a list of scaled questions on a survey where one could theoretically answer the same way to 
every question. The implications of this type of analysis and process (e.g., forced choices) are 
numerous, and there are both strengths and limitations. In the spirit of wary assessment, a 
detailing of these implications is articulated in the next chapter. 
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 Simply suggesting Q-methodology as the basis for a generally applicable process to 
understand human-nature relationships is inadequate. There is a need to provide further details 
within the context of conservation social science. For these details, a few examples from the 
ongoing research project outlined above are provided, which includes Armatas et al. (In Press) as 
the most recent development. This publication is entitled: Protocol for Social Vulnerability 
Assessment to Support National Forest Planning and Management: a technical manual for 
engaging the public to understand ecosystem service tradeoffs and drivers of change. The 
protocol outlines a step-by-step process for understanding human-nature relationships and the 
potential influences to such relationships. This protocol does not define ecosystem services in a 
single way, and it does not suggest that the same ecosystem services would be used to define 
relationships in all contexts. To show the flexibility in how ecosystem services are defined, 
consider the differences between the application of the protocol on the Shoshone National Forest 
for forest plan revision (Armatas, 2013), the Gila National Forest for forest plan revision 
(Armatas et al., 2017b), and the Flathead Wild and Scenic River system for comprehensive river 
management planning (Armatas et al., 2019).  
On the Shoshone National Forest, respondents sorted 34 water-based ecosystem services, 
all of which fit into a cultural, provisioning, or regulating category. Whether the ecosystem 
service was biodiversity, water for fighting fires, water for commercial irrigation, or water for 
cultural and spiritual use, the approach was more aligned with understanding the instrumental (as 
reflected by objects, activities, or uses) benefits of nature. Even though there were ecosystem 
services related to the bottom two tiers of Figure 5.2 (i.e., socio-cultural, identity-expressive), 
such as ‘preserving lifestyles, livelihoods, and landscapes’ (agricultural community) and ‘Native 
American cultural and spiritual values’, there were still instrumental meanings attached. For 
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instance, the latter ecosystem services was defined as follows: “the water resources in the study 
area have special meaning to Native Americans, and can be used for cultural, spiritual, religious 
and ceremonial purposes” (Armatas, 2013:202). This phrasing implies meaning in at least three 
of the four tiers of the relationship, but the instrumental element is prominently referenced with 
the emphasized language.  
It is worth noting that the follow-up interviews did capture the instrumental elements. A 
respondent related water quality to cultural and spiritual values of the Crow people: “It has been 
with the Crow Indians for a long time, the so called ‘Sweat’, and it is very important. When you 
have no place to sweat or dip [in the river] after that, you do not want to dip in the river so that 
affects that, you know, the pollution that goes into that river” (Armatas, 2013:260). Clearly there 
are deeper, lower-tier meanings embedded in this quote (and such meanings were elaborated by a 
different participant above), but the more instrumental need for clean water within the context of 
this culturally and personally meaningful event is implied too. It reinforces the interrelation 
between the different meaning tiers, as well as the breadth and complexity of human-nature 
relationships.    
The approach of having respondents sort primarily instrumental elements changed 
slightly when a similar study was performed for the benefit of Forest planning on the Gila 
National Forest, which expanded the scope beyond water to the forest more generally. For the 
Gila National Forest project, respondents sorted 30 ecosystem services related to the forest, but 
this time there were ecosystem services that did not neatly fit into the typical categories, 
including “public ownership and access to public land” and “places where human influence is 
substantially unnoticeable”. It could be argued that these ‘ecosystem services’ are not purely 
instrumental, but align more with the deeper meanings in Figure 5.2. On the Flathead Wild and 
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Scenic River project (still ongoing), both the scale of analysis (river system level versus forest or 
region wide) and the driving policy mandates (Wild and Scenic River Act versus NFMA and 
Forest Planning Rule) are different. While the results from the Flathead study are not yet 
available, the elements of the human-nature relationship to be considered by participants span the 
tiers of Figure 5.2. This is partly due to a management focus less on the multiple use mandate, 
and more on the protection and enhancement of outstandingly remarkable values (ORVs). 
Tentatively, human and ecological meanings and services (HEMS) to be sorted by members of 
the public include: ‘being free from society and its regulations’; ‘personal achievement from 
testing skills in primeval and challenging conditions’; ‘solitude, peace and quiet, clear night sky’; 
‘economic support to local communities’ and; ‘rustic lodging in forest service cabins’. In this 
decision-making context, the more tangible services are combined with the more intangible 
meanings.  
In all three applications of this process (i.e., Shoshone, Gila, Flathead), a ‘drivers of 
change’ component was, or will be, included. This component has individuals indicate factors or 
influences (e.g., management actions, impacts from climate change, too many regulations, 
closing of trails), both positive and negative, related to their relationships with the natural 
resource of interest. The need to understand drivers of change is based upon the idea that it is not 
only important to understand how nature supports well-being, but also what could influence that 
well-being. This was an interest of the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, and is stressed within 
several SES frameworks. A focus on drivers of change is also consistent with Sen’s capabilities 
approach, as functionings only become opportunities when one is capable of achieving such 
functionings. Sen articulated ‘conversion factors’ as a way to represent the path from 
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functionings to capabilities, and drivers of change is one way to think about that which impedes 
or facilitates this journey.  
Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly, complex environmental problems are often 
characterized by the involvement of individuals or communities whose functionings compete in a 
way. That is, there are potential tradeoffs, for instance, between maintaining a livelihood in the 
timber industry and achieving spiritual renewal through birdwatching. In light of this, a 
pragmatist EE should focus on how different relationships could influence one another. In sum, 
our varied relationships with nature may conflict and, additionally, there are influential 
exogenous factors. 
 
5.2.2.6. Guidance for interpretation of human-nature relationship research 
To briefly review, the general process proposed above is an assessment of human-nature 
relationships. While the example relies mostly on the ecosystem services metaphor, a pragmatist 
EE would suggest the human-nature relationship is comprised of a variety of elements, including 
already existing concepts such as Sen’s functionings, opportunites, and capabilities, the variously 
defined ecosystem services, and/or HEMS. Articulating any of these metaphors in a thorough 
way will require public engagement, literature review of study area specific literature, and the 
engagement of literature within multiple disciplines. Additionally, the drivers of change 
component is essential, as it generates thinking about the general problem of protecting and 
nurturing those relationships in a normatively sustainable way. And, to that end, it points us 
toward the various synapses of SESs. This is critically important, because it connects 
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relationships to the complex SES at large, at least in a fuzzy, fallible, and humility-laden12 sort of 
way. This idea is explored in chapter 7.  
Also, it should be noted that Q-methodology need not be involved, though it is an 
appropriate approach for public engagement. It is based upon abductive reasoning, and is 
systematic, well-established, and supported by a very engaged community. While the latter point 
may sound odd, it is worth mentioning the tremendous commitment of the Q-community (with 
an online gathering place at a Kent State Listserv). Questions posted several times a day are 
thoroughly engaged with by Q-methodologists. With a spirit of wary assessment, the Q-
community is a good audience for a pragmatist EE.   
The question then is what can be said generally about interpretation, or perhaps other 
related goals, of the research process proposed above. That is, when it comes to implementing 
the general human-nature relationship study, how would a pragmatist EE interpret the results or, 
relatedly, what elements of the research process might be honed to further the goals of decision-
making of managers and planners, as well as social learning and communication? First, 
regardless of the chosen method, it is ideal to engage the public at all steps of the process within 
the context of interest (e.g., Shoshone National Forest, Gila National Forest). That is, primary 
data collection and dissemination of results is ideal. This could potentially allow for public 
deliberation and engagement, which is an integral facet of communication and social learning. 
However, if, for instance, a forest planning team is planning the revision of their forest plan and 
                                                 
12 Be leery of those who project extreme confidence in their exact and precise explanation, understanding, and 
prediction of SESs (or the human-nature relationship for that matter). Because, fundamentally, the ultimate Peirce-
ian truth sought by SES research is to understand through models and frameworks the entirety of universe, in all its 
complexity. Of course, this is an unreachable truth at the end of infinite inquiry. As Aldo Leopold said, according to 
the poster overlooking the microwave of the Aldo Leopold Wilderness Research Institute: “no matter how intently 
one studies the hundred little dramas of the woods and meadows, one can never learn all the salient facts about any 
one of them.” Turns out he wrote this too, as he reflected about the natural wonders taking place in the month of 
April (Leopold, 1966:35).  
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do not have the capacity to engage the public with a research project, might there be something 
to learn from other studies on the human-nature relationship?  
This question is implicitly referencing the idea of external validity, or the extent that 
results about the human-nature relationship (or the methodological process for investigating 
them) are applicable to other contexts. This is a major issue for science generally, and is the topic 
of the remainder of this section. Following the general interpretive guidelines outlined in Section 
4.2.1, as well as the ontological assumptions related to the how humans experience the world 
(i.e., a rejection of atomistic human experience), a pragmatist EE should strive for 
‘transferability’. This contrasts, or is an attempt to move beyond the dualism related (Morgan, 
2007), to complete generalizability (i.e., law like human-nature relationships that apply in all 
cases) and context-dependence (i.e., results are only good for a single setting). It follows that a 
pragmatist EE would reject complete generalizability of human-nature relationships, but it also 
would caution against complete context-dependence. While it has been stressed throughout that 
context does matter, and thus generalizability is problematic, one would assume that similarities 
between different situations allow for some level of transferability of results.  
This idea is taken from Lincoln and Guba (1985:297), who stated that “at best only 
working hypotheses may be abstracted, the transferability of which is an empirical matter, 
depending on the degree of similarity” between contexts. To this, Morgan (2007:72) added that 
there is a need to “investigate the factors that affect whether the knowledge we gain can be 
transferred to other settings.” I relate these factors, or the degree of similarity, to a search for 
‘exemplars’. This term ‘exemplar’ is adopted to describe what factors might be relevant to a 
pragmatist EE when considering whether human-nature relationship research can be transferred 
to other settings. As stated, asserting transferability between two contexts is an empirical matter, 
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and this dissertation does not generally provide empirical evidence to suggest whether the 
relationships described, by Armatas et al. (2018) for instance, are transferrable from the 
Shoshone National Forest area to other settings. However, as a forward looking exercise, it might 
be helpful to discuss what types of factors might be investigated to assert transferability.  
Since a pragmatist EE adopts an axiology that focuses not only on understanding human-
nature relationships, but also on communicating such relationships for the purpose of decision-
making and social learning, three different types of factors or exemplars are proposed. The first 
type could be referred to as ‘relationship’ exemplars, and it would suggest that there may be 
particular human-nature relationships that appear in different settings (thus suggesting a pattern). 
Empirically, one would have to apply the general methodology proposed above multiple times 
within similar SESs across space and time. A current working hypothesis would be that there 
likely exists an agricultural relationship, as explored in Armatas (2013), throughout a number of 
settings in the American West. For instance, the ‘agricultural’ perspective from the Shoshone 
study has similarities to the ‘water’ perspective from the Gila study. The relationship between 
the Rocky Mountain West, people, and agriculture has a long history, and broadly-applicable 
policies and shared histories suggest that some experiences of predominantly rural, 
agriculturally-influenced residents are transferable from, say, Glenwood, New Mexico to 
Cowley, Wyoming. This is not a license to stereotype, but the point remains that possible 
connections, or abductions, can be made across space and time. 
It seems potentially beneficial to distinguish the transferability of human-nature 
relationships themselves, from potential transferability of methodological aspects. That is, a 
‘relationship’ exemplar suggests that there may be examples of human-nature relationships that 
apply across different settings, whereas perhaps there are ‘process’ exemplars that are 
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particularly effective for fostering understanding of others and, ideally, empathy and compassion 
for the human-nature relationships of others. Of course, criteria would need to be established for 
gauging what would constitute effective process for fostering understanding or empathy. Within 
the context of forest planning, it could include number of lawsuits opposing a plan (or perhaps 
successful lawsuits), number of formal oppositions voiced during a public comment period, or 
incidents of incivility during public meetings. With regard to process exemplars, only untested 
working hypotheses can be currently proposed. For instance, it has been stressed that the colorful 
factor arrays (e.g., Figure 6.5 below) derived from the studies underpinning the social 
vulnerability protocol (Armatas et al., 2017a; Armatas et al., 2017b; Armatas et al., 2018) are 
particularly helpful for communicating with the general public, but to my knowledge this is not 
something that has been empirically tested.  
From a pragmatist EE perspective, fertile ground for future research would be to 
empirically test the working hypothesis related to process exemplars within the context of 
human-nature relationship research. The goal would be to identify elements of the research 
process that break habits, and move people to a secondary experience where they engage 
reflective thinking. This could be the language used to describe components of human-nature 
relationships (e.g., ecosystem services, HEMS), the manner in which the drivers of change 
component is implemented, or something as simple as the physical presentation of the data 
collection materials. Experience suggests that the public engagement process described in 
Armatas et al. (In Press) can facilitate a move from habit to reflective thinking, but such research 
has not been formally conducted within this specific context at this point. The connections 
between research and social learning, such as the potential influence of using different language 
to describe the relationship components is likely the appropriate territory of a diverse range of 
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disciplines, including the humanities (environmental ethics to be sure, but also the arts), 
psychology, and behavioral economics.  
For a pragmatist EE, and likely most of the hybrid disciplines relevant to the conservation 
sciences, the distinction between the methodological domain and the substantive domain is 
blurry. In other words, it is not easy to disentangle the goal to understand the world as it is 
through human-nature relationships, from an expressed focus on influencing beliefs through 
social learning, from the overarching purpose of informing decisions in a normatively-
sustainable way. Therefore, it is appropriate to transition to the substantive domain to discuss the 
third type of exemplar. 
 
5.2.3. Substantive domain—part one: Research is practice  
A pragmatist EE, with its SESs viewpoint, recognizes the varied social and 
environmental contexts that surround and constitute complex problems. This means that a 
pragmatist EE searches for theory through practice. As a problem-oriented research tradition, EE 
does this in general, and pragmatism takes a similar stance. As Norton (1996b:108) stated, 
environmental pragmatism “works towards theoretical principles by struggling with real cases, 
appealing to less sweeping rules of thumb that can be argued to be appropriate in a particular 
context, rather than establishing a universal theory and ‘applying’ it to real cases.” This follows 
from the general pragmatist stance that theory is derived from practice, and not vice versa.  
Relating this to exemplars, in addition to relationship and process exemplars, it may be 
possible to find transferability across decision-making contexts. The final exemplar to be 
discussed is ‘decision-making’, which can be thought of in terms of two questions. First, are 
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there elements of assessing and communicating human-nature relationships and drivers of 
change that are particularly effective in addressing the needs of, for instance, national forest 
planners? Do these elements differ within the context of comprehensive river management 
planning? Perhaps thinking of the human-nature relationship in terms of ecosystem services 
better facilitates conversation with the public during national forest planning than Wild and 
Scenic River planning. A second, related question is as follows: what facets of the human-nature 
relationships, both individually and as they relate to SESs at large, are particularly informative to 
decision-makers (e.g., planners, program managers, district rangers, the responsible official) 
within different planning and management contexts?   
Relating the first set of questions to the second question acknowledges the somewhat 
arbitrary nature of separating decision-making from social learning. The same processes and 
information used to help the general public understand varied human-nature relationships can 
and should support decision-making whether, for instance, forest planners and managers are: 
grappling with questions such as closing or opening roads, approving timber sales, restricting 
recreation for endangered species, implementing a permit system, or leasing land for oil and 
natural gas extraction. Indeed, a pragmatist EE is about helping decision-makers understand the 
public, the public understand each other, and the public understand the decision-makers. The last 
point regarding the public understanding decision-makers may be counter-intuitive, but one 
stated benefit of the social vulnerability protocol, and the focus on conveying the various 
different human-nature relationships, is that it may help the public understand the magnitude of 
the challenge related to forest planning and management. In other words, forest planner and 
managers are confronted with a complex environmental problem, whereby several different 
human-nature relationships must be sustained, some of which are competing.  
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What types of knowledge (e.g., ‘kind’ versus ‘degree’, generalizable) and methods are 
most effective for helping decision-makers understand the public, the public understand each 
other, and the public understand the decision-makers is mostly an open question, and one that 
merits further study in specific contexts. From a pragmatist EE perspective, one way to start to 
address this question is to develop a research menu of sorts, which could help to illustrate and 
articulate the breadth of knowledge types related to human-nature relationships. Included in such 
a menu would be an accessible description of different general methods, and the benefits and 
weaknesses of different partial understandings. This research menu would not be in the form of a 
methodology and methods survey textbook, or even an article in an academic journal; it might be 
a general technical report for decision-makers, and perhaps something distilled even further for a 
general audience. Better articulation of the limitations and benefits of different scientific 
approaches is consistent with wary assessment.  
Analogies can often miss the mark, but the food menu parallel might work. First and 
foremost, it stresses that every approach to understanding the human-nature relationship is 
partial. One does not eat a single dish, and then claim they ate the entire menu. Second, a brief 
and cursory review of different approaches can be beneficial (even if simplified), while still 
devoting significant resources to the chosen approach. One can get a sense of the menu and be 
pleased with the available options, while still consuming and really knowing their chosen dish. 
And third, it put less pressure on any one approach, dish, researcher, or cook to be perfect or 
authoritative and, with less pressure, comes creativity. The human-nature relationship is neither 
fully defined, nor discredited by a single approach.  
A research menu would not only help researchers communicate and perhaps lead to better 
interdisciplinary research, it could facilitate the effectiveness of research in the substantive 
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domain where research meets practice. A pragmatist EE ideally engages with other science, 
decision-makers (e.g., forest planners and managers), and the general public. This 
transdisciplinary approach asks a lot of people who are not full time researchers. In the case of 
decision-makers, they have busy schedules which are often full of tasks that may or may not be 
relevant to the decision-context in question. Members of the general public are interested citizens 
who are performing their civic duty by engaging with public problems, but they are giving their 
generally-limited time. The point is that while transdisciplinary research needs active, and 
hopefully substantive, participation by non-researchers, the reality is that those being paid to 
perform such research are most immersed in the process. Of course, building trust is critical, but 
there is also a need to be very efficient with peoples’ time.    
A pragmatist EE research menu would likely inform transdisciplinary research mostly on 
the back end, as opposed to the front end. By front end, I mean the planning phase of 
transdisciplinary research where, in theory, non-scientists help to guide the research process 
itself. While transdisciplinary research is meant to engage the general public in research design, 
no attempt is made to articulate how a pragmatist EE might benefit such attempts. By the back 
end, I mean the communication phase when results are disseminated. The research menu could 
help to ensure that whatever partial understanding is being presented is contextualized within the 
bigger picture. It could be argued that engaging the public and non-researchers with 
methodological details is burdensome, confusing, generally not needed, and a waste of time from 
the researcher’s perspective (i.e., the inner monologue pondering, what kind of substantive 
methodological input could, me, the expert really get from lay people?). However, a pragmatist 
EE would reject this stance, because it assumes that people cannot handle complexity and learn 
from doing so.  
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My intent here is not to present a fully formed research menu (another future research 
project perhaps), but a rough start is worthwhile. A good starting point is with the ‘kind’ versus 
‘degree’ distinction made by Williams (2014a). It should be mentioned that Williams (2014b) is 
also an appropriate and interrelated starting point, as it provides a nice research menu through a 
place-research lens. The menu concisely outlines four ‘approaches’: phenomenological, 
semiotic13, cognitive/information processing, and social/discursive. My intent here is to start with 
the ‘kind’ versus degree’ distinction (Figure 5.7), because it operates at a more general, 
paradigmatic level. After providing a brief explanation of each item on the menu, I provide 
examples of research choices made within the ongoing research project of interest to this 
dissertation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 There is a deep history in pragmatism related to semiotics. See the appendix in Norton (2005) for a discussion on 
some of this history. This is the same appendix referenced earlier when I acknowledged Norton’s claim that 
pragmatism encompasses a revised version of positivism (Section 4.1). In a research article (not a book review), 
Hickman (2007-366), of pragmatist repute, complimented this appendix by claiming: “Norton’s appendix alone-
some 59 pages-is worth the price of the book.”   
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Figure 5.7. A research menu: different ways to understand human-nature relationships 
Pragmatist EE 
offerings 
 
 
Degree without tradeoffs 
Featuring Likert scales, psychometric constructs, levels of 
agreement/disagreement, factor analysis, cluster analysis, 
generalizability, and inherent and instrumental meanings 
 
 
Degree with tradeoffs 
Featuring non-market valuation techniques, econometrics, 
marginal WTP estimates, aggregated monetary values, forced 
choices, and inherent and instrumental meanings 
 
 
Kind without tradeoffs 
Featuring phenomenological and social/discursive methods, 
interviews, scenario building, contextual understanding, and 
sociocultural and identity-expressive meanings 
 
 
Kind with tradeoffs 
Featuring Q-methodology, a game-like activity, scenario 
building, contextual understanding, quantitative and qualitative 
elements 
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5.2.3.1. Degree: strength of relationships without tradeoffs 
For this approach, Jorgensen and Stedman (2001) is used as an example. The highly cited 
paper surveys lakeshore property owners with a 12-item scale (Table 5.1) to measure ‘sense of 
place’. Grounded in attitude theory, the research measures a general sense of place construct, 
within which three sub-constructs are nested: place attachment, place identity, and place 
dependence. Using standard multiple-contact survey methods and a five-point likert scale 
(disagree/agree), respondents express their sense of place. In this situation, a sense of place 
theory is assumed a priori and the strength is measured by respondent agreement. If all 
respondents responded strongly disagree, which is inversely coded as 1, then essentially there is 
no sense of place. An average of 12 summed across the total scale suggests a magnitude of 1 for 
sense of place. On the other extreme, an average of 60 (all answer strongly agree to all questions) 
suggests a magnitude of 5 for sense of place, or very strong sense of place. In this case, the 
authors found a mean value of 48.77 for the total scale; a fairly strong sense of place. Including 
sub-constructs allows for the existence of, for instance, a relatively low general sense of place 
with a strong level of place dependence. This is what Williams means by approaches that 
measure the ‘degree’ of a relationship, and such an understanding is derived with quantitative 
approaches. 
There are all sorts of research and analytic techniques surrounding Table 5.1. 
Confirmatory factor analysis can be used to test the validity of the constructs, and exploratory 
factor analysis can be used to explore new constructs. Structural equation modeling can be used 
to connect latent factors to predicted outcomes. All of these techniques are underpinned by 
generalizability, which is an attribute of this ‘degree’ approach that is potentially attractive for 
decision-makers. In this context, generalizability refers to the belief that if the survey sample is 
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representative of the population, then all lakeshore property owners have, on average, a strong 
sense of place. Generalizability is how the inherent values are assessed (top tier of Figure 5.2). 
Place research applying this approach has led to sweeping conclusions, such as the thought that 
nearly all people are have a proclivity for particular types of landscapes (Williams, 2014b).  
 
Table 5.1. Scale items for measuring sense of place   
Factor Item label Item description 
Place identity IDENTITY1 Everything about my lake property is a reflection of me 
 IDENTITY 2 My lake property says very little about who I am. 
 IDENTITY 3 I feel that I can really be myself at my lake property 
 IDENTITY 4 My lake property reflects the type of person I am. 
Place attachment ATTACH1 I feel relaxed when I’m at my lake property. 
 ATTACH2 I feel happiest when I’m at my lake property. 
 ATTACH3 My lake property is my favorite place to be. 
 ATTACH4 I really miss my lake property when I’m away from it for 
too long. 
Place dependence DEPEND1 My lake property is the best place for doing the things that 
I enjoy most. 
 DEPEND2 For doing the things that I enjoy most, no other place can 
compare to my lake property.  
 DEPEND3 My lake property is not a good place to do the things I 
most like to do. 
 DEPEND4 As far as I am concerned, there are better places to be than 
at my lake property.  
Source: (Jorgensen & Stedman, 2001) 
Another potential strength of generalizability is the potential for aggregation. Cluster 
analysis can divide the population into portions, so one could learn, perhaps, that 80 percent of 
the population of lakeshore owners had a really strong sense of place and the other 20 percent 
did not have a significant sense of place. Maybe there are demographic or geographic differences 
between the clusters, which might inform decisions, such as the location for routing power lines. 
Survey research focused on human-nature relationships can estimate support (e.g., favor/oppose) 
for proposed policy measures, such as implementing higher fees at national parks, or creating a 
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recreation permit system. Using survey research as a polling tool to address complex problems is 
a possibility, though policies or other institutions (in the governance sense) may guide decisions-
makers towards or away from this possibility. The final strength (or perhaps danger) worth 
mentioning is that to the untrained eye, positivistic science is likely still considered to be “more 
scientific”. Gardner (2013) found this to be the case in an empirical study of an interdisciplinary 
academic research team. 
With great power comes great responsibility, which is where a pragmatist perspective 
helps. There are not only several potential limitations with survey research, including declining 
response rates, representativeness based primarily on publicly available demographic statistics, 
and their generally unengaging format. But, most importantly, presenting respondents with a pre-
constructed or hypothesized theory does not typically provide the full opportunity to explore the 
bottom two tiers of Figure 5.2. The deeper meanings are discovered through other approaches, 
which is a weakness of focusing on strength of relationship with no tradeoffs.  
Notice that there are no tradeoffs required with this approach, and in this case it clearly 
makes little sense to ask if respondents would prefer attachment over identity. However, it is not 
uncommon for studies to apply a degree-without-tradeoffs approach to understand preferences 
for human-relationship elements that may be in competition. For instance, Sherrouse et al. (2014) 
studied ‘social values’ to inform decisions regarding ecosystem services tradeoffs, and their 
random mailback surveys had respondents rate 12 statements, all of which began with: ‘I value 
these forests because’. Tradeoffs were not forced in this part of the exercise, even though one 
could perceive competition between particular values (e.g., economic, intrinsic). Interestingly, 
another step of their survey had respondents allocate a hypothetical $100 toward specific values 
at specific locations, which represents a slightly different approach (i.e., degree with tradeoffs). 
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The basic point remains that survey research employing scales is prevalent, and respondents have 
the freedom to choose the same answer every time (tradeoffs are not required).  
 
5.2.3.2. Degree: strength of relationship with tradeoffs 
There are several ways to understand the strength of a human-nature relationship through 
the application of approaches that force choices. Unsurprisingly, given its interest in choices 
between alternatives, economic research has developed and honed such methods, including 
contingent valuation and choice modeling. Estimating marginal WTP provides a strength of 
relationship with regard to one state of the environment over another. Contingent valuation is 
usually the method employed for a single change (e.g., mine or no mine, preventing an oil spill). 
Typically this single change is expressed in a stated willingness to pay, or a dichotomous choice; 
regardless, the tradeoff is a change in policy for a hypothetical payment.  
Choice modeling presents a scenario with different levels of human-nature relationship 
elements. A ‘choice set’ (Figure 5.8) is the primary task in a choice modeling survey, and 
respondents are forced to decide between different states of the environment and, typically, a 
cost to their household. This makes WTP more implicit than a contingent valuation study, but a 
cost is still usually incorporated, which allows for estimating marginal WTP based on economic 
theory. Like approaches that measure strength without tradeoffs, respondents in this approach are 
presented with a scenario that is predetermined. In the case of this example, hypothetical changes 
in water quality and quantity and the attributes to be traded off were tied to four ecosystem 
services (e.g., agricultural community). If respondents were more concerned with some other 
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ecosystem service, such as whitewater boating, they cannot express that interest (other than in  
the survey comment section).  
 
Figure 5.8. Tradeoff question example from a choice modeling approach 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: (Armatas et al., 2018) 
  
Choice Set 1 Expected outcomes after 10 years 
Management Outcomes  Alternative A 
NO CHANGE  
in Management 
Alternative B  
Agricultural 
community 
 
 
 
550,000 acres 
irrigated 
 
550,000 acres 
irrigated 
600,000 acres 
irrigated 
Angling  
 
  
5% of streams 
are excellent  
10% of streams 
are excellent  
10% of streams 
are excellent  
River and 
riverbank 
biological 
diversity  
 
5% of streams 
are biologically 
diverse 
15% of streams 
are biologically 
diverse 
25% of streams 
are biologically 
diverse 
Motorized 
winter 
recreation 
 
50% open 40% open 20% open 
Annual cost 
to my 
household 
 
$300 
($25 monthly) 
$540 
($45 monthly) 
$840 
($70 monthly) 
My household would choose 
(select one only) 
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Assessing a human-nature relationship with this approach also allows generalizability, 
but in this case it is perhaps even more appealing to decision-makers as annual household 
marginal WTP can be estimated by simply aggregating individual WTP. Using mostly regression 
techniques, WTP estimates can be associated with population demographics and attitudes (e.g., 
males are associated with an increased WTP for motorized recreation). The weaknesses of this 
approach are similar to those above. However, this approach may be even less suited to assessing 
identity-expressive and cultural values, because the prospect of putting monetary units on 
particular elements of the human-nature relationship may be inappropriate, or perhaps even 
offensive, to some.  
Also, the ability to generate monetary estimates is potentially both more enticing to 
decision-makers and more controversial. Regarding the latter point, some may view cost-benefit 
analysis based upon monetary estimates of all human-relationship elements as a way around 
public debate and deliberation. Consider the following by Friedman (1953:5):  
Differences about economic policy among disinterested citizens derive 
predominantly from different predictions about the economic consequences of 
taking action—differences that in principle can be eliminated by the progress of 
positive economics—rather than from fundamental differences in basic values, 
differences about which men can ultimately only fight.  
This well-known quote by Milton Friedman epitomizes that which makes critics of ecosystem 
service monetization nervous. As Bromley (2015:6) noted in response to this quote, Friedman 
was eager to show that the objective methods of economics could render “fighting not only old-
fashioned, but unnecessary.” In defense of Friedman, it is possible that he never foresaw the 
application of economic analyses to complex natural resource problems where decisions are 
often about deeply personal issues. This defense is implicit in the point made by Varian (2014) 
when explaining the economic axiom of completeness, which assumes that a person can choose 
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when comparing two bundles of goods. Varian (2014:35, emphasis added) concedes that 
extenuating circumstances such as life or death choices may violate this axiom, though these 
choices are mostly “outside the domain of economic analysis.” Even the most ardent economists 
would likely find particular situations where economic methods are inappropriate, such as those 
involving life and death. A pragmatist EE, with its contextual approach, should partly focus on 
parsing those contexts where applying economic methods are appropriate or inappropriate for 
assessing human-nature relationships. Exactly how appropriate could be parsed from 
inappropriate in this case is another fertile area for future pragmatist EE research, though a focus 
on land management and planning policies would be a good start (a point briefly discussed in 
Section 5.2.4.1 below). 
 Prior to moving on to the next type of approach, it is worth noting that not all degree-
with-tradeoffs approaches are formal economic methods that yield monetary estimates. An 
example of a degree-with-tradeoff approach that does not necessarily yield monetary estimates is 
the analytic hierarchy process (AHP) (Saaty, 1987). This method is well-established, and it 
assigns strength of preference to one alternative over many, and it can also be aggregated and 
generalized.  
 
5.2.3.3. Kind: type of relationships with no tradeoffs 
Another way to gain a partial understanding of a human-nature relationship is through an 
assessment of the kinds of relationships that exist. This type of understanding is often described 
as qualitative which, as discussed below, can create confusion. It is likely fair to suggest that 
describing the kinds of relationships that exist is more commonly done with qualitative 
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approaches where people explain, discuss, and elaborate upon their human-nature relationship. 
One way to achieve a kind-without-tradeoffs understanding is with hermeneutics (Patterson & 
Williams, 2002), and it aims to provide respondents with the ability to express, in their own 
words, what is meant by a human-nature relationship. This can yield interesting insights, which 
may not be typically captured by approaches focused on relationship strength. For example, 
through interviews Van Patten and Williams (2008) found that some associate their seasonal 
homes with ‘obligation’, or a sense of dread related to perpetual upkeep. A study in the Gates of 
the Arctic National Park and Preserve in Alaska, which included extensive interviews, found, 
among many interesting insights, that there are positive perceptions related to encountering 
people, that there is an inextricable tie between personal identity and wilderness, and that there 
are a variety of feelings associated with the challenge of accessing an Alaskan wilderness 
(Glaspell et al., 2003; Watson et al., 2004). With regard to the Bitterroot National Forest in 
Montana, Gunderson and Watson (2007) found seven primary types of meanings, including ease 
of access to wild places, scenic beauty, unique contrast to other places in life, and those related to 
history, family, or tradition.        
Understanding relationships with a kind-without-tradeoff approach allows one to better 
understand the bottom two tiers of Figure 5.2. Understanding the details and nuance of socio-
cultural or identity-expressive meanings is challenging without free flowing conversation. These 
approaches are not typically generalizable or aggregated (though it is possible). Generalizing and 
aggregating deeply personal meanings, or even socio-cultural meanings, might be considered 
antithetical to the whole approach. Qualitative interview methods should not be equated with 
some generally non-scientific endeavor such as journalism. The qualitative researcher “builds a 
complex, holistic picture, analyzes words, reports detailed views of informants, and conducts the 
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study in a natural setting” (Creswell, 1998). Qualitative research, both in terms of data collection 
and analysis, are rigorous and systematic, which includes extensive time in the study area, a 
time-consuming and sometimes tedious data analysis process, and a theory building process that 
relies mostly on inductive reasoning (Creswell, 1998). Even though qualitative research is 
described as holistic, it should not be assumed that these methods do not reduce the data. Indeed, 
frequently qualitative coding techniques are applied to conceptually order the data into 
categories, which helps researchers make sense of the data to enable respondents “to speak in 
voices that are clearly understood” (Strauss & Corbin, 1998:56). So, even though the method is 
more holistic in that it does not constrain the respondent, analysis inevitably organizes the data 
for communication and dissemination of results. These results do not quantify the strength of 
feelings in the way that ‘degree’ approaches do.  
Results from this approach, relative to degree approaches, may be perceived by decision-
makers as more challenging to apply in practice; an assertion supported by Glaspell et al. 
(2003:62), who stated that “qualitative knowledge from studies of the deeper meanings of 
wilderness experiences has not typically been incorporated into management planning efforts.” 
However, the rich and contextual understanding of human-nature relationships is likely required 
to facilitate social learning. Suggesting, for instance, that a loss in water quality in a river or lake 
is strongly-moderately opposed by the population, or that the population has a WTP of $90,000 
per year to prevent such a change might appear to simplify decision-making, but it might not 
affect the public at a deeper level. On the other hand, learning that high quality water is directly 
tied to the maintenance of cultural identity, or a memory of fishing with a late-father might move 
the needle a bit more in the empathy and compassion department (these meanings may lead to 
valuable assertions that resonate with the public).    
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5.2.3.4.  Kind: type of relationship with tradeoffs 
The last general approach to be discussed is kind-with-tradeoffs. These approaches, such 
as Q-methodology, require tradeoffs but do not assign a strength to the relationship. This point 
was stressed above; even though Q-methodology requires prioritization of items, which measures 
the ‘degree’ of importance of items relative to each other, the approach does not measure the 
strength of a relationship as a whole in the way Williams (2014a) discussed. The use of a scale 
(e.g., -4 to +4 in Figure 5.6) and quantitative analysis does imply a quantitative method, but the 
fact that ‘kinds’ of relationships are explored and qualitative data is often used to support the 
different perspectives does highlight the hybrid nature of Q-methodology. Indeed, it was for 
these reason that Stenner and Stainton-Rogers (2004) called the method ‘qauliquantological’.    
By virtue of requiring a tradeoff among different items, a situation is created where 
scarcity is implied. Indeed, one cannot “have it all” when sorting items in a Q-methodology 
study. This is why Q-methodology is a potentially appropriate methodological choice in 
situations where conflicting perspectives are expected. The forced tradeoffs of Q-methodology 
also has limitations, as it may be assigning meaning where there is none. This limitation is 
discussed further in the next chapter, but what I mean is that individuals doing a Q-sort may find 
that all items are so relevant that they have trouble placing some in the neutral zone (i.e., middle 
of Figure 5.6), or that not enough are relevant to them and, and a result, they are placing items in 
the negatively and positively salient zone when they, in fact, are meaningless to the respondent. 
Q-methodology imposes both a normal distribution via the Q-sorting process, as well as an 
assumption that midpoints are comparable between Q-sorts.  
The primary point is that Q-methodology is potentially appropriate for gaining some 
insight into the degree of relative importance regarding particular elements of a relationship (i.e., 
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the cards, as in Figure 5.6, are conceptualized as elements of the human-nature relationship and 
they are sorted relative to one another), as well as the kinds of relationships that exist more 
holistically (i.e., when a Q-method perspective is assessed overall). Like the kind-without-
tradeoff approach, one cannot generalize or aggregate Q-method results, since data is collected 
using a purposeful sample to gain the broadest diversity of participants. The purpose of this type 
of approach is to understand the kinds of relationships that exist, as opposed to the magnitude or 
distribution of such relationships.  
This brief overview of potential general approaches to understanding human-nature 
relationships is not exhaustive, nor are they mutually exclusive. For instance, Q-methodology is 
predominantly a kind-with-tradeoff approach, but a kind-without-tradeoff discussion component 
can, and should, be added. Often surveys include both types of degree approaches, as was the 
case with Sherrouse et al. (2014). It is typical for choice modelling and contingent valuation 
surveys to include ‘attitudinal questions’, which are usually scaled questions of the degree-
without-tradeoff variety. A method such as scenario building, which is listed in both ‘kind’ 
approaches, may or may not incorporate tradeoffs. Daw et al. (2015) developed scenarios from 
focus groups which were guided to consider strengths and weaknesses of single future 
hypothetical scenarios, and then four such scenarios were placed side-by-side for comparison. 
Both processes imply tradeoffs, though scenario building may not take this shape in other cases.     
Nonetheless, the purpose of presenting these four different approaches is to highlight 
different ways that relationships can be partially understood, as well as the potential strengths 
and weaknesses that correspond to such approaches that may be relevant to decision-makers. In 
the context of these different approaches, and the different elements that potentially comprise a 
relationship (Section 5.2.4), a researcher operating in the substantive domain can better convey 
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to decision-makers and the public the part that their approach provides. Also, this can help with 
guiding and communicating particular methodological decisions. For example, why take one 
approach over another, or why aggregate WTP estimates in one case and not in another? These 
questions are expanded upon with examples in the next section.   
 
5.2.4. Substantive domain—part two: Practical considerations when studying human-nature 
relationships for application 
A pragmatist EE searches for exemplars, which may build up over time when assessing 
and articulating human-nature relationships to support decision-making and social learning. 
Decision-making exemplars could include relating particular approaches, as selected from the 
research menu, to particular decision-making contexts. They could also include the decision as to 
whether to stress generalizability and aggregation or not, if implementing a ‘degree’ approach or 
a combination of two or more approaches. Generalizability refers to the level of external validity 
of results (i.e., do results apply to all people in the population of interest) and aggregation refers 
to the issue of summing individual results (e.g., WTP estimates) across the population of interest. 
These two methodological decisions are discussed below, but first there is a need to preempt a 
question that may arise, particularly with regard to the interrelated issues of generalizability and 
aggregation.  
Does picking and choosing when to present (or not present) particular facets of an 
approach amount to relativism? In other words, is it problematic if one performs a ‘degree’ 
approach and decides to generalize and aggregate in one context but not in another? A pragmatist 
EE would assert “no” to both questions for two reasons. The first reason is the fundamental goal 
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of EE, and other conservation social sciences more generally, to not only describe the world as it 
is but to inform decisions toward some goal (e.g., normative sustainability). That is, the dual goal 
of description and action necessitate reflective thought about the implications of disseminating 
different types of knowledge. Second, answering no to the above questions implies taking the 
partiality-of-understanding belief and the division-of-labor belief very seriously. I think the 
former point has been made sufficiently, but the interrelated latter point refers to the idea that it 
is not good enough to simply state that some approach has weaknesses, which can be augmented 
by the work of others.   
For instance, Freeman (1979:34) suggested that focusing attention on particular aspects 
of well-being such as income and consumption to the exclusion of others was implicit of the 
“division of labor between economists and others.” To this, Brown (1984:244) noted: “while this 
recognition is sufficient to clear positive economics, it at the same time points out the limits of 
welfare economics tools such as cost-benefit analysis.” According to Norton (2012:456), “where 
I think economists may remain open to criticism is that, having recognized the necessary 
incompleteness of their results, they do not do much to clarify what is missing” in a cost-benefit 
analysis. This is a major impetus for suggesting the need for a research menu, and it also 
supports generalizing or aggregating in some cases but not others.  
 
5.2.4.1. Deciding on relationship approaches: searching for exemplars through decision-
contexts 
Often, at least within the United States, guiding administrative and legislative policy can 
highlight which approaches to partial understandings of human-nature relationships may be 
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needed. For example, the requirement for forest planners to consider economic, social, and 
ecological sustainability suggests a need for an understanding of both kind and strength of 
relationships. In other words, it is challenging to assess economic sustainability without 
capturing the strength of preferences for both marketed and non-marketed elements of human-
nature relationships. On the other hand, it is challenging to capture elements of cultural 
sustainability without ‘kind’ approaches, as they are particularly effective for understanding the 
deeper, lower-tier meanings in Figure 5.2.  
Wild and Scenic River planning, on the other hand, stresses an understanding of kinds of 
relationships. This is because the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act (WSRA) requires that 
outstandingly remarkable values (ORVs) are enhanced and protected, which include water 
quality and free-flowing water, as well as a variety of ORV categories such as wildlife, fisheries, 
scenery, and cultural and historic. Generally, the WSRA does not stress economics, or even 
human well-being. The focus on river protection, for the sake of the relevant ORVs, suggests that 
some measurement of well-being in terms of strength is perhaps less important than an 
understanding of how people relate to the river resource more qualitatively.  
Having said that, this more general planning step in the context of wild and scenic rivers 
is inextricably tied to potential management actions, which are often dictated by the priorities of 
the general public as well as limited management funds. For example, Wild and Scenic river 
planning may require a decision as to whether to build a new river access or invest funds in more 
cultural and historical interpretive resources. Such decisions should be informed by an 
understanding of what people may prefer, as resource scarcity is forcing a choice of one 
alternative over another; this is within the purview of ‘degree’ approaches, both with and without 
tradeoffs. A pragmatist EE holds that there is no common metric for weighing the various 
185 
 
decisions facing managers and planners, but instead there is a need to, the greatest extent 
practicable, consider how disparate human-nature relationships may be affected by decisions. 
This process aimed at a comprehensive understanding of human-nature relationships, in 
conjunction with both public debate and deliberation about the meaning of normative 
sustainability and the various mandates of relevant land management policy, can provide a 
foundation for addressing complex social-ecological problems. Ultimately, then, an 
understanding of both kind and strength of relationships is likely ideal for deciding on issues 
related to complex environmental problems. But, in the case of Wild and Scenic river planning 
there may be a more pressing need for understanding the kinds of relationships that exist and the 
lower tier sociocultural and identity-expressive meanings.  
Given the clear influence of policy (and other institutions) on the type of information that 
may best inform decision-making, there is a need to link other research, such as that related to 
governance, with a pragmatist EE focused on a comprehensive understanding of human-nature 
relationships. This is a point stressed further in the chapter after next on SES. For now, this 
cursory comparison of forest planning to comprehensive river management planning will suffice. 
In relation to forest planning, even without a thorough and nuanced governance study, it seems 
that informed decisions require both ‘kind’ and ‘degree’ approaches. For instance, the need to 
consider ecological, cultural, and economic sustainability within the context of policy mandates 
such as the National Forest Management Act and the Multiple-use Sustained Yield Act, and the 
Forest Service goal to meet the needs of current and future generations highlight the value of 
both kind and degree approaches. Meeting these various mandates inevitably raises the tricky 
task of generalizing and aggregating.  
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5.2.4.2. Supporting as many relationships as possible: a wicked problem 
When understanding a human-nature relationship with a ‘kind’ approach, one does not 
gain any knowledge of how such relationships are distributed across the population or SES at 
large. That is, how many people feel a particular way is not knowable. As highlighted above, 
aggregation generally requires quantitative approaches focused on strength of relationships. The 
problem with such research is that, in a vacuum, they are limited. Generalizability, 
representativeness, and aggregation are all normative assumptions attached to positivistic 
paradigms (e.g., that there is one ‘true’ description of the distribution of relationships across the 
population), and these assumptions have been thoroughly questioned for many decades; indeed, 
the perceived issues with such assumptions was a main impetus for the ‘paradigm wars’ (Denzin, 
2010). Within EE specifically, these assumptions are questioned through criticism of cost-benefit 
analysis, which is underpinned by aggregating individual marginal WTP estimates.  
A full account of these criticisms is not needed here, but perhaps a single example is 
worthwhile. There are issues related to equity, as WTP is constrained by income, and those with 
higher income can bid more than those with lower income. This constraint is taken seriously, and 
survey instruments commonly include a ‘straight talk’ message reminding respondents to really 
consider their income and other life expenses when stating their WTP. Non-market valuation 
studies aim to create a hypothetical marketplace that is as real as possible. While this issue can 
be partly assuaged, at least in theory, by willingness to accept (WTA) formats (Weber, 2013) and 
income-adjusted WTP (Breffle et al., 2015), it is nonetheless a problematic issue. This problem 
is exacerbated when this partial ‘degree with tradeoffs’ understanding is aggregated to a large, 
potentially global scale. Essentially those calling for an abandonment of mathematical formalism 
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in EE (e.g., Clive Spash) are suggesting that such estimates are too flawed to apply, and perhaps 
even misleading in public discourse.  
A pragmatist EE acknowledges the reality of such issues, but instead of discarding the 
theory and the knowledge it creates, it focuses on better articulating situations when such a 
partial understanding may be beneficial. For instance, aggregating individual marginal WTP 
estimates to yield monetary estimates of non-market benefits at a regional scale, while 
problematic, may serve as a starting point for facilitating negotiation in particular situations such 
as when a farmer (or group of farmers) are willing to install and maintain riparian buffer-strips 
between a river and their farmed parcels. This work will present costs to the farmers, and 
offsetting this costs could come from payments either by people interested in the resource or 
through general tax revenues. Regardless of the specific solutions, developing a ballpark estimate 
of the benefits provided by the buffer strips could facilitate negotiations or public acceptability of 
tax payments. While the buffer strip example has long been on my mind, it turns out that Norton 
(2011b:369) has already made this point (Norton (2015) reiterated it):   
An estimate of key ecosystem services might prove useful in the future as a way 
to identify a fair price when some resource users pay others to maintain favorable 
environmental conditions for the former. For example, in some partnerships 
between upstream users to maintain riparian buffers and in other ways protect the 
downstream water quality. In contexts such as this, estimates of the monetary 
value of services may be very useful, even though there is reason for skepticism 
that the ecosystem services strategy of counting and aggregating toward a “total 
value of nature” is feasible. 
This is a decision context where marginal WTP estimates, which are aggregated may be 
appropriate. For a pragmatist EE such estimates are never always appropriate or always 
inappropriate. 
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 When such estimates and aggregations are appropriate is clearly a subjective decision, 
which should not be taken lightly. This decision can be made by assessing the monetary 
estimates themselves, and considering other partial understandings are helpful in such an 
assessment. For example, the Shoshone National Forest study (Armatas, 2013) was followed up 
with a non-market valuation study which estimated marginal WTP for four ecosystem services. 
However, the fact that the valuation survey clearly did not capture a particular ‘kind’ of 
relationship in the Q-methodology study raised serious doubts about the survey 
representativeness and, consequently, generalizability. Partly due to these questions, the 
valuation results were presented in the context of a larger, more comprehensive study of human-
nature relationships, and they were not aggregated or assigned to a specific portion of the 
population; see Armatas et al. (2018) for full details. Furthermore, the valuation results were 
never published on their own, which was a deliberate knowledge-dissemination choice. This 
final point transitions us away from questions of interpretation to the related questions of 
research presentation and dissemination, and researcher reflexivity.  
 
5.2.5. Substantive domain—part three: wary assessment of both research and researcher 
A pragmatist EE, as stressed many times above, requires wary assessment of research, 
but it also requires a wary assessment of the researcher. This is consistent with full transparency 
of methodological decisions, and the prioritization of reflexivity. The decision to not report 
aggregated WTP estimates in Armatas et al. (2018) was partly due to a latent class analysis that 
only yielded three of the four perspectives found in the Q-methodology study (Armatas, 2013). 
However, there was another reason for not reporting aggregate WTP estimates, which is that the 
problem motivating Armatas et al. (2018) was perhaps too broadly defined.  
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Informing national forest decision-making in general and forest plan revision more 
specifically is a very general context, and the fact that the timing of the research was such that 
the results were only available after the plan revision was complete, it seemed that the 
controversial side of aggregate WTP estimates, as discussed above, was more pronounced than 
the decision-making benefits. Of course, these monetary estimates could still be used in the event 
that a relevant management decision arises, such as a proposal to reduce or expand motorized 
winter recreation on the Forest.  
This raises the question as to why one would complete such a study if the timing was 
such that the specific results would not provide immediate decision-making or social learning 
benefits. In the spirit of wary researcher assessment, the answer is the methodological benefits of 
providing an approach that can capture more holistic human-nature relationships. From a 
pragmatist EE perspective then, it makes little sense to publish the choice modelling results on 
their own. While it would have been easy enough to create a context for publishing a choice 
modelling (CM) survey, the benefit would not be methodological (there are many CM studies) 
nor substantive, but instead mostly an additional publication on my resume. This latter point 
represents a conundrum for a pragmatist ecological economist (or any scientist for that matter), 
which is the temptation to reduce research to the smallest publishable unit for personal reasons, 
or disseminate knowledge that provides the most comprehensive picture. If communication and 
social learning are ultimately the goal, then it seems the latter is perhaps the most appropriate 
choice, at least in the context of conveying human-nature relationships in support of solving 
complex environmental problems.       
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5.3. Limitations and challenges of a pragmatist ecological economics 
It would represent a flawed philosophy to put forth great effort in articulating an 
approach that focuses on highlighting the incompleteness of any single method without 
discussing potential limitations of what is proposed above. Perhaps the biggest limitation is the 
call for deliberative approaches where people can learn about different perspectives and, 
consequently, revise their beliefs to not only accommodate their own needs and desires but also 
those of fellow humans. A pragmatist EE should strive to develop such approaches, and the 
social vulnerability protocol (Armatas et al., In Press) theoretically represents such an approach 
to an extent. While the social vulnerability protocol does not have an explicit deliberative facet, 
it does stress the need to communicate results to the public for the purpose of better 
understanding and increased empathy related to others’ viewpoints. The learning benefits of the 
social vulnerability protocol are only theoretical at this point, as no empirical study has been 
conducted testing the potential learning benefits of the approach.   
The goal to create deliberative approaches that enhance social learning and potentially 
resolve conflict can seem futile in today’s world, or at least in today’s United States, where 
division and uncompromising ideology feel inescapable. Having recently expressed this potential 
Achilles heel of a pragmatist EE to an experienced conservation social scientist, a somewhat 
comforting reply was given. The essence of the reply was that there are two major schools of 
philosophical thought of relevance to this: deliberative democracy in the school of Habermas, 
and critical theory in the school of philosophers such as Foucault. The former calls for hashing 
out problems with reason and discussion, and the latter calls for creating change by uncovering 
and, consequently, dismantling the power structures that lead to an un-level playing field (Dan 
Williams, personal communication).  
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Another related limitation of a pragmatist EE is that it assumes that people are inherently 
social and potentially available for discussion and debate. There are a few sides to this debate, 
which raise questions as to whether this is a limitation. First, it seems humans increasingly 
minimize face to face interactions. Second, we have more information at our fingertips than ever 
before, which makes breaking habitual experience to get to a secondary experience that triggers 
reflective thought harder than ever. And a third, potentially positive reality is that circulating 
information is easier than ever; in this way we are more connected today than any other time in 
history.  
The final limitation to be discussed is related to interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary 
research. If interdisciplinary research (working with different researchers) can create better 
processes for understanding and communicating the varied human-nature relationships, then it 
will require that researchers from diverse backgrounds get outside their comfort zone, risk 
spending time that may yield little results and, at times, suspend entrenched beliefs. This is 
challenging for anybody, but it may be particularly challenging for a cohort of people who spent 
at least a decade learning to think in a particular way. The challenge of interdisciplinary research 
has been discussed at great length elsewhere, and empirical studies have reinforced common 
perceptions, such as the perceived superiority of positivistic science (Gardner, 2013). There is no 
doubt about the various barriers of good interdisciplinary research, and at times institutional 
structures (such as tenure and the metrics used to evaluate it) may conflict with interdisciplinary 
research. 
In addition to the challenges of getting researchers to work together, the incentive 
structures and long-established protocols within the research industry at large may impede 
interdisciplinary research. For example, promotions based upon productivity incentivize less (not 
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more) transparency, whether that manifests in the hording of data until all possible publications 
are complete, or the hesitance to share an idea with the fear that it might be taken and published 
before one has the time to fully develop it. These impediments are not only related to the desire 
for professional success. Peer-reviewed journals maintain a standard publication protocol that 
seem to hobble creativity as well. For instance, in what is now a largely digital publication 
process, it would seem reasonable to require all manuscripts that publish survey results include a 
full version of the survey instrument. If I had my druthers, I would like to browse not articles, but 
survey instruments. Imagine a feature where Ecological Economics, or better yet Elsevier, 
compiled all survey instruments by year, whereby a researcher could scan through them like the 
photos on their phone. Of course, a link to the relevant article would be readily available.  
    Regarding the potential limitation of transdisciplinary research (substantive 
engagement of non-researchers), there are perhaps more impediments to transdisciplinary 
research than interdisciplinary research. Similar to interdisciplinary research, the challenges of 
transdisciplinary research are well documented (Flint et al., 2019; Lang et al., 2012; Talwar et 
al., 2011; Wiek, 2007), but I will provide a couple of obvious impediments within the context of 
federal land management and planning and understanding the human-nature relationship. First, 
there are logistical impediments to effective public engagement. Gathering public input is 
required for forest planning and comprehensive river management planning, for example, and 
ideally this is meant to extend beyond the federally required comment periods. Such public 
engagement requires significant resources for the agencies. 
Also, there is the potential that non-researchers, particularly decision-makers (e.g., 
planners and managers), may not have the time, capacity, or desire to engage in conservation 
social science. More input from practitioners, within the context of specific decision-making 
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situations, is needed. But, as previously mentioned, their schedules are often very full with day to 
day tasks, and sometimes a forest plan revision is performed as extra work without additional 
staff. These realities can make research, even if fully funded, seem like extra work for already 
busy decision-makers.  
 
5.4. Next steps: A brief reorientation for the reader 
Up to this point, considerable effort has been put towards articulating a pragmatist EE. To 
this end, a thorough review of pragmatist philosophy was presented for the purposes of 
establishing a research paradigm and worldview. This was followed by a lengthy discussion of a 
pragmatist EE, which yielded a core burning question (i.e., what constitutes the varied 
relationships that people have with the environment?), a general methodological overview of 
how human-nature relationships can be partially understood (i.e., the research menu), and major 
considerations and challenges related to integrating an understanding of such relationships into 
decision-making (e.g., questions related to aggregating individual relationships). While I believe 
this “40,000 thousand-foot view” is cohesive on its own as a philosophical and conceptual 
pragmatist EE, further clarity and strength may be added to the case made herein through 
additional discussion; such discussion comprises the final two substantive chapters of this 
dissertation.  
First, the research-menu idea is revisited with a discussion that focuses on providing 
greater clarity of what a kind-with-tradeoffs approach (Q-methodology) provides, particularly as 
it relates to other items on the research menu. Specifically, the objective of the next chapter is to 
weigh into a long-running debate related to Q-methodology from the perspective of a pragmatist 
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EE. I consider the discussion in the next chapter to be pragmatist EE in practice, but not because 
it includes details related to the knowledge derived from pragmatist EE research. Indeed, it does 
not focus on the substance of human-nature relationships as reflected in the word clouds above 
(Figures 5.3, 5.4, and 5.5). Instead, the next chapter focuses in greater detail on what different 
methods (with accompanying normative assumptions) provide and do not provide. This 
statement may imply a theoretical discussion about methods, and in some ways it is. However, 
my aim is not to improve the different methodological approaches per se, but instead to 
demonstrate how a pragmatist EE might: (1) interpret the different approaches and; (2) facilitate 
better communication about different approaches to understanding human-nature relationships 
for the purpose of improved interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary research.  
The final substantive chapter (chapter 7) will focus on SES research with an aim of 
contextualizing an understanding of human-nature relationships within the larger goal of making 
more sustainable decisions. There is a need to sustain such relationships for both current and 
future generations, which highlights a much larger issue where natural systems (e.g., the health 
of ecosystems) and social systems (e.g., political and cultural institutions) must be considered 
and understood. SES research is well positioned to provide this understanding.   
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6. PRAGMATIST ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS IN PRACTICE: FOCUSING ON 
CLEAR AND CONTEXTUALIZED METHODOLOGY  
When introducing the research menu above, it was asserted that a pragmatist EE should 
focus on conveying the complexity of human-nature relationships by, in part, highlighting the 
partiality of any one approach. In other words, when presenting results (e.g., in peer-reviewed 
articles, public forums, or to practitioners) from, for instance, a kind-with-tradeoffs approach, a 
pragmatist EE would also strive to contextualize this information within the bigger picture. 
Perhaps by briefly describing what a degree-without-tradeoffs approach would provide in 
comparison, or what place research might convey in comparison to ecosystem services.  
It was also suggested that by committing to such a contextualization, one may better 
achieve both interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary research. To reiterate, clearly conveying how 
different partial-relationship understandings fit (or do not fit) with one another may help 
researchers communicate and, consequently, integrate research more effectively in a way that 
trends toward a holistic picture of the human-nature relationship. However, a pragmatist EE is 
focused on advancing interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary research, as well as applying 
research for the benefit of addressing complex environmental problems (through both decision-
making and social learning). Therefore, a pragmatist EE would assert that, in general, researchers 
need to expand their perceptions about what is relevant and irrelevant information within a given 
study. While the complexities of regression analysis are likely beyond the scope of a qualitative 
study, the basic differences (and/or similarities) between a kind-without-tradeoffs study and a 
degree-without-tradeoffs study are likely not. Articulating such differences and similarities are 
the focus of this chapter.  
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This chapter provides a detailed example of what the process might look like when 
developing a concise research menu item. Specifically, this chapter has one primary objective: to 
articulate how a pragmatist EE would address the debate between Q-methodology (a kind-with-
tradeoffs approach) and R-methodology (a degree-without-tradeoffs approach). To complete this 
objective, four primary aims are pursued: (1) demonstrating the standard statistical approaches in 
both Q-methodology and R-methodology; (2) articulating the normative assumptions of Q-
methodology and R-methodology with a focus on showing how such assumptions justify 
standard statistical procedures; (3) comparing the results of the different approaches using the 
same data set (i.e., data collected for the Gila National Forest study (Armatas et al., 2017b) and; 
(4) providing a pragmatist EE interpretation of what Q-methodology and R-methodology 
contribute within the context of national forest planning. 
To be clear, this chapter is primarily presented from a Q-methodology perspective (the 
reasons for which are discussed first below). However, the chapter is not a description of Q-
methodology, as several such works are available (e.g., Brown, 1980; Watts & Stenner, 2012), 
nor is it a critique of either Q-methodology or R-methodology (i.e., there is no conclusion stating 
that one is “better” than the other). Indeed, a pragmatist EE finds value in both approaches from 
the research menu, and suggests that applying both can lead to mutual reinforcement of findings.  
 
6.1. Starting with Q-Methodology: Wary assessment and a long-running debate 
Figure 5.7 presents four ways to partially understand human-nature relationships, so this 
chapter could reasonably start with any of the four approaches. I start with Q-methodology, as a 
kind-with-tradeoffs approach, for two main reasons. The first reason is practical and personal, as 
I am currently nearing Q-method data collection as project lead for the third time, and following 
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pragmatism it seems prudent to warily assess the methodology underpinning the social 
vulnerability protocol.  
The second reason for starting with Q-methodology is that it is probably the most 
misunderstood and controversial research methodology referenced herein. That is not to say, for 
instance, that qualitative interviews or choice modeling are not misunderstood or criticized. But 
Q-methodology, as a social science method for understanding viewpoints about a topic of 
interest, has been considered with discomfort and unease by some for a long time. In fact, 
debates about the method, which began in the 1930s, continue today. The debate has 
implications for both research and application. Regarding research, it is not uncommon for Q-
methodology studies to be met with peer-review skepticism by those who are unfamiliar with the 
approach (Ramlo, 2015). This is likely more a symptom of the debate than a cause of it. For 
instance, in a book review of the work that constituted the official debut of Q-methodology, 
Cronbach and Gleser (1954:330) discouraged students from adopting the approach based upon 
the fear that it would “misdirect much research effort” and, additionally, they asserted that factor 
analysis of Q correlations “appears to have little value.”  
While this review pre-dates the majority of the ‘paradigm wars’ and the gradual 
legitimization of multiple research paradigms, it likely set the tone for the debate that continues 
today. In other words, if one accepts that there are multiple ways to practice science, then a 
common accompanying belief is the inability to separate methods (primarily statistical 
techniques in this case) from worldviews and research paradigms. A pragmatist perspective, with 
an emphasis on context, would hesitate to suggest that factor analysis of Q correlations has little 
value generally; perhaps it has little value for testing, confirming, or discovering psychometric 
constructs as commonly understood as the more typical roles of factor analysis.  
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Prior to delving further into this discussion, it is worth highlighting the extent of the debate 
related to Q-methodology. It should also be noted at the outset that the second player in the 
debate discussed below is R-methodology (specifically factor analysis within the context of the 
psychometrics), which is not an approach that I have applied in practice. While survey research 
often subsumes R-methodology, and thus shares some common assumptions (e.g., random 
samples, generalizability), it is worth highlighting my limited expertise in the areas of factor 
analysis and psychometrics. The acknowledgment serves as an invitation to engage in productive 
debate with R-methodology experts and, while I am confident in my assessment of R-
methodology below, it also signals the existence of potential deficiencies (and the need for 
further research) related to this popular research area. 
 
6.1.1. The unproductive (and sometimes nasty) debate surrounding Q-methodology 
In Section 3.1, I argued that the debate related to methodological pluralism in EE lacked 
nuance, and was generally unproductive because those engaging in the debate failed to elaborate 
on the worldview level of the scientific macrostructure. Ultimately, I make a similar argument 
with relation to the Q-methodology debate, though this debate spans all three levels of the 
scientific macrostructure (worldview, paradigm, and research programs (particularly as it 
pertains to the methodological domain)). Arguing that the debate surrounding Q-methodology is 
the result of miscommunication, or perhaps misconception, with regard to different levels of the 
scientific macrostructure is not an original point.  
To be sure, the point has been reiterated since William Stephenson suggested that the 
critiques of Cronbach and Glaser were based upon false premises (Stephenson, 1954a); 
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essentially, Stephenson was making the case for a different, non-positivistic research paradigm. 
Interestingly, Stephenson’s thinking was heavily influenced by pragmatists such as John Dewey, 
Charles Peirce, and Williams James (Good, 2010; Stenner, 2009, 2011; Stephenson, 1983b, 1989 
[2005]). Fast forward 60 years and, within the context of Q-methodology as a mixed methods 
approach, it has been stressed that Q-methodology is misunderstood because, despite its 
conceptualization as a comprehensive methodology, which includes normative philosophical 
assumptions and general methodological guidelines, criticisms focus mostly upon methods (e.g., 
factor analysis, forced Q-sort) (Newman & Ramlo, 2010; Ramlo, 2015). Several others, long ago 
and more recently, have made the point that critiques of Q-methodology, mostly with regard to 
its statistical procedures, fail to consider Q-methodology more comprehensively (e.g., Brown, 
1980; Brown, 1993; Brown et al., 2015; Stenner, 2011; Stenner & Stainton-Rogers, 2004; 
Stephenson, 1978 [2014]). Given the fact that many have made this argument, and that there are 
several articles that outline the historical and current debate surrounding Q-methodology (Brown 
et al. (2015) and Ramlo (2015) are informative), the intent is to only briefly outline the debate. 
Q-methodology was officially debuted by William Stephenson in 1954 (Stephenson, 
1954b), but many ideas underpinning the approach were published and debated much earlier 
(Burt & Stephenson, 1939; Stephenson, 1935; Stephenson, 1936). The crux of the debate is the 
purpose for which factor analysis is applied. Factor analysis is an interdependence technique 
(input variables are not defined as dependent or independent) where the interrelationship among 
a large number of variables are explained in terms of a smaller number of common underlying 
dimensions (factors) (Hair et al., 2010). The typical approach in factor analysis is to correlate 
items, tests, or traits. +Q-methodology, along with its Q-sort data collection technique, uses 
factor analysis to find shared viewpoints within a purposeful sample of people with regard to 
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some topic of interest. Viewpoints are considered ‘shared’ when multiple people complete Q-
sorts similarly. In Q-methodology, the correlation matrix, which is subject to factor analysis, 
include correlations between people, not the more typical correlation matrix including 
correlations between tests (this difference is illustrated below). It is this analytic facet that 
Cronbach and Gleser (1954) found so dubious, and it is a source of the ‘measurement’ issues 
raised by Kampen and Tamás (2014).   
The critique provided by Kampen and Tamás (2014:3121), which perceives a variety of 
issues, concludes that Q-methodology should be recognized for what it is: “an analysis technique 
that in attempting to combine the strengths of quantitative and qualitative inquiry inherits 
weaknesses from both (respectively reductionism and subjectivity).” This critique of Q-
methodology resulted in a reply from Brown et al. (2015:524-527), who both addressed each 
specific critique and concisely reviewed the historical debate surrounding Q-methodology with 
supporting literature. To this rebuttal, Tamás et al. (2015:539-540, emphasis original) then 
stated:  
Readers who are by reason of time or competence unable to pick through the 
details in our exchange and in the reference material should not use Q-
methodology. While there are some circumstances in which ignorance of the inner 
workings of a method are scientifically acceptable, these require a degree of 
scientific consensus supported by empirical evidence that is certainly not found in 
the case of Q-methodology. On a final note, we are troubled by the reliance of our 
detractors on evasion, substitution, hyperbole and personalization in their 
arguments.  
This is not the only debate surrounding Q-methodology to devolve to the point of incivility, as is 
reflected in a more recent exchange that was specific to the factor analytic elements of Q-
methodology (Akhtar-Danesh, 2017a, b; Braswell, 2017; Brown, 2017).  
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The above block quote is worth discussion, because it raises several important elements 
of the debate that impede the potential for productivity. In other words, a healthy debate can 
often yield improvements on both sides but, unfortunately, the Q-methodology debate has mostly 
yielded missed opportunities.  First and foremost, a pragmatist perspective with its wary 
assessment requirement would caution the application of any scientific approach without an 
understanding of its details. Second, the authors’ comment about scientific consensus is unclear, 
and they separate method from methodology in the same sentence. In other words, are they 
suggesting that there is a lack of scientific consensus about the validity of Q-methodology as a 
comprehensive methodology, or is there a lack of consensus about particular details of the 
method and its analytic technique?  
From a pragmatist perspective, it does not seem possible to assess either in a vacuum and, 
most importantly, a critique of methodology can be improved by: (1) assessing the underlying 
normative assumptions of the respective methodologies and; (2) articulating, as the critic, one’s 
own worldview and paradigmatic approach to science (e.g., if one adopts an extreme rationalist 
view (Figure 2.1), or a purist/oppositional view (Figure 2.2), then skepticism of Q-methodology 
is understandable, particularly if one adheres to a positivistic paradigm). Without these two 
elements, it is difficult to realize the potential benefit of any critique (i.e., improved methodology 
or the creation of new insights). It seems, by and large, the majority of criticisms of Q-
methodology lack these two elements, which minimizes their potential benefit and maximizes 
the potential for detrimental misconceptions.  
On the other side of the debate, rebuttals in support of Q-methodology could be 
improved. The final sentence of the quote above implies an unprofessional tone by the Q-
rebuttal, and a reading of Brown et al. (2015), while informative and well supported by the 
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literature, does impress a defensive tone. Even though such a tone may be understandable given 
the fact that the lead author (i.e., Steven Brown) has spent an entire career discussing and 
clarifying Q-methodology, it is nonetheless unproductive. For those critiques of Q-methodology 
that assess the data collection technique and analysis in a vacuum, there seems to be an 
accompanying rebuttal that simply suggests the critique is missing the big picture. In short, Q-
methodology responses often miss an opportunity to advance the conversation. The debate does 
highlight a level of incommensurability, as the participants appear to continually ‘talk past one 
another’.   
It may be worth engaging in the debate, particularly because it provides an opportunity to 
demonstrate how a pragmatist EE might provide a different perspective and advance the 
conversation. There are two broad issues worth highlighting which could be addressed to 
advance the conversation. First, there is the issue of Q-methodology versus R-methodology 
(described in-depth below) as single approaches. That is, whether the debate could yield 
improvements to either Q-methodology, as a non-generalizable, small and purposeful sampling, 
tradeoffs eliciting approach to understanding viewpoints, or R-methodology as a generalizable, 
random sampling, degree-without-tradeoffs approach to developing psychological constructs. 
The second issue is the combination of Q-methodology with R-methodology, which would 
typically require two different data collection efforts. This issue is an important one, and 
arguably the greatest benefit of the Q-methodology debate is that it has, in part, motivated 
conversations about how to best combine the strengths of both approaches (e.g., Baker et al., 
2010; Danielson, 2009).  
However, this chapter focuses on the first issue, as this is the primary subject of the debate, 
and its continuation has led to less attempts to clearly articulate and embrace the differences 
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between Q-methodology and R-methodology and more attempts to make the two similar. For 
instance, Thompson et al. (2012) compared two random sample surveys, one of which employed 
a Q-sort data collection technique and the other employed a standard psychometric instrument 
with Likert-style scales. The Q-sort contained 36 statements and the Likert-scale questions 
included the same statements as individual items. Essentially, the authors were implementing the 
Q-sort technique with survey methodology to see if similar factors emerged in both surveys. 
Thompson et al. (2012) found that the results were similar, though the logistics of employing a 
Q-sort as a mailed survey was deemed relatively challenging, and ultimately reinforced the 
observation by Danielson et al. (2009) that traditional Likert-style surveys are the better 
approach to understanding the prevalence of viewpoints about a particular topic. This chapter 
focuses on highlighting the differences between Q-methodology and R-methodology, which may 
lead to insights how the two approaches could inform, reinforce, and/or contradict one another. 
To facilitate this discussion, the same data (i.e., Gila National Forest data) is analyzed through 
these different lenses. 
 
6.2. Q-methodology: A different way to study psychology  
It is important to stress that Q-methodology, as originally conceptualized by William 
Stephenson, was intended to provide an alternative approach to psychological study; one which 
eschewed an ontology that assumed human behavior was atomistic and mechanistic (Stenner, 
2009; Stephenson, 1989 [2005]). As Stephenson (1978 [2014]:48) lamented late in his life: “Q-
methodology was meant to be the foundation for a subjective science. Instead it remains as Q-
technique, Q-analysis, Q-method, alongside multivariate analysis, discriminative function, 
variance analysis, R factor analysis and the like tools of statistical minds.” This ‘subjective 
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science’ includes normative assumptions and basic beliefs about practice related to, for instance, 
sample sizes, representativeness, and interpretability. 
Discussion of this subjective14 science is presented below, but there is a need to first 
discuss the specifics of the debate (i.e., Q-methodology and R-methodology). The latter half of 
the above quote highlights the importance of discussing terminology. Indeed, the literature 
focused on the topics of ‘Q-methodology’, ‘R-methodology’, ‘R-type’ factor analysis, and ‘Q-
type’ factor analysis can create confusion as there is inconsistency related to the meaning of each 
of these terms (e.g., sometimes Q-methodology and Q-analysis are used interchangeably, and 
sometimes there is an explicit difference between the two). 
Generally, though, the purpose of factor analysis is data summarization and data 
reduction. The underlying assumption with for both types of factor analysis is that the data has 
unobservable latent entities, or factors, which represent a combination of multiple variables. The 
data summarization, according to Hair et al. (2010:98), is about uncovering the structure in the 
data where "individual variables are grouped and then viewed not for what they represent 
individually, but for what they represent collectively in expressing a concept.” Data reduction 
results because many variables are grouped into a much smaller number of factors, each of which 
essentially represents a single variable (as a combination of several variables) with a unique 
'collective' representation. A correlation matrix with an underlying structure is expected to have 
many instances of pairs of variables being highly correlated. 
                                                 
14 Subjective in this context is not referring to methodology in the sense that quantitative research methods are often 
assumed to be more ‘objective’ than qualitative research methods (a debatable, though prevalent, assumption). 
Instead, subjective is referring to ontological and, consequently, epistemological assumptions. The differences 
between such assumptions related to Q-methodology and R-methodology are discussed below, though the practical 
implications of such differences for the analysis discussed herein are discussed without certainty.   
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6.2.1. Q-methodology: data and deriving the correlation matrix 
In order to clearly articulate what Q-methodology provides (and does not provide) as a 
social science methodology, it is likely easiest to start with how data are collected and typically 
prepared for analysis. Q-methodology treats people as variables, who sort, or order, a sample of 
statements using a specific data collection technique called a Q-sort (Stephenson, 1954b), which 
is illustrated in Figure 6.1. When completing a Q-sort, each participant rank orders some number 
of statements along a forced quasi-normal distribution. In the case of Figure 6.1, each participant 
would have to rank two statements (or whatever is being ranked – for instance, ecosystem 
services, pictures of landscapes, opinions about politics) in the ‘+4’ column, three statements in 
the ‘+3’ column, etc. 
Figure 6.1. An example of the data collection instrument in Q-methodology 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please rank the statements on the cards from most important to most unimportant from your 
perspective.  Each statement represents an ecosystem service derived from the Gila National 
Forest.   
 
 
  -4     -3        -2        -1    0     +1      +2        +3  +4 
Less  
important 
More 
Important 
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The raw data yielded from completion of this exercise is shown below in Table 6.1. The 
variables in the columns represent people’s Q-sorts (i.e., “W”), and the observations in the rows 
represent the statements being ranked (i.e., “N” statements being ranked). Due to the quasi-
normal distribution of the Q-sort (and assuming each respondent completes the Q-sort as 
instructed), each of the variables (i.e., Q-sorts) has equal means and standard deviations. This 
means that the data do not need to be standardized prior to analysis for the purposes of 
comparing the Q-sorts of different individuals. Using the data in Table 6.1, a correlation matrix 
between all Q-sorts is derived.  
 
 
Table 6.1. Raw data matrix in Q-methodology 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.2, which is a slightly modified version of Table 6.1 shows how the Q-sorts are 
correlated. The explanation of how the correlation coefficient is derived is drawn from Brown 
(1980) and Armatas (2013).  The equation used for computation of the correlation coefficient in 
Q-methodology is as follows:  
 A B … W 
1 -4 +2 … -3 
2 +1 +3 … -2 
… … … … … 
N 0 4 … 1 
Persons (Q sorts) 
Statements 
(items) 
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  𝑟𝑎,𝑏 =  1 −  
∑ 𝑑2𝑁𝑛=1
2𝑁𝑠2
      (1) 
where d is equal to the difference between scores for each statement (e.g., d1,2
2), N is the number 
of statements being ranked, and s2 is equal to the variance for the forced distribution. The 
variance for the forced distribution is represented by the following formula (Brown, 1980:264): 
 𝑠2 =  
∑ 𝑓𝑥2
𝑁
      (2) 
where x2 is equal to the square of the raw score on the Q-sort (-4, -3,…, 3, 4 in our example in 
Figure 1) and f is the frequency at which it occurs on the Q-sort (i.e. the number of statements 
that can be given that score). 
 
Table 6.2. Calculating the correlation between Q-sorts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Using Table 6.2 as an example, Q-sort A scored statement 1 as -4, and Q-sort B scored 
statement 1 as +2 (both of these scores would be found by looking for the column placement of 
statement 1 by each Q-sorter), which yields a difference of 6.  The difference would then be 
 A B … W d1,2
2 
1 -4 +2 … -3 36 
2 +1 +3 … -2 4 
… … … … … … 
N 0 4 … 1 16 

d
n1
N
 2 
250 
Persons (Q sorts) 
Statements 
(items) 
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squared (62 = 36), and summed for all statements in the Q-set for Q-sort A and Qsort B.  To 
continue the example, let us assume that the sum of the squared differences of the statements 
between Q-sort A and B is 250.  The final aspect of the correlation coefficient equation that 
needs calculating is the denominator, which is as follows:  
  

2Ns2  2N( fx2 /N )        (3) 
To continue the calculation using the Q-sort in Figure 1, the scores of -4, -3, -2, -1, 0, +1, +2, +3, 
and +4 have frequencies of 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, respectively.  Therefore, fx2 for the far left 
column of the Q-board is expressed by:  (2)(-42) = 32, and the column with a score of -3 is 
expressed by:  (3)(-32) = 27, and so on and so forth.  After several calculations and remembering 
that N equals the total number of statements (which can also be computed by totaling the 
frequencies), the variance of the forced distribution in this example is as follows:  
s2 = ∑ fx2/N = 160/34 = 4.71 
The denominator for the correlation coefficient equation can now be calculated:  
  2Ns2 = 2(34)(4.71) = 320.28 
Calculating the correlation coefficient between Q-sort A and Q-sort B in this example is now 
possible:  
𝑟𝑎,𝑏 = 1 − 
∑ 𝑑2𝑁𝑛=1
2𝑁𝑠2
= 1 −  
250
320.28
= 1 −  .78 =  .22 
By calculating the correlation coefficients between all Q-sorts, one is able to create a correlation 
matrix (W by W, where W is number of Q-sorts). Table 6.3 provides an example of what a 
correlation matrix with four Q-sorts looks like. For the Gila National Forest study, there were 
122 participants, which resulted in a 122 by 122 correlation matrix, but four of those pairwise 
209 
 
correlations are included in Table 6.3. The particular pairwise correlations selected were 
strategic, as will become evident in the discussion below differentiating cluster analysis and Q-
type factor analysis (not to be confused with Q-methodology). A high positive correlation means 
that two Q-sorts were similar, or in other words, two people placed the cards onto the Q-board 
(Figure 6.1) in a similar way.  
 
Table 6.3. Correlations between Q-sorts (variables in Q-methodology) 
 Q-sort 2  Q-sort 24  Q-sort 31 Q-sort 92 
Q-sort 2 1.000 -0.51 0.78 -0.49 
Q-sort 24 -0.51 1.000 -0.70 0.90 
Q-sort 31 0.78 -0.70 1.000 -0.57 
Q-sort 92 -0.49 0.90 -0.57 1.000 
 
 In terms of technical details, Q-methodology is distinguished from ‘R-methodology’ by 
its Q-sort data collection technique and the derivation of a correlation matrix that includes the 
relationship between peoples Q-sorts. In other words, from the correlation matrix through final 
factor solution, the mechanics are mostly the same. To be clear, there are some differences, but 
these differences are mostly the result of paradigmatic differences (e.g., issues of 
representativeness, fundamental ontological beliefs). For example, Q-methodology studies do not 
apply ‘Cronbach’s Alpha’, because such a reliability test is not applicable to Q-methodology. 
This point is elaborated on below, but first it is necessary to briefly introduce the basics of ‘R-
methodology’.  
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6.2.2. R-methodology: data and deriving the correlation matrix 
R-methodology was a generic label applied by William Stephenson based on the well-
known correlation statistic of Karl Pearson (i.e., ‘Pearson’s r’) for all methods “which employ 
tests or traits as variables and operate using a sample of persons” (Watts & Stenner, 2012:10). 
An R-methodology study starts with data oriented as shown in Table 6.4 , where the columns in 
the data matrix are test/trait variables that could represent almost anything (e.g., height, weight, 
IQ score, introvert/extrovert test score, attitudes, behavioral observations, socio-demographic 
variables, etc.) and the rows represent people and their corresponding measurements for each 
test. 
 
Table 6.4. Initial data matrix for R-methodology analysis 
Tests, traits (e.g., attitudes, socio-demographic characteristics) 
Persons 1 2 3 m 
A ax1 ax2 ax3 axm 
B bx1 bx2 bx3 bxm 
C cx1 cx2 cx3 cxm 
D dx1 dx2 dx3 dxm 
N nx1 nx2 nx3 nxm 
Source: Adapted from Watts and Stenner (2012) 
 
Often, the variables are measured differently or on different scales, which does not allow direct 
and meaningful comparison. For example, Table 6.5 provides a hypothetical table of data that 
may be of focus in an R-methodology study. Directly comparing height and weight, for example, 
does not make much sense (e.g., consider the question: “is 72 inches bigger than 240 pounds?”).  
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Table 6.5. Data from a hypothetical R-methodology study 
Variables 
Persons Height (inches)  Weight (pounds)  Wing span 
(inches) 
IQ (numeric 
score) 
A 72 240 74 80 
B 80 220 80 115 
C 60 150 57 78 
D 53 110 56 140 
E 61 185 66 98 
 
In order to better compare these variables, it is common to standardize the measurements 
to yield ‘z-scores’, where the mean of each variable is zero and the standard deviation is one. 
Table 6.6 provides z-scores for the data in Table 6.5. The z-scores highlight how a particular 
score for a person compares to the entire sample with regard to each variable individually. For 
example, a z-score of 0.635 for height, for person A, represents that that particular person is 
0.635 standard deviations above the mean (average) height of the sample. It is important to note 
that standardization does not change the shape of the distribution (DeVeaux et al., 2012), 
therefore variables assumed to be normally distributed prior to standardization are assumed to be 
normal after standardization. Generally, normalcy is assumed for multivariate statistical 
methods, along with other assumptions such as homoscedasticity and linearity; while these 
assumptions are also generally assumed for factor analysis, they are perhaps only important in 
terms of their effect on reducing correlations between variables (Hair et al., 2010). In other 
words, as an interdependence technique, which is not trying to assert an 
independence/dependence relationship, factor analysis is more concerned with identifying 
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interrelated variables; thus, factor analysis is in many ways “more affected by not meeting its 
underlying conceptual assumptions than by the statistical assumptions” (Hair et al., 2010:104).  
  
Table 6.6. Standardized measurements, or z-scores of hypothetical data 
Variables 
Persons Height  Weight  Wing span IQ 
A 0.635 1.124 0.706 -0.856 
B 1.382 0.743 1.279 0.494 
C -0.486 -0.591 -0.916 -0.933 
D -1.139 -1.353 -1.012 1.458 
E -0.392 0.076 -0.057 -0.162 
 
These standardized scores can then be used to directly compare each of the variables. For 
the purposes of factor analysis, variables need not be standardized, as a correlation matrix where 
a ‘Pearson’s r’ is created for each pairwise combination of variables is possible without 
standardization. That is, there is nothing inherently mathematically wrong with completing factor 
analysis on variables that are not standardized, but the standardization is common as it ensures 
that variances are equal (Jolliffe & Cadima, 2016). The ‘Pearson’s r’, also known as the product-
moment correlation coefficient, is the “mean of the products of the pairs” of standardized 
variables (Stephenson, 1954b:53), as represented by the following equation15: 
  
𝑟𝑎𝑏 = (∑ (𝑠𝑎𝑠𝑏)
𝑛
1 ) ÷ (𝑛 − 1)     (4) 
                                                 
15 It may be noticed that equation (4) is different from equation (1), even though both are stated as equations for 
measuring correlation of two variables. While different representations, it should be noted that they are equivalent, 
as shown by Brown (1980:272-275). 
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Where r is the correlation coefficient, a and b are variables, s is the standardized score, and n16 is 
the number of observations (people) in the data set. Using Table 6.5, the correlation between 
height and weight is calculated as follows: 
𝑟(ℎ𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡)(𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡)
= ((0.635 𝑥 1.124) + (1.382 𝑥 0.734) + (−0.486 𝑥 − 0.591)
+ (−1.139 𝑥 − 1.353) + (−0.392 𝑥 0.076)) ÷ (5 − 1) 
          𝑟(ℎ𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡)(𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡)=0.88 
 
If this is done for all combinations of variables, a correlation matrix results, as shown in Table 
6.7. The correlation matrix is the subject of factor analysis, and while this particular matrix is not 
suitable for analysis due to the small sample size (i.e., n=5), it is important to clearly show the 
starting point for factor analysis in the case of R-methodology studies differs from that in Q-
methodology.   
 
Table 6.7. Correlations between tests or traits (variables in R-methodology) 
 Height  Weight  Wing span IQ 
Height  1.000 0.8846 0.9588 -0.2514 
Weight 0.8846 1.000 0.9122 -0.5072 
Wing span 0.9588 0.9122 1.000 -0.1459 
IQ -0.2514 -0.5072 -0.1459 1.000 
 
                                                 
16 It is worth highlighting that “n” is the number of observations in this equation, and “N” is the number of 
statements in equation (4). This highlights the reversing of people and items in the two approaches.  
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With regard to Q-methodology, then, ‘factoring’ people instead of tests/traits is done with a 
specific, “different form of data” (i.e., Q-sorts), which allows one to “ascertain the degree of 
agreement, or disagreement, between the entire set of item rankings produced by any two 
persons” (Watts & Stenner, 2012:18). This highlights a difference between Q-methodology and 
R-methodology, where the former implements a data collection instrument where all the items 
are interrelated to yield a single combination and the former does not (i.e., items are, in practice, 
independent). Furthermore, Q-methodology find “groups of persons [i.e., factors] who have rank 
ordered the heterogeneous stimulus items in a very similar fashion” (Watts & Stenner, 2012:18), 
whereas R-methodology initially starts by finding what test/traits are correlated and grouped. 
That is, the simple correlations between people, as shown in Table 6.3, are the starting point for 
Q-methodology, whereas R-methodology starts with a correlation matrix similar to Table 6.7. 
The implications of these differences between Q-methodology and R-methodology are 
elaborated on, with the help of an example, below; however, it is worth clarifying this area of the 
literature that is potentially confusing.  
 
6.2.3. Confusing Q-methodology and ‘Q-type’ factor analysis 
 Hair et al. (2010) identified two types of exploratory factor analysis: R-type and Q-type, 
where the former uses the correlation of variables as input for analysis, and the latter is based on 
the correlation of individual respondents. Accordingly, Q-type factor analysis identifies “groups 
or clusters of individuals that demonstrate a similar pattern on the variables included in the 
analysis”, which differs from cluster analysis in that it is “based on the intercorrelations between 
the respondents, whereas cluster analysis forms groupings based on a distance-based similarity 
measure between the respondents’ scores on the variables being analyzed” (Hair et al., 
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2010:101). In other words, cluster analysis of a group of respondents on variables would be less 
concerned with patterns across variables (e.g., two people show a decrease in value when 
moving from variable one to variable two) and more concerned with similarities across variables 
in terms of value (e.g., two people have similar values for two variables).  
To demonstrate this difference, Figure 6.2 is provided, and the authors note that cluster 
analysis would group respondents with A and B as one pair, and C and D as another pair, based 
on their proximity. While Q-type factor analysis would group A and C as one pair, and B and D 
as another pair, based upon the similar changes in direction of value across variables.  
 
Figure 6.2. Comparisons of score profiles for Q-type factor analysis and cluster analysis 
 
Source: Adapted from Hair et al. (2010) 
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In this context, Q-type factor analysis is referring to the correlations of people instead of 
variables, but it is assumed that matrix of data at issue for both ‘Q-type’ and ‘R-type’ factor 
analysis is the same. That is, the data being analyzed with ‘Q-type’ factor analysis is of the type 
shown in Table 6.5, where the variables (i.e., tests/traits) are generally assumed to be 
independent. To be clear, some level of ‘multicollinearity’ is desirable in factor analysis, as the 
general purpose is to find linear combinations of variables (so there is an underlying assumption 
that the variables are correlated) (Hair et al., 2010); however, the type of data discussed by Hair 
et al. (2010) is not Q-sort data, whereby the forced distribution introduces a level of dependence 
among the items being sorted. For example, based upon the assumption that respondents follow 
the forced distribution, if we are provided with the knowledge of how a respondent sorted 29 of 
the 30 ecosystem services onto Figure 6.1, then we know with certainty what the value of the 
final ecosystem service is. Such certainty is not built into the data being collected in Table 6.5.  
To demonstrate the influence of the forced distribution, Figure 6.3 illustrates the values 
for the 30 items sorted in the Gila National Forest study for four respondents. These four Q-sorts 
are those included in Table 6.3 above, which showed both highly positive and negative 
correlations. Those positive pairwise correlations (e.g., QSORT 2 and QSORT 31) demonstrate 
both a similarity in distance and pattern. In other words, the values of the different items being 
sorted are not only close in value, but in most cases they also demonstrate similar changes in 
value across the different items. This is different from Figure 6.2, which highlights the influence 
of the forced Q-sort.   
William Stephenson, as the creator of Q-methodology, was quite clear that the matrix of 
data applied within Q-methodology (collected with the Q-sort) was independent of that used in 
R-methodology (as shown in Table 6.5; however, critics of Stephenson such as Cyril Burt were 
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adamant about only one matrix being at issue (Stephenson, 1954b). The debate regarding the 
ability of simply inverting the data in Table 6.4, for instance, and then factoring people instead of 
tests/traits culminated in a joint paper between Cyril Burt and William Stephenson entitled, 
“alternative views on correlations between persons” (Burt & Stephenson, 1939). In this paper, 
the scholars laid out there points of agreement and disagreement and, in the end, ‘agreed to 
disagree’.  
These divergent perspectives on how to group people led to Q-methodology on the one 
hand, and Q-type factor analysis on the other. According to Newman and Ramlo (2010:507), “Q-
methodology” is different from “Q-factor analysis”, where the former constitutes a complete 
methodology with a “set of procedures, theory, and philosophy that focuses on subjectivity.” The 
latter, as advocated by Burt and others, was grouping people by, in essence, simply inverting a 
standard matrix of data so that people were correlated instead of variables. This is the approach 
to Q-type factor analysis that Hair et al. (2010) is referring to above. The association of Q-type 
factor analysis and cluster analysis is unsurprising, as the latter is typically how people are 
grouped with regard to the type of data shown in Table 6.5. Additionally, Figure 6.3 
demonstrates that highly correlated Q-sorts are also in close proximity (in the cluster analysis 
sense).  
Several papers have focused on comparing ‘Q-type’ factor analysis and cluster analysis, 
and in such comparisons (e.g., Akaah, 1988; Hagerty, 1985; Morf et al., 1976) the type of data 
being analyzed with the different techniques is similar to that in Table 6.5. Q-type of factor 
analysis is not well liked, as it is both computationally difficult (Hair et al., 2010) and is 
considered by some as statistically dubious (Watts & Stenner, 2012).  
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Figure 6.3. Scatterplot of item placement of four respondents from a Q-methodology study 
 
 
 
Y-axis: 
Raw scores 
from forced 
Q-sort 
X-axis: 
Items 
being 
sorted 
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Also, in the same way that traditional factor analysis only groups variables into factors, and thus 
requires cluster analysis to understand how different people align with the different factors; Q-
type factor analysis would only group people, leaving little clear understanding of what variables 
are underlying the groupings of people.   
In their book about latent variable models (e.g., factor analysis, latent class models), 
Bartholomew et al. (2011:244) use the term ‘Q-methodology’, even though they mostly describe 
a Q-type factor analysis. Interestingly, they also noted that Q-methodology “became detached 
from both psychology and statistics and exists as a separate entity with its own journal, 
conferences and so on…it is, perhaps, appropriate to observe that although the original link with 
factor analysis has become tenuous, if not tendentious, the existence of this field of study bears 
testimony to fertile ground which factor analysis has provided for the generation of new methods 
of statistical analysis.” While I cannot attest to the detachment from psychology and statistics, 
the latter part of the statement moves away from the confusion between Q-type factor analysis of 
the data shown in Table 6.5 to Q-methodology as a distinct and comprehensive methodology. 
 
6.3. Moving beyond the correlation matrix: Comparing factor analysis procedures of Q-
methodology and R-methodology 
As noted above, the basic steps and mechanics of analyzing the different correlation 
matrices in Q-methodology and R-methodology are similar. However, there are several facets, 
such as how (or if) particular factor analytic steps are completed, which vary between the two. 
These variations are due to the normative assumptions and general methodological beliefs 
underpinning Q-methodology and R-methodology. As Stenner (2008:1, emphasis original) 
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explained in the introduction to a special issue on theoretical perspectives related to Q-
methodology (in an article entitled Between method and ology): “it is the technical aspects of 
method that have been emphasized to the relative neglect of the philosophical aspects of ology.”  
In order to facilitate this discussion of general factor analytic procedures, results from the 
analysis of the Gila National Forest data is presented to highlight the difference between Q-
methodology and R-methodology in terms of factor analytic procedures. Therefore, the study is 
briefly introduced. The data used for analysis and discussion in this chapter is from an effort to 
support the Gila National Forest in their forest plan revision process (Armatas et al., 2017b). 
Using a Q-sort (Figure 6.1), data was collected from 122 people during the week of June 12th, 
2017. Over the course of five public meetings around the Gila National Forest, the participants 
were asked to prioritize the 30 ecosystem services listed in Table 6.8.  
Prior to commencing, there is a need to highlight the obvious limitation of analyzing this 
data within the context of R-methodology, which is that it is collected within the context of Q-
methodology. Therefore, the sample is purposeful, not random, which would prevent any 
assertions of generalizability to the population. Another limitation of analyzing Q-sort data 
through an R-methodology lens is that the ranking of the items, due to the forced Q-sort, are 
interrelated. When using scales to measure psychological constructs, each item is independent in 
the sense that one could select the same answer to every question. However, for illustrative 
purposes, I will proceed with an R-methodology analysis of the Gila data as if these limitations 
did not exist; that is, let us assume that the results below reflect those gathered from a random 
sample of the population using a survey instrument whereby each of the ecosystem services in 
Table 6.7 were individual questions in Likert-scale format. 
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Table 6.8. List of ecosystem services that participants prioritized  
Provisioning services (extractive resources and uses) 
1. Forest materials for personal use (for example – firewood, Christmas trees, gems, food, 
traditional and medicinal plants) 
2. Timber production  
3. Oil and natural gas and minerals (for example – gold, copper, gravel)  
4. Woody biomass for energy (for example - wood pellets, chip production)  
5. Livestock grazing 
6. Water for household and municipal use 
7. Irrigation for agriculture  
Cultural Services (recreation, historical, scientific, community and cultural, and personal-
enrichment benefits) 
Recreation and leisure related cultural benefits 
8. Outfitting and guiding (for example – hunting and fishing) 
9. Hunting and fishing (non-outfitted)  
10. Non-motorized recreation (for example - hiking, biking, horses, floating, bird 
watching) 
11. Motorized recreation (for example – Off-highway vehicles (OHVs), dirt bikes) 
12. Driving for pleasure 
13. Developed camping (areas with toilets, tent sites, and water) 
14. Dispersed camping (areas without any services) 
Other cultural benefits 
15. Solitude, quiet, and a clear night sky 
16. Native American cultural benefits (for example – ceremonial sites and materials) 
17. Traditional agricultural lifestyle (for example – connection to ranching, and use of 
irrigation ditches (Acequias)) 
18. Education and interpretation of the area and ecosystems. 
19. Research and science (for example - ecology, forestry, and archeology) 
20. Places where human influence is substantially unnoticeable. 
21. Cultural and archeological sites 
22. Public ownership and access to public land 
23. Scenic beauty, aesthetics, and inspiration 
Regulating Services (environmental benefits) 
24. Flood and erosion control 
25. Carbon absorption 
26. Biodiversity and abundance of plants and animals (including threatened and 
endangered species) 
27. Wildlife habitat and connectivity 
28. Water quality 
29. Air quality 
30. Water quantity (water in rivers and streams) 
*Note: Italicized categories of ecosystem services, and numbers associated with ecosystem 
services were not given to participants. In other words, each card had an ecosystem service only 
(e.g. “Livestock grazing”, “Outfitting and guiding (for example – hunting and fishing)”) 
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6.3.1. Factor Analysis and Principal Components Analysis 
Up to this point, the term ‘factor analysis’ has been used generally; however, it is also a 
specific analytic method that is usually differentiated from ‘principal component analysis’. Both 
methods are widely used and, according to Hair et al. (2010), the purpose of research is often the 
driving factor for deciding which is the most appropriate. If prediction is the focus of the 
research, and the ultimate goal is to “summarize most of the original information (variance) in a 
minimum number of factors”, then principal component analysis (PCA) is perhaps most 
appropriate; however, if “identifying underlying factors or dimensions that reflect what the 
variables share in common”, then common factor analysis may be more appropriate (Hair et al., 
2010:107).  
Variance, as the square of the standard deviation, “represents the total amount of 
dispersion of values for a single variable about its mean”, and the distinction between two factor 
analytic methods relates to how the methods incorporate unexplained variance and explained 
variance (Hair et al., 2010:105). PCA considers the total variance, or both the explained and 
unexplained variance. Explained variance, or common variance, is defined by the portion of a 
variable variance which is shared with all other variables. Unexplained variance includes unique 
(or specific) variance, which refers to the variance only associated with a specific variable, and 
error variance is variance that is due to “unreliability in the data-gathering process, measurement 
error, or a random component in the measured phenomenon” (Hair et al., 2010:105). Common 
factor analysis, on the other hand, considers only the common or shared variance (Hair et al., 
2010).  
The way that this is done is within the diagonal of the correlation matrix (i.e., the cell in 
the correlation matrix that represents how variables are correlated with themselves); PCA inserts 
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values of 1.0 (unities) into the diagonal, and factor analysis inserts communalities into the 
diagonal. A variables communality is the “estimate of its shared, or common, variance among 
the variables as represented by the derived factors” (Hair et al., 2010:105). In practice, the two 
different approaches have been shown to yield very similar results, though PCA is perhaps more 
common, which may be due to it seeking a single unique solution (as opposed to the factor 
indeterminacy in common factor analysis). It is worth noting that analysis of both data sets 
relevant to this dissertation (i.e., the Shoshone National Forest data and the Gila National Forest 
data) applied both PCA and common factor analysis. For practical purposes, there was little 
difference in the final factor solutions. For the examples provided below, PCA is used in both the 
R-methodology and Q-methodology approach to data analysis, and even though some insist that 
the resulting dimensions in PCA be called ‘components’ instead of ‘factors’, I will be using the 
general term factors to describe the dimensions extracted from the data.  
 
6.3.2. Assessing the correlation matrix prior to factor analysis 
Since factor analysis is a method focused on the interrelationship between variables, it is 
typical to assess the correlation matrix prior to factor analysis to understand if factor analysis is 
suitable.  
 
R-methodology 
In R-methodology, to assess for suitability, the correlation matrix is inspected to see if 
there are at least some high correlations between variables. To gain this understanding, two 
statistical tests were performed. First, the Bartlett test of sphericity, which tests for the presence 
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of correlations among the variables (Hair et al., 2010) indicated clear statistical significance (p-
value < 0.001); suggesting sufficient correlations to proceed. Additionally, a "Kaiser-Meyer-
Olkin factor adequacy", or KMO test, was run to measure sampling adequacy (MSA). This test 
provides an overall adequacy for proceeding with factor analysis, and it also highlights the 
suitability of proceeding with specific variables. According to Hair et al. (2010), if an MSA 
value falls below 0.50 for a variable, then it should be dropped prior to running factor analysis. 
The KMO test yielded a suitable overall value, and it also highlighted three variables worth 
dropping. From the start, PCA was performed on 27 variables (ecosystem services) with 122 
observations (people assigned importance to ecosystem services). 
 
Q-methodology 
Formal measures of sampling adequacy (e.g., KMO test) are not typically applied to the 
correlation matrix within Q-methodology. If fact, there is little formal assessment of the 
correlation matrix in Q-methodology (Brown, 1980), though one should visually inspect the 
correlation matrix for correlations. As Hair et al. (2010) suggested, it is appropriate to visually 
inspect the correlation matrix to note if there are at least several pairwise correlations above 0.30 
(without this then factor analysis is likely inappropriate). The reason for this discrepancy in 
process between Q-methodology and R-methodology is that the former, in its interest in finding 
whether or not there are similar Q-sorts about some (usually contentious) topic, generally 
assumes that there will be some level of similarity between some Q-sorts. In the case of the Gila 
study, extremely low KMO and Bartlett’s tests would suggest a lack of common variance where 
each Q-sort is a factor of its own (i.e., 122 idiosyncratic viewpoints), which seems unlikely. It is 
generally assumed that the topic of interest (e.g., the importance of ecosystem services) will 
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result in some groupings of similar Q-sorts (presumably because everyone sampled had some 
interest in the ecosystem services). 
For the purpose of this discussion, both the Bartlett test of sphericity and a KMO test 
were run on the correlation matrix for the Q-methodology study (i.e., correlations between Q-
sorts). The sphericity test indicated clear statistical significance (p-value < 0.001), suggesting 
sufficient correlations to proceed. On the other hand, the KMO test indicated a potential 
problem, which is that the matrix is singular. A singular matrix suggests that its determinant is 
zero, or that it contains rows or columns which are proportionally interrelated; two frequent 
causes of this are when the number of variables are greater than the number of cases, and two or 
more variables are highly correlated (ttnphns (user 3277), 2019). The correlation matrix at issue 
has both of these characteristics, with a variable (Q-sort) to observation (ecosystem service) ratio 
of 4:1, and inspection of the correlation matrix does indeed show several highly correlated 
variables, one of which is reflected in Table 6.3 (i.e., 0.90 pairwise correlation). Within the 
context of factor analysis (PCA specifically in this case), a large number of variables relative to 
observations can lead to a large number of significant factor loadings on the initial few factors 
extracted, which may make interpretation of the factors more difficult (Jolliffe & Cadima, 2016). 
Relatedly, highly correlated variables may lead to an overemphasis on the contribution of a 
factor, in terms of variance explained (i.e., size of the eigenvalue—calculated as the sum of the 
squared loadings on a factor) (whuber (user 919), 2013). These interrelated issues, and the 
rationale as to why they are not of major concern to Q-methodology, are discussed in the next 
section.  
In this section, the rationale for not implementing potential fixes to this issue are 
discussed from the Q-methodology perspective. Potential fixes related to this issue of a singular 
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matrix, at least from the R-methodology perspective, is to drop some of the highly correlated 
variables, and/or increase sample size. Indeed, this works with the correlation matrix at issue, but 
it requires a large reduction in variables (which also consequently decreases the Q-sort to 
ecosystem services ratio). By removing the first 110 Q-sorts, a KMO test yields both a suitable 
overall value and suitable single item variables. While dropping variables (and/or adding 
observations) is an option, at least statistically (as demonstrated by the approach described above 
within the context of R-methodology), there are reasons for why one would avoid such actions 
within the context of Q-methodology. For example, if measures of sampling adequacy, such as 
the KMO test, suggest a problematic variable, which is either lowly or very highly correlated 
with other variables, then it may be justifiable to drop this variable. However, in Q-methodology, 
it is not common practice to drop Q-sorts.  A Q-sort that is incomplete, or clearly highlights a 
person who misunderstood the task, could be dropped; but a Q-sort that is complete and 
otherwise acceptable represents a perspective of an individual that was selected to provide their 
opinion. It is as legitimate as any other perspective, and if it is not correlated with any other Q-
sorts then it suggests that it is a unique or idiosyncratic viewpoint. 
As for the potential action of increasing sample size, or the number of ecosystem services 
sorted by respondents in this case, it is both impractical and counter to the methodology. It is 
impractical in the sense that one cannot add ecosystem services to be sorted after data collection 
is complete. Most importantly, it is counter to the process of developing the list of items to be 
sorted in a Q-methodology study. That is, one aims to include a diverse range of items that 
generally represents the subject matter related to the topic of interest. If one can reasonably argue 
that, for instance, 30 ecosystem services represents the broad range of ecosystem services 
derived from the Gila National Forest, then adding addition ecosystem services for the sole 
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purpose of satisfying a KMO test seemed unjustified. Again, the implications of challenging 
factor interpretation and potentially biased eigenvalues are discussed below in the section on 
factor extraction.      
 
6.3.3. Factor extraction 
Factor extraction is usually not ‘spelled out’ in contemporary textbooks, because the 
actual process, if done by hand, is computationally arduous. Statistical software packages (e.g., 
R, STATA) complete the process in seconds. While Armatas (2013:122-129) includes an 
example of by-hand factor extraction, the reader is spared this tedious description. Instead, a 
concise discussion by Hair et al. (2010:108-109, emphasis original) is included, because it nicely 
captures the actual extraction process; while light on technical details, it highlights the 
conceptual workings of the extraction process:  
Both factor analysis methods [(i.e., common factor analysis and principal 
components analysis)] are interested in the best linear combination of variables – 
best in the sense that the particular combination of original variables accounts for 
more of the variance in the data as a whole than any other linear combination of 
variables. Therefore, the first factor may be viewed as the single best summary of 
linear relationships exhibited in the data. The second factor is defined as the 
second-best linear combination of the variables, subject to the constraint that it is 
orthogonal to the first factor. To be orthogonal to the first factor, the second factor 
must be derived from the variance remaining after the first factor has been 
extracted. Thus, the second factor may be defined as the linear combination of 
variables that accounts for the most variance that is still unexplained after the 
effect of the first factor has been removed from the data. The process continues 
extracting factors accounting for smaller and smaller amounts of variance until all 
of the variance is explained. For example, the components method actually 
extracts n factors, where n is the number of variables in the analysis. Thus, if 30 
variables are in the analysis, 30 factors are extracted.  
So, what is gained by factor analysis? Although our example contains 30 factors, 
a few of the first factors can represent a substantial portion of the total variance 
across all the variables. Hopefully, the research can retain or use only a small 
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number of the variables and still adequately represent the entire set of variables. 
Thus, the key question is: How many factors to extract or retain? 
The initial results of factor analysis is an unrotated factor matrix, and the common approaches to 
factor analysis such as PCA will result in orthogonal factors. The extraction process in both Q-
methodology and R-methodology, which in this example used PCA, are identical. The result is 
an unrotated factor matrix, which is generally inspected for the purposes of deciding how many 
factors to retain and rotate.  
 
6.3.4. Retaining and rotating factors – choosing the ‘right’ factor solution 
Ultimately, the factor analytic process in both Q- and R-methodology will reach a point 
where the analyst commits to a particular factor solution for full interpretation. The process of 
choosing the ‘right’ factor solution is an iterative process whereby a final factor solution is 
chosen after weighing both statistical criteria and theoretical/conceptual criteria (i.e., 
considerations about the research problem and theory – Hair et al. (2010) label this as the ‘a 
priori criterion’). In practice, the researcher often considers several different ‘factor solutions’ 
and chooses the solution that is ‘best’ based upon the aforementioned criteria, which will be 
detailed more below. As Hair et al. (2010:109) noted, “an exact quantitative basis” for reaching 
the final factor solution has not been developed. Like a lot of statistical analysis such as 
regression analysis, there is an art to it and there are inevitably judgment calls. 
With regard to choosing how many factors to retain and rotate17, statistical considerations 
often focus on eigenvalues and, interrelatedly, factor loadings of each factor. Eigenvalues are the 
                                                 
17 The process of rotation in factor analysis is critical. It does not change the structure of the data in anyway; it 
changes the how we view the data in a way that better highlights its structure. I do not discuss rotation in any detail, 
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sum of the squared factor loadings for each factor, and they are a measure of how much variance 
in the variables are explained by the factors (Brown, 1980; Watts & Stenner, 2012). A common 
rule of thumb is that eigenvalues over one indicate that a factor should be retained for analysis, 
though this depends on the number of variables. The reason for this is related to the factor 
loadings, because each squared loading contributes to an eigenvalue, and the squared loading 
also represents the amount of variance within a single variable captured by the factor. Therefore, 
the eigenvalue signals the proportion of total variance captured by a factor. If there are over 100 
variables, and variances are equal (with standardization if necessary), then an eigenvalue of one 
will not explain even a percentage point of the study variance. Hair et al. (2010) suggests that 20-
50 variables is when the eigenvalue test may be most useful, as under 20 variables may lead to 
too few factors being extracted, and over 50 may lead to too many being extracted. The 
percentage of variance explained (ratio of eigenvalues and total variance) is another 
consideration, and it refers to the amount of variance a factor solution explains. For the social 
sciences, this criterion is not all that rigid, and it is not uncommon for factor solutions with 50 
percent of variance being retained.  
The scree plot test includes plotting the eigenvalues and choosing the factor solution at 
the ‘elbow’, or where there is a leveling off. This signals the point when each additional factor 
captures roughly the same proportion of remaining variance. With only similar, bite-sized pieces 
of variance left, added effort does not necessarily yield a more parsimonious discussion of the 
data.  Lastly is the significant loadings test, which is more of a guideline really, and it refers to 
how many variables load ‘significantly’ onto a factor. ‘Significance’ is usually considered both 
                                                 
and there are several ways to rotate the factor solutions (e.g., VARIMAX, QUARTIMAX, and by-hand theoretical 
rotation). The analysis herein is performed with VARIMAX. 
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in a statistical and practical sense. Statistical significance often depends on sample size and, for a 
sample of 122 observations (in the case of R-methodology analysis of the Gila data), Hair et al. 
(2010) suggests a statistical cutoff of 0.50, though high loadings are preferable (a loading of +/- 
0.70 indicates 'well defined-structure'). Practical significance is less precise, but loadings under 
0.50 should not necessarily be disregarded all together (Hair et al., 2010). If a variable does not 
make the statistical cutoff, but it makes sense for interpretation, then asserted practical 
significance is an accepted practice.    
With regard to this process of potentially paring down ones options for factor solution 
through statistical considerations, there appears to be little difference between R- and Q-
methodology. That is, these statistical considerations are paired with study objectives, and 
conceptual, theoretical, and philosophical assumptions to make a judgement call on what factor 
solution is ‘right’. The indeterminacy involved with choosing a factor solution may be an issue 
for statisticians, so much so that some question the validity of factor analysis in general (Rencher 
& Christensen, 2012). Nonetheless, this judgement call inevitably involves a significant amount 
of factor interpretation within the context of one’s study.  
 
6.3.5. Interpretation of the rotated factor matrix 
 In both R- and Q-methodology, it is generally the rotated factor matrix that is fully 
analyzed and interpreted. Once a final factor solution is chosen, the analyst will typically spend a 
great deal of time working with the rotated factor matrix. However, the basic meaning of the 
rotated factor matrix does vary significantly between R- and Q-methodology, and it is this 
difference in meaning that can begin to clarify why particular issues that are of concern in R-
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methodology are not necessarily issues in Q-methodology (e.g., highly correlated, and 
potentially redundant variables). 
 
R-methodology 
 In R-methodology, the factor matrix will show factor loadings of the items relative to 
each factor. Table 6.9 shows the rotated factor matrix for a six-factor solution using the Gila data 
(full details as to why this particular solution was chosen is discussed below), where each 
ecosystem service has a loading on the six different factors. The factor loadings are correlations 
between each variable and each factor (Hair et al., 2010), and the squared factor loadings 
represent the percentage of variance in the original variable that is explained by a factor. For 
example, a loading of 0.80 on a factor means that 64% of the variance of a particular variable is 
explained by that particular factor. When several variables load ‘significantly’ onto this same 
factor, then this combination of variables can be interpreted as some latent construct. As 
mentioned above, using the general guideline of Hair et al. (2010) for statistical significance as it 
relates to sample size suggests, a factor loading of at least 0.50 (absolute value) is adopted for the 
Gila data.  
 If the first factor is used as an example, nine (bolded) variables have loadings above 0.59 
(absolute value). As a group, these variables can be interpreted as some underlying construct; 
this factor is dubbed ‘multiple use versus wilderness’, as there is an indication that positive 
responses (on a scale of importance) to ecosystem services such as ‘timber production’ are 
accompanied with negative responses to ecosystem services such as ‘places where human 
influence are substantially unnoticeable’. Additional interpretation of this factor is discussed 
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below, but the point to be made here is that the factor matrix itself provides substantive 
information to the analyst, which can be supported or questioned by existing theory.  
 
Table 6.9. Factor loadings for a six factor solution in R-methodology 
Ecosystem Services 
Factors 
     1           2            3           4           5           6    
timber production -0.62 -0.34 -0.24 -0.12  0.32 -0.07  
Oil, gas, minerals -0.63 -0.11 -0.33 -0.27  0.16 -0.09  
woody biomass energy -0.28 -0.11  0.22  0.01  0.74 -0.20  
livestock grazing -0.62 -0.35 -0.40 -0.10  0.35 -0.08  
irrigation for ag -0.64  0.03 -0.37 -0.01  0.33  0.08  
outfitting and guiding -0.19 -0.44 -0.10 -0.01  0.46 -0.31  
Hunt/fish (no outfit) -0.31 -0.77 -0.07  0.01 -0.21 -0.23  
non-motorized rec.  0.59  0.04 -0.08  0.41 -0.13 -0.13  
motorized rec. -0.17 -0.23 -0.15 -0.67  0.01 -0.32  
driving for pleasure  0.08 -0.04 -0.02 -0.84  0.01 -0.10  
Solitude, clear sky  0.78  0.13  0.04 -0.31  0.03  0.22  
Native cultural  0.14  0.20  0.78  0.13 -0.01  0.18  
traditional ag lifestyle -0.59 -0.22 -0.43 -0.06  0.46  0.01  
education and interp.  0.04  0.63  0.30  0.17 -0.22 -0.08  
research and science  0.06  0.73  0.22  0.15 -0.21 -0.02  
Places human influence unnotice   0.81  0.07  0.14  0.17 -0.14  0.11  
Cultural/archeological  0.15  0.37  0.69 -0.02  0.08 -0.01  
carbon absorption  0.35  0.48  0.15  0.49 -0.17  0.01  
Biodiversity/abundance  0.45  0.36  0.31  0.40 -0.36  0.21  
Habitat/connectivity  0.42  0.02  0.37  0.27 -0.52  0.04  
water quality  0.07 -0.10  0.20  0.14 -0.08  0.84  
air quality  0.15  0.32 -0.13  0.23 -0.25  0.60  
beauty and inspiration  0.79  0.19 -0.08 -0.04 -0.07  0.12  
Note: bolded factor loadings are greater than absolute value of 0.5 
 Returning to the concerns above related to a singular correlation matrix, it becomes clear 
why too many significant loadings on a factor (in the event of a high number of variables) could 
be problematic. If R-methodology analysis included 100 or more variables, and a large number 
of them were found to load onto a single factor, it may be challenging to interpret the meaning of 
such a latent construct, particularly if some items are very similar. For instance, if a survey asked 
people to respond to separate items related to ‘natural gas extraction’, ‘oil extraction’ and 
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‘mineral extraction’, and all three loaded onto a factor with many other items, then interpretation 
of the different extractive ecosystem services might be challenging. If these three items were also 
highly correlated in the correlation matrix, then there could be reason to drop one (or more) in 
order to yield a more parsimonious construct. This issue of redundancy within psychometric 
scale development is important, as discussed by DeVellis (2003). While an abundance of high 
factor loadings (and a potential redundancy in variables) is potentially challenging for 
interpretation and the final development of parsimonious constructs in R-methodology, the 
interpretation of the rotated factor matrix in Q-methodology is different. Consequently, a 
redundancy in variables is not a major concern.  
 
Q-methodology 
Q-methodology, as it treats peoples’ Q-sorts as variables (and the sorted statements as 
observations – e.g., ecosystem services), results in factor matrices that relate Q-sorts to 
individual factors. Table 6.10 is a portion of the rotated factor matrix for the Gila data (to save 
space, only 20 rows are included in the Table, though 122 Q-sorts were analyzed as variables). 
The basic interpretation of the factor loadings in Table 6.10 is the amount of variance in each 
individual Q-sort explained by a given factor. For instance, a loading of 0.80 means that 64% of 
variance in an individual Q-sort is explained by the factor. Using the cutoff of 0.50 for statistical 
significant (established above using the recommendation of Hair et al. (2010)), Table 6.10 shows 
those significantly loading Q-sorts, along with a total number of significantly loading Q-sorts 
across all 122 variables in the final row.  
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The total number of significantly loading Q-sorts in this final row implies 12 Q-sorts that 
are not captured, which necessitates a brief discussion. These Q-sorts either do not load onto any 
factor significantly, or they are ‘cross-loading’ in that they load onto more than one factor. Q-
sorts that do not load onto any factors are those whose variance is not significantly captured by 
any of the factors, and these represent unique, or idiosyncratic viewpoints. That is, these Q-sorts 
are not very similar to any of the other Q-sorts. For instance, all of the factor loadings for Q-sort 
18 are below 0.20, and inspection of the correlation matrix (not included in this dissertation) 
shows low correlations with all other Q-sorts as well. While this could be justification for 
dropping the Q-sort from analysis, this is generally avoided in Q-methodology (as discussed 
above). Variables that indicate significance on more than one factor represent Q-sorts that are 
partially explained by more than one factor (for practical purposes, Q-sort 19 constitutes such a 
cross-loader).  
As noted above, these factors will be more fully interpreted through R- and Q-
methodology lenses below, but a critical contrast between the two approaches is worth 
discussing, which is that Table 6.10 does not provide any substantive information other than 
which Q-sorts were completed in a similar fashion. For instance, with regard to factor 1, it can be 
interpreted that the four bolded positively loading Q-sorts were similar, and that the two 
negatively loading Q-sorts were similar. Together, the six are also similar, in a mirror-image sort 
of way. However, without either going back to the original Q-sorts or calculating factor scores 
(as discussed below), there is little to be said about the nature of these factors with regard to the 
ecosystem services. Of course, this is similar to R-methodology in the sense that the rotated 
factor matrix only highlights the existing constructs, and it is the calculation of factor scores that 
indicates how different respondents align (or do not align) with particular factors.  
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Table 6.10. Factor loadings between 20 Q-sorts and four factors (Gila study) 
QSORT    Factor 1           Factor 2           Factor 3           Factor 4 
1  0.2457    0.5928    0.2356    0.0953 
2 -0.6352    0.3981    0.4584   -0.2619 
3 -0.5398    0.6844    0.0242    0.1305 
4  0.2061    0.4706    0.2008    0.2992 
5 -0.1828    0.4000    0.0633    0.0616 
6  0.0157    0.4572   -0.2391    0.1269 
7 -0.4433    0.3075    0.7045   -0.1018 
8  0.0040    0.6151   -0.0457   -0.0342 
9  0.4861    0.1206    0.4740    0.3890 
10  0.4349   -0.0481    0.6727   -0.0305 
11  0.2012    0.1641    0.6096    0.2720 
12  0.5044    0.0951    0.5832    0.2322 
13  0.6454    0.0254    0.1361    0.4166 
14 -0.0653    0.4189    0.1487   -0.1006 
15 -0.2654    0.2429    0.5718   -0.2353 
16  0.4244   -0.0005    0.5064   -0.3530 
17  0.7621   -0.2559    0.3611   -0.1558 
18 -0.1819    0.1725    0.1761    0.1639 
19  0.4656    0.1282    0.4816    0.0504 
20  0.7985    0.0390   -0.1743   -0.0238 
Total statistically significant 
Q-sorts 
        75                   16                    13                     6 
 Note: bolded factor loadings are above 0.50 in absolute value 
 Note: statistically significant Q-sorts are the total number above an absolute value of 0.50 
 
A fundamental difference remains, though, which is that the underlying assumptions and 
process in Q-methodology (namely the purposeful, relatively small sample of Q-sorts) leads to a 
fairly specific (and somewhat empty) interpretation of Table 6.10. People are not being classified 
in the cluster analysis sense, whereby one could assert, for instance, an association between 
gender and a particular factor. Q-sorts are being grouped based upon their similarity, but the fact 
that 75 people (Q-sorts) load significantly onto factor one does not suggest in any way the 
prevalence of that factor within the population. To be sure, the large number of Q-sorts loading 
onto factor one suggests that, within the sample, the greatest number of similar Q-sorts are 
represented by factor one. However, to understand what these similar Q-sorts looked like, one 
needs to calculate factor scores.  
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Returning to the concern of a singular correlation matrix and too many highly loading 
variables, it seems interpretation of the factor matrix is not confused by an additional highly 
correlated Q-sort, as the factor matrix itself is not interpreted in great detail. As discussed below, 
the ‘factor arrays’, as developed from the calculated factor scores, is that which is interpreted. 
And, while the factor scores are calculated from highly loading Q-sorts, the calculation is an 
averaging of similar Q-sorts; consequently, redundancy appears to have minimal practical effect. 
This point is further discussed and clarified in the next section on factor scores.  
 
6.3.6. Estimating factor scores 
Factor scores are estimated values of how observations (e.g., individuals in R-
methodology survey research) rank or place on the factors (DiStefano et al., 2009). For instance, 
a high factor score on a factor for an individual suggests that, for the positively loading items on 
that factor, the individual generally answered highly to those questions. These scores can be used 
for a variety of subsequent analyses; “they can be correlated with measures of different 
constructs to help clarify the nature of the factors or they can be entered as predictor variables in 
multiple regression analyses or as dependent variables in analyses of variance” (Grice, 
2001:430). How these scores are actually computed is not straightforward, nor is there consensus 
on which method to use for computation (DiStefano et al., 2009; Grice, 2001). DiStefano et al. 
(2009) categorized several different methods for calculating factor scores into unrefined and 
refined methods, where the former generally refer to simple summation methods (e.g., sum the 
scores for each individual on each item related to a factor) and the latter refers to more complex 
methods where individual factor loadings on all variables are used to create factor scores that are 
linear combinations of the observed variables. This section will very briefly discussed the 
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calculation of factor scores in R-methodology and Q-methodology. The mechanics of the 
calculations are not discussed within the context of R-methodology for several reasons, including 
the variety of available methods, the complexity of the refined methods being beyond the scope 
of this discussion, and the primary (and pragmatist) focus on communicating the conceptual 
underpinnings more broadly. On the other hand, calculation of factor scores in Q-methodology is 
discussed as the vast majority of Q-studies appear to use the same method, which is a fairly 
simple ‘unrefined’ approach.   
   
R-methodology 
In R-methodology, there are a variety of ways to calculate factor scores for individuals. 
Hair et al. (2010) discussed using a surrogate variable to represent an entire (e.g., the item most 
strongly loading onto the factor), creating a summated scale (similar to the unrefined methods 
discussed by DiStefano et al. (2009)), or calculating factor scores using a more refined method. 
Generally, given that they often maintain orthogonality and can claim to be closer to the ‘true’18 
factor scores (DiStefano et al., 2009; Hair et al., 2010), it seems that factor scores in R-
methodology are commonly calculated using refined methods, which often yield standardized 
scores. For instance, Table 6.11 shows the factor scores for 10 of the 122 observations 
(individuals) of the Gila data analysis with R-methodology. The statistical package R was used, 
                                                 
18 When discussing factor scores in practice, it is typically implied that such scores of estimates. R-methodology has 
positivistic leanings and, consequently, it is often assumed that all individuals are, in reality, aligned with 
psychological constructs (e.g., we are all somewhere along the extroversion/introversion spectrum). The ‘true’ factor 
score represents this position, but it is generally accepted that this exact position is not knowable; but refined 
methods are meant to get us closer to that knowledge.  
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and the calculation of factor scores was done within the psych package, which uses a regression 
algorithm as its default (Revelle, 2018). 
 
Table 6.11. Example of factor scores estimated in R-methodology    
Individuals 
Factors 
        1               2               3               4              5               6 
1  0.688 -1.160 -0.622  0.529  1.409 -0.310 
2 -2.276  0.708 -1.014  0.225  1.351 -0.465 
3 -0.042 -0.931 -1.259 -0.966  2.120 -1.402 
4  0.125 -2.294  0.496  0.346  0.859  0.016 
5 -0.877 -1.491 -0.315 -0.532 -1.152 -0.683 
6  1.127  0.429 -1.240 -0.305  2.028 -2.847 
7 -2.226  0.064 -0.228  0.156  0.629  0.840 
8 -0.213 -1.571 -0.784  0.961 -0.880 -2.432 
9 -0.124 -0.660 -1.689  0.174 -1.328  1.605 
10 -1.268 -0.053  0.738  0.845  0.088  2.079 
 
The computational aspect is not discussed, but it is worth stressing that this is a refined 
method, where the factor scores for all variables (e.g., ecosystem services) were used to estimate 
the position that each person has on each factor. Position refers to the distance from the mean of 
zero, and the factor scores indicate the number of standard deviations. For instance, individual 
seven has a fairly extreme negative factor score on the first factor, which suggests that they the 
scores they reported on the variables for factor one followed the suggested pattern (positive 
values on multiple-use ecosystem services and negative values on the wilderness related 
ecosystem services). As another example, individual three had a factor one score close to zero, 
which means that this individual likely did not demonstrate such a pattern in their answers. Table 
6.12 supports this interpretation, which includes the ecosystem services that load highly onto 
factor 1, the loading magnitude and sign, and the reported scores (on a scale from -4 to +4) from 
the raw data for the individuals.  
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Table 6.12. An example of what underlies factor score interpretation in R-methodology 
Ecosystem Service Factor 1 loading Value for Individual 7 
(-4 to +4) 
Value for Individual 3 
(-4 to +4) 
Timber production -0.62 +3 +3 
Oil, gas, minerals -0.63 +1   0 
livestock grazing -0.62 +4 +4 
irrigation for agriculture -0.64 +3 +1 
traditional ag lifestyle -0.59 +4 +4 
non-motorized recreation 0.59 -2 -1 
Solitude, clear sky 0.78 -3 +1 
Places human influence is unnoticeable 0.81 -4 -3 
beauty and inspiration 0.79 -1   0 
 
 There are a variety of analyses that can be completed with respect to the factor scores, but 
a common approach is to group individuals by factor using cluster analysis. This allows an 
analyst to find groups of people who are positioned similarly on the factors. Clusters generally 
maximize heterogeneity between and homogeneity within based on factor scores. For instance, 
individual two and individual seven are similarly positioned on factor 1, though they do depart 
on other factors (Table 6.11). The calculation and interpretation in R-methodology, as will 
become apparent, differ significantly from Q-methodology.  
 
Q-methodology 
 Calculation of factor scores in Q-methodology, at least based upon seminal texts such as 
Brown (1980), qualifies as an unrefined method. This is clearly shown in a moment, but it is 
important to note that calculating the factor scores is conceptually different in that they estimate 
the placement or rank of the items being sorted. Table 6.13 reflects the parallel to the R-
methodology factor scores (Table 6.11). As shown, ecosystem services (not individuals) are 
given factor scores, and the interpretation relates the specific ecosystem service to all of the 
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individuals that loaded highly onto the specific factor (thus the unrefined approach to 
calculation). For instance, for those Q-sorts that loaded highly onto factor four, we would expect 
to see high values for public ownership and access (factor score of 1.89) and low values for 
carbon absorption (factor score of -2.11).  
 
Table 6.13. Factor scores from Q-methodology analysis 
Ecosystem Services 
Factor Scores 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
Forest materials for personal use                                 -0.68        1.27      0.24     -0.51   
Timber production                                                       -1.27        0.96    0.90      -1.15 
Oil and natural gas and minerals                                 -1.90       -0.56 0.12   0.18 
Woody biomass for energy                                         -0.97         0.10 -0.13 -1.11 
Livestock grazing                                                        -1.48         1.72 1.71   0.46 
Water for household use                                              -0.75       -1.30 0.86 0.87 
Irrigation for agriculture                                              -1.18       -0.19   1.03 0.09 
Outfitting and guiding                                                  -0.65      1.07     0.11   -0.92 
Hunting and fishing (non-outfitted)                             -0.06      1.47    0.33   0.23 
Non-motorized recreation                                             1.02       0.83    -1.28   -1.13 
Motorized recreation                                                   -1.57      -0.46    -1.70 1.58 
Driving for pleasure                                                    -1.07     -1.07   -1.46   0.78 
Developed camping                                                     -0.45      0.17    -1.18   -1.00 
Dispersed camping                                                       0.52      0.01   -0.74   -0.33 
Solitude quiet and clear night sky                                 0.88       -0.73 -0.66 1.35 
Native American cultural benefits                                 0.22      -1.18 -0.21 -0.20 
Traditional agricultural lifestyle                                   -0.95      1.17   1.37    0.60 
Education and interpretation                                          0.17     -0.84 -0.07 -1.15 
Research and science                                                      0.66      -1.06   0.51   -0.57 
Places where human influence                                        1.07      -0.84 -1.54   -1.42 
Cultural and archeological sites                                      0.24      -0.97 -0.42   -0.27 
Flood and erosion control                                                0.13      0.11   1.09    0.11 
Carbon absorption                                                            0.45     -1.34   -1.52   -2.11 
Biodiversity and abundance                                             1.57      -1.70   0.35   -0.69 
Wildlife habitat and connectivity                                     1.55       0.27   0.11   0.78 
Water quality                                                                    1.10       0.49   1.45   0.78 
Air quality                                                                         0.72      -0.04   0.67 0.69 
Water quantity                                                                   0.76       1.03   1.49   0.81 
Public ownership and access                                             1.12       1.79   -0.61   1.89 
Scenic beauty aesthetics and inspiration                           0.80      -0.18   -0.83   1.36 
 
 
   
  Table 6.14 illustrates this with respect to the four Q-sorts that loaded highly onto the 
factor, and it generally supports the interpretation above. While this interpretation may be valid 
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in the context of Q-methodology, there are facets of the factor score calculation and application 
that are particularly salient for this comparison between Q- and R-methodology.   
 
Table 6.14. An example of what underlies factor score interpretation in Q-methodology 
Q-sort  Factor 4 loading Value for carbon 
absorption (-4 to +4) 
Value for public 
ownership (-4 to +4) 
45 0.61 -4 +4 
56 0.83 -4 +3 
82 0.60 -2 +2 
112 0.65 -3 +4 
 
The first facet, which is potentially seen as a limitation from the R-methodology perspective, is 
that the calculation of factor scores is both unrefined and subjective in that decisions as to what 
Q-sorts are used to calculate the factor scores are made by the researcher. The approach to 
calculating factor scores for each factor is a simple weighted average of the highly loading Q-
sorts (the process seems roughly equivalent to the ‘weighted sum scores’ approach (DiStefano et 
al., 2009)). However, decisions as to what is highly loading, or which of the highly loading Q-
sorts to include (e.g., should cross-loading Q-sorts be used to calculate factor scores for the 
relevant factors), is up to the researcher. Prior to discussing this further, it is worth showing the 
typical process used to calculate factor scores (as summarized by Brown (1980) and Armatas 
(2013)).  
 A ‘factor weight’ is calculated for the Q-sorts that are chosen (how is discussed in a 
moment) as the subset to represent the factor via the interpretable ‘factor array’. The factor 
weight is used based upon the rationale that “some Q-sorts are closer approximations to a factor 
than are other Q-sorts” (Brown, 1980:240). By accounting for the factor weights, it means that a 
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Q-sort with a loading of 0.90, for example, will contribute greater to the factor scores than a Q-
sort with a loading of 0.65. Computing the factor weight is done with the following equation:  
  

g 
f
1 f 2
 
where g is the weight, and f is the factor loading of the Q-sort on the relevant factor.  The 
weights are then applied to the raw scores for each ecosystem service for that Q-sort. This 
process is done for all the chosen Q-sorts within the subset. Then, the weighted values for each 
statement are summed across all Q-sorts chosen, which results in the total score for each 
statement on each factor, and is represented by Kn: 

Kn  gycy
y1
Y
        (5) 
where n is equal to the statement number, Y is the subset of W participants (Q-sorts) that load 
onto the factor of interest, g is the weight for participant y, and c is the raw score participant y 
gave for statement n. This is a process takes place for all ecosystem services and factors, which 
is followed by one last adjustment. As Brown (1980:242) explained, “since factors contain 
differing numbers of subjects producing [sic] statement totals of differing magnitudes, it is 
convenient for purposes of comparability to normalize the total column.”  Normalizing the total 
for each statement is done with the following equation:   

zn 
Kn  XK
sK
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where Kn is the total value (equation (5)) for the statement (i.e., ecosystem service) n, 

XK is the 
mean of K across all statements (

XK 
Kn
n1
N

N
), and sK is the standard deviation of K. This 
normalization process is why factor scores in Q-methodology are sometimes described as z-
scores.  
 This calculation illustrates the unrefined nature of the factor score calculation, but it also 
clearly shows that the factor scores are dependent upon the chosen ‘subset’ of participants that 
load onto a particular factor. Choosing this subset is called ‘flagging’ in the Q-analysis process, 
and often statistical programs designed for Q-methodology (e.g., PQMethod) have a simple 
calculation for doing this automatically; however, this option may result in the selection of factor 
loadings as low as 0.30. Often, analysts completing Q-methodology will manually flag only 
those Q-sorts that have particularly high loadings (again, a subjective decision). Indeed, in the 
case of the Gila study, I manually flagged Q-sorts only if they both had loadings above 0.50 and 
were not cross-loading. Even this ‘rule’ was sometimes violated, as Q-sort 19 (Table 6.10) was 
considered cross-loading with at 0.47 and 0.48 loading on factor one and factor three, 
respectively. This process highlights another potential criticism of Q-methodology, which is that 
while the factors in the rotated matrix are orthogonal when using PCA and varimax rotation, the 
flagging process and unrefined calculation of factor scores results in some correlation between 
the factor scores. 
 While the unrefined approach to calculating factor scores may be seen as a limitation, the 
process is seen as a means to an end, which is deriving factor arrays that are distinct from one 
another as possible. The factor arrays are that which is ultimately interpreted for the purpose of 
discussion, and the factor scores are primarily used to develop these factor arrays.  
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A factor array is an approximate representation of each factor, which is developed by 
first ordering the factor scores for each ecosystem service from highest to lowest, and then 
inserting the ecosystem service back into the forced distribution. What results is a typified 
viewpoint, or a weighted average of those Q-sorts done similarly (i.e., those flagged Q-sorts). 
For example, the two highest factor scores for each factor would occupy the ‘+4’ column in the 
forced distribution (Figure 6.1), the next three highest scores would occupy the ‘+3’ column, and 
so on. One implication of this is that each factor is individually interpreted in terms of how all 
the ecosystem services are positioned within the typified distribution. The factor arrays for the 
Gila study are presented below within the context of the comparison of results between Q- and 
R-methodology.  
 Before moving onto this comparison of results, it is worth stressing that by avoiding the 
‘flagging’ of cross-loaders (and to a lesser extent unique Q-sorts that do not load highly onto any 
factor)19 the factor arrays are kept more distinct without the addition of a Q-sort that shares 
common variance with more than one factor. For instance, Q-sort 9 in Table 6.10 shows a 
loading of 0.49, 0.47, and 0.39 on factors one, three, and four, respectively. An inspection of Q-
sort nine shows several commonalities between the factor arrays (presented momentarily) 
representing each of these factors, but these similarities between the individual Q-sorter and the 
factor arrays are also accompanied by differences between factor arrays. For instance, Table 6.15 
lists seven ecosystem services and the respective raw scores for Q-sort nine, factor array 1 
(environmental perspective), and factor array 3 (water perspective). As shown, Q-sort nine aligns 
with the environmental perspective on oil and natural gas and minerals, wildlife habitat and 
                                                 
19 Since the factor weights are multiplied by the raw scores of each Q-sorter that is flagged, a low loading close to 
zero will have little practical effect on the factor scores.  
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connectivity, and carbon absorption. On the other hand, Q-sort nine aligns with the water 
perspective on flood and erosion control, irrigation for agriculture, and water for household use.  
 
Table 6.15. Raw scores (highlighting the effect of cross-loading Q-sorts) 
Ecosystem Services Q-sort 9 
Factor array 1 
(Environmental 
perspective) 
Factor array 3 
(Water 
perspective) 
Oil and natural gas and minerals -4 -4 0 
Wildlife habitat and connectivity +2 +4 0 
Carbon absorption  0 +1 -3 
Livestock grazing +1 -3 +4 
Flood and erosion control  +4 0 +3 
Irrigation for agriculture +1 -3 +2 
Water for household use +2 -2 +2 
Note: raw scores are taken from column in Q-sort (or factor array) forced distribution 
However, when comparing the environmental perspective with the water perspective, it can be 
seen that these six ecosystem services are not aligned. Therefore, using Q-sort nine to calculate 
the factor scores for both of these perspectives would only confound their differences but pulling 
the six ecosystem services closer together within the factor arrays for the environmental and 
water perspective. Within Q-methodology, it is for this reason that cross-loading Q-sorts are 
generally referred to as ‘confounding’ Q-sorts, and they are not used to develop the factor arrays 
(i.e., they are not flagged).  
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6.4. Comparison of Q-methodology and R-methodology analysis of the same data: An 
example related to forest plan revision 
This section provides an overview of the results and interpretation of factor analysis of 
the same data within the traditions of Q-methodology and R-methodology. Starting with Q-
methodology, four factor arrays are presented with limited discussion, as the specifics of the 
results are fully discussed in Armatas et al. (2017b) (and elements of the results and analysis 
were covered above). Furthermore, the specifics of analysis, such as why a four factor solution 
was chosen, or what the scree plot looked like, are not presented below. These specifics have 
been presented elsewhere with regard to the Gila National Forest (Armatas et al., 2017b), as well 
as the Shoshone National Forest (Armatas, 2013). However, since an R-analysis of the Gila data 
has not been presented elsewhere, a full description of methodological process and results are 
presented.  
With regard to interpretation, an attempt is made to distinguish the ontological, 
epistemological, and axiological assumptions of the two approaches. However, it is worth noting 
that this discussion is primarily through a Q-methodological lens, which is a way of implying 
that my presentation of R-methodological assumptions may be oversimplified (particularly 
related to ontology and the lack of distinction between clearly established concepts within social 
psychology such as attitudes, events, and traits).  
  
6.4.1. Q-methodology analysis: Overview of results from the Gila study 
The results summarized are drawn from a report provided to the Forest Planning Team on 
the Gila National Forest (i.e., Armatas et al., 2017b). These results are mostly just presented, 
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without any of the underlying rationale or process. It provides the basis for comparing the results 
yielded from an R-analysis. To be clear, the analytic process (at least with regard to factor 
analysis) was similar in both cases. That is, this Q-methodology analysis involved multiple 
iterations of data analysis; several different factor solutions were considered, and the standard 
statistical tests (e.g., Scree test, significant-loadings test) were performed to guide the selection 
of the factor solution.  
Figures 6.4 though 6.7 are the factor arrays derived from the factor scores for factor one 
through four, respectively. Spending time with these four factor arrays will reveal four different 
general viewpoints about what ecosystem services derived from the Gila National Forest are 
important and unimportant. The basic interpretation of the factor arrays is that those ecosystem 
services toward the right of the distribution (i.e., +2 to +4) are positively salient ecosystem 
services for that viewpoint, those to the left (i.e., -4 to -2) are negatively salient, and those 
ecosystem services toward the middle of the array (i.e., -1 to +1) are more neutral. Again, this 
forced distribution is why Q-methodology represents a kind-with-tradeoffs approach. The final 
note on basic interpretation is that the ecosystem services highlighted in black on each factor 
array are ‘statistically distinguishing’ statements, or those statements where the factor score 
between one factor and all others is greater than the difference between the standard error for that 
factor and all other factors. Full details of this calculation are not provided herein, though they 
are available in Appendix B.9 of Armatas (2013).  
The four factor arrays were dubbed: environmental, utilitarian, water, and motorized. 
These factor arrays are presented, in part, to facilitate the comparison of results between an R- 
and Q-analysis. As will become evident below following the R-analysis, there are commonalities 
between the factor arrays in Q-analysis and the factors in R-analysis. The full interpretation of 
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each factor array is articulated within Armatas et al. (2017b); very brief interpretations are 
provided herein.   
The environmental factor array generally represents viewpoints that place a high level of 
importance on regulating ecosystem services (e.g., biodiversity and abundance of plants and 
animals, wildlife habitat and connectivity, water quality) and on particular cultural services that 
would generally be thought of as reflective, or underpinned by intrinsic values (e.g., non-
motorized recreation, solitude, quiet, and clear night sky, places where human influence is 
substantially unnoticeable). The utilitarian factor array represents a viewpoint that prioritizes 
provisioning services (e.g., timber production, livestock grazing) and cultural services that 
clearly provide economic benefits (e.g., hunting and fishing outfitting, traditional agricultural 
lifestyle). The water factor array represents an agricultural perspective, particularly as it relates 
to livestock grazing, irrigation, traditional agriculture lifestyles, and water quality and quantity. 
Lastly, the motorized factor array highlights the priorities related to motorized recreation, 
accompanying benefits such as scenic beauty and solitude, and the need for public access. While 
this interpretation of the four factor arrays is brief, it is mainly presented for the purpose of 
setting up: (1) a discussion of how Q-methodology, based upon its normative assumptions would 
fundamentally interpret such factor arrays and; (2) a comparison with R-methodology results.  
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Figure 6.4. The environmental factor array 
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Figure 6.5. The utilitarian factor array 
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Figure 6.6. The water factor array
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Figure 6.7. The motorized factor array 
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6.4.1.1. General interpretation of results in Q-methodology based on normative assumptions 
Above are the results typically gleaned from a Q-method approach, but the question 
remains as to how Q-methodology, given its underpinning normative assumptions, would 
interpret these results. As previously mentioned, Q-methodology was intended to be a ‘science of 
subjectivity’ (see Good (2010) for a historical account of this ‘quest’). It should be made clear 
that ‘subjectivity’ in this context is not referring to the nature of research. Or, as discussed by 
Babbie, the idea that there is objective research (i.e., researcher values are cast aside and an 
accepted systematic process yields results that can be perfectly replicated by any researcher) and 
subjective research (i.e., research where judgements and values of the researcher affect the 
results in a way the makes replication challenging). As highlighted above, there are elements of 
factor analysis, particularly within the Q-methodology tradition, that require subjective choices 
by the researcher. Even though a pragmatist EE would suggest that articulating such judgements, 
as well as the reasoning behind them, can facilitate replication and more ‘objective’ research, 
there are nonetheless elements of the research process that could be considered subjective (to be 
clear, this is an issue for R-methodology as well).  
However, the assertion that Q-methodology is the study of ‘subjectivity’ is not 
referencing this objectivity versus subjectivity discussion (i.e., the one about methods choices), 
instead it is meant to distinguish the ontological assumptions (and consequently epistemological 
and axiological assumptions) of Q-methodology from those of R-methodology. The meaning of 
subjectivity in Q-methodology is articulated by Brown (1980:46, emphasis original):  
Fundamentally, a person’s subjectivity is merely his own point of view. It is 
neither a trait nor a variable, nor is it fruitful to regard it as a tributary emanating 
from some subterranean “stream of consciousness.” It is pure behavior of the kind 
we encounter during the normal course of the day, as when a person prefaces his 
remarks with “As far as I’m concerned…,” or “In my opinion…,” or whatnot.    
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This quote reflects some of the original epistemological and ontological thinking of William 
Stephenson, who considered viewpoints, as expressed through the behavior of a Q-sort, as 
“manifestations of a person’s predispositions to act based on lived experiences” (Wolf, 2009:8). 
From an R-methodology perspective, one might suggest that ‘behavior’ (or behavioral intention) 
is often seen as a variable, or that ‘predispositions’ could be interpreted as relatively stable, 
enduring ‘traits’ or more specific and short-lived ‘attitudes’. So, for Q-methodology, a person’s 
subjectivity is akin to everyday conversation.   
Clearly distinguishing between Q- and R-methodology in this respect is challenging and, 
while it is likely due in part to my lack of expertise in social psychology, it may also be partly 
attributed to a lack of clarity in the Q-methodology literature (a healthier debate between the two 
traditions might help to remedy this ambiguity). Nonetheless, it seems that the main distinction is 
that subjectivity is seen as a viewpoint that cannot be defined a priori nor from the external 
standpoint of the researcher (Brown 1980). For instance, measuring a psychological construct in 
R-methodology, such as introversion/extroversion (trait), it is typically established prior that a 
select number of scale items will measure the construct and that particular answers to those items 
will indicate if a person is extroverted or introverted. The existence of ‘correct’ answers in R-
methodology that makes it ‘objective’; not in the sense that it is more correct to be introverted or 
extroverted, but that specific answers to the scale items will lead to a particular designation on 
that construct. As Brown (1980:3) explained, by specifying that a particular response to a set of 
scale items yields a particular interpretation, “the observer elicits his concept on the spot, and the 
subject’s response breathes life into it…by constructing meanings [in the tradition of Q-
methodology], the observer uses the subject’s responses to assist him in bringing his concept into 
being, a transaction that is more akin to creativity than to measurement.” This point makes it 
255 
 
clear that the researcher is still influential to how the viewpoints are interpreted in Q-
methodology (perhaps the naming of factor arrays as the most clear example of this), but relating 
Q-methodology to a creative transaction (as opposed to a measurement) implies both an ontology 
and epistemology that is more constructivist than positivist.  
The importance of lived experiences for creating knowledge, as well as the belief that a 
point of view is derived not necessarily from some pre-existing atomic and identifiable thing, but 
perhaps a more elusive feeling reflects the influence of pragmatist philosophy (see Section 4.1.2) 
on Q-methodology. Indeed, Stephenson (1983b:76, emphasis original) suggested that the 
concern of Q-methodology (i.e., terminal axiological goal) was with “understandings, in the 
common conversations and everyday communicability between people, and within oneself—the 
folkways of a people and their culture.” In this context, ‘understandings’ are equivalent with 
points of view about some topic of interest, which “form in feeling”; Stephenson (1983b:76) 
explicitly draws this idea from Charles Peirce’s ‘law of mind’. Peirce (1892:554) was clear that 
this ‘law’ lacks the rigidity of those pertaining to physical matter, as there “always remains a 
certain amount of arbitrary spontaneity in its [(i.e., the mind)] action.” Therefore, as discussed in 
Section 4.1.2, it follows that Peirce considered experience to go far beyond what our ears, eyes, 
nose, and skin report: “Peirce takes anything that is compelling, surprising, brute, or impinging 
to be an experience, regardless of what causes us to feel compelled and regardless of whether we 
can identify the source of the compulsion” (Misak, 2004a:155). 
Subjectivity is a first-person perspective or viewpoint, “no more and no less” (Watts, 
2011:40). And given its alignment with Peirce’s ideas, it is important to perceive this viewpoint 
not as “permanent or semi-permanent disposition or mental orientation”, but only as a subjective 
viewpoint in their “current outlook or positioning relative to some aspect of their immediate 
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environment” (Watts, 2011:40, emphasis original). The connection between viewpoint and 
context is another commonality between pragmatist philosophy and Q-methodology. Each 
individual Q-sort, then, represents a person’s viewpoint within the context of some topic in a 
particular place and time. If these viewpoints are conceptualized as human-nature relationships, 
as done herein, then it is expected that the viewpoints will evolve and change over time. Indeed, 
a major implication of adhering to a pragmatist philosophy is the belief that public debate and 
deliberation can lead to social learning (and consequently a trend toward human-nature 
relationships that facilitate normative sustainability).   
A major challenge of considering a Q-sort as a first-person viewpoint which, according to 
Brown (1980:3), may have a meaning and significance that is different from the meaning 
“assumed by the observer or anyone else”, is transitioning from the individual viewpoint (Q-sort) 
to the collective viewpoint (factor array). In the case of the Gila National Forest study, 122 
individual viewpoints regarding the importance of ecosystem services derived from the Gila 
National Forest were expressed within the context of the forest plan revision. Four archetypical 
viewpoints emerged through factor analysis (e.g., Figure 6.6), which raises the question as to 
how these shared viewpoints are interpreted. While articulating ‘Q as a constructivist 
methodology’, Stenner (2009:63, emphasis original) stated (with support from Stephenson):   
The concrete actuality represented by a given factor analytic 'solution' is to be 
thought of as an approximation [of a constructed meaning], not of the 'meaning' of 
particular items or the 'nature' of some aspect of the Q-sorter, but of the forms of 
feeling 'running through' (Stephenson, 1983a, p. 216) and hence synthesizing each 
of the factors. It is this underlying feeling that must be sought out in factor 
interpretation. Just as each individual Q-sort concerns not just feeling towards this 
or that item but feeling towards the complete item set, so Q-factors concern 
common feeling state vectors within a sample of such sorts. 
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As approximations, it is expected that individuals inspecting a factor array that they aligned with 
might remark: “that is not an exact representation of my viewpoint, but its close.” This potential 
discrepancy in meanings assigned to individual Q-sorts highlights: (1) the value of the follow-up 
discussions above individuals Q-sorts (and the potential benefit of integrating better qualitative 
research techniques into Q-methodology – as discussed in Chapter 7); (2) the potential limitation 
of assuming that the normal distributions are comparable across Q-sorts (e.g., that the middle of 
the distribution are those ecosystem services that are either neutral or not well understood by the 
respondent) and; (3) the critical importance of clearly conveying to audiences (both scientific 
and lay) that ‘shared’ viewpoints do not represent mutually exclusive groups of people, but 
typified viewpoints derived from similar Q-sorts. While the factor arrays do represent a 
collective viewpoint in some ways (i.e., a weighted average of several Q-sorts in the sample), the 
normative assumptions of Q-methodology, summarized in Table 6.16, are not grouping people in 
the manner that is likely commonly thought of in the conservation social sciences.   
     A pragmatist perspective, with its focus on language, would note that the term ‘grouped’ 
may be problematic. Anecdotally, stating that Q-methodology ‘groups people’ is something that 
I have done frequently, and while it does not seem to trigger questions or concerns from the 
public, it may confuse discussions with other researchers. It suggests that people are put into 
mutually exclusive categories, and it also tempts one to think that characteristics of that group of 
people (e.g., gender, income, eye color) might by associated, or worse, connected with causality 
to a factor array. While making such connections can be done with other methods (namely 
random sampling approaches and statistical techniques such as ANOVA of clusters and 
regression), Q-methodology is not such an approach. Understanding the distribution of 
viewpoints across a population is not possible, primarily because the purposeful sample does not 
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allow for “counting noses”, as Brown (1993:120) phrased it. That is, there is no way to assert 
that a particular viewpoint represents some percentage of the population, nor can one connect 
viewpoints with demographics.  
 
Table 6.16. Normative assumptions of Q-methodology 
Ontological assumptions Epistemological 
assumptions 
Axiological assumptions 
 First-person viewpoints 
(e.g., self-reflections) are 
outlooks relative to one’ 
environment and day-to-
day experiences. 
 Viewpoints are not 
amenable to 
deconstruction into 
component parts (e.g., 
attitudes).  
 Viewpoints are time and 
context bound; 
constructed and made 
tangible through Q-sorts, 
interacting with items, and 
follow-up discussion with 
researcher. 
 Similarities among 
individual viewpoints are 
likely to emerge (factor 
analysis facilitates finding 
such similarities) 
 Explore and discover new 
insights about viewpoints 
related to the topic of interest.  
 Understand potential 
tradeoffs among different 
items. 
 Describe viewpoints in terms 
of the orientation of all items 
in the Q-set. 
 Understand diverse range of 
viewpoints with purposeful 
sample. 
 
 Having said that, abductive reasoning, another connection between pragmatism and Q-
methodology, might allow one to create hypotheses for further investigation which could allow 
for the connection of particular viewpoints with population characteristics. For example, the 
‘Native American’ viewpoint in the Shoshone National Forest study, dubbed as such due to the 
paramount importance assigned to ‘Native American cultural and spiritual values’, was the 
weighted average of eight participants (Armatas, 2013). Even though all eight participants 
identified as Native American (Eastern Shoshone Tribe and Crow Tribe) in the Q-methodology 
study, one cannot equate this with a hypothesis test of statistical significance related to the group 
of people loading significantly onto the ‘Native American’ factor and the Native American 
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population more generally. That is, just because one loads highly onto the Native American 
factor, or the agricultural factor (both from the Shoshone study) does not mean that they are 
more likely to be tribal members (or farmers and rancher in the case of the agricultural factor). 
As Bartholomew et al. (2011) observed, there is no probability model behind Q-methodology; 
the results are purely descriptive.  
Despite the descriptive nature of Q-methodology, it can lead to reasonable hypotheses 
such as that expressing a viewpoint via Q-sort which emphasizes Native American cultural 
values is more likely to occur if one identifies as Native American. Abductive reasoning, as Wolf 
(2009:26) noted, is “to propose something new, or to discover”, which aligns with the discussion 
of abduction in Section 4.1.2. Another potential hypothesis, given the participant above who 
stressed the web of farming and ranching connections, is the agricultural viewpoint being the 
most prevalent in the Wind-Bighorn Basin of Wyoming. As it turns out, the random sample 
choice modeling study supports both of these hypotheses. As discussed by Armatas et al. (2018), 
the ‘Native American’ viewpoint was not discovered in the survey data, which may be due to a 
survey sample that was very underrepresented by the Native American population. The latent 
class analysis also suggested that the ‘agricultural’ viewpoint was the most prevalent.  
It may seem implausible or contradictory to accept, on one hand, that Q-methodology is 
exploring and understanding shared viewpoints which do not pre-exist as variables or constructs; 
while, on the other hand, suggesting that survey research could be used to understand the 
distribution of Q-methodology viewpoints within some population (or similarly, the potential 
association between some viewpoint and demographic characteristics). In other words, if one 
adheres to the belief that Q-methodology viewpoints do not ‘belong’ to people, then it does not 
follow, ontologically, that survey research could be used to count who holds what Q-
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methodology viewpoint. Danielson (2009:224) acknowledged this potential conflict in an article 
focused on combining Q-methodology and survey methods: “Some Q users of a more 
constructivist persuasion remain resistant to ‘reifying’ Q discourses by converting them into 
survey measurements.”  
Of course, with regard to this issue, scientific worldview is important. From a pragmatist 
perspective, the potentially conflicting ontological assumptions underpinning these different 
methodologies are reconciled through the understanding that both provide a partial 
understanding of the phenomena being studied (e.g., the human-nature relationship within the 
context of a pragmatist EE). Danielson (2009), sounding much like a pragmatist, cautioned 
against “unwarranted fixation on preserving the detailed specificity of individuals at the expense 
of the gains in understanding to be had by self-conscious use of imperfect-but-workable 
theoretical boxes.” A pragmatist perspective would see Q-methodology as complementary to, not 
competing with, R-methodology approaches. Individually, the approaches accomplish something 
different, and the mechanics of the different approaches are employed to those different ends. 
For example, Q-methodology does not employ a Cronbach’s Alpha test, as the items included in 
such a study (e.g., Table 6.8) are not ‘measuring’ a specific construct. Q-methodology does not 
typically employ a random sample, as the diversity of opinions are of interest as opposed to the 
distribution of such opinions across a population. In order to better highlight what R-
methodology provides, I proceed with an illustrative example whereby the data from the Gila 
study is analyzed with more traditional factor analysis.  
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6.4.2. R-methodology analysis: Overview of results from the Gila study 
Deciding how many factors to retain for the R-methodology factor analysis was based on 
the standard considerations discussed above (e.g., scree plot, significant loadings test, and 
eigenvalues test). Initially, five different factor solutions were assessed, all of which were rotated 
using varimax rotation. This rotation is common practice in Q-methodology (and thus 
appropriate for comparison) and, in addition, within the context of R-methodology, Hair et al. 
(2010:115) suggested that it "has proved successful as an analytic approach to obtaining an 
orthogonal rotation of factors."  
Prior to further assessment of these solutions, variable X1 (forest materials for personal 
use) was dropped as it did not significantly load onto any factor within any solution, the variable 
only correlated with one other variable at a value above 0.50, and in all solutions the 
communality was below 0.50. Assessment of four-, five, and six-factor solutions highlighted 
additional variables to be dropped due to low loadings and low communalities. After a couple 
analytic iterations, it was concluded that 23 variables was appropriate, which was supported by 
the KMO test with a higher value for overall suitability and the lowest score for a single variable 
of 0.65. Factor analysis of a correlation matrix with 23 variables resulted in a six-factor solution, 
though the five-factor solution was a close second. In terms of statistical criteria, there is no clear 
'winning' solution. The Scree Test indicates a robust first factor, but there is not much of an 
'elbow' following the initial factor. 
The decline in variance explained after factor one is quite gradual. The eigenvalue test, 
which often suggests retaining factors with a value greater than one suggests somewhere 
between five and six factors. Regarding the number of variables with significant loadings on 
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each factor, all three potential factor solutions have factors with only two significantly-loading 
variables (some might suggest a two-variable factor is unconvincing). 
 
Figure 6.8. Scree plot for the PCA of the Gila data with ecosystem services as variables 
 
While the four-factor solution only has one factor with only two significant variables (which is 
understandable because there are only so many variables to ‘go around’), I would argue that 
conceptual and theoretical criteria highlighted more compelling stories with both the five and 
six-factor solutions. Ultimately, I will move forward with a full interpretation of a six-factor 
solution. 
When considering Table 6.17 below, and selecting a final solution for full interpretation, 
one could argue for a few different factor solutions. The first factor tells the most complete story 
and, in all factor solutions, the second factor and beyond provide story fragments. Across all 
factor solutions, the first factor could be labeled “multiple use versus wilderness”, as negative 
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loadings on several production ecosystem services (i.e., timber production; oil and natural gas 
and minerals; livestock grazing; irrigation for agriculture; traditional agricultural lifestyle) are 
paired with positive loadings on several wilderness-related ecosystem services (i.e., non-
motorized recreation; solitude, quiet, and clear night sky; places where human influence remain 
substantially unnoticeable; scenic beauty, aesthetics, and inspiration). This suggests a negative 
correlation between the two groups of variables. In other words, negative scores on production 
services are associated with positive scores on wilderness services (or vice versa).   
It is worth noting that moving to a six-factor solution from a five/four-factor solution 
results in two variables becoming insignificant (i.e., they do not load onto a factor): (1) 
biodiversity and abundance and; (2) wildlife habitat and connectivity. This slightly changes the 
story with the first factor, and it is debatable whether it makes the factor label of “multiple-use 
versus wilderness” more or less appropriate. At the same time, moving to a six-factor solution 
results in a factor with ‘wildlife habitat and connectivity’, with a negative loading, and ‘woody 
biomass for energy’ with a positive loading. This two-variable factor (factor six) provides, 
perhaps, a mini-story where the desire to have intact areas of wildlife habitat is in conflict with 
this specific form of renewable energy. It is viable interpretation, as woody biomass for energy is 
particularly intensive in its requirement to extract wood products from the forest. A suitable 
name for this factor could be “open space and energy needs”. 
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Table 6.17. Factor loadings on each variable in a four-, five-, and six-factor solution 
Note: variables dropped were – forest materials for personal use, water for household use, developed camping, dispersed camping, flood and erosion control, 
water quantity, and public ownership and access. 
Note: factor loadings less than an absolute value of 0.50 are generally omitted from display. The single exception is the loading on ‘carbon absorption’, which is 
deemed practically significant for both interpretive reasons and its nearly 0.50 loading. 
Variables 
(ecosystem services) 
# of factors in solution # of factors in solution # of factors in solution # of factors in solution # of factors in solution # of factors in solution 
Four Five Six Four Five Six Four Five Six Four Five Six Four Five Six Four Five Six 
1st factor 2nd factor 3rd factor 4th factor 5th factor 6th factor 
timber production -0.68 -0.70 -0.62                
Oil, gas, minerals -0.70 -0.70 -0.63                
woody biomass energy       -0.55        0.74    
livestock grazing -0.72 -0.75 -0.62                
irrigation for ag -0.78 -0.78 -0.64                
outfitting and guiding    -0.66 -0.51  -0.51            
Hunt/fish (no outfit)     -0.73 -0.77             
non-motorized rec. 0.60 0.60 0.59                
motorized rec.        0.61  -0.62  -0.67       
driving for pleasure        0.82  -0.82  -0.84       
Solitude, clear sky 0.63 0.65 0.78                
Native cultural    0.62     0.78     0.71     
traditional ag lifestyle -0.76 -0.78 -0.59                
education and interp    0.67 0.68 0.63             
research and science    0.71 0.77 0.73             
Places human influen.  0.80 0.82 0.81                
Cultural/archeological    0.71     0.69     0.66     
carbon absorption     0.52 0.48      0.49       
Biodiversity/abundance 0.57 0.59                 
Habitat/connectivity 0.66 0.66             -0.52    
water quality       0.54    0.85       0.84 
air quality       0.73    0.62       0.60 
beauty and inspiration 0.67 0.70 0.79                
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Accepting a six-factor solution also suggests that the grouping of the four ‘other cultural 
services’ (i.e., Native American cultural benefits, cultural and archeological sites, research and 
science, and education and interpretation) on a single factor, as is the case in a four factor 
solution, is not the best interpretation. Instead, the second factor in the final solution, which 
could be dubbed the “science and education” factor, shows a negative loading on ‘hunting and 
fishing (non-outfitted)’ and positive loadings on ‘education and interpretation’, ‘research and 
science’, and ‘carbon absorption’. The reason for the negative correlation with hunting and 
fishing is difficult to know, but it may be the result of a perception science and research can 
potentially result in decreased opportunities for hunting and fishing. This interpretation is 
tenuous, but the rationale is based upon the Shoshone National Forest study, were the recreation 
perspective considered science and education to be a threat to recreation (particularly motorized 
winter recreation) because it was perceived that science often leads to less recreation 
opportunities. Specifically, it was suggested that science focused on conserving grizzly bears 
yields restrictions on motorized recreation. A similar rationale might explain the negative 
correlation between science and hunting and fishing. For instance, some may question whether 
‘hoot owl’ restrictions on fishing (the practice of regulating angling when water temperatures are 
high) use science to justify overly cautious management actions. The positive loading variables 
suggests a connection between gaining scientific knowledge about forests and its relation to the 
ecosystem service that most clearly mitigates climate change.  
Under a six-factor solution, the third factor groups ‘Native American cultural benefits’ 
and ‘cultural and archeological sites’ together. Interpreting this factor as “culture – now and 
then” is logical, given that the Gila National Forest region has several cultural and archeological 
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sites that also represent Native American culture. The most well-known site is the Gila Cliff 
Dwellings, which provides a window into the Mogollon Culture of the late 1200s.  
Two factors have yet to be discussed. The fourth factor groups ‘motorized recreation’, 
‘driving for pleasure’, and ‘carbon absorption’ together. The two motorized benefits have 
positive loadings, and carbon absorption has a negative loading. This factor, perhaps named 
“motors and the atmosphere”, highlights the potential tension between climate change mitigation 
and motorized recreation. Lastly, there is the “clean air and water” factor, which groups together 
‘water quality’ and ‘air quality’. This grouping of variables is not surprising, and they were 
grouped in all three factor solutions that were considered. 
 A six factor solution, as discussed, is summarized in Table 6.18, which includes factor 
name and the items (i.e., ecosystem services) categorized by positive and negative loading. If 
these ecosystem services were included in a survey instrument with a Likert-scale format with a 
random sample, then mean (average) values for each factor could be calculated in relation to 
different sub-groups of the population. For instance, one could test, using an analysis of variance, 
whether different income levels or gender were associated with the latent dimensions. This 
would generally involve completing cluster analysis to understand which respondents were 
similarly positioned on the six factors. Additionally, the factors, as discussed below, are 
considered existing constructs and would be subject to a variety of statistical tests including 
internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha). One could complete hypothesis testing as well, to 
examine significant differences between groups, significant correlations with other survey 
measurements (e.g., length of residency), and or model testing.  
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Table 6.18. Factors derived from R-methodology analysis of Q-sort data  
Factor Name 
Ecosystem Services 
Positively Loading Negatively Loading 
Multiple use versus 
wilderness 
non-motorized recreation; solitude, quiet, 
and clear night sky; places where human 
influence remain substantially 
unnoticeable; scenic beauty, aesthetics, 
and inspiration 
 
timber production; oil and natural gas 
and minerals; livestock grazing; 
irrigation for agriculture; traditional 
agricultural lifestyle 
Science and education education and interpretation; research 
and science; carbon absorption 
 
hunting and fishing (non-outfitted) 
Culture – now and then 
 
Native American cultural benefits; 
cultural and archeological sites 
 
Motors and the 
atmosphere 
Motorized recreation; driving for 
pleasure 
 
carbon absorption 
Open space and energy 
needs 
 
Woody biomass for energy 
 
wildlife habitat and connectivity 
Clean air and water Water quality; air quality  
 
 Due to the hypothetical nature of this R-methodology analysis of Q-sort data, I will not 
proceed with such tests. However, the reasons for why such tests are not completed in Q-
methodology will become more apparent as interpretation and the different normative 
assumptions of R-methodology studies are discussed.  
 
6.4.2.1. General interpretation of results in R-methodology based on normative assumptions 
The debate regarding factor analysis in Q-methodology and R-methodology originated, 
and to a lesser extent continues, within the context of psychology. As noted above, Stephenson, 
like Dewey, was interested in shifting psychological study away from an atomistic and 
mechanistic ontology, which is typically assumed in mainstream psychometric theory. For 
instance, in an introductory textbook on psychometric theory, Raykov and Marcoulides (2010:2) 
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started by defining ‘constructs’ as an “abstract, possibly hypothetical entity that is inferred from 
a set of similar demonstrated or directly observed behaviors.”  
This description does not necessarily distinguish R-methodology from Q-methodology, 
as ‘viewpoint’ in the latter are inferred from similar Q-sorts. However, as additional basic ideas 
are introduced the differences in normative assumptions, from ontology to axiology, start to 
become clear. For example, Raykov and Marcoulides (2010:6, emphasis added) suggested that 
the practical reason for measuring and evaluating constructs is to “help classify and describe 
individual atomistic behaviors. This leads to substantial reduction of complexity and at the same 
time helps us understand the common features that interrelated behaviors possess.” Without such 
research and complexity reduction, “chaos and ensuing confusion would not allow them to 
deduce any principles that may underlie or govern these behavioral phenomena” (Raykov & 
Marcoulides, 2010:6, emphasis added). 
The axiological goals of explanation and prediction are not goals in Q-methodology, 
which strives for understanding and communicating viewpoints about some topic of interest. The 
goal is to understand a viewpoint, “not to explicate it in terms of other theories” (Stephenson, 
1983b:81). R-methodology aims to both understand, as the discussion of the six-factor solution 
above reflects, and explain in terms of other theories. As Raykov and Marcoulides (2010:8) 
explained a challenge of psychometric theory is that constructs “cannot be defined only in terms 
of operational definitions but must also demonstrate relationships (or lack thereof) with other 
constructs and observable phenomena.” For instance, one could assess the factor scores of 
individuals in R-methodology, or use cluster analysis of the factor scores to find groups of 
people, and find that people positioned highly on the wilderness versus multiple-use factor are 
also positioned highly on the science and education factor, and the clean air and water factor. 
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This would show a relationship between a preference for wilderness ecosystem services, public 
land for the benefit of knowledge creation, and clean air and water. While this makes sense 
intuitively, these particular answers on a survey could be associated with other behaviors, such as 
the practice of leave no trace principles while recreating. Q-methodology, on its own, is focused 
in part on giving voice to different viewpoints (a point stressed in the social vulnerability 
protocol (Armatas et al., In Press)), but these viewpoints are expressed in terms of how all of the 
different ecosystem services (Table 6.8) relate to one another. This facet of Q-methodology does 
not necessarily lump ecosystem services together across all people. For instance, the wilderness 
versus multiple use factor in the R-analysis suggests that all of the variables defining that factor 
are interrelated, and the factor scores suggest that all people, to some extent, see these variables 
as interrelated. Q-methodology does not make this connection, but instead might find that one 
viewpoint that lumps, for instance, livestock grazing with non-motorized recreation in the 
positively salient zone of the forced distribution (see Figure 6.5).     
While delving further into psychometrics is beyond the scope of this dissertation, the 
above interpretative guidance related to R-methodology is hopefully sufficient to make the point 
that the debate related to Q-methodology versus R-methodology, which mostly focuses on 
technical-methods facets, is unproductive due to a lack of attention given to normative 
assumptions and worldviews.  
 
6.5. Applying a pragmatist lens to assess and add productivity to the debate 
Within the context of the conservation social sciences, a pragmatist perspective 
recognizes that Q-methodology and R-methodology both have something different to offer. 
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Clarifying these differences with better articulation of worldviews and normative assumptions 
(paradigms) of each approach provides a robust foundation for weighing in on the debate. 
Furthermore, clearly understanding the differences between the approaches may yield productive 
insights, such as ways that each approach can support understanding and decision-making related 
to human-nature relationships. This section begins with a formal assessment of the Q versus R 
debate, which is followed by a few examples of how the different approaches may complement 
each other within the context of conservation social sciences.  
 
6.5.1. Debate assessment: Both sides can do better 
As suggested above, both sides of the debate can improve by better communicating the 
worldviews and normative assumptions underpinning their argument. However, it should be 
noted that Q-methodology proponents, as they occupy the minority camp (i.e., R-methodology is 
far and away the more popular and accepted methodology), will likely need to put forth greater 
effort in distinguishing the two approaches.  
From a pragmatist perspective, R-methodology critiques might benefit from critiquing 
the language used by Q-methodology proponents as a way to highlight why confusion and 
misunderstanding exists (and persists). For instance, a common critique aimed at Q-methodology 
is that factor analysis employed in Q lacks rigor as it does not focus on issues of validity and 
reliability. For instance, Kampen and Tamás (2014) criticized the lack of attention to assessing 
“measurement validity (does the instrument measure what it is supposed to measure)”, which is a 
large concern in R-methodology. Within this tradition, one way to understand if a scale item is 
correlated with an unobserved latent construct is to ascertain whether the items within the scale 
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are correlated with each other (a common technique is applying Cronbach’s coefficient alpha) 
(DeVellis, 2003). However, given the differences in axiological goals and ontological 
assumptions, a focus on validity is not a major concern in Q-methodology (Brown, 1980); 
though one could argue that returning to respondents to check to see if their viewpoint was 
captured is a type of validity check. But, different assumptions remain, such as the exploratory 
nature of Q-methodology and the desire to yield interesting insights about some subjective topic 
such as the important of ecosystem services assumes that any viewpoint, assuming the Q-sorting 
exercise is understood, is valid. This is the point made by Brown (1980), who equated the 
interaction between the respondent and the Q-sort as less of a ‘measurement’ exercise and more 
of a creative transaction. 
In defense of Kampen and Tamás (2014) and those that came before them, this 
misunderstanding may stem from the language used by Q-methodology proponents. Stephenson 
(1954b) originally introduced Q-methodology as an ‘alternative’ way for psychological study, 
which ‘measured’ subjectivity. The former highlighted word implies competition with R-
methodology, and the latter word often corresponds with positivistic research goals such as 
explanation and prediction. It seems that contemporary proponents of Q-methodology are not 
advocating the measurement of viewpoints, but instead exploring and communicating shared 
viewpoints. A Q-sort is not often referred to as a survey instrument. Personally, I have framed 
the Q-sort this way on occasion, but ‘interactive exercise’ or ‘game-like activity’ are my more 
common labels.  
While these axiological goals may differ, it must be conceded that both traditions 
presume there are viewpoints to be identified and mapped, though Q-methodology considers 
these viewpoints to be constructed as opposed to existing in dormancy waiting to be discovered. 
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Try as I might, I fear that this nuanced difference could be articulated better, and entire articles 
focused on teasing apart this ontological difference (e.g., Stenner, 2009; Wolf, 2009) have, in my 
opinion, proved unsatisfactory. This lack of satisfaction is partly due to an inadequate attention 
given to the difference that the disparate ontological assumptions make for analysis and 
interpretation. From a pragmatist perspective (and following the pragmatic maxim), if viewing 
Q-methodology viewpoints differently than R-methodological constructs is significant 
methodologically, then the exact reasons why needs to be better articulated. If this difference 
simply allows Q-methodologists to worry less about issues such as validity, then R-
methodologists are likely justified in their frustration. It seems paying less attention to issues 
such as construct validity is better supported by the axiological goals for exploration and 
abductions and, importantly, the fact that a purposeful sample precludes any assertions about the 
greater population.    
Often, the distinction between Q-methodology and R-methodology is that persons are 
correlated, not tests or traits. Even though this is true, it neglects to clearly highlight the reasons 
for why particular methods choices are made including, but not limited to: the use of ‘centroid’ 
factor analysis (considered by some to be outdated and simplistic (Akhtar-Danesh, 2017b)), a 
sparse employment of standard R-methodological factor analytic techniques (e.g., Cronbach’s 
alpha), and the use of factor analysis instead of the generally preferred person-grouping 
technique of cluster analysis. To be clear, many Q-methodologists do articulate normative 
assumptions, but normative assumptions are not often connected to particular methods choices. 
For example, from a pragmatist perspective, the use of factor analysis instead of cluster analysis 
is preferred in Q-methodology for three primary reasons: (1) ontologically, viewpoints are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive or possessed by people; (2) a purposeful sample does not allow 
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generalizing to the greater population, which suggests that understanding how many people 
adhere to a particular viewpoint in a sample is not all that informative and; (3) perhaps most 
importantly, cluster analysis does not provide the same insight and nuance into how the entire set 
of items were prioritized (i.e., it does not allow for the development of factor arrays). To 
highlight the different potential contributions of Q- and R-methodology, a few examples are 
provided in relation to the Gila study.  
 
6.5.1.1. Q-methodology and national forest plan revision 
As clearly stated, the typified viewpoints represented by the factor arrays above cannot be 
generalized to the greater population, and so forest decision-makers do not understand how the 
viewpoints are distributed across the population. However, there are several other potential 
benefits for planning and management that a Q-methodology study focused on a human-nature 
relationship can provide. The potential benefits are clearly outlined in Armatas et al. (In Press) 
and Armatas et al. (2017b), which included two broad categories of benefits: (1) public relations 
and; (2) decision-making. The former broad benefit highlights the potential ability of the typified 
viewpoints, as reflected by the factor arrays, to help members of the general public understand 
each other in a way that may facilitate empathy for others. Furthermore, the factor arrays can 
provide managers with a cognitively manageable way to visualize the diverse viewpoints of the 
public, and the fact that the result are not generalizable could be framed as a positive in this 
context—as the approach does not imply the prioritization of some viewpoints over others. 
Another benefit of the Q-methodology viewpoints is that it may add legitimacy to other peoples’ 
perspectives through the tangible and understandable factor array illustrations. If there is 
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skepticism among the public about a particular shared viewpoint, then seeing the factor array and 
understanding it came from a structured scientific process may lend credence to the viewpoint.   
Regarding the ‘decision-making’ benefit, Q-methodology can provide an understanding 
of perceived tradeoffs among elements of the human-nature relationship, which may help 
decision-makers understand the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of a particular decision (Armatas et al., In 
Press). For instance, the factor arrays for the utilitarian and water archetype (Figure 6.5 and 6.6, 
respectively) reflect the view that livestock grazing is important within forest plan revision, 
whereas the environmental archetype (Figure 6.7) views this more negatively. This 
understanding helps to highlight “what archetypes are sensitive to changes in the provision of 
particular ecosystem services” (Armatas et al., In Press:80). 
The understanding of the viewpoints provided to managers and planners is 
comprehensive in that all the items ranked are included in the factor arrays. In the case of the 
Gila, this allows for an understanding of how the entire set of items relate to one another. While 
forcing people to tradeoff different items in this fashion may not always be appropriate, it is a 
suitable task within the context of forest plan revision, which is focused on maintaining social, 
economic, and ecological sustainability. The ecosystem services contributing to this three-tiered 
sustainability are potentially conflicting in a number of ways, and while people may ‘want it all’, 
that does not necessarily reflect the reality of planning and management.  
As a final point, Q-methodology forces the consideration and prioritization of the entire 
set of items (R-methodologists would note that cognitive abilities of respondents only justifies 
the ranking of a smaller set of items), which has implications for interpretation. As mentioned 
above, even if participants are only actively interested in a limited number of ecosystem services 
in Table 6.8, the Q-sorting activity requires that some level of relevance is assigned to each one. 
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Unlike a survey item, which often includes a ‘do not know’ or ‘no opinion’ option, Q-sorts 
assume that each item can be reasonably placed within a viewpoint. Even though the center of 
the Q-sorting activity (i.e., the middle of the forced distribution) is reserved for items that may be 
neutral, less relevant, or not understood, there is the possibility that meaning is being assigned to 
items when there may none. There is also the possibility that people place cards that are 
irrelevant or misunderstood toward the left side of the distribution (i.e., the negatively salient 
side). This stresses the importance of providing thorough and clear instructions to participants 
prior to a Q-sort, as well as engaging in a follow-up discussion about each individuals Q-sort. 
This latter point is critical. While there is certainly room for improvement with the follow-up 
discussion element of Q-methodology (namely, better integration of qualitative research 
methods), the ability to add depth through discussion is a benefit to planners and managers who 
are managing people as much as natural resources.    
On the other hand, and from a social learning perspective, the ranking of all items may be 
a positive aspect of Q-sorting. The reality of forest planning and management is that any given 
individual may only be interested in a few issues, but when the general public is considered at 
large it is likely that all ecosystem services in Table 6.8 are relevant. That is, while not all 
ecosystem services are relevant to all people, each individual ecosystem service is likely relevant 
to somebody. Consequently, when considering 122 people who each consider a handful of 
ecosystem services to be relevant, by forcing thoughtful interaction with all items, there may be 
increased potential for people to learn about the variety of viewpoints different from their own 
through an understanding of the variety of ecosystem services derived from national forests that 
support human well-being. In this context, Q-methodology may benefit from less focus on 
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parsimonious constructs; a focus that may result in the deletion of redundant and/or cross-
loading variables.    
As will become evident below, that which is provided by Q-methodology differs from 
that provided by an R-methodology study; however, these differences may be complementary in 
some cases.   
  
6.5.1.2. R-methodology and national forest plan revision 
The ability to estimate the prevalence and strength of psychological constructs within the 
context of environmental values across a general population is the most obvious difference 
provided by R-methodological approaches. Again, for the purposes of discussion, let us assume 
that the R-methodology results presented above reflect those gathered from a random sample of 
the population using a survey instrument whereby each of the ecosystem services in Table 6.8 
were individual questions in Likert-scale format. If this were the case, then the six factors could 
be related to the population in a variety of ways.  
One could understand, for instance, if particular income levels were associated with a 
difference in preference for the provision of ecosystem services in the ‘wilderness versus 
multiple-use’ factor. These differences are typically expressed in degree, based upon the factor 
scores assigned to each construct, and they would be interpreted as the different subgroups of 
people being located at different places on the latent dimension. The ability to connect people to 
latent constructs with some degree of strength is potentially beneficial to decision-makers as it 
can help to set priorities, and since the results are meant to represent the population at large then 
such priorities could be treated in the same manner as a vote. Additionally, groups (and their 
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associations with factors) can be related to other characteristics, such as geographic dispersion 
and behavior, including jobs, membership with relevant organizations, preferred recreation 
activities, and tolerance of encountering other recreationists on the forest. Such knowledge is 
important for decision-makers charged with facilitating sustainability and accommodating a host 
of human-nature relationships. However, it should not be assumed that this knowledge is all that 
is needed in the face of complex ecological problems such as forest planning; indeed, a 
pragmatist EE would argue the focus on tradeoffs and the potential social learning benefits of Q-
methodology are also important components.  
 
6.6. The big takeaways of Q versus and R 
As mentioned at the outset of this chapter, the debate surrounding Q-methodology and R-
methodology has generally been unproductive. While one could argue that the persistent 
skepticism about Q-methodology likely resulted in those applying it to better articulate what it 
does (and does not) provide, it could also be argued that misdirected critiques have resulted in 
the methodology being adopted less. Or perhaps most importantly, it could be argued that the 
stagnant debate has hampered communication and, thus, potential methodological integration. 
Regardless, the fact that the debate remains (albeit Brown et al. (2015) suggested that the 
critiques are less frequent in current times) implies that there is still a lack of clarity related to the 
different approaches.  
This chapter focused on weighing in on this debate through a pragmatist EE lens, which 
involved a wary assessment of both the statistical approaches and the underpinning normative 
assumptions, as well as a comparison of results of analyzing the same data set with the two 
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traditions. It must be noted that this chapter is not authoritative or exhaustive, particularly as it 
relates to the discussion of normative assumptions of R-methodology and the practical 
implication of the different ontological assumptions underpinning the two approaches. However, 
asserting that Q- and R-methodology provide different types of understanding of the human-
nature relationship, which both support natural resource planning and management in important 
ways is perhaps well-supported. Two main takeaways are provided in conclusion.   
First, we are a collective, 7.5 billion strong, and so despite the limitations of aggregation 
and generalizability, there is a need to consider human-nature relationships in chunks.  That is, 
understanding 7.5 billion relationships is not possible for the purposes of day-to-day normative 
sustainability, so there is a need to generalize to some extent. R-methodology has developed the 
tools to do this. However, relying singularly on such tools is untenable as well. Adding depth and 
nuance to our understanding of the human-nature relationship with exploratory and abductive 
methods such as Q-methodology is needed for communicating with and engaging the public in 
planning and management processes. Q-methodology, by virtue of its forced distribution, can put 
the public in the shoes of managers and planners. With a handful of important human-nature 
relationship elements, the exercise makes the impossible task of meeting a three-tiered 
sustainability feel tangible.  
Second, in addition to supporting planning and management with a more comprehensive 
understanding of the human-nature relationship, it seems that Q-methodology and R-
methodology could inform each other methodologically. As Q-methodologists spend hours 
inspecting factor arrays and the associated comments provided by respondents in order to 
provide a compelling, concise, and well-supported interpretation of a particular viewpoint, 
abductions may emerge. For instance, a suggested interpretation above was that the factor with 
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two positive loaders (research and science, and education and interpretation) and a single 
negative loader (hunting and fishing) was due to a concern that additional science is a reason to 
restrict hunting and fishing. This is an abduction, based primarily on a finding of the Shoshone 
study related to motorized recreation. An R-methodology study is well equipped to test this 
hypothesis.  
Of course, this point could be criticized by those concerned about ‘reifying’ Q-method 
viewpoints, as mentioned by Danielson (2009). But, a pragmatist EE would suggest that as long 
as the principle of wary assessment is embraced, then it is perhaps not too risky a pursuit. 
Additionally, it should not be implied, or always assumed that interpretive research always 
precedes more positivistic research. Generally, a pragmatist EE would avoid prioritizing either 
method, as it suggests one approach is interesting, perhaps, while the other is the “real” science. 
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7. SOCIAL-ECOLOGICAL SYSTEMS RESEARCH: POSITIONING THE HUMAN-
NATURE RELATIONSHIP AMONGST IT ALL 
SES research represents “a re-integration of thinking about, analyzing and studying 
humans as an integral part of the biophysical world. Nature no longer simply sets the context in 
which social interactions take place. Likewise, the human enterprise is not an external 
disturbance acting upon an ecosystem” (Schoon & Van der Leeuw, 2015:167). As noted by 
Folke et al. (2016:1), the SES approach “emphasizes that people, communities, economies, 
societies, cultures are embedded parts of the biosphere and shape it, from local to global scales”, 
and vice versa. According to Colding and Barthel (2019), this fundamental ontological belief 
has, over the course of 20 years, led to three major sources of inspiration: (1) the original SES 
conceptualization by Berkes and Folke (1998), which focused on combining ideas of institutional 
resilience (i.e., the way in which natural resource systems, mostly common property regimes, are 
managed by humans through cultural norms, policies, etc.) with ecological resilience (i.e., 
ecological knowledge related to the self-organization of ecosystems); (2) the robustness 
definition of SES research developed by Anderies et al. (2004), which expanded the definition of 
the social element of SESs to account for designed system resilience (i.e., robustness), whereby 
humans are seen to consciously shape the institutions of the system and; (3) the multitier 
conceptualization developed by Elinor Ostrom and others (McGinnis & Ostrom, 2014; Ostrom, 
2007, 2009), which focused on creating a shared language to discuss and understand the myriad 
variables, both social and ecological, that comprise complex natural resource management 
systems.         
The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that social-ecological systems (SES) 
research can facilitate the operationalization of a pragmatist EE. That is, SES research can help 
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to position a comprehensive understanding of the human-nature relationship within the larger 
system by highlighting a broad range of ‘variables’, including governance institutions (e.g., laws, 
administrative rules, social norms) and biophysical systems (e.g., watersheds), which are likely 
to interact and affect human-nature relationships in a variety of ways. 
From a pragmatist EE perspective, this is critical information, as a more comprehensive 
understanding of the human-nature relationship (variable) is, on its own, insufficient for 
decision-making, communication, and social learning within the context of complex 
environmental problems. Returning to Bryan Norton’s language related to normative 
sustainability (which partly borrowed from Amartya Sen), a pragmatist EE strives to identify and 
understand the broad range of ‘opportunities’ important to human-nature relationships, but it is 
recognized that there are ‘constraints’ (or a lack of constraints) that influence the realization of 
such opportunities. SES research can highlight these constraints and potentially how they interact 
with human-nature relationships. The broad range of variables influential in SESs can also 
underscore the various knowledge needs, much of which is broadly covered within the 
conservation sciences. It could be argued then that SES research can also facilitate an 
understanding of the role of a pragmatist EE relative to the broad conservation (social) sciences.  
It addition, it is argued that a pragmatist EE can benefit SES research which, as discussed 
below, is itself facing a bit of an identity crisis. Specifically, the main arguments of this chapter 
are: 
 A pragmatist EE, with the clearly stated normative assumptions established above, 
establishes a stance on what SES research does. Namely, it is a heuristic or conceptual 
mapping tool, not a formal decision-making apparatus complete with quantitative 
predictive models.  
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 SES research can support a pragmatist EE by highlighting where governance within the 
context of complex environmental problems can be improved (i.e., it can help to 
‘operationalize’ pragmatist EE research findings in practice);  
 A pragmatist EE can help to address the critique that the social system is oversimplified 
within SES research (e.g., that preferences are assumed as homogenous, SES does not 
allow for human agency, etc.) and; 
 SES research can help a pragmatist EE acknowledge the missing knowledge gaps (i.e., 
avoid the ‘so-much-is-missing critique’ outlined in Section 5.2.7); 
In order to make these arguments, this chapter proceeds with a basic justification of the proposed 
integration of SES research and a pragmatist EE, which is that they fundamentally share origins 
and general goals. Second is a general review of SES research, including common criticisms, 
areas of agreement with regard to ontology, epistemology, and axiology, parallels with the 
normative assumptions in pragmatist EE, and the myriad frameworks currently available for 
application within SES research. Third, a methods section for the analysis herein is presented, 
which includes a justification for the chosen SES framework, a brief overview of the study on 
human-nature relationships on the Shoshone National Forest, and the basic goals and limitations 
of the analysis. Finally, the four aforementioned (bulleted) arguments are discussed and 
supported with examples primarily related to forest planning and management.  
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7.1. The common origins, goals, and challenges of social-ecological systems research and 
ecological economics 
Social-ecological system (SES) research and EE have much in common. First and 
foremost, Colding and Barthel (2019:1) places EE at the birth of the SES concept:  
The [SES] concept was originally used in a transdisciplinary research project at 
the Beijer Institute of Ecological Economics that started in early 1998. The 
purpose behind this project, referred to as “Dynamics of Ecosystem-Institution 
Linkages for Building Resilience,” was to analyze critical linkages in social-
ecological systems, and to generate insights on how to interpret, respond to, and 
manage feedbacks from complex adaptive systems.    
Cote and Nightingale (2011) also connected the SES concept with EE and the Beijer Institute; 
interestingly, the Beijer Institute was mentioned above (Section 3 footnote) as EE was discussed 
within the context of transdisciplinary science and sustainability. These early efforts shared 
many of the same ideas, such as the ‘coevolutionary paradigm’ (Folke et al., 2005; Kallis & 
Norgaard, 2010; Norgaard, 1994; Ropke, 2005).  
The common roots of EE and SES were generally motivated by concerns stressed in the 
Brundtland Report, which yielded similar broad objectives. Reflecting the early ideas of Berkes 
and Folke (1998),  one primary goal of SES research was stated by Folke and Gunderson 
(2012:55) as developing “strategies that build resilience rather than attempt to control for optimal 
production and short-term gain” while also harnessing human ingenuity to encourage sustainable 
development approaches that are cognizant of biosphere limitations. A common intuition that 
emerged in response to such ambitious goals was the inadequacy of any single approach or 
discipline in the face of complex environmental problems. According to Adger (2006:269, 
emphasis added), a number of research traditions focus on elaborating “the nature of social-
ecological systems while using theories with explanatory power for particular dimensions of 
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human-environment interactions.” In other words, due to the all-encompassing nature of SESs, a 
single researcher is likely to study some component of a SES and then position that study within 
the broader framework. Presumably, this exercise can both contextualize the particular 
interaction being studied within the SES at large, and advance theory about how particular 
variables within the system interact.    
Of course, a consequence of disciplinary integration and a focus on complex SESs is a 
nebulous scientific landscape, as reflected by hybrid disciplines, and the lack of a unifying 
methodology. Interrelatedly are issues of scientific identity, which within the context of EE were 
clearly established above. However, identity issues were also recently discussed within the 
context of SES research. In an exploration of 20 years of social-ecological systems discourse, 
Colding and Barthel (2019:8) called for a more unifying definition of the SES concept, lest the 
door is left “open for scholars to come up with their own homegrown interpretations and 
definitions of SES, creating an overall confusion of the concept’s scientific relevance.” 
Similarities between EE and SES research can also be found in the critiques of the respective 
fields, including criticizing an adherence to overly reductionist mathematical formalism (and the 
resulting neglect of nuance) and a homogenization of complex social entities (e.g., preference 
homogeneity, atomistic ontological assumptions). The similar origins, goals, and challenges of 
SES research and EE suggest that synergies exist for the benefit of both general efforts. 
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7.2.  Normative assumptions of social-ecological systems research: consensus may be 
impossible, but clarity is not 
  The idea that social and natural systems are separate entities, or that all social interactions 
are simply occurring independent of some environmental backdrop has, in numerous arenas, 
been dispatched for the idea that society and the environment interact in diverse ways creating 
equally diverse outcomes. Integrated systems, from this perspective, have been variously dubbed 
‘coupled human and natural systems’, ‘coupled human-environment systems’, ‘socio-
environmental systems’, ‘social-environmental systems’, and ‘social-ecological systems’. In the 
literature, these various terms appear to be as treated synonyms, though some authors have made 
explicit distinctions, such as between the meaning ‘human’ and ‘social’ (Scholz, 2011; Scholz & 
Binder, 2004). The chosen metaphor in this dissertation is ‘social-ecological systems’ (SESs), 
which is a choice based upon its prevalence in the literature. 
The application of a SES perspective is a common denominator within a number of 
research traditions, including ecological economics. This may partly explain its increasing 
popularity.  According to Schoon and Van der Leeuw (2015), research on SES has grown 
exponentially from 30 citations in 1970 on the topic to over 14,000 in 2013. Colding and Barthel 
(2019) illustrated a similar trend between 1998 and 2016. In light of this rapid increase in 
popularity, it is perhaps unsurprising that SES research struggles to find a united identity; that is, 
as many apply the idea in different ways, its meaning becomes less clear. Like EE, its rapid 
increase in popularity has resulted in calls for answers to the “what are we doing question”. It 
seems that the multiple applications of SES frameworks is a good thing, and given the variety of 
worldviews and paradigmatic beliefs in the conservation sciences one would not expect complete 
consensus on the exact nature of SESs (ontology), how and what constitutes knowledge about 
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such SESs (epistemology), and the purposes of SES research (axiology). However, being clear 
with each application, as to what normative assumptions are underpinning the work, is critical 
for a coherent conservation social science.  
Like the research menu and the various benefits associated with each approach to 
partially understand human-nature relationships, coherence about SES research will facilitate 
communication with both other researchers and the general public. In order to add clarity as to 
how a pragmatist EE views SES research, it is necessary to highlight the various stances 
surrounding the subject. Following pragmatism, the contrast between different views may lead to 
greater agreement about the “what are we doing question”. To start, common critiques of a 
positivistic SES research are provided. This qualifier is added, because it would be unfair and 
confusing to label the critiques below as targeting SES research in general. Not all practice SES 
research through a positivistic lens, and it is arguable that the type of SES conceptualization 
being criticized was not the original intent. Specifically, the original intent of SES researchers 
(e.g., Berkes, Folke, Ostrom) was not to develop formal models whereby all variables (both 
social and environmental) can be modelled formally and quantitatively. To be clear, the critiques 
are profound and important, and they are generally accepted and reflected in the chosen 
conceptualization of SES presented herein. The balance, or perhaps vacillation, between 
reduction and complexity (as discussed in Section 5.2.2.1) is an important goal of a pragmatist 
EE, as so it is with a discussion of SES research.  
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7.2.1. Common critiques of positivistic SES research 
Olsson et al. (2015) provided a rather harsh critique in their article partly entitled, ‘why 
resilience is unappealing to social science’. While SES research has been adopted widely (and 
thus does not necessarily need to be framed by resilience theory) (Stojanovic et al., 2016), the 
critique by Olsson et al. (2015) remains as a critique of SES research for two reasons. First, SES 
research is heavily influenced and, to some extent (at least historically), is inextricably tied to 
ecological resilience theory. As shown below, this is particularly true when conceptualizing how 
systems function. Second, Olsson et al. (2015) are criticizing the prospect of resilience thinking 
being applied as a ‘boundary concept’ for integrating social and natural dimensions of 
sustainability, which is an overarching goal of SES research. Their critique is centered on five 
principals in resilience theory that “create theoretical tensions and methodological barriers 
between the natural and social sciences and thus stand in the way of a constructive dialogue on 
knowledge integration between disciplines” (Olsson et al., 2015:2).  
The five principals in resilience theory considered are: ‘systems ontology’, ‘system 
boundary’, ‘equilibria, thresholds, and feedback mechanisms’, ‘self-organization’, ‘the notion of 
function and functionalism.’ Regarding system ontology, the primary point is that some social 
scientists are reluctant to use systems as a way to describe social reality and, furthermore, the 
attempts to do so have been controversial and the systems conceptualized have been quite 
different from that in resilience theory and SES research. The second critique is with regard to 
the difficulty of deciding on what constitutes the boundary of a system, which is perhaps not 
unique to resilience theory.  
The third issue relates to the application of ecological systems concepts related to 
equilibria, thresholds, and feedbacks, and the authors suggest that applying these concepts to 
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social systems is problematic. For instance, in SES research, systems are considered to have 
thresholds that, when exceeded, “result in changed system feedbacks that lead to changes in 
function and structure” (Walker et al., 2006:2). And according to Olsson et al. (2015), the idea 
that social systems change not only function but structure (e.g., institutions) is perhaps 
unrealistic. Regarding feedbacks, it has been suggested that the concept applied to ecological 
systems (i.e., positive and negative feedbacks) is too simplified for social systems, because the 
interactions in the latter are dictated by norms and agency as opposed to structural forces 
(Davidson, 2010; Olsson et al., 2015).  
The issue of agency, or perhaps the lack thereof, in SES research is a common critique. 
Several have suggested that a systems conceptualization is problematic when integrating natural 
and social systems because it does not account/allow for agency (Cote & Nightingale, 2011; 
Davidson, 2010; Fabinyi et al., 2014; Murphy et al., 2017; Olsson et al., 2015), or the idea that 
individuals make choices largely based on their own free will (as opposed to be guided by larger 
social forces). Stojanovic et al. (2016:2) noted that SES research “inadequately theorize and 
operationalize ‘the social’.” This critique stems from the idea in SES research that systems are 
self-organizing without intent (Levin, 1998). Though, as pointed out by Walker et al. (2004:7), 
while this may be the case, “the capacities and intent of the human actors strongly influence the 
resilience and trajectory of the SES.” This idea that human actors have agency, yet the systems 
themselves are self-organizing, is a problem according to Olsson et al. (2015).  
The idea of a self-organizing system makes sense in ecology, as there is often an 
overarching driver, the ‘attractor’. For instance, “all leaves in a deciduous boreal forest orient 
themselves toward the sun to optimize the amount of sunlight that they can capture, thus 
maximizing the uptake of solar energy, which is an attractor of that system” (Olsson et al., 
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2015:4). In the social realm, the ‘market’ as conceptualized by Adam Smith with the ‘invisible 
hand’ idea is provided as an example, as market equilibria are the result of decentralized and 
nonintentional processes that occur regardless of the awareness of those participating in the 
market (Olsson et al., 2015; Ullmann-Margalit, 1978). While consumers in a market are free to 
choose whatever they prefer, it is perhaps debatable as to whether their free will is constrained 
by overarching forces such as budget and utility.  
 The final critique to be discussed is the notion of function applied within SES research. 
The primary concern is that an SES view “is implicitly based on an understanding of society that 
resembles consensus theories in sociology, according to which shared norms and values are the 
foundation of a stable harmonious society in which social change is slow and orderly – and 
where, in analog, resilience thus become the equivalent of stability and harmony or the good 
norm” (Olsson et al., 2015:5, emphasis added). With regard to ‘consensus’ theories, Olsson et al. 
(2015) suggest that transformational change is often explained by conflict theories in sociology, 
where differences in opinions and values result in conflict (typically against those in power), and 
thus can result in radical change. This idea underpins the suggestion by Fabinyi et al. (2014:2) 
that SES research is biased by “the tendency to aggregate or homogenize social complexity and 
thereby assume that people’s interest, expectations, and experiences are the same.” Regarding 
the ‘good norm’, this highlights another ‘bias’ identified by Fabinyi et al. (2014), which is that it 
is value laden and mostly assumed to be a good thing.  
 Cote and Nightingale (2011) question whether SES research allows for an understanding 
of equity and justice through questions of who ‘resilience outcomes’ benefit, and they suggest 
that a focus on the function of institutions implicitly adopts a conservative approach to social 
change that may mask normative factors. Some are concerned that SES research, with its 
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functionalist approach, is too heavily aligned with the neoliberal economics paradigm (Olsson et 
al., 2015). These critiques are underscored by the debate between deliberative democracy and 
critical theory, as discussed in relation to the limitations of a pragmatist EE (Section 5.3). Indeed, 
researchers with a background in critical theory often question SES research (Stojanovic et al., 
2016).  
 These critiques are not presented to set up a systematic response to each individual point, 
but instead to highlight the basic areas of concern related to the SES research paradigm. 
Fundamentally, the critiques highlight basic concerns related to the application of a positivistic 
ontology embraced in ecological resilience theory to social units, both at the individual and 
aggregated level. This is a valid concern, particularly because SES research emerged from 
research traditions that lean toward an objectivist ontology within a positivistic paradigm. 
According to Schoon and Van der Leeuw (2015), SES research is historically influenced by the 
coalescence of thought in political economics, ecology and its theory of resilience, and 
complexity science (an approach interested in complex, dynamic, and unpredictable systems) 
over the past 25 years.  
However, the concerns are mostly referring to a simplistic, and fairly literal transfer of 
ecological principles to the social realm, and the question is whether this is the intent of those 
adopting an SES perspective. That is, to what extent are the principles of resilience theory and 
systems thinking embraced? Are the principles perfectly transferable theories to the social 
domain, or are they metaphors and basic heuristics meant to guide understanding? A pragmatist 
EE, given its normative assumptions, would certainly caution against developing definitive 
formal models of SESs, as literal extension of ecological concepts to the social realm 
misrepresents and distorts decades of work by scholars in various fields, such as sociology. A 
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pragmatist EE suggests that the ecological principles serve better as metaphors and heuristics; 
ideas such a feedback and threshold can create a common language to compare theories, which 
was an original intent of Ostrom’s framework. Interestingly, even within ecology resilience 
theory more narrowly there was a hesitation to claiming definitive models. As C.S. Holling, an 
ecologist, early EE thinker, and SES pioneer noted in his seminal work on resilience theory: 
“however, complex, [ecological models] are still so simple that they should not be viewed in a 
definitive and quantitative way. They are more powerfully used as a starting point to organize 
and guide understanding” (Holling, 1973:6). This sentiment has carried over to complex SESs, as 
Holling (2001:391) stated, we can never fully understand complex SESs, “we are always left 
with best judgments, not certainties.” 
The primary point related to these critiques is that many practicing SES research would 
likely accept, for instance, that actors do not have homogenous interests; indeed, complex 
systems are explicitly assumed to be heterogeneous (Liu  et al., 2007). It also seems that the 
above critiques have at least been heard. For instance, as pointed out by Schlüter et al. (2017), 
formal modeling of SESs requires, on the human behavioral side, finding relevant theories, 
grappling with the incompleteness of decision-making theories, and introducing causality with 
regard to how psychological, social, and environmental factors includes decision-making. 
Schlüter et al. (2017:23) accepted these challenges, despite that: “In sum, the challenge of 
modellers is to identify and transform relevant theories on human decision-making into crisp 
causal relationships, while the best available knowledge is fragmented, context dependent and 
descriptive. Given these challenges, it is no surprise that many models rely on rational choice, 
which is based on a clear, unified and well-established theory that has and can be easily 
formulated in mathematical equations.” While this continued pursuit of formal quantitative 
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models of SESs, despite the clear limitations, would likely mystify some, a pragmatist EE would 
withhold judgment until the case was made as to how such work could enhance communication, 
social learning, and decision-making toward normative sustainability. Short of good arguments 
toward this end, a pragmatist EE views SES research as a heuristic, and it can be argued that this 
is the primary intent of much of the SES research community. But, the question remains, a 
heuristic of what, how is it developed, and for what purpose?    
 
7.2.2. Ontology and the nature of social-ecological systems 
Integrated SESs are assumed to be composed of various components (or variables), 
where the different components interact with one another creating outcomes and feedbacks in 
complex ways. These components, often described as governance or institutional structures are 
common ontological units of analysis in SES research. Berkes and Folke (1998) focused on 
institutions and property rights. The meaning of ‘institutions’ is, perhaps, somewhat 
counterintuitive; typically referring to rules (e.g., 2012 Forest Planning Rule), laws (e.g., Clean 
Air Act), and societal norms (e.g., not littering). The focus on governance institutions in SES 
research is stressed by many, and is perhaps the most common unit of analysis in SES research. 
Additionally, the focus on ‘human-nature interactions’ constitutes an ontological unit of analysis 
(Adger, 2006; Liu  et al., 2007). According to Schoon and Van der Leeuw (2015:169), the 
interaction identified by SES frameworks “serve as building blocks for understanding how 
institutions and people co-produce outcomes.” This is consistent with the focus on the processes, 
elements, and linkages that comprise the governance of systems (primarily water systems in this 
specific context) (Pahl-Wostl, 2009; Pahl-Wostl et al., 2010). However, there are few bounds as 
to what constitutes a component or variable in an SES (hence the ‘amongst it all’ in the title to 
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this chapter). The broad scope of several frameworks (as shown below), and the general 
acceptance that a diversity of disciplines need to engage in SES research is testament to the 
broad range of potential units of analysis. Given this, it seems most appropriate to suggest that 
SES research is focused broadly on the system as an ontological unit, though nested within 
systems are a variety of variables which interact in a variety of ways. The complexity of SESs 
requires that some simplification for the purposes of understanding and research in practice, 
which is why specific interactions and variables within the system are ultimately the focus; 
though the system as a whole should remain in sight.  
What exact variables constitute a system, and how they interact is the major open 
question of SES research. Ecological and complex systems principles are generally discussed 
within this context, but the specifics of what, for instance, ‘feedbacks’ entail within the context 
of variable interactions is both open for discussion. Ideally, a broad range of disciplines engage 
in the discussion. That is, the various outcomes that take place within SESs are context 
dependent, and it is difficult (if not impossible) to declare that particular outcomes will always 
take place when particular variables are present within a SES (the system is not conceptualized 
like a car engine). Complex SESs are characterized by reciprocal effects and feedback loops, 
non-linear changes and thresholds, high uncertainty, surprises, legacy effects and time lags, and 
heterogeneity (Liu  et al., 2007). Reciprocal effects and feedback loops refer to the interactions 
between people and nature; for instance, the authors provide an example in Kenya where 
intensive agriculture for decades without application of additional nutrients leads to soil 
degradation and declining yields which, in turn, results in rapid conversion of the remaining 
forestland for additional agriculture. An example of a non-linear change is provided for a case in 
Wisconsin, where “fallen trees that provide critical fish habitat in lakes and stream drastically 
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decrease when housing density exceeds about seven houses per kilometer of shoreline”, and 
thresholds refer to the point where a system may change dramatically from one state to another 
(Liu  et al., 2007:1514). The changing of states of an SES, and the implicit suggestion that SESs 
can have multiple stable states, is rooted in ecological resilience theory. In his seminal paper, 
Holling (1973) questioned the traditional viewpoint that ecological systems fluctuated around a 
single equilibrium, and suggested that systems can move between multiple stable states. Clearly 
the lack of an ‘ideal’ state complicates decision-making and normative sustainability goals. But, 
ontologically it seems that SES research emphasizes that there are not necessarily multiple 
realities at an given time, but that SESs are dynamic and always changing, and that that change 
in a system is both unpredictable and may yield unprecedented outcomes.    
Due to the complex nature of SESs, it is assumed that ‘high uncertainty’ and ‘surprises’ 
are characteristic of the systems (Holling, 2001). Surprises refer to the occurrence of the 
unforeseen (e.g., when the introduction of a wildlife species to achieve some end goes wrong). 
Legacy effects and time lags refer to the temporal aspect of how human-nature interactions can 
have effects long into the future (or present effects resulted from historical human-nature 
interactions). Lastly, heterogeneity acknowledges that human-nature interactions vary across 
space, time and organizational units. Liu  et al. (2007:1516) noted, for instance, that “the 
socioeconomic difference among people in Wisconsin lead to different choices and behaviors, 
which in turn result in very different ecological outcomes than one would find were everyone to 
have the same preferences for ecosystem services”. Two other aspects of SESs yet to be 
discussed is that they are both ‘adaptive’ and ‘self-organizing’ (Levin, 1998; Walker et al., 
2004), where adaptability refers to the ability of human actors to influence the trajectory of the 
system toward some desirable state. 
295 
 
As a result of the qualities discussed above, Schoon and Van der Leeuw (2015:167) 
explained that “the behavior of a complex system is generally said to be emergent – behavior that 
cannot be inferred from the behavior of its components – and subject to self-organization so that 
some form of aggregated or global order emerges from uncoordinated local interactions. In short, 
the macro-level behavior or pattern of the system is more than the sum of the micro-level 
behaviors of its components.” The idea of a system being emergent was an underlying message 
in the initial work on ecological systems by Holling (1973). Ontological implications of 
emergent systems include unpredictability and uncertainty, and a lack of universality. Clearly, 
these ontological characteristics will have implications for both epistemology and axiology, and 
the latter set of assumptions are discussed next.   
 
7.2.3. Axiology and the reasons for conducting SES research 
Like pragmatist philosophy and EE, the goals of SES research include both those related 
to a cognitive interest (understand and explain the world as it is) and an action interest (manage 
the world based on an idea of how it ought to be). Regarding the action interest, Berkes and 
Folke (1998) claim that motivation of SES research is primarily that the conventional approaches 
to resource management were mostly not resulting in sustainability. Therefore, SES thinking is 
focused on how to manage resources better. The stress on ‘management’ within the context of 
the SES paradigm implies some level of human meddling for the benefit of humans, which 
distinguishes it from ‘deep ecology’ (i.e., preservation of ecosystems independently of their 
utility to people) and the animal rights movement (Berkes & Folke, 1998). The overarching 
specific goal of SES research is improved governance. 
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Governance is commonly defined as a complex process of interaction and decision-
making, which necessarily goes beyond governmental organizations and includes diverse actors 
such as communities, private sector organizations, and non-governmental organizations (Graham 
et al., 2003; Lemos & Agrawal, 2006; Pahl-Wostl, 2015; Tropp, 2007). According to Stoker 
(1998:17, emphasis added), this broad conceptualization of the decision-making process “reflects 
the interest of the social science community in a shifting pattern in styles of governing”, and that 
governance is “ultimately concerned with creating the conditions for ordered rule and collective 
action.” As noted by Dietz et al. (2003), the delegation of power to environmental agencies (e.g., 
EPA) does not always lead to conflict resolution, which has led governments to experiment with 
different governance approaches to complement the more traditional management approaches.  
The term ‘action’ is emphasized above to stress the proactive element embedded within 
the governance concept, as clearly demonstrated within the definition of environmental 
governance provided by Lemos and Agrawal (2006:298): “environmental governance is 
synonymous with interventions aiming at changes in environment-related incentives, knowledge, 
institutions, decision making, and behaviors.” Stoker (1998) provided five ‘propositions’ with 
regard to the governance concept:  
1. Governance refers to a complex set of institutions that are drawn from but also 
beyond government. 
2. Governance recognizes the blurring of boundaries and responsibilities for tackling 
social and economic issues. 
3. Governance identifies the power dependence involved in the relationships between 
institutions involved in collective action. 
4. Governance is about autonomous self-governing networks of actors. 
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5. Governance recognizes the capacity to get things done which does not rest on the 
power of government to command or use its authority. It sees government as able to 
use new tools and techniques to steer and guide. 
SES research, ultimately, is focused on providing knowledge that can facilitate effective 
governance in the face of myriad environmental problems and the interrelated human 
insatiability for natural resources.    
 Given this general focus, the remaining open question in terms of axiology is related to 
the terminal goal(s) of the science itself (e.g., communication, prediction, understanding, or 
explanation, etc.). On this question, there is no clear agreement. For instance, Binder et al. 
(2013:1) suggested that the main focuses of SES research include: “combining material or 
energy flows and economic flows”; “modeling human behavior and drivers that specifically 
impact on an ecosystem or an ecosystem service”; “identifying and modeling specific goods that 
are relevant for the human system as well as for the ecological system” and; “studying resilience 
and adaptive management of social-ecological systems.” While these foci could imply a variety 
of terminal goals, the stress on modeling does imply some level of prediction and/or explanation.  
 Perhaps somewhat differently, SES research has, in large part, been about developing 
frameworks, which can provide common language regarding several components applied for 
viewing a particular reality (Binder et al., 2013; Ostrom, 2009). With this suggestion that SES 
research includes both ‘modeling’ and the development of ‘frameworks’, it is worthwhile to 
briefly define these terms. Rapoport (1985:256) stated: “conceptual frameworks are neither 
models nor theories. Although these latter terms are used in many different and often 
contradictory ways, let me suggest that models describe how things work, whereas theories 
explain phenomena. Conceptual frameworks do neither; rather they help to think about 
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phenomena, to order material, revealing patterns – and pattern recognition typically leads to 
models and theories.” As noted by McGinnis and Ostrom (2014), frameworks provide a basic 
vocabulary of concepts and terms that may be used to construct causal explanations. Theories 
posit “specific causal relationships among core variables. In contrast, a model constitutes a more 
detailed manifestation of a general theoretical explanation in terms of the functional 
relationships among independent and dependent variables important in a particular setting” 
(McGinnis & Ostrom, 2014:2, emphasis added).  
This nuanced difference between specific causal relationship of variables within an SES 
and a general explanation of all variables together is critical. First, it stresses that the SES 
framework itself is mostly empty in its projection of specific theories, which leaves open the 
opportunity for causal explanations, if appropriate, from a variety of disciplines. At the variable 
interaction level, for instance, sociological theories about change and social movements can be 
inserted into the overarching SES conceptualization. Second, it implies that no single theory will 
adequately capture how all the variables in an SES specifically interact, such an implication 
would seem counter to an emergent system and other ontological assumptions. This suggests that 
SES conceptualizations are heuristics, not formal prediction and decision-making tools at the 
overarching system level. The third point to be made is a note about the focus of language in 
pragmatism, which is that the use of ‘independent and dependent variables’ in the above 
definition of a model is potentially misleading, as statistical techniques such as regression 
analysis, which apply this language, are commonly focused on yielding assertions of causality. 
Given this potential for conflation, a pragmatist EE might recommend discarding the ‘model’ 
terminology all together, with perhaps ‘heuristic’ or ‘conceptual map’ as substitutes.  
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A focus on frameworks implies an abduction phase, which could potentially lead to more 
formal conclusions regarding prediction and causality. However, Colding and Barthel (2019:6) 
interpreted Ostrom’s multitier framework as mainly concerned with identifying variables that 
influence SESs, which may have been neglected otherwise, for the purpose of comparing 
different theories and developing a shared language for the purpose of “communication and 
wider understanding.” This interpretation of Ostrom’s work, which appears to represent a shared 
axiology among most SES researchers, follows from her challenge to the “presumption that 
scholars can make simple, predictive models of social-ecological systems (SESs) and deduce 
universal solutions, panaceas, to problems of overuse or destruction of resources” (Ostrom, 
2007:15181). While identifying causal effects among a specific, generally small set of variables 
in an SES may be a shared goal among SES researchers, there is certainly disagreement both 
about the generalizability of such effects across SESs as well as the extent to which such effects 
are understood (i.e., can causal effects be measured precisely and quantitatively, or is the 
understanding more general and qualitative?).   
 
7.2.4. Epistemology and methodology for understanding social-ecological systems 
Following Laudan (1984), paradigmatic assumptions are mutually defining and 
constraining, which means that ontological and axiological assumptions imply, with some level 
of specificity, epistemological and methodological assumptions. Unsurprisingly, given the range 
of disciplinary interest in SES research and the varying stances on ontology and axiology, there 
is no single epistemology or methodology to highlight.  Viewing the world in a holistic manner 
and embracing its complexity is considered as one of the more promising aspects of SES 
research (Berkes & Folke, 1998; Cote & Nightingale, 2011), but it is also a perspective that has 
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led to the general acceptance that SES research requires, very broadly, interdisciplinary and 
transdisciplinary research. Again, as Adger (2006:269, emphasis added) noted, a number of 
research traditions focus on elaborating “the nature of social-ecological systems while using 
theories with explanatory power for particular dimensions of human-environment interactions.” 
The general idea that SES research combines interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary 
approaches to construct frameworks, model, and/or theorize about complex systems is, perhaps, 
the common denominator. Regarding epistemology (how knowledge is judged in terms of 
validity) and methodology (how knowledge is gained), there seem to be no limitations. These 
questions are seemingly left to be addressed within the context of the various disciplines and 
research traditions participating in SES research.  
Other issues of epistemology such as who can know, or how knowledge is presumed to 
exist and be shared is equally as broad. However, given ontological assumptions such as the 
importance of context and the lack of universality, as well as the existence of time lags, these 
epistemological issues clearly remove the privilege commonly assigned to the western scientist 
(usually assigned to the positivistic paradigm). Indeed, the need for nuanced and locally specific 
knowledge clearly includes all types of research (e.g., all items on the research menu). 
Additionally, it includes traditional knowledge, which is a topic thoroughly discussed by Fikret 
Berkes, a prominent SES proponent (Berkes, 1999, 2009). Traditional knowledge, as discussed 
by Armatas et al. (2016), is systematically observed over generations, passed down and 
iteratively updated, and often locally specific; all important, arguably scientific, facets of 
knowledge within the context of SES research.  
 This brief discussion of normative assumptions of SES research establishes basic beliefs, 
but it is worth explicitly stating where a pragmatist EE stands on the normative assumptions of 
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SES research. Additionally, it may be helpful to place such assumptions next to those in a 
pragmatist EE. This is the focus of the final brief section prior to a discussion of methods.  
 
7.2.5. A summary of normative assumptions in social-ecological systems research and 
pragmatist ecological economics 
Table 7.1 summarizes the normative assumptions adopted for SES research for this 
dissertation and for a pragmatist EE. To facilitate the example of an SES analysis of human-
nature relationships, the basic assumptions of a pragmatist EE are also provided. As shown, SES 
research does not focus in on specific variables in all cases. Different SESs, and the purpose of a 
particular research project, will likely dictate what a conceptual map of an SES looks like, as 
well as the specifics of each individual variable. As discussed above, this requires several 
different approaches to fill in the details of the conceptual map or heuristic. This chapter 
proceeds with an example of how SES research and a pragmatist EE might relate to one another.  
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Table 7.1. Normative assumptions of SES research and a pragmatist EE 
SES research Pragmatist EE 
Ontological assumptions 
 Unit of analysis is the SES generally, with a 
specific focus on variables and their 
interactions.  
 Complex SESs span various spatial and 
temporal scales, included interacting variables 
with feedbacks, and are unpredictable, 
heterogeneous, non-linear, dynamic, context 
dependent (not universal), and emergent.    
 Unit of analysis is the human-nature 
relationship and the various, innumerable 
elements comprising it. 
 The human-nature relationship is complex, 
context dependent, nested within an SES, and 
dynamic and evolving. 
Axiological Assumptions 
 Providing a common language for the 
comparison of theories about composition and 
interaction of variables within an SES. 
 Provide a conceptual map or heuristic to 
generally describe SESs at large. 
 A typical focus on social and institutional 
factors.  
 Facilitate governance of natural resource 
systems toward normative sustainability. 
 Describe and understand the human-nature 
relationship comprehensively.  
 Communicate such relationships with the goal 
of enhancing social learning and establishing 
normative sustainability goals. 
 Develop and communicate concise 
methodological approaches to understanding 
to researchers and public. 
 Support decision-making by articulating 
complex human-nature relationships and 
positioning such relationships within the SES 
at large.  
Epistemological Assumptions 
 Comparing, contrasting, and potentially 
synthesizing different theories may yield 
improved understanding of specific 
variables and interactions.  
 Context-free generalizations of SESs at 
large is not possible (transferability is the 
goal).  
 Knowledge is derived through 
engagement of multiple disciplines. 
 Wary assessment and democratic deliberation 
yield tentative truths. 
 Context-free generalizations of 
comprehensive relationships is not possible 
(transferability is the goal).  
 Knowledge is derived through experience; 
science is systematic but not privileged 
because warranted and valuable assertions are 
needed. 
 
7.3. Methods for demonstrating the an social-ecological systems analysis of the Wind-
Bighorn Basin of Wyoming and Montana 
The purpose of this chapter, stated at the outset, is to demonstrate how SES research can 
help to operationalize the understanding of the human-nature relationship yielded by pragmatist 
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EE. To this end, a conceptual framework developed within SES research is applied to the Wind-
Bighorn Basin as an example. The hypothesis of this chapter is that SES can highlight relevant 
variables in the system that may, using Sen’s language, constrain (or not constrain) human-
nature relationships.  
This section lays out the methods for this analysis, which begins with a brief review of 
available SES frameworks and a discussion of the chosen conceptual framework. This discussion 
is followed by a brief description of the human-nature relationship research completed in the 
Basin. Finally, a basic discussion of how the SES framework is actually applied to the Basin is 
presented, along with a few caveats with regard to the analysis.  
 
7.3.1. The rationale for the chosen analytic framework 
Several SES frameworks have been developed and refined, primarily in the last 20 years. 
Binder et al. (2013) compared ten SES frameworks with regard to a variety of elements, 
including purpose, conceptualization of social system (e.g., resource users (actors) and the 
governance system that influences the actions), social scale (e.g., decision-makers, society, local 
stakeholders), spatial scale (e.g., regional, global), and types of interactions (e.g., interaction 
between social and ecological system). The ten frameworks, with their basic purposes, are listed 
in Table 7.2. For the purpose of illustrating the relationship between EE and SES research, 
several frameworks were ruled out (i.e., DPSIR, ESA, ES, MEFA, SLA, and TVUL) because 
they do not conceptualize social dynamics at a detailed level (Binder et al., 2013). For instance, 
Figure 7.1 is a general representation of the ecosystem services framework adapted from Martín-
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López et al. (2014) and, while it does generally show how the social system is integrated, there is 
little detail with regard to this integration. 
 
Table 7.2. Frameworks and their respective purpose 
Source: Adapted from Binder et al. (2013) 
 
For example, an ecosystem services ‘framework’ does not focus on social or institutional 
factors that may prevent someone from reaping an ecosystem service that supports their well-
being. According to Partelow and Winkler (2016:9), the ecosystem services concept is not 
Framework Purpose 
Driver, Pressure, State, Impact, 
Response (DPSIR) 
Develop an improved understanding of, indicators for, and appropriate 
responses to impacts of human activities on the environment along the causal 
chain-drivers-pressure-state-impact-responses. 
Earth Systems Analysis 
(ESA) 
Understand the global interactions in and dynamics of the earth system as 
well as its sustainable evolutions. 
Ecosystem Services (ES)  
 
Analyze the integral, dynamic, and complex interactions of biotic and abiotic 
components of an ecosystem in relation to the supply of services this system 
provides to support life on Earth. 
Human Environment Systems 
Framework (HES) 
 
Provide a methodological guide or template for analyzing the structure of 
social-ecological systems and understanding the processes and dynamics 
between the social and ecological systems as well as within different scales of 
the social system. 
Material and Energy Flow 
Analysis (MEFA) 
 
Analyze the metabolic profiles of societies. Analyze the material and energy 
flows as representing the metabolism of a society, region, or nation. 
Management and Transition 
Framework (MTF) 
 
Support the understanding of water systems, management regimes, and 
transition processes toward more adaptive management; enable comparative 
analyses of a wide range of diverse case studies; and facilitate the 
development of simulation models based on empirical evidence. 
Social-Ecological Systems 
Framework (SESF) 
 
Provide a common language for case comparison for organizing the many 
variables relevant in the analysis of SES into a multitier hierarchy that can be 
unfolded when needed, and for facilitating the selection of variables in a case 
study. 
Sustainable Livelihood 
Approach (SLA) 
 
Analyze which combination of livelihood assets enable the following of what 
combination of livelihood strategies with sustainable outcomes. 
The Natural Step (TNS)  
 
Provide a framework for planning toward sustainability based on: 
constitutional principles (how the system is constituted); outcome (principles 
for sustainability); and process to reach this outcome (principles for 
sustainable development). 
Vulnerability Framework 
(TVUL) 
Analyzes who and what are vulnerable to multiple environmental and human 
changes, and what can be done to reduce these vulnerabilities. 
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usually “applied as a holistic conceptual framework to explain the whole SES”; that is, it does 
not contribute significantly to an understanding of how governance or institutional structures 
influence provision of ecosystem services. It is within this arena that SES research can highlight 
what EE does not provide, which is why the ecosystem services framework is not chosen in this 
case. It is arguable that the ecosystem services concept is not a framework, but more of a concept 
or metaphor for highlighting how natural systems support human well-being. The latter is what 
gave rise to the ecosystem services concept in the first place (Norgaard, 2010). And so, while 
relevant, it is excluded from future discussion.   
The HES, MTF, and SESF appear to be the most appropriate for the assessment of the 
variety of (informal) variables of an SES that would influence human-nature relationships as 
conceptualized herein. Ultimately, the MTF framework was chosen as the primary framework, 
because it was developed with the expressed interest of analyzing complex water governance 
regimes, and it focuses on identifying the various elements, linkages and processes that 
constitute water management and governance in river basins (Pahl-Wostl, 2009; Pahl-Wostl et 
al., 2010). This latter aspect is critical, as it allows for capturing the social dynamics of how 
human-nature relationships are influenced by a variety of factors. As such, it is well suited for 
framing a study focused on improving water governance within the context of a large river Basin 
in the western United States. The study focused on water, complemented a biophysical 
vulnerability assessment, and included both a kind-with-tradeoffs approach and a degree-with-
tradeoffs approach. 
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Figure 7.1. Ecosystem services cascade that conceptualizes the SES 
 
Source: (Partelow & Winkler, 2016) 
 
7.3.2. The management-transition framework (with support from Ostrom’s SES) 
Although the MTF was chosen, the analysis presented below could have been provided 
within the context of the SESF. Both frameworks are directly informed by the Institutional 
Analysis and Development (IAD) framework developed by Ostrom (2005) and, according to 
Pahl-Wostl et al. (2010:574), “the IAD framework introduces some characterizations of policy 
processes and social interactions which are very useful for a process analysis.” Namely, ‘action 
arenas’ and ‘action situations’, which are concepts central in both frameworks, and are thus 
central in the hybrid presented herein. Pahl-Wostl et al. (2010) concisely explained: 
Action Arenas comprise Action Situations in which participants with diverse 
preferences interact, exchange goods and services, solve problems, or develop 
new rules…the notion of an Action Situation is very broadly interpreted in the 
MTF though. It captures interactions of individual actors who negotiate about a 
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specific problem as well as aggregated interactions among collective actors which 
lead to a general policy framework.  
It seems that the influence of the IAD framework on both the MTF and the SESF also resulted in 
the use of similar variables for defining the various subsystems, which makes them comparable.   
The MTF was the central output of an interdisciplinary research project including nearly 
40 partners and over 100 individual researchers (Pahl-Wostl et al., 2008). The schematic for the 
MTF provides a conceptual map for an unspecified water system (Figure 7.2). With regard to the 
different interactions between variables, lines without any arrow denote some unknown 
association. For instance, the ‘observed state of the water system’ is assumed to associate, 
though in an unknown way, with ‘evaluation criteria.’ The former variable includes the specific 
indicators that could be used as metrics for defining the desirability of the water system (Pahl-
Wostl et al., 2008), such as miles of blue ribbon trout fishing, availability of culturally important 
plants, or species biodiversity. These indicators are posited as important knowledge for public 
debate related to the governance of the system. ‘Evaluation criteria’ is that which ‘actors’ use to 
“evaluate the degree of satisfaction” with the observed state of the water system (Pahl-Wostl et 
al., 2008:86), which could include a specific target for miles of blue ribbon trout fishing, or the 
removal of a species from the threatened and endangered list. Arrows denote “a generalization 
([and add] ‘is a’ link – e.g. situated knowledge is a kind of knowledge)”. Lines with a diamond 
point denote an “aggregation (‘has a’ link – e.g. an actor has a mental model)” and, lastly, the 
arrow with ‘holds’ next to it denotes a clear unidirectional relationship. The significance of this 
unidirectional, ‘holds’ interaction between the ‘actor’ and ‘role’ variable is described by Pahl-
Wostl et al. (2008:86): 
‘Roles’ are based on a shared understanding of their meaning and function. A 
‘role’ is held by an ‘actor’ during an ‘action situation,’ whereas ‘roles’ belong to 
the ‘action situation’ and not to the ‘actor’. ‘Role has been derived from 
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“position” as used in the IAD framework. Given the link to game theory, position 
in IAD is linked to distinguishing players according to the pre-defined rules of the 
game. Similarly, a ‘role’ is linked to a range of possible actions and entitles actors 
holding this role to certain knowledge.  
 
With regard to interpreting Figure 7.2 more generally, each box represents a first-tier 
variable, each of which can be further specified. For instance, the ‘actors’ variable is defined by 
four different categories, corresponding with the four perspectives investigating in the SNF 
study. Each of the actor variables can be further defined by second-, or third-, level variables. 
Based upon the meaning of different connecting arrows, we can interpret actors as having 
‘mental models’, ‘evaluation criteria’, and ‘situated knowledge’. As another example, ‘action 
situations’ have ‘knowledge’, ‘actors’, and ‘roles’ (which are held by actors). It is worth defining 
‘mental models’, and distinguishing between ‘knowledge’ and situated knowledge’. According 
to Pahl-Wostl et al. (2008), mental models are “representations of the world in the minds of 
‘actors’”, which includes beliefs about what outcomes particular actions will yield, and the 
expectations of other actors. 
309 
 
Figure 7.2. Management-transition framework conceptualizing the water system of an unspecified SES 
Source: (Pahl-Wostl et al., 2008)  
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It is worth noting the constructivist subtext of the quote, as well as that Dewey’s view of 
experience subsumes the mental model, knowledge, and situated knowledge. Situated knowledge 
is defined as knowledge “activated” in a particular action situation, and it “captures the 
importance of framing and reframing and the embeddedness of knowledge in a social context” 
(Pahl-Wostl et al., 2008). The regular, non-situated knowledge variable captures “meaningful 
information and experience”, and access to information such as “reports” is provided as an 
example (Pahl-Wostl et al., 2008). It seems the distinction, in pragmatist parlance and the context 
of Dewey’s experience, is that situated knowledge is that information thought to be valuable 
assertions, which may break the habitual experience and trigger the secondary experience where 
deeper thinking and social learning commence. This is, if we assume that deception and lies are 
not part of situated knowledge, and surely many social theorists would not make such an 
assumption, including political ecologists. Non-situated knowledge seems to encompass 
warranted assertions, or that information that is generally accepted as tentative truth.   
Relative to the SESF schematic (Figure 7.3), the MTF provides a more detailed starting 
point in terms of first-tier variables (or ‘classes’ in the case of the MTF)—henceforth, variables 
is the chosen term20. Specifically, the SESF shows the interaction between eight first-tier 
variables, each of which subsumes lower level variables (Table 7.3), whereas the MTF starts 
with nearly 20 first-tier variables (each of which is further characterized by lower-level 
variables). A result of more variables is increased detail related to interactions, which is 
potentially preferable. Although refraining from adding too much detail in terms of interaction 
                                                 
20Terminology differs between the SESF and the MTF. The former uses ‘first-tier variable’ to denote systems, the 
action arena, and other settings, and the latter uses ‘classes’ as “classes of elements and their relations, attributes, 
and applicable methods that have been identified as important to describe water management systems” (Pahl-Wostl 
et al., 2008:83). Both the first-tier variables and the classes are further defined by lower-level variables or elements. 
To limit confusion, the term ‘variable’ is used, but it is used informally in that variables need not be represented 
quantitatively, nor do their interactions with other variables need to be represented mathematically.  
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aligns with the anti-foundationalist leanings of pragmatism, one can maintain a pragmatist 
approach by treating the MTF schematic as a starting point without treating proposed 
interactions as concrete.  
 
Figure 7.3. The Social-ecological system framework for representing complex systems 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: McGinnis and Ostrom (2014) 
 
Highlighting the general nature of the SESF (Figure 7.3) is not a criticism, as it was a 
deliberate design choice because it is intended to be tailored and detailed depending on the 
context. However, given the current focus on the water system, as well as the importance of 
communication within a pragmatist EE, the additional detail within the MTF is attractive. While 
the SESF schematic (Figure 7.3) is not used directly in this analysis, the development of an 
extensive list of potential relevant second-level variables (Table 7.3) is beneficial.  
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Table 7.3. First- and second-tier variables of an SES  
First-tier 
variable 
Second-tier variable First-tier 
variable 
Second-tier variable 
Social, 
economic, 
and political 
settings (S) 
S1 – Economic development 
S2 – Demographic trends 
S3 – Political stability 
S4 – Other governance systems 
S5 – Markets 
S6 – Media organizations 
S7 – Technology 
Resource 
units (RU) 
RU1 – Resource unit mobility 
RU2 – Growth or replacement rate 
RU3 – Interaction among resource units 
RU4 – Economic value 
RU5 – Number of units 
RU6 – Distinctive characteristics 
RU7 – Spatial and temporal distribution  
Resource 
systems 
(RS) 
RS1 – Sector (e.g., water, 
forests, pasture, fish) 
RS2 – Clarity of system 
boundaries 
RS3 – Size of resource system 
RS4 – Human-constructed 
facilities 
RS5 – Productivity of system 
RS6 – Equilibrium properties 
RS7 – Predictability of system 
dynamics 
RS8 – Storage characteristics 
RS9 – Location 
Actors (A) A1 – Number of relevant actors 
A2 – Socioeconomic attributes 
A3 – History or past experiences 
A4 – Location 
A5 – Leadership/entrepreneurship 
A6 – Norms (trust-reciprocity)/social 
capital 
A7 – Knowledge of SES/mental models 
A8 – Importance of resource 
(dependence) 
A9 – Technologies available 
Governance 
systems 
(GS) 
GS1 – Government 
organizations 
GS2 – Nongovernment 
organizations 
GS3 – Network structure 
GS4 – Property-rights systems 
GS5 – Operational-choice rules 
GS6 – Collective-choice rules 
GS7 – Constitutional-choice 
rules 
GS8 – Monitoring and 
sanctioning rules 
Action 
situations: 
Interactions 
(I) → 
Outcomes 
(O) 
I1 – Harvesting 
I2 – Information sharing 
I3 – Deliberation processes 
I4 – Conflicts 
I5 – Investment activities 
I6 – Lobbying activities 
I7 – Self-organizing activities 
I8 – Networking activities 
I9 – Monitoring activities 
I10 – Evaluative activities 
O1 – Social performance measures (e.g., 
efficiency, equity, accountability, 
sustainability) 
O2 – Ecological performance measures 
(e.g., overharvested, resilience, 
biodiversity, sustainability) 
O3 – Externalities to other SESs 
Related 
ecosystems 
(ECO) 
ECO1 – Climate patterns 
ECO2 – Pollution patterns 
ECO3 – Flows into and out of 
focal SES 
  
Source: Adapted from McGinnis and Ostrom (2014)   
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For instance, the MTF highlights the importance of considering excludability, subtractability, 
economic value, and variability of ecosystem services; however, consideration of the second-
level (and potential third-level) variables subsumed by the ‘resource unit’ (Table 7.3) potentially 
add further detail (e.g., how do the interactions between different resource units influence 
ecosystem services?). In summary, the MTF is operationalized with support from the variable 
development within the SESF. The generality and abstract nature of SES frameworks can be 
challenging to follow, an issue that will hopefully be assuaged by the analysis provided below.  
 
7.3.3. The Basin and the methods for understanding the human-nature relationship 
Application of an SES framework to the case study on the Shoshone National Forest 
(SNF) requires a brief overview of the background of the research. The details of this study are 
extensively documented elsewhere (Armatas et al., 2017a; Armatas, 2013; Armatas et al., 2018), 
with only a brief overview provided herein. The SNF study was initiated to provide a 
comprehensive understanding of the broad range of perspectives about the importance of water-
based ecosystem services, and the perceptions of what factors or influences could potentially 
affect the flow of important ecosystem services to society. This social-science study was 
intended to complement a biophysical vulnerability assessment by Rice et al. (2012), which 
suggested that water resources in the study area (Figure 7.4) were vulnerable to climate change 
and land-use change. The study included both a Q-methodology study and a choice modeling 
study, and the purpose was specifically to support the Forest Plan Revision process on the SNF. 
The rationale was that the SNF is a major part of the landscape, and its management and 
planning have a significant impact on the adjacent communities in the Wind/Bighorn River 
Basin (Basin). If the ambitious goals of the Forest Planning Rule are to be achieved (e.g., provide 
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for ecological, social, and economic sustainability both on and off the forest), then USFS 
decision-makers need to know their audience.  
What we found was that the social system is heterogeneous. There are a diverse range of 
perspectives about what ecosystem services are important, and in some cases the ecosystem 
services important to some people are conflicting (i.e., there is some level of subtractability or 
rivalry) with those ecosystem services important to others. Four general perspectives about what 
ecosystem services are important were uncovered and explored: the agricultural perspective 
(highly valued irrigation, water for stock, and the agricultural lifestyle), the environmental 
perspective (highly valued biodiversity conservation, conservation of keystone species, and other 
regulating ecosystem services), the Native American perspective (highly valued Native 
American cultural and spiritual use, water quality, and in-stream flow), and the recreation 
perspective (highly valued motorized winter recreation and river fishing). Each of these 
perspectives also highlighted specific drivers of change considered to be influential to their 
ability to derive these benefits from the water system.  
This information is potentially helpful for decision-makers as it serves as a nuanced and 
detailed reminder of the varied needs and wants of the nearby communities regarding the SNF 
and its surrounding area. However, the primary focus of the study was not to highlight structures, 
processes, and functions of the governance system that may be facilitating or impeding the 
receipt of these benefits. To be sure, the discussion of threats, and the focus on vulnerability, did 
provide some understanding of structures, processes, and functions of the governance system that 
may be influential (as discussed in Armatas et al. (2017a)). But, it remains, that the study did not 
explicitly focus on the governance system, and the various elements that may enhance or detract 
from one’s human-nature relationship.  
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Figure 7.4. Study area of the Wind-Bighorn Basin
Source: Armatas et al. (2017a) 
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 Therefore, the next section will apply the MTF framework to the Basin and, based upon 
the understanding yielded from the empirical research in the Basin, it may become clear what 
variables are relevant to managing the Basin’s water resources toward normative sustainability. 
That is, the general purpose of the SES framework applied herein, based on the express purpose 
of the MTF and SESF, is to understand the most important variables and processes to support 
adaptive water governance and management with a focus on transitioning toward a new regime. 
As suggested by Pahl-Wostl et al. (2010:578), a general research question within the context of 
the MTF framework might be: “What are the characteristics of multi-level governance regimes 
that increase adaptive capacity and foster or impede social learning and transitions towards 
adaptive water management?” One characteristic is the human-nature relationship, but 
positioning this characteristic within the SES and governance system more broadly may be 
helpful.  
 
7.3.4. Methods (and caveats) for applying the MTF to the Basin  
 Prior to presenting the results of analysis below, it is worth briefly highlighting how the 
framework is actually applied. The starting place is the MTF, as developed during an 
interdisciplinary study (‘NeWater project’) on integrated water management (Pahl-Wostl et al., 
2008). This framework, like most interpretations of SES frameworks, is a general starting point 
where additional detail is added via specific case studies. Additional general details can also be 
added with other SES frameworks, which as described above was the intent of including 
Ostrom’s framework. For instance, the analysis of the SES in the Basin includes a variable for 
‘operational outcomes’, which is not an original variable in the MTF. Inclusion of this variable 
from Table 7.3 specifies potential outcomes that actors within the Basin might propose.     
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The basic method for applying the SES to the Basin was, first and foremost, by equating 
‘actors’ with the human-nature relationships identified by the research in the Basin (Figure 7.5). 
Two points are required for clarification. First, as discussed in the previous chapter, Q-
methodology does not find groups of people, however, the choice modeling study did classify 
people via latent class analysis (Armatas et al., 2018), which found three classes of people, 
which we cautiously suggested represented the distribution of the Q-methodology viewpoints 
identified by Armatas (2013). The fourth, missing ‘actor’, in this the Native American viewpoint, 
which was not discovered via latent class analysis; the reason for this is almost certainly the 
result of a biased sample (i.e., very few Native American respondents) in the choice modeling 
study. However, the combination of the two studies suggests at least four general viewpoints 
worth consideration within the context of decision-making and sustainability. The second point 
is that the ‘actor’ variable in the MTF is broadly defined, with attributes including their “values, 
goals, and whether they are collective or individual” (Pahl-Wostl et al., 2008:87). For the 
analysis and application of the MTF below, ‘actors’ are not conceptualized as specific 
individuals or collectives, though such a specification would be potentially fruitful (perhaps with 
a social network analysis), instead they are conceptualized as unspecified embodiments of the 
four human-nature relationships explored in the Basin research. A fairly major caveat related to 
the partiality of these human-nature relationships is discussed in a moment, but first it is worth 
concluding the basic methods for the analysis below.  
Figure 7.5 presented in the next section basically mirrors the original MTF, except for a 
slight change in appearance (e.g., block arrows are used instead of diamond-pointed arrows). As 
a reminder, lines without any arrow denote some unknown association, thin arrows denote “a 
generalization (‘is a’ link – e.g. observed state of water system is a kind of knowledge”, block 
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arrows denote an “aggregation (‘has a’ link – e.g. an actor has a mental model)” and, lastly, the 
red arrows denote a clear unidirectional relationship. Another facet of the analysis below is that 
when specific variables correspond with each other (e.g., an actor is assumed to have a mental 
model in the MTF), this is reflected by a number proceeding a letter, which is an approach 
borrowed from the SES application by Bennett and Gosnell (2015). For example, the 
environmental actor (1A) has a mental model (1M), or rough perception of the world, that is 
driven by ecological sustainability ideals and the belief that public-land policy should, and can, 
help to achieve these ideals. The agricultural actors (2A), on the other hand, has a mental model 
(2M) that focuses on water law, the historical significance of agriculture in the Basin, and a 
livelihoods perspective. All variables that the ‘actors’ have (i.e., those with block arrows 
pointing towards the actors—situated knowledge, evaluation criteria, mental model) correspond 
with one another, as represented by number first-letter second labeling. The remaining classes 
and labels do not correspond in this way, which is shown by ‘letters first’ in all other cases. For 
instance, ‘action situations’ have ‘operational outcomes’, but Figure 7.5 is not suggesting that an 
operational outcome of ‘instream flow right’ (OO1) is the result of ‘public meetings’ (AS1).  
Returning back to the previously mentioned caveat; first and foremost, the human-nature 
relationships developed in the Basin study are partial, which of course follows from chapter five. 
That is, the analysis below could be improved through further research from the research menu 
and, importantly, the research methods previously employed could be improved. For instance, 
the qualitative element of the Q-methodology study, whereby individuals discuss their Q-sort 
(and the relevant drivers of change to their important ecosystem services) was not rigorously 
designed or analyzed, at least as per the standards of qualitative research. Therefore, the quotes 
of individuals in the Basin presented below, and the interpretations that follow should be 
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considered with this limitation in mind. Having said that, I am confident in my understanding of 
the Basin and its people, based upon: empirical research (two separate data collection efforts), 
extensive literature review of the study area, nearly 100 personal contacts and discussions 
through the Q-study, thousands of miles of travel around the study area, a personal connection 
yielding additional time spent in the study area, and an interest in history of water in northwest 
Wyoming. 
The final methods-related point to be made is that the analysis could be more thorough. 
For the purposes of both highlighting how SES research can help to operationalize the 
understanding of human-nature relationships yielded from a pragmatist EE, and supporting the 
specific bulleted arguments in the introduction (e.g., addressing the critique that the social is 
over-simplified), the analysis focuses only on a few examples. In other words, not every ‘actor’, 
or unspecified embodiment of the human-nature relationships studied in the Basin, is discussed 
in detail, nor are all governance structures highlighted within Figure 7.5 discussed. Below, the 
application of the MTF framework is applied to the Basin, which is followed by a discussion of 
the four bulleted arguments in the introduction.  
 
7.4. Application of the Management and Transition Framework: An example from the 
Wind-Bighorn Basin of Wyoming and Montana  
Figure 7.5 illustrates the conceptualization of the Basin SES through the MTF. The 
heuristic is meant to support the axiological goals of facilitating governance toward normative 
sustainability, which requires communication and social learning (Table 7.1). This interest in 
proactive management, and potentially shifting the function and structure of a system, implies 
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that the system is currently (or may in the future) be undesirable. In response to the critique 
related to the ‘desirable for who’ question, a pragmatist EE looks to human-nature relationships 
to understand if the system is desirable, and the SES concepts of robustness and rigidity can help 
to make the point relevant to this critique.  
Robustness as recommended by Anderies et al. (2004) for the purposes of SES research, 
refers to the human-designed elements of the system (e.g., not only physical infrastructure, but 
also institutions such as administrative rules), which maintain a desired system (Carlson & 
Doyle, 2002). Robustness is seen as positive, but SES research also has a concept that is seen as 
negative. One is vulnerability, and indeed robustness is sometimes thought to be the converse of 
vulnerability (Gallopín, 2006). But, for this section, the idea of rigidity is considered.  Within the 
context of their general framework of adaptive change, Gunderson and Holling (2002) defined 
rigidity traps as situations where a ‘maladaptive system’ emerges because of: (1) high potential 
(accumulated wealth or abundant natural capital); (2) high connectedness (social control that 
deters novelty and innovation); and (3) high resilience (systemic ability to resist external 
disturbance).  Rigidity traps are common in large bureaucracies where adaptation is impeded not 
due to a lack of management or financial resources, but because of a lack of flexibility that 
oftentimes stems from political reasons (Allen & Gunderson, 2011; Gunderson & Holling, 
2002). It can be difficult to distinguish between robustness and rigidity of an SES, because 
understanding the difference between the two depends upon perceptions of who decides, and 
what constitutes a ‘desirable’ system state (Robards et al., 2011).  
Whether a system is robust or rigid is a matter of perspective, or perhaps a matter of 
one’s human-nature relationship. The analysis of the Basin within the SES framework is through 
two examples, which highlight different human-nature relationships that likely perceive the 
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desirability of SES differently. The first example provided is the perspective of the agricultural 
‘actors’, who would likely consider the resistance to change as a sign of a resilient and robust 
SES that is not easily pushed into an alternative, less desirable state, despite stressors such as 
climate change. Then, a different perspective is presented, which suggests that the SES is stuck 
in a rigidity trap, whereby issues such as poor water quality and inadequate flows persist despite 
efforts to change the current, undesirable state. If Figure 7.5 is considered as a conceptual map or 
heuristic for describing the SES, then some of the processes and structures preventing this 
change come into view. While this analysis does not yield a suggestion as to whether governance 
should favor one human-nature relationship over another, as such a suggestion would require 
public deliberation and debate about normative sustainability, the analysis does yield 
recommendations related to the primary institution included in this analysis: the forest planning 
rule (variable ‘IN1’ in Figure 7.5).    
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Figure 7.5. The Basin SES as comprised by relevant variables identified in the MTF 
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7.4.1. A robust SES from the agricultural perspective 
In the MTF framework, actors are defined quite broadly, so those falling into the 
agricultural actor group (2A) could be individuals (e.g., farmers, ranchers, or interested citizens), 
or collectives of individuals acting in an official (e.g., Stock Growers Association, irrigation 
districts) or unofficial (e.g., a ranching community) capacity. Actors also encompass non-
governmental organizations that may be participating in action situations, such as the Greater 
Yellowstone Coalition (an actor in 1A). As mentioned, for the purposes of this analysis, ‘actors’ 
are generally unspecified, but they are assumed to embody the human-nature relationship that 
corresponds with the viewpoint explored in the Basin empirical research. A general picture of the 
agricultural actor (2A) emerges based on their evaluation criteria and mental model. The 
‘evaluation criteria’ and, relatedly, the ‘observed state of the water system’ were developed 
based upon the research in the Basin. For instance, agricultural community strength was a 
common discussion in the Q-methodology study, and this important element of the human-nature 
relationship was measured with ‘irrigated acres’ in the choice modelling survey.   
As is evident in Figure 7.5, the variables for ‘role’, ‘knowledge’ and ‘situated knowledge’ 
are unspecified, which is because a specific ‘action situation’ is not being analyzed. As suggested 
by Pahl-Wostl et al. (2008), situated knowledge is that specific information that actors ‘activate’ 
within specific action situations, and the role is also specific to the action situation. For the 
purpose of this discussion, the action situation is broadly the Forest Planning Rule and the 
processes it engages such as public input, but there are specific lower level situations where 
situated knowledge might be deployed differently. It is arguable that the research performed for 
the social vulnerability protocol constitute an ‘action situation’ (AS2), where different actors see 
an opportunity to strategically deploy their valuable assertion. This likely took place during the 
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research performed by Armatas (2013), as the study focused on obtaining input from a variety of 
people including those in strategic positions with an interest in particular policy. For example, 
some of those who aligned with the ‘recreation’ perspective, who would be categorized as 
recreation actors (4A), were representatives for winter motorized recreation organizations, and 
they were likely deploying situated knowledge with a ‘role’ in the research project to influence 
outcomes in the Forest Plan. The ability to gather diverse perspectives within the forest planning 
process (AA1) is partly by design, and it is informed by the strategic management goal (SM1), 
which calls for economic, social, and ecological sustainability.  
 Getting back to the agricultural actors (2A), the SES heuristic suggests that given the 
evaluation criteria and mental model, these actors may deploy situated knowledge focused on the 
‘economic’ and ‘social’ (and even ‘ecological’) aspect of the strategic management goal. This is 
easily highlighted by drawing attention to components of the ecological and water system such 
as ecosystem services and technical infrastructure. Participants in this case study were quite clear 
that irrigation and agricultural lifestyles (ES2) have both economic and cultural significance. The 
agricultural community is represented through a shared identity and culture dating back to the 
homesteaders of the late 1800s. Bonner (2003) and Bonner (2005) documented the formation of 
the Basin as it relates to water development and homesteading. Inherent within this formation is 
the ongoing irrigation of a desert landscape, despite the perpetual conflict between landowners 
and federal entities (SS5), and the influence of power and ‘big money’ over vulnerable 
homesteaders. 
This homesteading history and culture (SS2) is entwined with the contemporary 
agricultural community, and it drives the discourse regarding the reasons why water for 
agricultural use should be maintained. As a county commissioner and farmer in the Basin 
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explained regarding the web of connections within the agricultural community (block quote in 
Section 5.2.5.2). The idea that the Basin would not exist without agriculture is prevalent 
throughout the agricultural community, and it is an idea that is used as justification for why 
water should continue to flow to agricultural use. The reasons are not only economic, historical 
and cultural, but also ecological. Furthermore, if these reasons are not convincing enough, one 
participant stressed that we need to remember “that the whole system was set up for commercial 
irrigation in the first place.” Another participant, not earning income from agriculture but 
nonetheless “supportive” of the “vibrant ag community”, noted: “we have a reservoir up here 
that is basically built for storage for irrigation…none of it is dryland farming, it is all irrigation.”  
These elements of the human-nature relationship reflect the socially-constructed and 
ecologically-evolved characteristics of the Basin, and the choice of the words “set up” by one 
participant support this; however, a qualitative researcher might be skeptical of this analysis of 
the human-nature relationship because thorough qualitative analysis has not been presented (as 
previously mentioned). However, this provides a nice opportunity to show that: (1) employing 
multiple methods can help to inform and strengthen our partial understandings of the human-
nature relationship in light of the limitations of some methods on their own and; (2) that 
introducing the theories of different research traditions can strengthen our understanding of 
different variables (and their interactions) in the SES.  
Regarding multiple methods, the above interpretation that the current state of the SES is 
desirable (and strongly important) is supported by the choice modeling study (degree-with-
tradeoffs ) detailed in Armatas et al. (2018:13), which asserted that the agricultural relationship’s 
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preference for the status quo (no change in the current management of the Basin SES) was due to 
the current state being favorable21 to agriculture:   
The average household marginal willingness to pay to maintain the status quo is 
$2,195 per year. This is a staggering figure and the general message is clear: the 
agricultural perspective, as defined in the economic assessment [(choice 
modeling)], has a strong preference for the status quo. Commonly, a preference 
for the status quo is labeled a ‘bias’ as people in general resist change; however, 
the social assessment [(Q-methodology)] suggests that those adopting the 
agricultural perspective do prefer the current state of the environment in the 
Basin. 
The challenges of interpreting this WTP estimate within the context of a choice modeling study 
are described by Armatas et al. (2018), but the point remains that it is a strong preference.  
With regard to other research traditions and theories, it seems a very brief aside on 
political ecology is worthwhile, as it can show how one might use the SES framework as a 
common language to compare different theories. Like EE’s fellow hybrid discipline, political 
ecology lacks a single agreed upon definition (see Healy et al. (2013) for a discussion about their 
compatibility). But, at the core of the concept is the idea that environmental conflict and 
degradation are the product of political processes and that research through this lens can “reveal 
winners and losers, hidden costs, and the differential power that produces social and 
environmental outcomes” (Robbins, 2012:20). This foundational idea to political ecology 
supports the ontological interpretation of an SES as socially-constructed and ecologically 
evolved.  
As another example of how political ecology might benefit this SES analysis, its focus on 
power could add depth to the understanding of how situated knowledge interacts with the actor 
                                                 
21 Favorable in that, according to research-related discussions with experts, the Basin is essentially maxed out on 
irrigation. There is one area called the ‘Polecat Bench’ that people talk about as a possibility for future irrigation and 
farming, but the Basin is essentially reached irrigation capacity.   
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variable, as well as this research project as an action situation (AS2). The final support of this 
aside is that political ecology’s concept of ‘community’ can support the interpretation of the 
agricultural relationship in light of its limited qualitative-research rigor. Li (1996:502) noted that 
“contests over the distribution of property are articulated in terms of competing representations 
of community”, and the deployment of different representations of community can bring about 
particular effects (e.g., that activating situated knowledge to maintain what is perceived as a 
desirable SES). This concept of community also supports the idea that SESs are heterogeneous, 
and that methods that attempt to tease apart heterogeneity (R-factor analysis/cluster analysis, 
latent class analysis, Q-methodology) are beneficial. Political ecology argues that the image of 
the community as one homogenous, harmonious collective is misguided, as it disregards 
subgroupings and different communities of interest; or it conflates communities of place (the 
community of the Wind-Bighorn Basin) with communities of interest (actors embodying 
different human nature relationships) (Leach et al., 1997; Robertson, 1984; Walker & Hurley, 
2004). 
Returning back to the SES analysis, Figure 7.5 only includes the Forest Planning Rule as 
an institution (IN1), as this is the primary focus of this example; however, the Forest Planning 
Rule is influenced by other ‘institutions’, which are reflected as ‘rules’ associated with IN1. The 
flexibility of the Forest Planning Rule is heavily bounded by other laws, such as Wilderness 
designation. Activities off of the Forest are also regulated by current laws, such as prior 
appropriation water law, which is another reason that this particular SES is resistant to change. 
To the agricultural actors, these facets of the SES are likely perceived as robustness. The same 
facets from a different perspective may be seen more negatively as rigidity. 
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7.4.2. A rigid SES from the environmental perspective 
 The ‘environmental actors’ (1A) might consider the SES to be rigid (in a negative sense). 
Those within the environmental community stress the importance of leaving water in the stream 
to support aquatic health and biodiversity. Although the historical and cultural connection to 
water may not be as strong as that of the agricultural community (an assertion based primarily on 
the length of agricultural history in the Basin and their high WTP to maintain it), those who 
support environmental uses of water believe that pristine environmental qualities are part of the 
community identity (1M). As one participant noted with regard to maintaining high quality water 
and conserving particular aquatic species: “we have a reputation around here for being a world 
class, if not world class then national, fishing destination and the cutthroat trout has a huge 
profile.” (1E) 
While I did not attend any ‘action situations’ where the debate between the agricultural 
actors and the environmental actors could be witnessed, this case study captured the sentiment 
that would likely manifest itself within such a situation. Specifically, situated knowledge could 
be deployed that focused on ecological legitimacy (or lack thereof) and the need to give climate 
change greater attention. For instance, the potential conflict between these two actor groups is 
evident in one participant’s quote:  
The second it hits ranch land the water quality starts to fall apart.  And I grew up 
on a ranch and a farm, and they are not the stewards of our waterways or our land.  
That is one of the biggest misconceptions. 
 
Ecological legitimacy is another concept explored in political ecology (Neumann, 2005; 
Pulido, 1996), but this quote highlights the perceived interaction between the Basin streams 
(WS1), water quality (ES2), and agricultural ecosystem services (ESS3 and ESS4). The share 
and importance of both private and federal land for agriculture is significant. It dominates private 
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land use in the study area with 86 percent of private land in Park County being agricultural land 
(Taylor et al., 2012), and federal land in the study area, both under BLM and FS jurisdiction, is 
also important for grazing operations.  Half of the agricultural operations in Park County hold 
grazing permits, and two-thirds of those permits are for land owned by the Federal government 
(Taylor et al., 2012).  The importance of federal land for grazing is not with regard to acreage, 
which is relatively small, but for its supply of forage during particular times of year.  
These operations are, in part, responsible for degraded water quality in the study area. 
Irrigation ditch malfunctions have led to sediment plumes that result in large fish die-offs, and 
several reaches have been added to the 303(d) list of impaired waters for fecal coliform because 
of irrigation return flows and cattle grazing along the river (Wyoming Department of 
Environmental Quality, 2012). Another participant was concerned about the ability of farmers to 
responsibly use herbicides and pesticides (EH5):  
My brother lives on a portion of our land over in the Bighorn Valley, and they did 
a test on his well and there is a high concentration of the stuff to help plants grow 
better, so that he can’t even drink that water.  So he needs to bring water in.  I 
think that we need to do stricter studies on that, so either dig our wells deeper or 
do something to monitor the farmers so that they do not over spray their crops. 
 
The concern about climate change was not only evident in the kind-with-tradeoffs approach, but 
also in the degree-with-tradeoffs approach. Those who indicated that conserving aquatic 
biodiversity was important to them commonly indicated that climate change was a threat (1M). 
The connection between a desire for environmental use of water and a concern for climate 
change appears to exist.  
 Another perception among those in the environmental actor group, which may be one 
way to influence more equitable management, is that the current allocation of water is simply 
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unfair. With full acknowledgment of the agricultural right to water (R1d), one participant 
explained:   
I mean I grew up on a ranch, my dad still ranches but I feel like that is an 
unfortunate situation because I feel like ag should get some of the water, but it 
shouldn’t get all of the water. 
 
Another participant asserted: 
We have seen basically that the people that control in-stream flow don’t care 
whether we have good fishing or not, good aquatic insect hatches or not, whether 
we have a healthy river at all.  They really do not care, so basically at this point I 
see us having really bad in-stream flows, inconsistent from year to year.  Very 
poorly managed, short sighted and made for irrigation of agricultural goods and 
services and that is it.  They care nothing about anything else besides ag.    
  
This sentiment reflects a concern, perhaps, that the water governance regime is driven too much 
by top-down mechanisms which, according to Pahl-Wostl et al. (2010), is likely to reduce 
adaptive capacity and inhibit social learning. These are characteristics of a rigidity trap.   
As stated above, these are brief analyses facilitated by an SES framework, but hopefully 
the examples are sufficient to support the discussion of the four arguments outlined in the 
introduction. That is, that SES is a heuristic, that it can help position and operationalize EE 
within the larger SES which, consequently, highlights other variables and interactions not fully 
capture, and that a pragmatist EE can help to address the oversimplification of the social critique.  
 
7.5. SES research and a pragmatist EE: might they help one another?  
The four main arguments just summarized are discussed in turn with the focus on 
highlighting how the two areas of research may support one another. 
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7.5.1. SES research: a heuristic or conceptual mapping tool – not a formal decision-making 
apparatus 
At risk of losing its scientific relevance, Colding and Barthel (2019) argued that there is a 
need to clearly define SESs and the research intended to understand them. Similar to EE, SES 
research may be in a place where the disparate applications and perspectives are unlikely to lead 
to consensus and a single unified application. However, it is reasonable to suggest that 
applications of SES research should clearly state what basic beliefs and assumptions at the 
outset, based upon the understanding that there is no single universal conceptualization of SES 
research.  
From a pragmatist perspective, it is clear that SES research can provide a useful heuristic 
for describing and understanding complex SESs (Table 7.1). A pragmatist EE would reject using 
definitive, formal models of the type discussed by Schlüter et al. (2017) for the purposes of 
making decisions, but if mathematical, formal, and definitive models of an SES can facilitate 
debate about the complexities of addressing wicked problems then it is likely worthwhile. In 
other words, a pragmatist EE would suggest that formal models of SESs can inform the process 
towards making a decision, but the limitations and simplified representation should be clearly 
stated. For instance, formal human-behavior models (e.g., choice models for non-market 
valuation of ecosystem services) can be quite helpful for informing decision-making (as 
discussed in Section 5.2.7.2). But, such approaches should not be seen as a way around debate 
and deliberation, nor should they obscure (or at least neglect to fully acknowledge) the deeper 
meanings of the human-nature relationship or the complexities of SESs (e.g., the social elements 
thoroughly studied by sociologists). This aligns with the suggestion by Olsson et al. (2015) that 
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scientific pluralism (i.e., where several disciplines contribute theories, methods and ideas) is the 
way forward for addressing complex social-ecological problems.  
Ultimately, policy-makers and on-the-ground decision makers cannot replace judgment 
with a formal model of complex SESs and a unified theory of how the world works. To be clear, 
a pragmatist EE does not think that all the variables and sub-variables reflected in Figure 7.5 can 
be linked in a seamless web of quantitative representations. An anecdote may clarify exactly 
what is being stated (and what is generally meant by ‘formal’, ‘mathematical’ and ‘definitive’ 
when referencing SES conceptualizations). I was once a significant contributor (i.e., lead 
organizer) to a major National Science Foundation proposal, which proposed representing the 
Basin as a complex SES whereby several analytic procedures incorporated all the variables in the 
system. These analytic procedures included simulating landscape forest and wildfire dynamics, 
which informed a simulation of water quantity, quality, and temperature, which informed the 
simulation of impacts to Yellowstone cutthroat trout, which influenced the values of water-based 
ecosystem services. On another side of this SES representation, WTP estimates from an 
economic survey, with other variables such as economic growth, eventually led to the simulation 
of the net value of agriculture and the simulation of land-use change. All of these simulations 
culminated in a ‘goal programming’ of adaptive management strategies and water allocations to 
maximize net benefits from ecosystem services. The proposal, devastatingly, was returned 
without review due to a mistake made during a rushed submission process. However, the point is 
that such an application of SES research for decision-making and understanding the complex 
system does not align with a pragmatist EE, nor should such tools be accepted by policy-makers 
as a silver bullet answer to making tough choices. Instead, the contribution of several disciplines 
(including formal modeling of a limited number of variables where appropriate) should be 
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considered; and such contributions themselves should be designed to engage other disciplines 
and non-scientific communities. A pragmatist EE would argue that what will result is a more 
comprehensive understanding of complex SESs that is both closer to the tentative truth and more 
likely to facilitate communication and social learning. 
While formal models of entire SESs for making decisions would not align with a 
pragmatist perspective, an SES conceptualization (e.g., Figure 7.5) can provide a roadmap for 
considerations within the context of complex environmental problems. SESs can help to set the 
agenda for science, civil discourse, and debate. That is, when considering the Basin and the 
various and sometimes conflicting human-nature relationships, giving voice, acknowledging, and 
perhaps questioning all variables, from actors to institutions, is the process by which decisions 
should be made and learning achieved. For instance, increasing in-stream flow, whether through 
changing water law and prior appropriation or establishing senior in-stream flow rights (where 
possible), is a broad institutional question which will clearly affect actors differently. Explicit 
discussions of these effects is advisable, which could perhaps provide some insight into the 
strengths and weaknesses of relevant institutions within the context of normative sustainability. 
An SES perspective highlights the various interrelated elements of this discussion, which 
minimally include livelihoods, homesteading culture and water conflict history, ecological 
concerns, lack of economic diversity, and confidence (or lack thereof) related to established 
institutions. It is a conversation starter, but there is a need, particularly as it relates to the actors 
and human-nature relationships, for a comprehensive understanding, including good qualitative 
research that helps the public understand the variables with greater depth.  
Formally modeling the impacts of, for instance, the effect of potentially losing the ten 
percent of late season river flow in the Basin derived from glaciers (Cheesbrough et al., 2009) on 
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these ‘variables’ (e.g., homesteading culture) could be done, particularly if such variables can be 
represented quantitatively (perhaps through willingness-to-pay estimates). However, as discussed 
in Section 5.2.3, such knowledge is only a partial representation of the human-nature relationship 
and, as discussed in Section 5.2.4, quantitative representations may instill a false sense of 
certainty in decision-makers. Given these basic beliefs about what SES research is (Table 7.1), 
what recommendations can be made with regard to improved governance? That is, can an SES 
lens support the application of research, such as the social vulnerability study on the Shoshone 
National Forest? 
 
7.5.2. SES research can facilitate the operationalization of pragmatist EE research findings 
With a focus on improving governance regimes through interventions targeting 
“environment-related incentives, knowledge, institutions, decision making, and behaviors” 
(Lemos & Agrawal, 2006), SES research can guide thinking toward potential improvements in 
the decision-making process. For the SES analysis above, the institution of focus was the Forest 
Plan Revision process. While it is challenging to recommend specifically how the Forest Plan 
itself might directly address issues with the water resources of the Basin’s SES outlined above 
(as many issues are regarding off-forest jurisdiction), USFS forest plans are meant to facilitate 
landscape scale sustainability. As such, there may be some process improvements that could 
enhance governance to this end.  
The primary change suggested is improved, or at least required, processes for engaging 
the general public. The public engagement processes on the Gila National Forest, the Shoshone 
National Forest, and the Flathead Wild and Scenic River system were very different public 
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engagement processes. This lack of consistency is typical within national forest planning, which 
is to say that the planning staff have a wide range of discretion regarding the public engagement 
process. While flexibility is beneficial, the lack of any standard approaches is problematic given 
that, as shown above, perspectives about what constitutes a desirable system are likely to vary 
significantly. In other words, a reasonable assumption, at least from a pragmatist EE perspective, 
is that a given SES will include several actor groups and corresponding mental models or, more 
generally, human-nature relationships. Thus, it would follow that any official federal effort 
aimed at sustaining such relationships should include scientifically robust processes for 
documenting and disseminating such relationships. A pragmatist EE will support these 
processes, but SES research may highlight the relevant action situations, interacting ecological 
and social variables (e.g., water system, environmental hazards, social system variables, and 
ecosystem services), as well as lynchpin governance institutions.  
The second recommendation for improved governance within the context of Forest Plan 
revisions is to explicitly address potential tradeoffs that may result from different forest 
management decisions. This should not simply include language related to the variety of 
important elements of the human-nature relationship that a forest plan are intended to 
accommodate, but it should articulate and acknowledge how some actor interests may be 
accommodated at the expense of others. Of course, overall, it can be stated that these interests 
will be balanced (to the greatest extent practicable). The Planning Rule charges the ‘responsible 
official’ to ensure that a plan contains components that focus on the three prongs of 
sustainability, but the SES analysis above highlights that in some situations contributing to one 
prong may result in the reduction of another prong. The SNF plan, which was completed in 
2015, outlines situations where livestock grazing could be reduced, primarily for the purpose of 
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habitat restoration. The perspective of the agricultural actors suggests that such a change would 
constitute a negative change. While SES research does not necessarily lead to a consideration of 
tradeoffs, conceptualizing the system in terms of its desirability (i.e., robust versus rigid) will 
both align with a pragmatist EE perspective and address the critique related to the question of 
who the SES is desirable for. 
One way to potentially integrate these tradeoff discussions would be to include a section 
within a planning document that focuses on human-nature relationships in a more 
comprehensive, socially-centric way. There are a variety of documents that relate to the forest 
plan revision, including an extensive environmental impact statement and various appendices; 
however, two primary documents are perhaps the most suitable place for the tradeoff discussion: 
(1) the plan and; (2) the record of decision. The plan is the formal document that outlines the 
general direction for future management, and the SNF plan (United States Department of 
Agriculture, 2015b) is organized mostly by individual resource, which is a fairly typical 
approach to planning documents (including comprehensive river management plans).  That is, 
plans are segregated into sections on, for instance, water, soil, air, forests, fire, livestock grazing, 
recreation, scenery, and minerals. For each of these resources, ‘management direction’ is 
articulated in a very general manner with ‘desired conditions’, ‘guidelines’, and ‘management 
approach’. While the planning document does focus on social elements of the human-nature 
relationship such as through the management direction related to recreation, or the management 
challenges related to society and the economy, these details are generally limited. And, perhaps 
most importantly, the sections are segregated in a way that obscures potential interactions 
between, say, ‘tribal interests’ and ‘recreation’.  
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The suggestion to integrate more explicit tradeoff discussions does not imply dispatching 
with these standard plan elements (indeed, such a move is likely legally questionable), but 
instead to include additional discussion that aims to represent different human-nature 
relationships more holistically. For example, including the Q-methodology factor arrays (e.g., 
Figure 6.6), with accompanying narratives, could enhance understanding of different 
perspectives. At the same time, it stresses to the interested public that there are both a diverse 
range of wants and needs to be accommodated, and that individual resources (e.g., recreation, 
air) are not managed in a vacuum. Additionally, an SES heuristic could be included to highlight 
the position of the human-nature relationship ‘amongst it all’, which stresses the ‘not managed in 
a vacuum’ point.  
If such discussions are either considered too detailed, inappropriate, and/or onerous for 
the actually planning document, then they may be more appropriate in the record of decision. 
This document, written by the ‘responsible official’, conveys a summary of both the implications 
of the chosen plan alternative as well as the rationale for said alternative. In the case of the 
Shoshone National Forest (United States Department of Agriculture, 2015a), the record of 
decision highlighted a range of implications, including an increase in motorized winter recreation 
relative to other alternatives. The increase of this particular recreation opportunity was justified 
as a response to ‘public comments’, but additional details about who benefits and potentially 
loses from such a decision, as outlined in both Armatas et al. (2018) and Armatas et al. (2017a), 
would have better contextualized and illustrated a clear process to that decision.   
The final recommendation goes beyond the forest plan revision process to the institutions 
underlying it. According to the record of decision for the SNF, in accordance with the 1982 
National Forest Management Act, each forest plan alternative needs to be considered in terms of 
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net present value (NPV), which analyzes “all outputs, including timber, grazing, recreation and 
minerals, to which monetary values are assigned” (United States Department of Agriculture, 
2015a:19). Mentioning the NPV requirement provides an opportunity for the responsible official 
to highlight the multiple institutions underpinning forest planning, and the need for multiple 
methods aimed at understanding the human-nature relationship.  
A comprehensive NPV would require both market and non-market techniques, the latter 
of which apply degree-with-tradeoffs approaches; however, meeting the three-pronged 
sustainability of the Forest Planning Rule requires an understanding not provided by an NPV 
calculation. For instance, the inability to capture Native American cultural and spiritual values 
renders an NPV calculation incomplete and, as a result, automatically choosing the alternative 
with the highest NPV may not be advisable. Furthermore, an NPV calculation is not capturing 
the complexities of the SES at large, such as institutional requirements of the Forest Planning 
Rule to accommodate cultural sustainability (which includes intrinsic value), as well as the 
potential changes in the SES that may result from the interaction between, say, the ecological 
system and environmental hazards.   
As it happens, the alternative with the highest NPV was not chosen on the SNF, though 
the chosen alternative was said to be a close second. The rationale for why this alternative-
selection criteria was not rigidly followed was not elaborated upon, likely because the top NPV 
calculations were close enough (United States Department of Agriculture, 2015a). However, 
even if the chosen alternative had an NPV that was significantly lower than other alternatives, 
overriding NPV as a selection criteria could be justified with other approaches to understanding 
the human-nature relationships and an acknowledgement of the complexity of the SES, as 
represented by the conceptual map. 
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A pragmatist EE would argue that these discussions should be made explicit in both 
public engagement activities and in official planning documents, but there is also a recognition 
that an EE approach (in this case both a kind-with-tradeoffs study and a degree-with-tradeoffs 
study) does not illuminate all the pertinent and relevant information that is represented in Figure 
7.5. That is, an SES framework, as an overarching reminder of the various interrelated variables, 
implicitly calls on more than an understanding of human-nature relationships as defined herein.       
 
7.5.3. SES research can help a pragmatist EE acknowledge the missing knowledge gaps 
SES conceptualizations can highlight the broad range of relevant variables even if only a 
small number of variables are analyzed in depth. In other words, SES frameworks can provide an 
overarching picture of how a complex system (e.g., a large national forest and its surrounding 
communities) is influenced by various elements of the system and, as a result, it can help identify 
relevant, and more specific, aspects for in-depth research and investigation (Ostrom, 2009). 
While a pragmatist EE focuses on the human-nature relationship, defined broadly as those 
connections that support human well-being and social welfare, it is beneficial to understand how 
those relationships are positioned within the SES at large.  
In other words, a pragmatist EE can yield an understanding of a SES, but only to an 
extent. Similar to the way that any item on the research menu can only provide a partial 
understanding of the human-nature relationship, EE can only provide a partial understanding of 
an SES. That is, other disciplines and research traditions are required. A large interdisciplinary 
project discussed by van Riper et al. (2017), which focused on ecosystem service valuation and 
roughly falls within the SES paradigm outlined above, included perspectives and conceptual 
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frameworks from environmental anthropology, ecological economics, geography, landscape 
architecture, political science, conservation psychology, and environmental sociology. In a non-
exhaustive list, Hinkel et al. (2014:1) suggested that the disciplines and research fields involved 
in SES research include “sustainability science, landscape ecology, ecological economics, 
geography, resource economics, and resilience thinking, which all contribute different and 
valuable perspectives on social-ecological interactions and outcomes.” Some research traditions 
are explicitly called upon, such as ecological economics (Perrings, 2006), while others, such as 
anthropology and political ecology, have been suggested to address some of the aforementioned 
SES critiques (Fabinyi et al., 2014).  
The different disciplines22, individually, will not provide detail for all variables in an SES 
conceptualization. For example, a pragmatist EE (from a social science perspective) can provide 
some understanding of several variables in Figure 7.5, such as actors, mental model, evaluation 
criteria, ecosystem services, societal system, and perhaps knowledge about the observed state of 
the water system. However, fully understanding how, for instance, the ecological system, water 
system, and relevant environmental hazards influence the flow of ecosystem services requires 
other disciplines such as ecology and hydrology. In addition, understanding the nuances of the 
forest planning rule as an institution which, in the context of multiple actor interests, can 
influence the achievement of normative sustainability in a complex ways requires governance 
and policy understanding. University of Montana’s own Martin Nie is a leading scholar related 
to this understanding (e.g., Brown & Nie, 2019; Nie, 2019; Nie & Schembra, 2014). Similarly, 
                                                 
22 In this context, the term ‘disciplines’ is a somewhat ambiguous term, as the goal of inter/trans-disciplinary  
research in the conservation sciences, over the last few decades, has confounded its meaning. For instance, while 
resource economics draws a mostly unified methodology and theory from mainstream economics, ecological 
economics does not. Similarly, political ecology does not have a unified methodology or theory. This discussion is 
mostly avoided, at least explicitly, by the use of the terms ‘research tradition’ or ‘approach’. On the other hand, the 
ambiguity related to methodology and theory underlies the entire dissertation.  
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understanding other potentially relevant institutions that influence normative sustainability is 
likely beyond the scope of pragmatist EE.  
To add further focus, a pragmatist EE, as an approach to understand relationships, likely 
provides the most detail, relative to other variables, about the actor and mental model. 
Understanding the importance of resource (A8 in Table 7.2) is a major focus of a pragmatist EE, 
and gaining such an understanding, as reflected above, can lead to insights into different mental 
models. The mental model, as outlined by both SES frameworks relied upon herein, suggests that 
the mental model is comprised of the ‘action outcome link’, ‘expectation about other actors’ 
behavior’ (Figure 7.2), and ‘knowledge of the SES’ (A7 in Table 7.3). When considered in 
conjunction with the different actor’s human-nature relationships, the mental model variable 
encompasses beliefs about the legitimacy of an actors corresponding relationship. These beliefs 
are evident in the discussion above, as reflected by the agricultural actor’s assertion that the 
Basin was developed for the purpose of agriculture and, as a result of this history, there is a level 
of entitlement to the continued support of the agricultural relationship.  
 
7.5.4. A pragmatist EE assumes heterogeneous social systems and human experience  
One common critique of SES research is that the framework representing complex 
systems treat the social variables in an overly simplistic way (e.g., human individuals are 
assumed to have no agency, or the idea that free will is constrained by structural forces such as 
the desire to maximize utility). If SESs are viewed as formal and definitive models, then perhaps 
this critique holds because, as pointed out by Schlüter et al. (2017), many such models 
operationalize human elements with the rational actor model, which is easily represented with 
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mathematical formulas as in microeconomic theory. It seems this critique is less valid if SES 
conceptualizations are treated as heuristics or conceptual maps, which represent basic starting 
points to guide inquiry or discussion within the context of some complex environmental 
problem.  
Nonetheless, even if SES conceptualizations are treated as heuristics, as is the case 
herein, there is still a need to articulate how variables such as actors (e.g., 1A in Figure 7.5) 
interact with other variables such as the action situation. From the start, it seems that SES 
frameworks are empty in the sense that no theory about variable interaction is assumed or 
proposed. Through the application of a pragmatist perspective, it is assumed that actors would 
enter an action situation as individuals in a democratic process. Mental models and the 
interrelated human-nature relationships are assumed to be constantly evolving. Of course, a 
lifetime of previous experiences may lead to strong relationships and beliefs, but a pragmatist 
philosophy assumes that such beliefs are open to change. And therefore, the common goals of 
communication and social learning within SES research and a pragmatist EE may be achieved. 
While a pragmatist philosophy would hesitate to theorize how actors would specifically 
behave in particular contexts, it is generally assumed that human-nature relationships and the 
experiences that form them will be heterogeneous. This basic assumption is consistent with the 
hesitation to formally model SESs, and it also suggests that the most effective way to address 
complex environmental problems is through democratic processes. 
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7.6. Common roots and several compatibilities 
The primary goal of this chapter was to demonstrate how SES research might help to 
operationalize the understanding of human-nature relationships yielded by a pragmatist EE. This 
was equated with the positioning of human-nature relationships within the SES, or ‘amongst it 
all’. The motivation for this discussion was based primarily upon common roots between the two 
research areas and, as shown through a discussion of the normative assumptions, a number of 
other commonalities (Table 7.1). The SES analysis provided an example to support four main 
arguments, which are that: (1) SES research represents heuristics (not definitive models); (2) the 
overarching conceptualization of the SES can facilitate direction related to how a pragmatist EE 
understanding of the human-nature relationship may be implemented in practice (e.g., specific 
recommendations for improving the composition of forest plans and records of decision); (3) a 
pragmatist EE can help to address the critique that the social is oversimplified in SES research 
and; (4) SES research can help a pragmatist EE acknowledge the missing knowledge gaps, such 
as the need for engagement with experts on governance and policy institutions.  
This chapter should not be perceived as authoritative, as it is unlikely that the diverse 
range of application in SES will yield a consensus. However, the chapter does make clear 
(hopefully) a set of basic beliefs related to the nature of SES research, as well as the relationship 
between SES research and a pragmatist EE.  
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8. CONCLUSIONS: A SUMMARY, ‘TENTATIVE’ STANCES, AND FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
This dissertation concludes with a brief summary of discussion points and findings, then 
several tentative stances are presented. In the spirit of pragmatism, the stances presented are 
tentative in that pragmatism does not achieve settled truth. Finally, future research is proposed 
(normally limitations would also be discussed at this juncture, however, I suggest that this has 
been adequately covered in Section 5.3).  
 
8.1. A summary 
Ecological economics is a promising research tradition focused on balancing competing 
values, tradeoffs, and insights for more equitable decision-making. The focus on sustainability 
implies a consideration of both current and future generations, and its explicit interest in issues 
such as equity and distribution, and a focus on integrating ecological principles and the broad 
social sciences is meant to distinguish it from environmental economics. Despite these laudable 
goals, many have argued the interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary field is built upon tenuous 
philosophical and theoretical foundations. As a result, there are several big-picture concerns, 
including an amorphous body of literature, which makes identifying fundamental characteristics 
such as subject matter a challenge. There are also concerns about relativistic science, where 
sorting good knowledge from bad is not possible. Some question the future viability of the field. 
In addition to these existential problems, I suggest that attempts to add more clarity to the field 
through philosophical and theoretical discussion have been of limited value, as they lack a 
common framework for discussing science more generally.  
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To address these issues, pragmatist philosophy is recommended as a foundation for 
research in ecological economics, and the recommendation is conveyed through an established 
scientific macrostructure framework. The synthesis of ecological economic literature and 
pragmatist philosophy yielded recommendations for a core subject matter task: a comprehensive 
understanding of human-nature relationships. To achieve this goal, a focus on better processes 
and methods for understanding the various elements comprising the human-nature relationship is 
recommended, which includes a synthesis across big ideas (e.g., place research, ecosystem 
services). Communication and discussion of human-nature relationships is meant to facilitate 
social learning for the purpose of achieving normative sustainability, as opposed to the more 
traditional focus on strong or weak sustainability.  
A pragmatist EE focuses on a more clear articulation of the middle ground between just 
one approach to science and relativism. This middle ground is embraced where a plurality of 
methods, ethics, beliefs, and human experiences are integrating into science. Specifically, a 
research menu is proposed whereby different methodological approaches to understanding the 
human-nature relationships are explicitly discussed and compared. This facilitates 
interdisciplinary research and, consequently, yields a more comprehensive understanding of the 
relationships. In order to demonstrate the rigor and process of developing such a research menu, 
a methodological debate between Q- and R-methodology is presented. The perspective of a 
pragmatist EE is injected into this debate and recommendations are provided for how the debate 
can shift from a situation of scholars talking past one another to one of greater discussion. 
Recommendations include a focus on language, better articulation of the reasons for choosing 
particular statistical approaches, and a focus on underpinning normative assumptions.  
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 While a pragmatist EE may provide a path to a comprehensive understanding of human-
nature relationships, it is acknowledged that meeting its ‘action’ oriented purpose (i.e., 
supporting decision-making) requires knowledge related to how human-nature relationships are 
positioned within social-ecological systems (SESs) at large. That is, decision-making for the 
purposes of normative sustainability requires more than an understanding of human-nature 
relationships, such as an understanding of the influence of governance and institutional structures 
on the ability to realize that which is important to the diverse range of relationships. Therefore, 
an SES perspective is proposed. The benefits of such a perspective are conveyed through the 
application of an SES framework to a study of human-nature relationships in the Wind-Bighorn 
Basin in Wyoming and Montana. Specifically, it is argued that an SES perspective can help to 
operationalize an understanding of human-nature relationships; that an SES perspective can 
highlight those variables in the system that are not understood with a pragmatist EE, such as the 
nuances of administrative rules and policy and; that a pragmatist EE can support SES research by 
clearly defining the normative assumptions of the latter research area (and its general nature—
i.e., a heuristic or conceptual map).  
Synthesizing ecological economics with pragmatism is appropriate for a variety of 
reasons. Interestingly, environmental pragmatists set out to defend anthropocentric interests in 
the environmental ethics arena where non-anthropocentric views reigned supreme, while 
ecological economists, at least from the social-science side, set out to do the opposite by pulling 
economics away from its traditional instrumental and anthropocentric focus (or at the very least 
contextualizing it more effectively). A pragmatist ecological economics can help to connect the 
dots of the theoretically rich conservation social sciences that have long grappled with the 
relationships between humans and the environment. Joining pragmatism and EE provides 
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established beliefs about the nature of reality with its contextual ontology, the way we learn with 
Dewey’s experience model, the way to deliberate knowledge with wary assessment, and a clear 
purpose to communicate, understand, and learn about (in no particular order) human-nature 
relationships.  
 
8.2. The research menu and a dialectical tension: a final food analogy 
Pragmatist EE is interested in adding clarity to the dialectical tension between approaches 
that create and reduce options for understanding human-nature relationships. There are no 
connotations implied to the emphasized terms. In other words, the current research menu 
highlights four approaches, two of which I argue create options (the ‘kind’ approaches) and two 
of which reduce options (the ‘degree’ approaches). But, a pragmatist EE asserts that create and 
reduce are not value laden in this context; one is not better than the other.  
Full acknowledgement of the depth of human-nature relationships, and the complexity of 
SESs and the problems we face, is what creating does. It allows for a transaction between 
researcher and respondent. These items of the research menu likely touch all levels of the 
human-nature relationship, but they create more opportunities to explore the lower tiers of Figure 
5.2. If we are ranking items on the menu, the kind-without-tradeoffs approach (i.e., pure 
qualitative research) is the most creative. If you’re into creative, you’re gonna love this beef 
Wellington. But Q-methodology, as a kind-with-tradeoffs approach, also creates options with its 
exploratory nature. It starts with a large number of, for instance, ecosystem services and then 
pares that list down to a smaller, but still substantial, set of items for sorting. Then, a fun game-
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like activity is completed and the discussion after should have few bounds. If you’re into 
creative, but maybe want a little reduction, I’d say try the Christmas Burrito.  
Helping our human brains process the complexity and depth of our situation, to then 
carry on and make decisions (hopefully toward normative sustainability), is what reducing does. 
The researcher generally steps away from the subject and watches. These items focus on the top 
tiers of the human-nature relationship, though all tiers are engaged (e.g., economic theory does 
not prevent engaging a diverse range of motivations and, to some extent, it is assumed (as 
discussed in Section 4.2.3.2)). Continuing the menu rating, the degree-with-tradeoffs approach is 
full of reduction. Choice modeling, or the even more reduced contingent valuation, takes 
elements of the human-nature relationship and elicits preferences, which might be in monetary 
terms. You like a nice roux? Try the beef bourguignon. One benefit of this approach is that the 
vast majority of people know how to think economically, which facilitates communication. Of 
course, reducing the human-nature relationship in this way has its limitations, but it is 
nonetheless attractive for the purposes of processing, carrying on, and informing decisions. If 
reducing human-nature relationships to mostly monetary terms is not your taste, then perhaps the 
degree-without-tradeoffs approach might suit you: try the ragù (from Caffe Dolce). R-
methodology approaches, broadly drawing on psychology, do not reduce down to the monetary 
dimension, but it still mostly focuses on those top tiers of the human-nature relationship. Likert 
scales, three to five items per construct, and generalizability potential, simplify complexity in a 
way that is beneficial to decision-making as well. 
 Having established that reduce and create lack connotations in this context (other than 
tastiness), a research menu may illuminate the dialectical tension in a way that promotes 
interdisciplinary research. This was hopefully demonstrated in chapter six. As for 
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transdisciplinary research, my case is currently tenuous (and mostly avoided), but I do believe 
that better communicating science to the public, with explicit attention given to methodology, is 
critical. What this looks like in practice is hard to anticipate, but a pragmatist EE hypothesizes 
that pulling the curtain back on methodology can not only improve research but also enhance 
public understanding of human-nature relationships. The potential substantive implications of 
this better communication with the public could be highlighted with SES research, as it could 
orient relevant variables around this comprehensive science communication. That is, science 
communication could constitute a variable in an SES, which interacts with other variables in a 
variety of ways. One such variable would almost certainly be trust between the public and 
management agencies. Perhaps a brief anecdote can highlight this interaction, and the presence 
of Q-methodology within this anecdote makes it particularly relevant.   
Trust research related to planning and management has been done in the Bitterroot Valley 
of Montana (Liljeblad & Borrie, 2006; Liljeblad et al., 2009, 2010). And, somewhat ironically, a 
recent planning meeting was conducted in this same Valley, in anticipation of formal forest 
planning predicted to begin not until 2021. The meeting was covered by the local newspaper to 
highlight the lack of trust between the Forest Service and the public (Chaney, 2019). I attended 
this ‘collaborative’ group meeting held in Lolo, MT as a citizen interested in the process. The 
meeting focused on building stakeholder trust and familiarity prior to formal forest plan revision 
on the Lolo and Bitterroot National Forests. The meeting was meant to get the Forest and a fairly 
specific group of stakeholders together for, fundamentally, relationship building. Some 
participants were unsatisfied with the process of who was invited, which is the primary focus of 
the article by Chaney (2019).   
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However, gathering ‘public input’ was also a part of the meeting, which included a Q-
methodology exercise. While some input was collected, nearly all of the meeting was spent 
discussing process. This discussion was motivated in part by a Q-methodology ‘values exercise’ 
and a methodological question posed regarding factor analysis. The discussion resulted in 
significant tension. By significant, I mean that it influenced the meeting; indeed, one participant 
suggested that the collaborative group should not complete the Q-methodological ‘values’ 
exercise. Another piled on that factor analysis was a “fishing expedition” that led to a false sense 
of understanding. These two responses were apart from the original question, which was posed 
by a public figure who claimed that factor analysis would result in the discarding of some values 
over others. It should be noted that, in the end, those who completed the exercise (several did 
not) seemed engaged, and the discussion that followed as the group talked about their different 
‘values’ was lively, though limited due to the loss of time resulting from the preceding 
discussion.   
 
8.3. A pragmatist ecological economics 
The reader is hopefully satisfied with the full articulation of a pragmatist ecological 
economics, but there may be some confusion and discontent as to what constitutes the pragmatist 
ecological economics. The focus on human-nature relationships certainly captures the majority 
of this, but are there particular items on the research menu that may be more or less 
representative of an ecological economics approach? I would suggest that the answer is ‘yes’ in 
the short term, and maybe ‘no’ in the long term. In the short term, it might be suggested that the 
‘tradeoff’ approaches on the research menu are representative of an ecological economics 
approach; not only because those are the methods that have been empirically applied within the 
351 
 
context of this dissertation (i.e., Q-methodology and choice modeling), but also because 
economics is generally focused on making choices in the face of constraints, whether those are 
budgetary or within the context of rivalrous and/or excludable goods. It must be conceded that 
tradeoff approaches, and thus a pragmatist EE in the short term, has a consequentialist bent. That 
is, tradeoffs are generally forced and the underlying subtext is that human-nature relationships 
are competing. There are likely implications of such a framing, and indeed these are discussions 
had by environmental philosophers and ethicists (another future research topic perhaps).  
In the long term, however, it might be suggested that familiarity will build with the 
research menu, and research skills will develop in a way that allows for clear and concise 
articulation of the various items on the research menu. As this happens over time, basic 
methodology may become less prominent in discussions, and the focus may shift toward the 
human-nature relationship itself (i.e., the ‘results’ of research); such an occurrence would more 
generally represent a pragmatist conservation social science. In other words, as a community of 
researchers become familiar with, and proficient in applying, all of the various items on the 
research menu with a fundamental goal of understanding human-nature relationships, then 
labelling some researchers as ecological economists, and others as, perhaps, environmental 
psychologists, will become more arbitrary. This would represent a situation where the 
conservation sciences become less unique in the sense outlined on the first page of this 
dissertation; that is, a more unified scientific foundation may emerge in relation to those 
interested in studying human-nature relationships to address complex environmental problems. 
This stance naturally transitions to a pragmatist EE stance on the term ‘convergence’, which is 
used frequently throughout the dissertation with regard to benefits of inter- and transdisciplinary 
research.   
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8.4. Convergence? 
It has been variously mentioned that a pragmatist EE may result in methodological 
convergence, perhaps toward a more comprehensive tentative truth; it is also stressed that, 
following Peirce, this will likely not fully take place. But what, really, is meant by convergence? 
This does not necessarily mean that approaches on the research menu will blend to a single, 
super methodology where one set of normative assumptions underpin a set of research methods. 
Indeed, this would not be desirable, as the different menu items offer something different, as 
highlighted in the dialectical tension discussion above. Instead, convergence is referring to a 
unified idea that any single approach focused on the human-nature relationship is resulting in a 
partial understanding. Convergence is referring to the idea that as more partial understandings of 
the human-nature relationship are combined, a more comprehensive tentative truth of that 
relationship is yielded. However, the dynamic nature of relationships and SESs precludes a full 
and final truth, instead it is an understanding that is iteratively updated in perpetuity.   
Finally, convergence in pragmatist EE is the idea that different approaches to science 
focused on the human-nature relationship are not competing, but partners in a collaboration 
imbued with wary assessment. Consensus is agreeing to participate in an endless dialectical 
dance, whereby one is open to updating their methodological beliefs and assumptions through 
long-term engagement with the research menu. Over time, methodology may converge in the 
sense that particular choices, such as when to monetize or when to aggregate, become standard 
practice in particular contexts. However, such standard practice would only signal a tentative 
methodological truth, as the dynamic nature of both the human-nature relationship and SESs 
would prevent any ‘end-all-be-all’ exemplars. 
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8.5. Social-ecological systems research: a heuristic vulnerable to a critique of language 
 A beer-worthy conversation is whether SES research is a discipline (roughly defined as a 
community of researchers). On one hand, one can spend a tremendous amount of time studying 
SESs, it is possible to establish normative assumptions for such research (Table 7.1), and lots of 
scholars are engaged in SES research. On the other hand, it is mostly devoid of specific theories 
related to variable interactions, I am not aware of SES departments, and when the analytic focus 
zooms in on specific variables one is no longer studying the system per se.  
 The pragmatist EE stance is that SES research is a perspective, which yields heuristics 
and conceptual maps. SES research does not constitute a discipline with this framing. For 
instance, even though it is suggested that a focus on governance and institutional structures is a 
large part of SES research, and studying governance likely constitutes a discipline, SES research 
remains devoid of disciplinary status because governance scholars need not connect such 
institutions to the rest of the SES. In other words, one could study, for instance, how the forest 
planning rule affects the decision-making of on-the-ground practitioners without wading into 
how such decisions influence a variety of human-nature relationships. It seems disciplines study 
specific variables and their interactions, and the SES frameworks provide a common language 
for comparing theories and an overarching conceptual map.  
 So, SES is a theoretically-empty heuristic and this interpretation can address critiques 
related to an oversimplification of the social elements in the system. However, a pragmatist EE 
would highlight that SES research is vulnerable to a critique of the language used. Embracing 
SES as a heuristic implies that the ‘system’ language is mostly a metaphor, or at least it is not 
taken to mean that an SES can be understood and ‘solved’ like a car engine. Of course, a car 
engine is a closed system, and SESs are not. However, the point remains that the common 
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language meaning of a ‘system’ is that it can be grasped in a definitive way. Therefore, when 
communicating about SESs, both to other researchers and the public, this potential 
misunderstanding should be conveyed. From a pragmatist EE perspective, the ‘system’ analogy 
is powerful, as it simplifies the complexity in a way that may be beneficial in light of our limited 
brains. But, it is also recognized that a systems framing may be perceived as a certain 
understanding, which would be a misunderstanding within the context of SESs and complex 
environmental problems. Like the human-nature relationship understanding, SES research faces 
a similar dialectical tension between creating and reducing, where the former separates variables 
apart and the latter aims to understand the emergent system as a single unit.     
 
8.6.  Future research 
 A search of this dissertation for ‘future research’ yielded four main areas, and two more 
are added for a total of six.  
1. Social learning: This is clearly a big theme above, and two primary claims are made 
related to social learning. First, it is suggested that a better understanding of the human-nature 
relationship will yield social learning. This is largely unsubstantiated of course. But research 
could investigate, such as with a degree or kind without tradeoffs approach, whether this may be 
the case. For instance, does a comprehensive understanding of all relationship layers, from the 
inherent to the deeply personal, change one’s opinion about how we should manage this planet? 
Empirical research is important. But for me also investigating the theory (e.g., double-loop 
learning) is a future research direction. Second, and interrelatedly, it is mentioned that particular 
items on the research menu (or language used in the public domain) trigger social learning. 
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Specifically, it is put forth that primary, habitual experiences may be broken, thus triggering a 
secondary experience where deeper thinking is engaged. For instance, the question as to whether 
Q-methodology, relative to survey research, is more or less engaging, and potentially influential 
in someone’s thinking, seems worthy of investigation.  
 
2. Values research: Synthesizing how disciplines that are relevant to EE conceptualize 
values would be worthwhile. Immediately relevant disciplines include environmental 
psychology, ecology, conservation biology, economics, and environmental ethics and 
philosophy. This could facilitate interdisciplinary research, while also helping to identify what, 
within the context of normative sustainability, would be debated and discussed by the scientific 
community and the general public. It is also likely such a synthesis would illuminate a host of 
human-nature relationship elements.  
 
3. Research Menu: The research menu needs to be more fully built! Perhaps there are more 
than four categories, but there are likely several methods within each category. Concise 
descriptions of each approach, couched within the macrostructure framework, could be 
beneficial. This is likely a thorough literature review, perhaps with qualitative data collected 
from experienced researchers about the approaches.   
 
4. Should we put a dollar value on it? It was mentioned that a pragmatist EE would focus on 
parsing the decision-contexts where monetization may be more or less appropriate. One clear 
case where it has been generally not used is spiritual and cultural values, particularly as it relates 
to indigenous populations. Venn and Quiggin (2007) found it to be generally inappropriate, and 
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it was avoided in the Basin choice modeling study as well. This future research might start with 
an analysis of relevant institutions, such as the forest planning rule and guidelines for planning 
and management more generally.  
 
5. Generalizability theory: The issue of moving between the individual and the collective 
(e.g., aggregating WTP estimates, assuming representativeness, asserting transferability) is a 
topic that has been discussed, which likely needs to be better understood prior to suggesting 
specific future research areas, but such areas most certainly exist.   
 
6. Future foundational work: It was claimed at the outset that by comparing different 
foundational approaches, such as critical realism compared to pragmatism, within the context of 
EE would clarify how they were different. While pragmatism is adopted and thoroughly 
explored, many other potentially relevant approaches to science are likely worth investigating. 
For instance, investigating how participatory action research compares to a pragmatist EE may 
help to better define both approaches.  
 
8.7. Thank you 
Finally, thank you for reading this long exploration. As a foundational piece, it is 
necessarily large, as context and the review of many fundamentals are important. This often 
made me wonder if you, the reader, were unsatisfied by the philosophical nature, where it can 
feel like nothing is being “done”, and that questions outnumber answers. I mean, I just spent 357 
pages talking about social learning, and yet social learning is on the list of future research topics. 
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The point is, as empirical, data-driven scientists, the usual approach is to get to the data as 
quickly as possible, and include only enough context to position the data. This dissertation is the 
mirror opposite. And so it is, on a note of gratitude, I end this dissertation, with an eye toward 
future research.  
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